Quarterly report and macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy. December 2023
Global economy
1. Despite the restrictive global monetary policy stance and the numerous sources of geopolitical uncertainty, the world economy remains notably buoyant.
2. In recent months, the disinflationary process has continued at global level, with some geographical areas even exceeding expectations.
3. Central banks in emerging economies have continued to loosen their restrictive monetary policy stance, while their counterparts in the main advanced economies have paused their interest rate hiking cycles.
4. Global financial markets have moved sharply, with notable stock price gains and declines in long-term interest rates.

Euro area economy
5. Economic activity in the euro area has continued to show clear weakness and is only expected to pick up at a relatively slow pace.
6. Headline inflation in the euro area has recently fallen more than expected, thanks to the slowdown in all its components.
7. The European Central Bank halted the rate hiking cycle.

Spanish economy
8. In Spain, the National Statistics Institute’s revision of the Annual National Accounts raised the increase in GDP for 2020-2022 as a result of higher growth in domestic demand.
9. After a remarkable upswing in the first half of 2023, Spanish economic activity slowed down in Q3.

The indicators available for Q4 suggest that economic activity has continued to grow at a pace similar to that recorded in Q3.

Employment growth appears to have stabilised in Q4, buoyed once again by the strength of employment among foreign nationals.
The pass-through of monetary policy tightening to financing costs and bank lending has continued in recent months.
The vigour of private consumption appears to have dampened in 2023 Q4.
In the closing months of the year, business investment could remain on the positive course observed in Q3.
Following the deterioration in net external demand in recent quarters, its negative contribution to growth appears to have eased in Q4.
The public deficit continues along its path of gradual decline.
After several months of rising rates, headline inflation fell again in November, while underlying inflation has held on a gradually slowing path.
Unit labour costs have grown significantly despite the contained rise in wage settlements.
Profit margins appear to have moderated slightly in Q3.
The Banco de España’s latest macroeconomic projections revise GDP growth for 2024 and 2025 slightly downwards and average headline inflation for 2024 significantly downwards.

MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2023-2026)
1 Despite the restrictive global monetary policy stance and the numerous sources of geopolitical uncertainty, the world economy remains notably buoyant

— Q3 was marked by upward surprises to GDP growth, particularly in the United States – thanks to strong employment and private consumption – and in China – amid greater fiscal support to counter the weakness of the real estate sector. Nonetheless, activity was more lacklustre than expected in certain regions, such as the euro area and Japan.

— Although a slowdown in global economic activity is expected in Q4, it should be relatively mild, particularly in light of the most recent Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) indicators, as the downward trend of recent quarters now looks to be showing signs of levelling off (see Chart 1.a).

— In any event, global GDP growth appears to have slowed significantly between 2022 and 2023 – with notable heterogeneity across regions – and is not projected to pick up appreciably in 2024, partly due to the loss of momentum expected in the United States and China1 (see Chart 1.b).

Sources: S&P Global and IMF.

1 For further details of the economic situation in China and its global implications, see Alonso, Santabárbara and Suárez-Varela (2023).
In recent months, the disinflationary process has continued at global level, with some geographical areas even exceeding expectations

— Inflationary pressures have continued to recede faster in terms of headline inflation than of underlying inflation (see Chart 2.a), where the rate of decline is still shaped by the greater relative persistence of services inflation. All of this in a context in which energy prices, which have been highly volatile of late, have tended to surprise on the downside, particularly in the case of oil (see Chart 2.b).

— By geographical area, the recent pace of disinflation has, broadly speaking, been faster than anticipated in the advanced economies – particularly in the United States and the euro area – and has been in line with expectations in some emerging economies – especially in Latin America and Eastern Europe.

— Inflation rates are expected to continue falling worldwide in the coming quarters, an expectation that will depend crucially on avoiding an escalation in the conflicts in Ukraine and the Gaza Strip, which could significantly push up energy prices.

**Chart 2**

2.a Inflation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% year-on-year</th>
<th>Global</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Advanced (excl. US)</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headline inflation</td>
<td>![Graph]</td>
<td>![Graph]</td>
<td>![Graph]</td>
<td>![Graph]</td>
<td>![Graph]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underlying inflation</td>
<td>![Graph]</td>
<td>![Graph]</td>
<td>![Graph]</td>
<td>![Graph]</td>
<td>![Graph]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.b Oil and gas prices and futures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$/barrel</th>
<th>€/MWh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
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<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
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<td>65</td>
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<td>55</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Brent futures Dec-23 QR cut-off (12/12) | ![Graph] |
| Brent futures Sep-23 QR cut-off (22/8)  | ![Graph] |
| Natural gas                              | ![Graph] |
| Gas futures Dec-23 QR cut-off (12/12)   | ![Graph] |
| Gas futures Sep-23 QR cut-off (22/8)    | ![Graph] |

**SOURCES:** National statistics and Refinitiv.
3 Central banks in emerging economies have continued to loosen their restrictive monetary policy stance, while their counterparts in the main advanced economies have paused their interest rate hiking cycles

— In the emerging economies, notable examples include the rate cuts in Brazil – by a total of 150 basis points (bp) (see Chart 3.a) between August and November – and in Chile – 225 bp over the same period. Similarly, in a context of minimal inflationary pressures and some structural signs of sluggish economic activity, China’s central bank also relaxed its monetary policy, cutting the one-year rate by 20 bp. Conversely, policy rates in Türkiye have risen by 3,150 bp since May in an attempt to curb inflation rates that still remain above 61%.

— In the main advanced economies, at their latest monetary policy meetings the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank (ECB), among others, decided to keep their policy rates unchanged, having reached their highest level since 2008 (see Chart 3.b).

— In any event, these central banks, which have been keen to stress publicly that the policy rates will probably have to remain at their current levels for some time to ensure that inflation returns to its medium-term target, are starting to signal that the current monetary tightening cycle may have reached its limit, and that the restrictive monetary policy must be given time to take full effect.

**Chart 3**

3.a Policy interest rates in emerging economies

3.b Policy interest rates in advanced economies

**SOURCES:** National central banks and Refinitiv.
Global financial markets have moved sharply, with notable stock price gains and declines in long-term interest rates

- The performance of global financial markets has continued to be shaped by expectations over the future path of monetary policy.

- These expectations have changed substantially over Q4, with policy rates for 2024 now expected to be cut earlier and by a larger amount in both the United States and the euro area. Thus, for instance, at the cut-off date of this Report, the markets are expecting the first policy rate cut in the United States midway through 2024 (vs September 2024, as expected three months ago) with an overall reduction of 125 bp in 2024 (75 bp more than anticipated three months ago).

- This has triggered significant falls in long-term yields (see Chart 4.a) and sharp rises on the main stock market indices (see Chart 4.b). Moreover, sovereign bond spreads in the euro area have narrowed overall, particularly in the case of Greek and Italian debt, in the context of an improvement in their credit ratings.²

² Standard & Poor’s and Fitch rated Greek sovereign debt as investment grade on 20 October and 1 December, respectively. Meanwhile, on 17 November Moody’s upgraded the outlook for Italian sovereign debt from “negative” to “stable”.

**Chart 4**

4.a 10-year sovereign debt yields

4.b Stock market indices

SOURCE: Refinitiv Datastream.
Economic activity in the euro area has continued to show clear weakness and is only expected to pick up at a relatively slow pace.

- Euro area GDP shrank by 0.1% in 2023 Q3, performing slightly worse than expected, owing to the slowdown in the international environment, the deterioration in households' purchasing power, tightening financial conditions and the decreased competitiveness of the region as a whole on the international stage.

- The most recent activity indicators suggest that these factors have continued to weigh on the dynamism of the euro area's economic activity in Q4. According to the most recent Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections exercise, GDP will rise by just 0.1% this quarter, underpinned by muted growth in consumer confidence.

- This exercise also saw the growth outlooks for 2023 and 2024 revised down slightly from 0.7% and 1% in September to 0.6% and 0.8%, respectively, while the 2025 outlook held steady at 1.5% (see Chart 5.a). Looking further ahead, further growth of 1.5% is forecast in 2026.

- The projected gradual road to recovery would appear to rely above all on private consumption, buoyed by the rise in households' real disposable income in an environment of rising wages and falling inflation. External demand is also expected to perform positively, although its contribution to growth will be limited by euro area exports' loss of market share.

### Chart 5

5.a  Euro area GDP growth forecasts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2022</th>
<th>2023</th>
<th>2024</th>
<th>2025</th>
<th>2026</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec-22 to Dec-23 (a)</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec-22 to Dec-23 (a)</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec-22 to Dec-23 (a)</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** ECB, European Commission and Consensus Economics.

a The letters refer to the month in which the corresponding earlier forecast was published.
6 Headline inflation in the euro area has recently fallen more than expected, thanks to the slowdown in all its components

— Euro area inflation stood at 2.4% in November, having declined more quickly in the two previous months (see Chart 6.a). This notwithstanding, inflationary pressures still remain high, with strong contributions from food prices and, above all, services, meaning that underlying inflation is still at 3.6%.

— The price slowdown is expected to continue in the coming quarters. The Eurosystem projection exercise published in December shows headline inflation at 5.4% for 2023 as a whole, easing to 2.7% in 2024 (see Chart 6.b). Price growth is expected to slow further in 2025 and 2026, to 2.1% and 1.9%, respectively.

— In the current environment of high uncertainty over future energy price movements, among other factors, the latest projections lower the previous quarter’s inflation outlook for 2023 and 2024 by 0.2 percentage points (pp) and 0.5 pp, respectively, while that of 2025 is unchanged. These revisions are fundamentally the result of more encouraging developments in energy prices.

**Chart 6**

6.a Euro area inflation and contribution of components

6.b Euro area inflation forecasts

**SOURCES:** European Commission, Consensus Economics, Eurosystem and Eurostat.

a Headline HICP excluding energy and food.

b The letters refer to the month in which the corresponding earlier forecast was published.
7 The European Central Bank halted the rate hiking cycle

— Following ten consecutive key rate rises up to September 2023, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) considers that, based on its current assessment, the key interest rates are at levels that, maintained for a sufficiently long duration, will make a substantial contribution to ensuring that inflation returns to its 2% medium-term target in a timely manner.

— As a result, the Governing Council kept the key interest rates unchanged at its December meeting, as in October, with the interest rate on the deposit facility remaining at 4% (see Chart 7.a).

— The Governing Council will continue to follow a data-dependent approach to determining the appropriate level and duration of restriction. In particular, its interest rate decisions will continue to be based on its assessment of the inflation outlook in light of the incoming economic and financial data, the dynamics of underlying inflation, and the strength of monetary policy transmission.

— At its December meeting, the Governing Council also announced its intention to begin reducing the pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) portfolio during the second half of 2024, by €7.5 billion per month on average, as part of the Eurosystem’s balance sheet normalisation. The principal payments from maturing securities will continue to be reinvested in full until then. Furthermore, as previously announced, it intends to discontinue reinvestments under the PEPP at the end of 2024.

Chart 7

7.a Key ECB interest rates and €STR

In Spain, the National Statistics Institute’s revision of the Annual National Accounts raised the increase in GDP for 2020-2022 as a result of higher growth in domestic demand

According to this revision, Spanish GDP shrank by 11.2% in 2020, but grew by 6.4% and 5.8% in 2021 and 2022, respectively. These figures suggest that GDP growth in each of these three years was 0.2 pp, 0.9 pp and 0.3 pp, respectively, higher than previously reported. This would mean that Spain’s economy was able to recover to its pre-pandemic level of activity by 2022 Q3.

As explained in Fernández, González Mínguez, Izquierdo and Urtasun (2023), this statistical change also led to significant changes in other key areas of the Spanish economy’s recent performance. For example, there was a significant increase in the contribution of domestic demand to GDP growth in the period analysed (see Chart 8.a). Similarly, the new figures entail a change in tax revenue that is somewhat more consistent with the macroeconomic bases, as well as more dynamic developments in household spending in line with the significant increase in real incomes. Meanwhile, although productivity was slightly stronger than initially reported, the significant increase in compensation per employee in the period under review led to higher unit labour costs.\(^3\)

As part of this process of statistical revision, harmonised at European level, GDP growth in the euro area was also revised upwards in recent years. Following these revisions, euro area GDP in 2023 Q3 stood above its pre-pandemic level, as did Spanish GDP, although the difference was smaller – 3 pp compared with 2.1 pp.

For their part, profit margins, proxied by the ratio of gross operating surplus (GOS) to gross value added (GVA), stood slightly below their pre-pandemic level in 2023 Q2, at 46.7% compared with the 47.5% estimated using the earlier time series.
9 After a remarkable upswing in the first half of 2023, Spanish economic activity slowed down in Q3

— The Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) flash estimates published at end-October suggest GDP grew by 0.3% in Q3, 0.1 pp less than in the previous quarter, in line with the forecasts of the Banco de España’s September projection exercise (see Chart 9.a).

— Output growth in Q3 was once again driven by domestic demand, especially by private consumption and investment in capital goods, which recorded quarter-on-quarter growth rates of 1.4% and 2%, respectively (see Chart 9.b). By contrast, net external demand made a negative contribution to growth, as exports – weighed down mainly by the slowdown in global and European economic activity – fell more than imports.

— By activity, services continued to perform comparatively better (particularly the artistic activities and information and communication sectors, whose level of activity grew by 11.9% and 1.1%, respectively, in Q3). Conversely, agriculture, industry and construction shrank by 3.4%, 0.6% and 0.6%, respectively.

Chart 9

9.a GDP growth in Spain

% quarterly rate of change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>2022</th>
<th>2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.b Quarter-on-quarter growth rates for the main components in Q3

% growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>Q2</th>
<th>Q3</th>
<th>Q4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private consumption</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government consumption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment in capital goods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing investment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing investment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing investment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.


b Latest GDP series available (28 July 2023) at the time of the Banco de España’s September 2023 projection exercise. Since then, Annual National Accounts figures for the period 2020-2022 have been revised and new QNA series consistent with the new national data have been published, along with the Q3 QNA flash estimate.
The indicators available for Q4 suggest that economic activity has continued to grow at a pace similar to that recorded in Q3.

An overall analysis of the various indicators (including employment, consumption and confidence indicators) that provide partial, and as yet incomplete, information on the performance of activity in 2023 Q4 suggests that Spanish GDP could grow in this period by 0.3% quarter-on-quarter. There is, however, considerable uncertainty surrounding this estimate.

Among the available indicators, the PMIs held at around Q3 levels until November and continue to point to greater buoyancy in services compared with manufacturing (see Chart 10.a).

In the same vein, the Banco de España Business Activity Survey (EBAE by its Spanish abbreviation) suggests that firms’ turnover remained practically unchanged compared with Q3, a period in which firms reported a decline in their turnover (albeit with notable sectoral heterogeneity) (see Chart 10.b).

Sources: S&P Global and EBAE (Banco de España).

4 For more details, see the Projections in this report.
5 For more details, see Fernández and Izquierdo (2023).
11 Employment growth appears to have stabilised in Q4, buoyed once again by the strength of employment among foreign nationals

— After some loss of momentum in October, in November social security registrations grew by almost 0.2% in seasonally adjusted terms, in line with the net job creation rates seen in the summer months (see Chart 11.a). This could herald a rise in employment in Q4 similar to that seen in Q3.

— By activity, social security registrations grew across the board, with the recovery in employment in the agricultural sector standing out, after the declines seen in prior months.

— The strength of employment in recent quarters was closely linked to the strong momentum in the foreign worker group, which saw a year-on-year increase in social security registrations of 8.6% in November, compared with 1.7% for Spanish nationals (see Chart 11.b). Thus, in the past year, foreign workers were behind somewhat more than 40% of total growth in social security registrations and now account for 12.8% of total registrations, up from around 11% at end-2019.

SOURCES: Ministerio de Inclusión, Seguridad Social y Migraciones and Banco de España.

a Seasonally adjusted monthly rate.

b Year-on-year rate.
12 The pass-through of monetary policy tightening to financing costs and bank lending has continued in recent months

— The cost of new bank loans to households and firms and the average cost of outstanding debt has continued to increase in recent months (see Chart 12.a).

— Moreover, the latest edition of the Bank Lending Survey pointed to a further reduction in demand and a tightening of credit standards across all credit market segments. For Q4, respondent financial institutions expect both supply and demand to continue to contract, albeit somewhat less sharply than in Q3.

— Against this background, the decline in the outstanding balance of lending to the private sector has steepened, particularly in loans to firms and sole proprietors (see Chart 12.b). Conversely, consumer credit has continued to grow steadily at around 4% year-on-year, driven in the recent period by lending for durable consumption.

**Chart 12**

**12.a Increase in the cost of credit since the start of the monetary policy tightening cycle**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Loans for house purchase</th>
<th>Consumer credit</th>
<th>Other lending, excl. sole proprietors</th>
<th>Lending to sole proprietors</th>
<th>Lending to non-financial corporations</th>
<th>Loans for house purchase</th>
<th>Consumer credit</th>
<th>Other lending, excl. sole proprietors</th>
<th>Lending to sole proprietors</th>
<th>Lending to non-financial corporations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Last quarter</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From December 2021</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>to July 2023</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**12.b Change in lending to households and firms since mid-2022**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Loans for house purchase</th>
<th>Consumer credit</th>
<th>Other lending, excl. sole proprietors</th>
<th>Lending to sole proprietors</th>
<th>Lending to non-financial corporations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Last quarter</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
<td>-4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From June 2022 to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2023</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Banco de España.

- **a** Bank interest rates are narrowly defined effective rates (NDERs), i.e. they exclude related charges, such as repayment insurance premia and fees, and are adjusted seasonally and for the irregular component (small changes in the series with no recognisable pattern in terms of periodicity or trend).
- **b** Seasonally adjusted data. Includes securitisations except in the breakdown of other lending.
13 The vigour of private consumption appears to have dampened in 2023 Q4

— The information available for Q4 suggests that, after exhibiting considerable buoyancy in Q3 which helped it return to its pre-pandemic level, household consumption has eased in the final stretch of the year. This is suggested, for example, by the retail trade index, whose increase in October was more moderate than in the summer.

— This moderation of consumption appears to reflect, inter alia, the ongoing pass-through of monetary policy tightening to the cost of credit and lower consumer confidence, which seems to have contributed recently to curtailing the increase observed over the last few months in consumers’ intentions to make major purchases (see Chart 13.a).

— In light of the results of the ECB’s monthly Consumer Expectations Survey, Spanish households’ spending might remain less dynamic over the coming quarters, owing in part to the lower use that they expect to make of consumer loans in the future (see Chart 13.b).

**Chart 13**

13.a Consumer confidence and intentions to make major purchases (a)

[Graph showing consumer confidence and intentions to make major purchases over the past 12 months and the next 12 months.]

13.b Compared with the last 12 months, households expect to use credit less in the future to cope with the expected trajectory of prices (b)

[Bar chart showing the percentage of households taking various actions in response to price changes in the past 12 months and those expected to take the same actions in the next 12 months.]

**SOURCES:** European Commission and Consumer Expectations Survey (ECB).

a Quarterly averages depicted. 2023 Q4 calculated as the average of the October and November data.

b The chart shows the share of households that in September reported having taken each of the actions indicated in response to price changes in the past 12 months (and those that expected to take each of these actions in the next 12 months in response to price changes over the coming year), according to the survey used.
14. **In the closing months of the year, business investment could remain on the positive course observed in Q3**

- Following the growth posted in Q3, investment in capital goods could hold on its path of returning to pre-pandemic levels in the last few months of the year. The improvement observed in the PMI for new manufacturing orders in November, for example, appears to be pointing in this direction.

- Also pointing along the same lines is the gradual development of the investment projects associated with the Next Generation EU (NGEU) programme. For instance, although the Recovery and Resilience Facility tenders under this programme are being awarded somewhat more slowly in 2023 than initially foreseen, the volume awarded in the first 10 months of the year was close to 40% higher than in the same period of 2022.

- Residential investment appears to have remained relatively stable in Q4, underpinned, inter alia, by the recent pick-up in the construction execution indicator (see Chart 14.a). For their part, house prices rose 4.5% year-on-year in Q3, 0.9 pp more than in Q2. All this, against a background in which the supply of housing (especially new housing) still faces significant obstacles to meeting continued strong demand, despite tightening financing conditions.

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**Chart 14**

14.a Changes in the main residential investment indicators (a)

![Chart 14](image-url)

**Sources:** Banco de España, Centro de Información Estadística del Notariado, INE and Ministerio de Transportes, Movilidad y Agenda Urbana.

*a* For the construction execution indicator, the time frame considered is three months from issuance of the building permit to the construction start date, and 18 months thereafter for the construction work. Seasonally adjusted series for house purchases. The dot for house purchases depicts the October 2023 figure.
15 Following the deterioration in net external demand in recent quarters, its negative contribution to growth appears to have eased in Q4

— The external sector continued to weigh on GDP growth in Q3, owing to a sharp fall in exports (4% quarter-on-quarter) amid a slowdown in external markets and, in particular, among Spain’s main trading partners (see Chart 15.a).

— However, the fall in imports in Q3 partially mitigated the external sector’s negative contribution to GDP growth. This decline appears to be associated with the post-pandemic boom in the consumption of services (which are less import-intensive) that had been observed in previous quarters, and with the deterioration in household purchasing power, which seems to have spurred a shift in consumption towards “own brand” goods, which have a lower import content.6

— Looking forward, the gradual recovery expected in the euro area should provide support for Spanish exports over the coming quarters. Nevertheless, the growth in tourism flows is expected to ease, now that these have returned to their pre-pandemic levels.7

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6 Own brands tend to be cheaper than manufacturer brands. This phenomenon appears to be particularly marked in some sectors such as food and textiles, where imports have fared worse than domestic sales.

7 On the latest INE data, foreign tourist arrivals in January-October 2023 exceeded their pre-pandemic levels by 0.2%.
16. The public deficit continues along its path of gradual decline

— In cumulative 12-month terms, the general government deficit stood at 4.2% of GDP at end-Q3, 0.3 pp lower than in June and 0.5 pp less than at end-2022. Nevertheless, it is yet to reach the Government’s target of 3.9% for 2023 as a whole (see Chart 16.a).

— In cumulative terms from January, spending grew by 6.2% year-on-year in September, down slightly on the increase observed up to June. By item, social benefits were noteworthy, rising by 9.8% year-on-year, driven by the increase in pensions, and also by the growth in unemployment expenditure (which rose by 5.2%). Moreover, both government consumption and interest payments once again saw significant growth, posting rates of 6.1% and 8.8%, respectively. By contrast, public subsidies fell by 19.4%, owing to the base effect of the withdrawal of the fuel subsidies that were in force in 2022, while government investment decreased by 2.7%.

— Meanwhile, again in cumulative terms from January, revenue posted a year-on-year increase of 8.1% in September, slightly lower than that recorded up to June. Of note in this respect were the year-on-year rises in direct tax revenue (11.1%) and social security contributions (9.2%), helped by higher nominal income and certain recently approved measures, such as the increase in social security contributions and the introduction of windfall taxes on corporate profits and wealth. Nevertheless, the growth in tax revenue since end-2022 is smaller than what might be expected given the macroeconomic bases and the measures adopted, especially in the case of indirect taxes.

**Chart 16**

16.a General government balance (a)

![Diagram illustrating general government balance](image)

**SOURCES:** Banco de España and IGAE.

- The dots correspond to the data for the overall general government sector, which the National Audit Office (IGAE) only publishes on a quarterly basis and with a longer time lag. The remaining monthly data are extrapolated drawing on information of the aggregate excluding local government.
After several months of rising rates, headline inflation fell again in November, while underlying inflation has held on a gradually slowing path

— From the low levels observed in June (1.6% year-on-year), headline inflation climbed steadily to October, essentially due to the sharp slowdown in the decline of energy prices. In November, the fall in headline inflation (to 3.3%) chiefly owed to the deceleration of underlying inflation (see Chart 17.a).

— The rate of growth of energy commodity prices observed up to early October has eased considerably in recent weeks, helping to check the acceleration of the energy component in November.

— Since July, underlying inflation has slowed progressively, to 3.4% in November. This decline stems chiefly from the fall observed in components relating to recreation, hospitality and tourism (from 6.6% in July to 5.4% in November), and to household equipment and maintenance (from 4.5% to 2.8% in the same period).

— Turning to food inflation, the slowdown came to a halt in the summer, but has resumed in the last two months, and inflation in this component stood at 8.6% in November. The prices of cereals, milk and dairy products have contributed the most to the recent slowdown in food inflation, although this phenomenon has been fairly broad-based across products.

**Chart 17**

17.a Inflation in Spain: change and contribution of components

**SOURCES:** Eurostat and Banco de España.

*a* Headline inflation, excluding energy and food.
18 Unit labour costs have grown significantly despite the contained rise in wage settlements

— Up to November, the wage settlement for 2023 stood at 3.5%, slightly above the 3% agreed for 2022 (see Chart 18.a). The negotiated increase is proving higher in the collective agreements signed this year, which already cover just over 3.5 million workers. Specifically, these new agreements envisage a wage increase of 4.1% for 2023, which is generally in line with the recommendations of the fifth Employment and Collective Bargaining Agreement.

— In any event, compensation per employee in the market economy has in recent quarters outpaced the wage increases negotiated in collective agreements, growing by 4.9% year-on-year in Q3, despite slowing down from the dynamics observed in the first half of the year.

— Against a backdrop of higher non-wage costs (for example, social security contributions) and weak productivity, this wage growth means that unit labour costs in Spain have risen more than in other euro area countries since the start of the pandemic, which could ultimately affect the price competitiveness of Spanish firms.

**Chart 18**

18.a Wage settlement

**SOURCE:** Ministerio de Trabajo y Economía Social.
19 Profit margins appear to have moderated slightly in Q3

According to QNA data for 2023 Q3, the ratio of gross operating surplus (GOS) to gross value added (GVA) in the market economy has held on a moderating path since the beginning of the year, following the upturn seen in 2022 (see Chart 19.a). However, the overall trend of this ratio remains compatible with a significant degree of heterogeneity across sectors.

These developments are consistent with the behaviour of the ratio of gross operating profit (GOP) to GVA observed in the sample of firms in the Banco de España’s Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey (CBQ), although this ratio appeared to stabilise somewhat in Q3. Meanwhile, in the CBQ sample, profit margins (proxied as the ratio of GOP to turnover) continued to rally in Q3, reaching pre-pandemic levels (see Chart 19.b).

Sources: Banco de España and INE.

a Margin on sales is defined as the ratio of GOP to net turnover. Margin on GVA is defined as the ratio of GOP to GVA. Four-quarter cumulative data.
The Banco de España’s latest macroeconomic projections revise GDP growth for 2024 and 2025 slightly downwards and average headline inflation for 2024 significantly downwards

— The last section of this Report describes the key features of the Banco de España’s latest macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy over the horizon 2023-2026.

— Under the assumptions of the exercise, Spanish GDP is projected to grow by 2.4%, 1.6%, 1.9% and 1.7% in 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026, respectively. As compared with those published in September, the current projections entail a slight upward revision, of 0.1 pp, to GDP growth for 2023, attributable to the positive effect that the INE’s statistical revisions in recent months have had on output growth rates in 2023 H1 and 2022 H2. Conversely, GDP growth for 2024 and 2025 is revised down by 0.2 pp and 0.1 pp, respectively, owing, among other factors, to a less favourable outlook for future household consumption, although this will continue to be the main driver of Spanish growth over the entire projection horizon.

— Meanwhile, inflation is expected to continue to ease gradually in the coming quarters, such that the rate of headline inflation will decrease from 3.4% in 2023 to 3.3% in 2024, to fall again in 2025 and 2026 to 2% and 1.9%, respectively. Compared with the September projections, headline inflation has been revised down by 0.2 pp for 2023, due to the surprises in the energy component in the last few months. Moreover, the latest projections revise headline inflation down by 1 pp for 2024 and up by 0.2 pp for 2025. The 2024 revision is mainly on account of the new assumptions underlying the projections, which envisage lower energy prices over the coming quarters and an extension of the lower VAT rate on food and the public transport subsidies through to June and December 2024, respectively. The upward revision for 2025 is primarily attributable to the withdrawal of these measures.

— The risks to these projections are tilted to the downside with regard to activity and balanced with respect to inflation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP (%)</th>
<th>2023</th>
<th>2024</th>
<th>2025</th>
<th>2026</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>↑ 0.1 pp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>↓ 0.2 pp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>↑ 0.2 pp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>3.3%</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>↓ 1.0 pp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Banco de España.
MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2023-2026)
Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2023-2026)

This section presents the key features of the most recent update to the Banco de España’s macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy for 2023-2026.¹

Under the assumptions of the exercise, Spanish GDP – which grew by 5.8% in 2022 – will slow to a growth rate of 2.4% in 2023 and 1.6% in 2024. It will then run at 1.9% in 2025 and 1.7% in 2026 (see Table 1). As for prices, headline inflation – which stood at 8.3% on average in 2022 – will fall to 3.4% in 2023 and continue to soften over the full projection horizon (recording average rates of 3.3% in 2024, 2.0% in 2025 and 1.9% in 2026). Meanwhile, underlying inflation will run at 4.1% this year (0.3 percentage points (pp) higher than in 2022), slow to 1.9% in the following two years and stand at 1.8% in 2026. Lastly, the unemployment rate will decrease from 12.9% in 2022 to 12.1% in 2023 and will head slowly downwards – standing at around 11% – over the period 2024-2026.

The projections are structured as follows. First, the key assumptions and determinants underlying these projections are described. Then, the main features of the outlook for activity and prices are detailed. Lastly, some of the main risks to these projections are discussed.

Main determinants and assumptions underlying the projections

Broadly speaking, any projection exercise is affected by two key factors. First, a set of technical assumptions that describe the expected future path of certain macro-financial and fiscal variables. These developments are key to determining how activity and inflation may evolve in the coming quarters. Second, any statistical revisions made in recent months that may have changed the starting point used to project the future paths of activity and prices. The role that these factors play in the current projection exercise is described briefly below.

Assumptions about future energy price developments. Eurosystem projection exercises use energy commodity futures to proxy the expected future path of energy commodity prices over the projection horizon, which can only be estimated with an extraordinarily high degree of uncertainty. Futures markets currently signal lower oil and natural gas futures prices than those incorporated into the September projections, although they remain above their pre-pandemic levels (see Chart 1).

¹ Compared with the projections published on 19 September, these projections incorporate the new information that has become available since then. This includes, in particular, the revised Annual National Accounts (ANA) figures for the period 2020-2022, the revision, in line with the new ANA time series, to the Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) up to 2023 Q2, the Quarterly Non-Financial Accounts for the Institutional Sectors for 2023 Q2, the QNA flash estimate for 2023 Q3 and the changes in the technical assumptions underlying developments in various variables that are key to this exercise. In addition, these are the first projections to include 2026 in the horizon. The cut-off date for the projections is 30 November.
Assumptions about future interest rate developments. International financial market expectations\(^2\) are for short and long-term interest rates to remain at relatively high levels over the full projection horizon. However, compared with the expectations of financial market participants a few months ago, the expected future path of interest rates has recently been revised downwards slightly (see Table 2).

Assumptions about future external market developments. In line with the outlook for global economic activity in the coming quarters and, in particular, for euro area economic growth, the joint Eurosystem projection exercise envisages a gradual recovery in Spain’s export markets in the coming years. However, this recovery is expected to be slightly weaker than envisaged in the September projection exercise, due above all to the slower momentum anticipated in the final
Meanwhile, compared with the September projections, the nominal effective exchange rate has appreciated somewhat.

**Assumptions about fiscal policy in Spain.** The new fiscal assumptions include some significant changes from those used in the September projections, namely the extension, to December 2024, of the public transport subsidies rolled out in 2023 (as detailed by the Government in the latest draft budgetary plan) and the extension, to June 2024, of the lower VAT rate on certain foods (as announced by the Government). However, the assumption about the end, in late 2023, of the other measures deployed to address the energy crisis (specifically, lower taxes on energy) is unchanged. Disregarding the fiscal impulse from the Next Generation EU (NGEU) programme, the foregoing represents a contractionary fiscal stance in 2024, albeit one that is looser than in the September projections. In addition, the fiscal stance should become slightly expansionary in 2025, on account of the assumption that the temporary revenue-raising measures will not be extended beyond their current expiration date.

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**Table 2**

**International environment and monetary and financial conditions (a)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual rate of change (%)</th>
<th>December 2023 projections</th>
<th>Difference between the current projections and the September 2023 projections (b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2022</td>
<td>2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain’s export markets (c)</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil price in dollars/barrel (level)</td>
<td>103.7</td>
<td>84.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monetary and financial conditions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dollar/euro exchange rate (level)</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominal effective exchange rate against non-euro area countries (d) (2000 = 100)</td>
<td>112.1</td>
<td>115.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term interest rates (3-month EURIBOR; level) (e)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term interest rates (10-year Spanish government bond yield; level) (e)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCES:** Mercado Ibérico del Gas, ECB and Banco de España.

a Cut-off date for assumptions: 28 November for Spain’s export markets and 23 November for all other variables. Figures expressed as levels are annual averages; figures expressed as rates are calculated on the basis of the related annual averages.

b Differences in rates for export markets, in levels for oil prices, the dollar/euro exchange rate and the nominal effective exchange rate, and in percentage points for interest rates.

c The assumptions regarding the behaviour of Spain’s export markets presented in the table are obtained from the December 2023 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area.

d A positive percentage change in the nominal effective exchange rate denotes an appreciation of the euro.

e For the projection period, the figures in the table are technical assumptions, prepared following the Eurosystem’s methodology. These assumptions are based on futures market prices or on proxies thereof and should not be interpreted as a Eurosystem prediction as to the path of these variables.
Assumptions about NGEU-funded spending. The projected path of NGEU-related spending and investment incorporates a slight delay compared with that included in the September projections. This is mainly attributable to tenders having been awarded more slowly than expected in recent months. Thus, compared with the previous projections, the impact of NGEU funds on GDP is now expected to peak in 2025 and 2026, rather than in 2024. In addition, these projections incorporate the use of loans linked to the NGEU programme and included in the Addendum to Spain's Recovery, Transformation and Resilience Plan, which was approved by the European Commission in October. However, in light of the high uncertainty over, and the lack of relevant information on, the implementation of the different mechanisms to channel these loans, the current projections only incorporate their effect on public debt over the projection horizon, but not their potential macroeconomic impact, which could materialise beyond the 2023-2026 horizon.

Statistical revisions. A factor with a considerable bearing on the current projections are the revisions by the National Statistics Institute (INE) in recent months both to the ANA (for the period 2020-2022) and to the QNA (for the first two quarters of 2023). While such revisions are well-known statistical procedures that are standardised across Europe, on this occasion they have prompted some very significant changes in both the level and the composition of Spanish economic activity, marking a considerable change in the starting point of these projections compared with the September exercise. In particular, as detailed in Fernández, González Mínguez, Izquierdo and Urtasun (2023), according to the new figures, the Spanish economy recovered its pre-pandemic GDP level in 2022 Q3 (rather than in spring 2023 as per the earlier information). This was explained, among other factors, by stronger than initially reported household consumption, with household real income also seeing a significant upward revision.

Activity

Against the backdrop of a weak external environment and the gradual pass-through of monetary tightening globally and in Europe to economic activity, the Spanish economy slowed in 2023 Q3, but continued to grow at a relatively fast pace. According to the QNA flash estimate published by the INE, GDP grew quarter-on-quarter by 0.3% in Q3, in line with the Banco de España’s September projections. Although this growth rate was down on the first two quarters of the year (0.6% and 0.4%, respectively), it was well above the euro area average (-0.1%) and the rates in the region's other major economies.

The indicators available for Q4 suggest economic momentum on a par with Q3, consistent with growth of around 0.3%. For example, the Purchasing Managers' Indices (which in October and November held at similar levels to those observed in Q3), the Banco de España Business Activity Survey (EBAE) (with firms reporting that turnover has remained unchanged in the final stretch of the year) and social security registrations (whose pace of growth in October and November was, on average, similar to the Q3 growth rate) all point in this direction.

Looking ahead to the coming quarters, economic growth is expected to steady at levels slightly above those of H2. However, the high economic momentum in late 2022 and early 2023 means that, in annual average terms, GDP growth will slow between 2023 and 2024 (from 2.4% to 1.6%), before regaining some speed in 2025 and 2026, when it will reach rates of 1.9% and 1.7%, respectively (see Table 3). This is consistent with the assumptions underlying these projections (the fiscal impulse from the NGEU programme and the gradual resurgence of the European economy) and with the expected softening of inflation and the consequent recovery in agents’ real income over the projection horizon. The adverse impact of monetary policy tightening on activity will peak next year and this will also drive the expected acceleration in the GDP growth rate in 2025-2026.

Throughout the projection horizon activity will mainly be underpinned by domestic demand (see Chart 2). Household consumption will be boosted by the increase in real income, against a backdrop of easing inflation rates and job creation and wage increases in a relatively buoyant labour market. Gross capital formation will also act as an important growth driver, largely because of the galvanising effect of the NGEU-related investment projects, which will gather pace in 2024 and 2025. Meanwhile, the contribution of net external demand to growth will recover over the
coming quarters (after making a marked negative contribution in spring and summer 2023). However, in the coming years, net exports are not expected to be able to drive GDP growth as forcefully as they did in 2022 and, to a lesser extent, have done in 2023. This is because the growing momentum projected for exports of goods and non-travel services (consistent with a gradual improvement in the external environment) will be offset by the recovery in imports (associated, among other factors, with the growth of gross fixed capital formation, which has a high import content (Prades and Villanueva, 2017)) and by the slowdown in exports of travel services which have already exceeded their pre-pandemic levels.

Compared with the September projections, GDP growth has been revised up slightly for 2023 and down for 2024 and 2025. The September projection exercise and this one basically envisage the same level of economic dynamism in Spain in 2023 H2. In consequence, the upward revision to the GDP growth rate for the year is essentially due to the positive effect of the statistical revisions mentioned above on the output growth rates for 2023 H1 and 2022 H2. The growth forecast for 2024 has been revised down by 0.2 pp owing to the confluence of various opposing factors. On the one hand, lower energy prices on the international markets and the extension of some of the measures deployed by the authorities to combat the effects of the inflationary episode reduce inflation. This helps boost real incomes and, therefore, GDP growth in 2024 compared with the previous projections (see Chart 3). On the other hand, as a result of the statistical revisions conducted by the INE in recent months, the initial GDP and consumption levels for 2023 Q3 considered in this projection exercise are significantly higher than those envisaged in September. In addition, and also as a result of the statistical revisions, there is less slack in the Spanish economy, thus reducing the capacity for future economic growth. Moreover, even considering that household consumption will be the main growth driver in 2024, the European Central Bank’s monthly Consumer Expectations Survey points to this demand component faring worse in the coming quarters than envisaged in the September projections. This relative slowdown in consumption is understood to stem, at least in part, from the lower use that households expect to make of consumer loans in the future, in a setting in which, in recent months, they have perceived a certain deterioration in their access to borrowing.

**Chart 2**

2.a GDP growth and contributions of main components

SOURCE: INE.
Turning to the labour market, employment momentum will soften over the projection horizon, in keeping with expected developments in activity and with the minor recovery assumed in productivity. In particular, the pace of growth of productivity per hour worked is expected to normalise over the period 2023-2026, outpacing the growth observed in the more recent years but in line with the pre-pandemic figures. Meanwhile, the unemployment rate will continue to decline over the projection horizon, albeit at a slower pace than in recent years, owing to lower job creation and the expected growth in the labour force, driven by strong immigration flows. In consequence, the unemployment rate is expected to stand at 11.3% in 2026, below the historical average of the last four decades (16.8%) but above the all-time low (8.2%) recorded in 2007.

Prices and costs

After rising in recent months, headline inflation fell in November. Specifically, the year-on-year rate of change of the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) stood at 3.3% in November, 0.2 pp below the October figure. This is the result of a combination of factors: the increase in energy commodity prices observed up to early October has eased significantly in recent weeks, while in recent months food and underlying inflation, although still high, have continued to head down.

Headline inflation is expected to remain on a slightly upward path in early 2024 – albeit with a significantly lower growth trajectory than projected in September – and to resume a downward path in the second half of the year (see Chart 4.a). This pattern is essentially determined by the expected path of energy prices, which in turn is mainly driven by two factors. First, some energy futures prices, which point to a slight increase in the coming months, although as indicated above energy prices for the coming quarters are expected to be lower than envisaged in September. And second, the assumption underlying these projections that the principal
measures deployed by the authorities in 2021 and 2022 to mitigate the effects of rising inflation will be withdrawn at end-2023. Accordingly, the rate of change in the energy HICP, which averaged -16% in July-November 2023, is expected to reach around 15% in mid-2024, a figure which is, however, 10 pp below that forecast in September.

**Food inflation will continue to ease throughout the projection horizon.** The main driver of this projected slowdown in food prices is the expected decline in food commodity prices, and in the prices of certain essential inputs for food production, such as energy and fertilizers, whose prices rose significantly during most of 2022. Meanwhile, in the early months of 2024, food inflation should ease rather more than was previously expected in September, driven in part by the assumption that the lower VAT rate on certain foods will continue through to June 2024 (as publicly announced by the Government). In any event, in the coming quarters food inflation may fall less than expected, should adverse weather conditions have a negative impact on the production of certain agricultural products in specific geographical areas.

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5 Specifically, the cuts in tax rates on electricity bills (from 21% to 5% (VAT) and from 5.1% to 0.5% (excise duty on electricity)), the reduction in the VAT rate on natural gas (also from 21% to 5%) and the suspension of the tax on electricity generation.
Underlying inflation is expected to continue to decline, relatively gradually, throughout 2024, to stabilise at around 2% over the rest of the projection horizon (see Chart 4.a). The chief factors driving this anticipated easing in underlying inflation in the coming quarters are the gradual impact of monetary policy tightening on demand, the softening of the inflationary pressures stemming from the post-pandemic economic reopening, and the steady pass-through of lower energy costs to the prices of non-energy industrial goods and services. Among the underlying inflation components, over the coming quarters the slowdown is expected to be more pronounced in non-energy industrial goods than in services. This is consistent with the stronger demand for services, and with the fact that their labour costs account for a higher share of their total costs.

Both wage costs and profit margins are expected to remain relatively contained in the coming years, in line with the pattern observed in recent months. In particular, wage settlements look set to evolve in accordance with the fifth Employment and Collective Bargaining Agreement, with annual increases of around 3% in 2024-2026. In any event, throughout the projection horizon, compensation per employee will continue to grow at a somewhat faster pace than agreed in collective bargaining agreements, essentially as a consequence of the increases envisaged in social security contributions and, to a lesser extent, a slightly positive wage drift. Meanwhile, profit margins are expected to remain on the moderating path observed since early 2023, and to be able to accommodate the anticipated growth in unit labour costs. Overall, in line with developments to date, it is assumed that no significant second-round effects via wages and/or profit margins will emerge that could fuel inflationary feedback loops.

Considering all these developments, headline inflation will stand at 3.4% on average in 2023, falling to 3.3% in 2024, 2.0% in 2025 and 1.9% in 2026 (see Chart 4.b). Underlying inflation will amount to 4.1% in annual average terms in 2023, and will drop to 1.9% in 2024 (against a backdrop of lower economic growth), remaining around that level in 2025 and 2026.

Compared with the previous projections, headline inflation has been revised down significantly for 2024 and revised up slightly for 2025. Specifically, the average headline inflation rate now expected for 2024 is 1 pp lower than that envisaged in September. As indicated above, this downward revision is mainly on account of the lower energy prices on the futures markets for the coming quarters and the effect of assuming that the lower VAT rate on food and the public transport subsidies will continue through to June and December 2024, respectively (see Chart 5). Moreover, the assumption that these measures will ultimately be withdrawn in June and December 2024 is the main factor behind the upward revision – by 0.2 pp – to projected headline inflation for 2025.

Main risks to these projections

The risks to the economic growth projections are on the downside, while the risks to the inflation projections are considered to be balanced.
A potential escalation in the ongoing conflicts in the Gaza Strip and in Ukraine is the main source of risk to this projection exercise. Should this risk materialise, it would most likely have a negative impact on economic growth, insofar as greater geopolitical uncertainty makes for a less favourable environment for investment and spending decision-making by economic agents and may trigger episodes of financial market turmoil. Moreover, a possible escalation in these conflicts could also provoke fresh negative supply shocks. This would probably result in energy prices performing worse than envisaged under the baseline scenario, exerting downward pressure on activity and upward pressure on inflation.

Another highly significant source of uncertainty surrounding the baseline scenario relates to the scale of the effects of monetary policy tightening on activity and prices. In this respect, the weaker than expected economic activity in the euro area in recent months, and the slightly sharper than anticipated fall in inflation rates, could suggest a somewhat stronger than expected transmission of monetary policy to activity and prices. However, in such a complex environment, in which multiple shocks and public policies are simultaneously impacting the future of the economy, the uncertainty about the possible effect of monetary policy conduct on the main macro-financial aggregates remains extraordinarily high. Accordingly, continuous analytical monitoring of this issue is essential over the coming months.

A further risk that cannot be ruled out is that global economic momentum may falter, possibly linked to a slowdown in the Chinese economy sharper than expected under the baseline scenario. Alonso, Santabárbara and Suárez-Varela (2023) find that the materialisation of this risk would probably entail minor downward revisions to GDP growth and inflation, in the euro area and globally.

On the domestic front, doubts persist regarding the withdrawal, at end-2023, of some of the measures rolled out by the authorities to address the energy crisis. As indicated above, under the baseline scenario it is assumed that both the lower VAT rate on food and the public transport subsidies will be extended, but not the energy price measures, which are set to be...
withdrawn in December 2023. A potential extension of the energy price measures could further temper inflation and boost activity in 2024. However, in this hypothetical scenario, the eventual withdrawal of the measures would have a negative impact on both activity and prices. Another key risk linked to the hypothetical extension of some of the measures mentioned, assuming no tax steps were taken to offset their impact, would stem from continuing high structural budget deficit and public debt levels, especially against a backdrop of rising borrowing costs and reactivation of the European fiscal rules.

**Other domestic risk factors could also have a considerable impact on activity and prices.** First, in a setting marked by inflation rates that are still relatively high, the possible emergence of significant second-round effects via wages and/or profit margins that could fuel inflationary feedback loops cannot be completely ruled out. Second, doubts persist regarding the pace of execution of the NGEU-related projects and their impact on activity. Lastly, although some of the more habitual indicators used to proxy the degree of uncertainty about economic policies – such as the EPU – have not increased significantly in recent months, the latest edition of the EBAE shows that, for the second consecutive quarter, the percentage of Spanish firms that report economic policy uncertainty as a factor affecting their activity has risen, standing at 60%. This is close to the levels observed during the energy crisis but below the pandemic levels. Should these patterns persist, they could have an adverse impact on the future growth path of the Spanish economy.\(^6\)

\(^6\) For more details on the economic impact of uncertainty in Spain and how it is measured, see, for instance, Ghirelli, Gil, Pérez and Urtasun (2021).