Bad State: Discrimination against Immigrants in the Public Sector

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European Workshop on the Macroeconomic Implications of Migration

Banco de España

Motivation

- Immigration can affect the quantity and quality of public provision, especially for vulnerable population (Dustmann and Frattini 2014; Lewis and Peri 2015; Peri 2016; Mayda, Senses, and Steingress 2024)
- Effective provision often relies on bureaucrats who act with fairness and integrity.
- Yet immigration can shape individuals' support for redistributive policies (Dustmann and Preston 2005; Mayda 2006; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva 2023)
- Does immigration affect distributive preferences and perceptions of bureaucrats? Are migrants discriminated against in access to social programs and why?
- Not a naive question: If poor immigrants are discriminated against, poverty control may fail.

Chile: fivefold increase in immigration in the past decade, from 2 to 10%

- ∼80% of municipalities experienced >50% increase of immigrants between 2017-2023.



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Analyze allocation of largest poverty alleviation program in Chile (Transfers + Psychosocial Support).

1. Do eligible migrants experience unequal access to the program?
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4. .[Not Today] Can civil servants' biased preferences be corrected through information?
   - Tackling subjective discrimination through **Information Experiments**.

The Program

(i) **Financial support**: Monthly Cash Transf. covering 50% of PC extreme poverty line ($45).

(ii) **Psychosocial/labor support**: Weekly home visits with counseling, skill development & job search.

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- **Assignment:**
  1. Central-level Government bureaucrats ($\sim$ 250) $\rightarrow$ Program design + listing eligible HHs.
  2. Each municipality receives a fixed number of slots, f(HHs registries, fiscal budget)
     $\sim$ 1,000 per municipality
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- **Implementation:**
  1. Program offers MUST be limited to households listed as eligible.
  2. Street-level Bureaucrats ($\sim$ 2,300) offer the Program + Timely Home Visits + Session Registration.
  3. Avge. Monthly pay $\sim$ $1,000 (2 $\times$ MW), yet no direct penalties tied to performance, lot of discretion.

The Program

Do eligible migrants experience unequal access to the program?

Do Civil Servants' Distributive Preferences align with Migrants' unequal access to the Program?

How elastic are Civil Servants' Distributive Preferences to changes in immigration inflows?

Can Civil Servants' biased preferences be corrected through information?

Conclusion

Actual Distribution: Imm. Offer Rate vs Imm. Eligibility Rate 2023

- On average, Immigrants offer rate $<$ Immigrants eligibility rate
- $\sim$ 80% of the municipalities are below the 45° line.



Eligibility vs. Poverty

Actual Distribution: Across-Municipalities Parity Ratio by nationality 2023

- Parity Ratio of Imm. is consistently lower than 1, and around 1 for Chileans.
- $\sim$ 89% of municipalities are below 1 for immigrants; and 13% for Chileans.
- Parity Ratio $\text{Imm}_m = \frac{\%\text{Immigrants Offered}_m}{\%\text{Immigrants Eligible}_m}$ Parity Ratio $\text{Ch}_m = \frac{\%\text{Chileans Offered}_m}{\%\text{Chileans Eligible}_m}$



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Conclusion

Preferred Distribution of Nationals versus Migrant Beneficiaries

- Survey to 1,203 State Officials in 300 municipalities — Then replicated to citizens in 104 municipalities (N=2,233).

- We asked CS (and CZ) an hypothetical vignette to elicit their preferred distribution of Chileans and Immigrant beneficiaries:

''Imagine you are in charge of a social program for people living in poverty. There are 20 people eligible for the program, but only 10 spots are available. Ten out of twenty eligibles are Chileans, with the remainder being immigrants. From zero to ten. What number of immigrants would you include in the program?''

Balances

Preferred Distribution of Nationals versus Migrant Beneficiaries



- 10% of CS would not give any benefit to migrants
- 60% of CS would not choose equality

Preferred Distribution of Nationals versus Migrant Beneficiaries



- 10% of CS would not give any benefit to migrants, yet this is 40% among citizens
- 60% of CS would not choose equality, yet this is 75% among citizens

Imm. offered/Tot. offered: Observed against Preferred Distr. of CS



Δ^{+}10pp. in Pref. % Migr. is associated with Δ^{+}1.9pp. in Actual % Migr. Offers. Model table

Survey Experiments

List Randomization Experiment

—overcome social desirability bias

- **Goal:** Elicit stated preferences for prioritizing national vs. migrant beneficiaries.
- **Method:** List Randomization where **Sensitive Statement** is "*I believe priority in social programs should be given to Chilean families over immigrant families*".
- **Treatment Arms:**
  - **Control:** 4 neutral statements on public sector mgmt.
  - **Treat.:** 4 neutral statements + sensitive statement.
- **Outcome:** Mean Diff. in # agreed statements
  $\equiv$ % of respondents who agree with sensitive statement.

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Allocation Experiment

— causal identification of subjective discrimination

- **Goal:** Elicit revealed preferences in selecting national vs. migrant beneficiaries.
- **Method**: Vignette Experiment where participants are asked to choose between two Chilean families and one more vulnerable family for inclusion in a program with only 2 slots available.
- **Treatment Arms:**
  - Control: New more vulnerable family is Chilean.
  - Treat.: New more vulnerable family is Immigrant.
- **Outcome:** Mean Diff. in Likelihood of including the new family with 100% probability (=10 in 1-10 Likert Scale).

Results: Stated and Revealed Preferences against Migrants

Stated Preferences against Migrants: $\#\text{Agreed Statements}_{is} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \textit{ListTreat}_i + \phi_s + \epsilon_{is}$

Revealed Preferences against Migrants: $\text{If New Family Included}_{is} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \textit{NewIsMigrant}_i + \phi_s + \epsilon_{is}$

	State Officials						Citizens	
	All		Central-level Bureaucrats		Street-level Bureaucrats		All	
	Stated Pref. # Agreed Statements	Revealed Pref. New Family Included (= 1)	Stated Pref. # Agreed Statements	Revealed Pref. New Family Included (= 1)	Stated Pref. # Agreed Statements	Revealed Pref. New Family Included (= 1)	Stated Pref. # Agreed Statements	Revealed Pref. New Family Included (= 1)
ListTreat (=1)	0.294***							
	(0.062)							
New is Migrant (=1)		-0.058***						
		(0.029)						
Cont. Mean	2.437	0.545						
Obs.	1,203	1,203						

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

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ListTreat (=1)	0.294***		0.183		0.316***			
	(0.062)		(0.140)		(0.068)			
New is Migrant (=1)		-0.058***		-0.065		-0.058*		
		(0.029)		(0.073)		(0.031)		
Cont. Mean	2.437	0.545	2.258	0.570	2,470	0.540		
Obs.	1,203	1,203	190	190	1,013	1,013		

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ListTreat (=1)	0.294***		0.183		0.316***		0.453***	
	(0.062)		(0.140)		(0.068)		(0.050)	
New is Migrant (=1)		-0.058***		-0.065		-0.058*		-0.142***
		(0.029)		(0.073)		(0.031)		(0.020)
Cont. Mean	2.437	0.545	2.258	0.570	2.470	0.540	2.496	0.327
Obs.	1,203	1,203	190	190	1,013	1,013	2,233	2,233

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

- 29% of Public Servants prefer Chileans than Migrants; 50% higher among CZ (45%)
- Prob. of replacement for a new, more vulnerable family, drops by 11% if migrant; $\times 4$ for CZ (43%)

Statistical Discrimination? Decline Rates and Completion Rates





- Immigrants more likely to decline offers (7pp.) ... Immigrants less likely to complete program (7pp.)

Statistical Discrimination? No Het.Eff. across Diff. in Decline/Completion

Stated Preferences against Migrants:

Agreed Statements



Revealed Preferences against Migrants:

If New Family Included



Ratio of offers vs eligible against 2017-2023 Imm. Inflow



$$\text{MigrantsOfferRate}_{m,2023} = \alpha + \beta \underbrace{\left[\ln\left(\frac{\text{Imm}_{m,2023}}{\text{Pop}_{m,2023}}\right) - \ln\left(\frac{\text{Imm}_{m,2017}}{\text{Pop}_{m,2017}}\right)\right]}_{\Delta \ln(\text{ImmShare}_{m,2023\text{-}2017})} + e_m$$

$\Delta \ln(\text{ImmShare}_{m,2023\text{-}2017})$ is endogenous, e.g., demand pull factors.

Shift-Share instrument

- We instrument $\Delta \ln(\text{ImmShare}_{m,\text{2023-2017}})$ by:

$$\Delta \ln(\widehat{\text{ImmShare}}_{m,\text{2023-2017}}) = \sum_n \theta^n_{m,2017} \times \Delta \ln \left(OutMig\right)^n_{2019-2017}$$

- $\theta^n_{m,2017}$: % of imm. from origin country n over total imm. in municipality m in 2017.

$$\theta^n_{m,2017} = \frac{ImmStock^n_{m,2017}}{\sum_{n'} ImmStock^{n'}_{m,2017}}$$

- $\Delta \ln \left(OutMig\right)^n_{2019-2017}$: log change 2019-2017 in migrants of origin country n **to all other** destination countries except Chile (UN Population Division Migration 2021).
- $\sum_n \theta^n_{m,2017} \times \Delta \ln \left(OutMig\right)^n_{2019-2017}$: For each municipality m, sum the changes for all origin countries, weighted by the share of immigrants from each nationality in 2017.

Internal Validity Test 1 Internal Validity Test 2

Elasticity of Discrimination to Changes in Immigration: Observed Distrib.

	Objective Measures (Municipality Level)			Subjective Measures (Civil Servant Level)
	Chileans Observed Offer Rate		Migrants Observed Offer Rate	Migrants Preferred Offer Rate
	OLS	IV		
	(1)	(2)		
$\Delta \ln(\text{ImmShare}_{m,2023\text{-}2017})$	0.025*	0.013		
	(0.014)	(0.045)		
Mean DV	0.597	0.597		
F-stat		14.46		
Observations	300	300		
Controls	Yes	Yes		

Robust SE in parenthesis. Cluster SE in brackets. *, **, and *** for $p < 0.10$, $p < 0.05$, and $p < 0.01$

$\rightarrow$ Doubling the % Imm. does not change the offer rate among Chileans

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	Objective Measures (Municipality Level)				Subjective Measures (Civil Servant Level)
	Chileans Observed Offer Rate		Migrants Observed Offer Rate		Migrants Preferred Offer Rate
	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Δ ln(ImmShare$_{m,2023\text{-}2017}$)	0.025*	0.013	-0.115***	-0.374***	
	(0.014)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.132)	
Mean DV	0.597	0.597	0.303	0.303	
F-stat		14.46		14.46	
Observations	300	300	300	300	
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	

Robust SE in parenthesis. Cluster SE in brackets. *, **, and *** for $p < 0.10$, $p < 0.05$, and $p < 0.01$

$\rightarrow$ Doubling the % Imm. (100% increase) decreases the offer rate among Migrants by 120%

Elasticity of Discrimination to Changes in Immigration: Preferred Distrib.

	Objective Measures (Municipality Level)				Subjective Measures (Civil Servant Level)	
	Chileans Observed Offer Rate		Migrants Observed Offer Rate		Migrants Preferred Offer Rate	
	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\Delta \ln(\text{ImmShare}_{m,2023\text{-}2017})$	0.025*	0.013	-0.115***	-0.374***	-0.054**	-0.139**
	(0.014)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.132)	[0.024]	[0.066]
Mean DV	0.597	0.597	0.303	0.303	0.323	0.323
F-stat		14.46		14.46		46.30
Observations	300	300	300	300	1,013	1,013
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust SE in parenthesis. Cluster SE in brackets. *, **, and *** for $p < 0.10$, $p < 0.05$, and $p < 0.01$

→ Effects are robust to the use of our subjective measure of preferred offer rate reported by civil servants

▸ Eligible ▸ Eligible chl ▸ Eligible imm ▸ Offers ▸ Offers chl ▸ Offers imm

Statistical Discrimination? No Het.Eff. across Diff. in Decline/Completion

Elasticity of Discrimination to Changes in Imm.:

Observed Distribution



Elasticity of Discrimination to Changes in Imm.:

Preferred Distribution



Where does discrimination hit the most?

	Migrants Observed Offer Rate		
	IV	IV	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\Delta \ln(\text{ImmShare}_{m,2023\text{-}2017})$	-0.489***	-0.463**	-0.546**
	(0.174)	(0.181)	(0.242)
$\Delta \ln(\text{ImmShare}_{m,2023\text{-}2017}) \times$ Low Crime Rate 2017	0.839**		
	(0.396)		
$\Delta \ln(\text{ImmShare}_{m,2023\text{-}2017}) \times$ Low Imm. Share 2017		0.615	
		(0.465)	
$\Delta \ln(\text{ImmShare}_{m,2023\text{-}2017}) \times$ Low Right Vote Share 2013			0.444
			(0.279)
Observations	300	300	300
Mean DV	0.303	0.303	0.303
SW F-Stat	12.04	11.65	28.89
p-val $\beta_{Base} + \beta_{Inter} = 0$	0.287	0.681	0.374

Robust SE in parenthesis. *, **, and *** for $p < 0.10$, $p < 0.05$, and $p < 0.01$

$\rightarrow$ Discrimination increases in mun. with High Crime, High % Immigrants, High % Right Wing Voters

Stage 1: Information Experiment with citizens (Pilot)

- **Goal:** Measure if info. increases Citizens' willingness to provide welfare to immigrants.
- **Information Experiment**: Participants were asked if government welfare programs should be provided to immigrants.
- **Treatment Arms:**
  - Control: No information is provided.
  - Treatment: `Did you know migrants in Chile pay taxes? Like Chileans, they pay 19% VAT on purchases, and regularized migrants also pay income taxes. Studies show they contribute about $1,250 million dollars in taxes each year, while the state spends only $400 million on them, leaving a net gain of $850 million annually. That's enough to fund around 560,000 annual school vouchers.`
- **Outcome:** Mean diff. in Likelihood of supporting welfare programs to immigrants (≥ 5 (median) or $=10$ in 1-10 Likert Scale).

Stage 1: Information Experiment with citizens (Pilot)

- Provide program to immigrants$_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Treat_i + \epsilon_i$

	Citizens	
	Welfare provision	
	($\geq$5)	(=10)
Treatment	0.070***	0.043***
	(0.021)	(0.015)
Control mean	0.527	0.132
Observations	2,233	2,233

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

- Information increase welfare program inclusion in 4-7pp (13-33% wrt. control mean).

Bottom Line

- Immigration not only shape citizens perceptions, but also bureaucrats perceptions, restricting migrants' access to vital anti-poverty programs
- Doubling the share of immigrants more than double the decrease of migrants' offer rate — results are consistent across objective and subjective measures

  $\rightarrow$ discriminatory behavior intensifies disproportionately as immigration increases.
- Statistical Discrimination seems not to be an obvious channel, opening room for taste-based sources
- Next: Can information change Civil Servants' support for immigrants access and offerings in welfare programs? (...in progress).

Thank You

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Immigration by Nationality



Back

Share of Immigrants with Secondary Education



Back

Immigrant Eligibility rate vs Immigrant Poverty Rate

- *Stylized fact 1*: Ratio of **eligible imm.** is lower than the ratio of **poor imm.** across municipalities.



- Underepresentation of migrants **does not imply** preferences against immigrants.
- Information and agency barriers may reduce immigrants' ability to register for the safety net

→ Better compare Offer Rates *among eligible Chileans and Immigrant.*

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Internal Validity: Testing for Parallel Trends of Pre-shock Incomes

Regression of Pre-Shock Income over Immigration Shares

(a) Venezuela



(b) Top 5



(c) All



Note: Municipality-level regression of Per Capita Income against the nationality shares in each year interacted with year fixed effects, controlling for municipality fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Point estimates reflect the differential effect of nationality-specific shares relative to the baseline year 2011. We convert the growth rates to levels and index the levels in 2011 to 0. F statistic and the associated p-value tests for the null hypothesis of no differential pre-trend.

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Internal Validity: Testing for Parallel Trends of Pre-shock Discrimination

Regression of Mincerian Immigrant-Residual Correlates over Immigration Shares

(a) Venezuela



(b) Top 5



(c) All



Note: Municipality-level regression of Discrimination Coefficient against the nationality shares in each year interacted with year fixed effects, controlling for municipality fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Point estimates reflect the differential effect of nationality-specific shares relative to the baseline year 2011. We convert the growth rates to levels and index the levels in 2011 to 0. F statistic and the associated p-value tests for the null hypothesis of no differential pre-trend.

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Imm. offered / Total offered: Observed against Preferred Distr. of CS

	Imm. Offered / Total Offered (Observed in 2023 Admin. Data)				Imm. Offered / Total Offered (Observed in 2024 Admin. Data)			
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
[Imm. Offered / Tot. Offered]×10 (CS Survey)]	0.023**	0.020**	0.021**	0.019**	0.023**	0.019**	0.020**	0.019**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Observations	300	300	300	300	300	300	300	300
Mean DV	0.0225	0.0225	0.0225	0.0225	0.0278	0.0278	0.0278	0.0278
R^2	0.111	0.158	0.197	0.208	0.114	0.178	0.222	0.235
Avg. HH Income Control	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Population Control	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Poverty Rate Control	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y

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Balance of samples

$$Outcome = \alpha + \beta * DummyGrupo + \sum \Gamma_i RegionFE + \varepsilon(\text{clust. region level}) \quad (1)$$

	All vs 300 (CS)			All vs 104 (CZ)			300 (CS) vs 104 (CZ)		
Variable	CS Sample	Remaining	Diff	CZ Sample	Remaining	Diff	CZ Sample	Remaining 300	Diff
Population in 2017	58,911.648	24,357.500	33086.211**	103061.828	34181.797	55058.160***	103061.828	35485.020	51750.719***
	(86,704.930)	(47,135.445)	(15,355.843)	(114773.070)	(53775.996)	(8667.135)	(114773.070)	(54571.266)	(8578.118)
Average HH income in 2017 (USD)	835.338	834.954	-9.172	939.937	784.940	-81.600***	939.937	779.837	-81.136***
	(376.980)	(289.308)	(44,435)	(418.488)	(336.584)	(22.801)	(418.488)	(341.278)	(26.658)
Poverty rate in 2017	0.113	0.113	0.007	0.095	0.123	0.017*	0.095	0.123	0.017*
	(0.073)	(0.069)	(0.009)	(0.062)	(0.076)	(0.008)	(0.062)	(0.077)	(0.008)
Extreme Poverty rate in 2017	0.032	0.029	0.001	0.028	0.033	0.002	0.028	0.034	0.002
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.005)	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.003)	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.003)
Proportion of males head HH	0.605	0.596	-0.002	0.593	0.611	0.013	0.593	0.612	0.013
	(0.078)	(0.061)	(0.014)	(0.074)	(0.078)	(0.014)	(0.074)	(0.080)	(0.014)
Observations	300	26	326	104	222	326	104	196	300

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