Abstract: Aggregate price shocks can lead to significant inequality in losses both across and within income groups. This creates a trade-off between supporting households through subsidies, which target those most affected but introduce inefficiencies, and transfers, which are less distortionary but harder to target precisely. We develop a framework to quantify this trade-off, using rich panel data on energy spending and income, alongside price and policy variation from the 2022-23 European Energy Crisis. We show that, in the absence of policy intervention, average household welfare losses would have been equivalent to 6% of income, with some households facing much larger losses. A combination of an energy price subsidy and universal transfers reduced both the mean and dispersion of household losses but incurred efficiency costs equivalent to 12% of the total funds spent on the relief package. Under a range of social preferences, better targeted transfers would have reduced the optimal subsidy rate, though not eliminated it entirely.

Discussant: Peter Levell (IFS).

Chair: Isabel Micó.

Contact: Isabel Micó.

Location: Meeting room DG Economics.

Timetable: 2025.10.15 (12:00-13:00).