Subsidising mature age employment or throwing coins into a wishing well: a quasi-experimental analysis
Series: Working Papers. 1740.
Author: Paulino Font, Mario Izquierdo and Sergio Puente.
Topics: Labour market | Non-financial corporations, businesses | Public policy assessment | Quantitative methods | Productivity.
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Abstract
This paper evaluates the effect that subsidies to employment maintenance have on the probability of mature age workers staying in the firm. Implementing a quasi-experimental design provided by changes in Spanish labour market regulations, we are able to estimate that subsidy removal had a small though significant impact on the workers’ firm attachment rate. Our results show that a 1 pp increase in the worker’s cost translates into a 0.11 pp increase in the cumulative probability of the worker separating from the firm in the next five months. This effect was mainly driven by workers with relatively less seniority in the firm, who present lower dismissal costs, and by workers in low-skill jobs, for which the wage-productivity gap seems to negatively evolve with age. In terms of cost-benefit analysis, we document that the previous higher rate of job maintenance was achieved at a disproportionate cost, and therefore the elimination of the subsidy resulted in Social Security efficiency gains.