

DISCUSSION: "BAD STATE: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST IMMIGRANTS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR"

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Do Chilean civil servants discriminate against immigrants?

Data

- Administrative Data (2020–2023): Municipality-level records from Chile's Programa Familias (PF), including eligibility and offer rates by nationality.
- Survey of Public Officials and citizens (2024): Responses from 1,203 bureaucrats and civil servants (47% response rate), covering 300 municipalities+ 2,233 citizens from 104 large municipalities.

Empirical methodology

- Descriptive Analysis: eligibility and offers using parity ratios.
- Survey Experiments:
 - List Randomization: stated preferences for prioritizing Chileans.
 - Revealed Preferences: simulated allocation decisions.
- Shift-Share IV Design: causal impact of immigration inflows (2017–2023)
 on discrimination

Disparities in Access:

 Immigrants are underrepresented in program offers relative to their eligibility—parity ratios below 1 in 89% of municipalities.

Evidence of Discrimination:


- 29% of civil servants agree with prioritizing Chileans (stated preferences).
- 11% less likely to offer a spot to a more vulnerable immigrant family (revealed preferences).


Elasticity of Discrimination:

• Doubling the immigrant share reduces offer rates to migrants by 37.4 percentage points—discrimination intensifies with immigration.




- Which factors affect the big difference between the ratio of poor immigrants and eligibility (poverty ≠ eligibility)
 - legal residence (one of the key requirements is to be registered in the Registro Social de Hogares, have access to financial accounts).
 Importance of additional scoring variables?
- eligibility ≠ offer
 - 20% almost zeros parity ratio: Are these small municipalities?





- I am not sure to stretch that much the results by strata
 - Could sample representativeness affect?
- I might think reasons why civil servants discriminate less than citizens, but why bureaucrats should discriminate less than civil servants?
- Are citizens comparable in age and migrant exposition to civil servants?




(3) MigrantsObsOfferRate_{$$m,2023$$} = $\alpha + \beta \Delta \ln(\text{ImmShare}_{m,2023-2017}) + \epsilon_m$

$$\Delta \ln(\mathrm{ImmShare}_{m,2023\text{-}2017}) \ = \ \left[\ln \left(\frac{\mathrm{Imm}_{m,2023}}{\mathrm{Pop}_{m,2023}} \right) - \ln \left(\frac{\mathrm{Imm}_{m,2017}}{\mathrm{Pop}_{m,2017}} \right) \right]$$

$$\Delta \ln(\overline{\mathrm{ImmShare}_{m,2023\text{-}2017}}) = \sum_{n} \theta^{n}_{m,2017} \times \Delta \ln\left(OutMig^{n}_{2019\text{-}2017}\right)$$

- Attitudes towards migration might be more by stocks instead of flows?
 - Sum of flows 2017-2023
- COVID-19 might have affected?
 - Although F is higher than
 10



- (3) MigrantsObsOfferRate_{m,2023} = $\alpha + \beta \Delta \ln(\text{ImmShare}_{m,2023-2017}) + \epsilon_m$
- The fact that the coefficient is negative for migrants observed offer rate but 0 for Chileans observed offer rate has any meaning?
 - Shouldn't I expect a positive and a negative? Does this mean a lower effectiveness offering in general?
- On top of discrimination: With higher migration there could be faster assimilation or higher mobility changing eligibility in real time

TABLE 2. Elasticity of Discrimination to Changes in Immigration

	Objective Measures (Municipality Level)				Subjective Measures (Civil Servant Level)	
	Chileans Observed Offer Rate		Migrants Observed Offer Rate		Migrants Preferred Offer Rate	
	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\Delta \ln(\mathrm{ImmShare}_{m,2023-2017})$	0.025*	0.013	-0.115***	-0.374***	-0.054**	-0.139**
	(0.014)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.132)	(0.024)	(0.066)
Mean DV	0.597	0.597	0.303	0.303	0.323	0.323
Δ ln(ImmShare _{m,2023-2017})		1.517***		1.517***		2.016***
		(0.399)		(0.399)		(0.145)
F-stat		14.46		14.46		46.30
Observations	300	300	300	300	1,013	1,013
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes



THANK YOU!

