Arriving LATE: Access to Citizenship and Economic Integration

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Motivation

- Migration flows and the share of the foreign-born population ↑
- Immigration and liberal immigration policies under pressure in many countries
  → Threat of political and social backlash
- Successful integration of migrants more important than ever
  → For immigrant and destination country alike
- Citizenship one important policy
  → Extensive political rights and equal access to all aspects of economic and social life
- Is citizenship a catalyst for successful integration?

Residency Requirements across Countries (2022)



The Case of Germany



- About **13.7 million (16%) foreign-borns** (OECD, 2022)
- Immigrant-native gaps:
  - Employment $= 7.4$pp
  - Wages $= 10 - 17\%$

Research Questions

→ Does a liberalization of citizenship law foster immigrant integration?

→ Who benefits?

→ What are the mechanisms?

Mechanisms


Access to Citizenship
Position in LM
• Access to Professions
• Match Quality
• Employer Investment
Human Capital
• Language
• Education
Attitudes
↑ Aspirations
↓ Discrimination
Employment Careers
Earnings

Citizenship Literature

→ Survey: Gathmann and Garbers (2023)

Labor Market Integration

- X-sectional Comparison: Chiswick (1978)
- Naturalization - Panel Data: Bratsberg et al. (2002) for US, Steinhardt (2012) for Germany
- Local Referenda - RDD: Hainmueller et al. (2019) for Switzerland
- Reform of Intermarriage - DiD: Govind (2021) for France
- Residency Requirements: Gathmann and Keller (2018) for Germany

Our Contributions

- Causal effects with clean identification
- Who benefits and why?
- Novel estimation strategy:
  Local Randomization Approach
  = RDD for discrete running variable

A Reluctant Immigration Country: before 1990

- Guest worker program (Turkey, Italy and others)
  - 1955-1973 and their families after 1973
  - Large inflows starting end of 1980s
- Citizenship tied to *jus sanguinis*
- No explicit rules for naturalization

Federal Guidelines of 1977:

The Federal Republic of Germany is not a country of immigration; it does not strive to increase the number of German citizens by way of naturalization [...]. The granting of German citizenship can only be considered if a public interest in the naturalization exists; the personal desires and economic interests of the applicant cannot be decisive.

Germany's Citizenship Reforms: 1991

Alien Act (Ausländergesetz)

- Reform passed in April of 1990
- Explicit criteria for naturalization of first-generation immigrants
- Age-dependent residency requirements:
  → arrival age 15 and older: 15 years
  → arrival ages 8-14: 8 years

Other requirements:

- Renounce previous citizenship
- No criminal record
- Economic self-sufficiency
- At least 6 years of schooling in Germany
- Loyalty to democratic principles

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Data: German Microcensus

- Annual survey of 1% of the German population
- Large sample of foreigners (about 50,000 per year)
- Detailed individual information on:
  - year of arrival
  - year of naturalization (since 2005)
  - country of origin (since 2005)
  - demographics
  - labor market outcomes (employment, personal income, type of contract etc.)

Definition of Sample

- Microcensus 2005-2019
- First-generation immigrants
- Arrival years 1980-1988
- Arrival ages 8-21
- Exclude ethnic Germans
  - Czech, Hungarian, Kazakh, Polish, Romanian, Russian, Slovakian or Ukrainian
- Exclude if naturalized with less than required years of residency (esp. intermarriage)



Eligibility Criteria of 1991 and 2000 Reform

Detail

	Ages	
Arrival Year	8-14	15-21
1980	11	15
1981	10	15
1982	9	15
1983	8	15
1984	8	15
1985	8	15
1986	8	14
1987	8	13
1988	8	12



Exploit Discontinuity in Residency Requirements

- **Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design**
  See Lee and Lemieux (2010) for details

- **Local Randomization Approach** (preferable if running variable is discrete)
  See Cattaneo et al. (2015; 2016; 2017, 2024)

Local Randomization Approach

Main Idea

- There is a window W_0 close to the cutoff where the assignment of the treatment can be seen as random
- Difference in the outcomes between the treatment group and control group can be analyzed like a randomized experiment

Local Randomization Approach



Check Identifying Assumptions (Similar Migrants)



Check Identifying Assumptions (No Sorting)





Probability and Timing of Naturalization Decision

	Naturalized		Years since Naturalized	
	Men (1)	Women (2)	Men (3)	Women (4)
Faster Access	0.065***	0.098***	1.006***	1.428***
CI (95%)	[0.03;0.10]	[0.06;0.14]	[0.30;1.69]	[0.51;2.45]
Mean	0.35	0.29	11.11	11.15
Mean (14)	0.39	0.34	11.66	11.93
Mean (15)	0.32	0.24	10.65	10.50
Obs. (14)	1,364	855	530	290
Obs. (15)	1,647	1,027	533	248
Window	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]

- Facing shorter residency requirements ↑ naturalization probability by 6.5 for men (19%) to 9.8 for women (34%) percentage points
- Facing shorter residency requirements ↑ the years since naturalization by 1 year (9% – men) and about 1.5 years (13% – women)

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Faster Access to Citizenship and Employment

	LFP		Emp.		Act. Working	
	Men (1)	Women (2)	Men (3)	Women (4)	Men (5)	Women (6)
Faster Access	0.016	0.089***	-0.012	0.079***	-0.011	0.066***
CI (95%)	[-0.01;0.04]	[0.04;0.13]	[-0.04;0.01]	[0.03;0.12]	[-0.04;0.02]	[0.02;0.11]
Mean	0.917	0.634	0.840	0.570	0.763	0.510
Mean (14)	0.926	0.683	0.834	0.613	0.757	0.546
Mean (15)	0.910	0.594	0.845	0.535	0.768	0.480
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- Facing shorter rr ↑ LFP of women by 8.9pp
- Reducing the rr by one year would raise female LFP by 1.7pp
- Faster access to citizenship also leads to higher female employment in the labor market

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Faster Access to Citizenship and Personal Income

	Personal Income		Personal Income (LFP = 1)	
	Men (1)	Women (2)	Men (3)	Women (4)
Faster Access	28.68	143.66***	17.73	102.56**
CI (95%)	[-38.3; 93.6]	[72.5; 208.8]	[-53.1; 86.3]	[16.6; 188.8]
Mean	1,740.97	673.97	1,824.05	913.19
Mean (14)	1,756.15	752.24	1,832.92	966.21
Mean (15)	1,727.47	608.58	1,815.18	863.65
Observations (14)	1,315	836	1,216	570
Observations (15)	1,594	997	1,451	590
Window	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]

- Facing shorter rr ↑ monthly personal income of women by 144 Euros (21.3% relative to the mean)
- The earnings of immigrant women in the labor market ↑ by 103 Euros per month (11.3% relative to the mean)

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Potential Threats to Identification

Selective Out-migration Table

- Tests that are possible → No differences

Artificial Cutoffs Table

- Not perfect, but also no reason for major concerns

Lee Bounds Table

- Results are similar

Double Robust Estimator Table

- Results are similar

Other Requirements Table

- Exposure to the host-country school system does not explain the results

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Density Test Table

- 0.45(treated)/0.55(control) → Strictly speaking, no equal distribution, but...
  - Differences are not very large (positive gradient in the age of arrival distribution)
  - All individuals in our sample arrived in Germany before the reform was passed
  - No selection into a young arrival age to face shorter residency requirements
  - Only problematic if differences in pre-determined characteristics → No differences

Placebo Outcomes Table

- No differences for gender, EU15 and former Yugoslavia; higher share of Turkish (15)

Migration with parents Figure

- No difference

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Additional Results

Economic Self-sufficiency Table

- No effect on social transfers (UI or welfare)
- Men get less welfare
- Women get more welfare conditional on LFP → In-work benefits

Heterogeneity of Returns Table

- Non-EU and less skilled migrants profit more

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Why are Effects Stronger for Women?

1. Women have lower labor supply (intensive and extensive margin)
   $\rightarrow \uparrow$ hours?
2. Women are less skilled (without a high school or vocational degree)
   $\rightarrow \uparrow$ more in school?
3. Women work in more precarious jobs $\rightarrow$ improvements when eligible earlier?
4. Women invest less in family formation?

Explaining the Gender Differences

Changes in Labor Supply or Productivity Table

- No impact on hours worked → Effect accounted for by improvements in wages

Investments in Human Capital Table

- Positive effect on education for men and women → Mainly from low- to medium-skilled
- Positive effect on language for women → More often employed in language intensive jobs

Job Characteristics Table

- Women more likely to be in white-collar jobs; men in public sector jobs
- No impact on self-employment, job and geographic mobility

Family Formation → Table

- No effect on married/cohabitation and number of children

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Conclusion

- Use discontinuity in residency requirements generated by Germany's citizenship reforms
  → We estimate a local average treatment effect (LATE)
- Strong positive effects of faster access on labor market outcomes for immigrant women
  → Citizenship acts as a catalyst for integration
  → Improves the relative position of immigrant women
- Gender differences due to higher HC investments and movements into 'better' jobs

Thank you for your attention!

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Appendix

Reforms and Naturalizations in Germany (1981–2022)

Back



Policy Variation

Back



Summary Statistics

Back

	Men		Women	
	Age 14	Age 15	Age 14	Age 15
Naturalized	0.39	0.32	0.34	0.24
	(0.49)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.43)
Waiting Time	9.19	14.33	9.05	14.26
	(1.33)	(1.08)	(1.28)	(1.11)
Years Since Naturalized	11.66	10.65	11.93	10.50
	(5.96)	(5.62)	(5.88)	(5.12)
Labor Force Participation	0.93	0.91	0.68	0.59
	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.47)	(0.49)
Real Monthly Personal Income	1,756.15	1,727.47	752.24	608.58
	(999.19)	(831.51)	(853.94)	(611.54)
Observations	1,364	1,647	855	1,027

Selective Return Migration

Back

		2005	2010	2015	2019	T-St. (2005-2010)	T-St. (2005-2015)	T-St. (2005-2019)
	Mean Age							
	14	34.69	35.22	34.37	35.45	−1.41	0.90	−2.03
	15	36.03	36.26	36.61	36.61	−0.67	−1.72	−1.75
Obs. 14		128	161	152	151			
Obs. 15		148	170	184	179			
	EU 15							
	14	0.10	0.07	0.11	0.11	0.81	−0.28	−0.12
	15	0.09	0.09	0.14	0.15	−0.01	−1.37	−1.73
Obs. 14		128	161	152	151			
Obs. 15		148	170	184	179			
	Former Yugoslavia							
	14	0.09	0.07	0.05	0.10	0.56	1.35	−0.38
	15	0.09	0.11	0.08	0.06	−0.33	0.42	1.34
Obs. 14		128	161	152	151			
Obs. 15		148	170	184	179			
	Turkey							
	14	0.62	0.70	0.68	0.64	−1.38	−1.04	−0.18
	15	0.69	0.71	0.71	0.70	−0.44	−0.45	−0.18
Obs. 14		128	161	152	151			
Obs. 15		148	170	184	179			
	Men							
	14	0.61	0.60	0.60	0.61	0.12	0.18	0.00
	15	0.61	0.63	0.64	0.59	−0.39	−0.62	0.29
Obs. 14		128	161	152	151			
Obs. 15		148	170	184	179			

Artificial Cutoffs

Back

	Labor Force Participation							
	Men (1)	Women (2)	Men (3)	Women (4)	Men (5)	Women (6)	Men (7)	Women (8)
Faster Access	0.001	0.024	-0.005	0.023	0.012	-0.015	-0.018	0.006
Mean	0.943	0.695	0.945	0.669	0.901	0.608	0.903	0.613
Mean left	0.943	0.705	0.943	0.681	0.905	0.600	0.893	0.616
Mean right	0.943	0.681	0.948	0.658	0.893	0.616	0.911	0.610
Observations left	796	827	718	551	3,181	2,480	1,661	2,416
Observations right	718	551	945	555	1,661	2,416	1,923	2,650
Window	[8, 9, 10 vs 11, 12]		[11, 12 vs 13, 14]		[15, 16, 17 vs 18, 19]		[18, 19 vs 20, 21]	

	Real Monthly Personal Income							
	Men (1)	Women (2)	Men (3)	Women (4)	Men (5)	Women (6)	Men (7)	Women (8)
Faster Access	-81.11	94.09*	4.72	33.85	28.09	-51.33***	-3.32	-62.36***
Mean	1,885.32	889.26	1,925.19	815.66	1,657.35	583.50	1,640.07	641.97
Mean left	1,846.76	926.72	1,927.87	832.63	1,666.98	558.26	1,638.89	609.59
Mean right	1,927.87	832.63	1,923.15	798.77	1,638.89	609.59	1,642.21	671.95
Observations left	767	804	695	534	3,056	2,396	1,594	2,327
Observations right	695	534	914	540	1,594	2,327	1,862	2,552
Window	[8, 9, 10 vs 11, 12]		[11, 12 vs 13, 14]		[15, 16, 17 vs 18, 19]		[18, 19 vs 20, 21]	

Lee Bounds

Back

	Trim Skilled		Trim Less Skilled	
	Men (1)	Women (2)	Men (3)	Women (4)
	Labor Force Participation			
Faster Access	0.025**	0.125***	0.012	0.077***
Mean	0.913	0.620	0.920	0.644
Mean (14)	0.926	0.683	0.926	0.683
Mean (15)	0.901	0.558	0.914	0.606
Observations (14)	1,364	855	1,364	855
Observations (15)	1,364	855	1,364	855
Window	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]
	Real Monthly Personal Income			
Faster Access	82.50**	199.84***	−8.51	130.91***
Mean	1,714.90	652.32	1,760.41	686.78
Mean (14)	1,756.15	752.24	1,756.15	752.24
Mean (15)	1,673.65	552.40	1,764.66	621.32
Observations (14)	1,315	836	1,315	836
Observations (15)	1,315	836	1,315	836
Window	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]

Double Robust Estimator

Back

	Labor Force Participation		Personal Income	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Faster Access	0.013	0.070***	23.62	120.8***
	(0.010)	(0.022)	(36.58)	(31.12)
POmean (14)	0.927***	0.670***	1.76***	733.10***
	(0.007)	(0.016)	(27.92)	(25.15)
Observations	3,011	1,882	2,909	1,833
Window	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]

Other Requirements

Back

	Labor Force Participation	
	Men (1)	Women (2)
Faster Access	0.025	0.085*
Mean	0.892	0.694
Mean (14)	0.903	0.726
Mean (15)	0.878	0.641
Observations (14)	341	237
Observations (15)	271	142
Window	[14, 15]	[14, 15]

Density Test

Back

	All	Men	Women
Observations	4,893	3,011	1,882
Observations (14)	2,219	1,364	855
Assumed P	0.5	0.5	0.5
Observed P	0.453	0.453	0.454
P	0.000	0.000	0.000

Placebo Outcomes

Back

	Gender	Country of Origin		
	Men	EU 15	Former Yugoslavia	Turkey
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Faster Access				
Intention-to-treat	-0.001	0.001	0.010	0.040***
Mean	0.615	0.094	0.079	0.679
Mean (14)	0.615	0.094	0.074	0.660
Mean (15)	0.616	0.095	0.084	0.700
Observations (14)	2,674	2,674	2,674	2,674
Observations (15)	2,219	2,219	2,219	2,219
Window	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]

Economic Self-sufficiency

Back

	Welfare		Welfare (LFP=1)		Welfare (Empl.=1)		Unemployment Benefits	
	Men (1)	Women (2)	Men (3)	Women (4)	Men (5)	Women (6)	Men (7)	Women (8)
Faster Access	−0.008*	0.007	−0.002	0.009*	−0.002	0.008	0.010	−0.003
Mean	0.015	0.023	0.008	0.010	0.008	0.009	0.025	0.010
Mean (14)	0.011	0.026	0.007	0.015	0.007	0.013	0.031	0.008
Mean (15)	0.019	0.020	0.008	0.006	0.008	0.006	0.021	0.011
Observations (14)	1,198	756	1,198	756	1,198	756	1,198	756
Observations (15)	1,452	903	1,452	903	1,452	903	1,452	903
Window	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]

Heterogeneity of Returns

Back

	Non-EU		Less Skilled		Skilled	
	Men (1)	Women (2)	Men (3)	Women (4)	Men (5)	Women (6)
			Labor Force Participation			
Faster Access	0.022**	0.100***	0.026*	0.071***	−0.001	0.051
Mean	0.912	0.613	0.895	0.580	0.949	0.787
Mean (14)	0.923	0.668	0.908	0.622	0.949	0.809
Mean (15)	0.902	0.567	0.882	0.550	0.950	0.758
Observations (14)	1,250	761	759	576	602	277
Observations (15)	1,503	917	985	807	658	219
Window	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]
			Real Monthly Personal Income			
Faster Access	43.27	127.85***	−29.15	98.80**	65.56	106.77
Mean	1,736.61	648.22	1,593.93	568.09	1,943.60	968.27
Mean (14)	1,760.27	717.82	1,577.32	625.39	1,977.25	1,016.02
Mean (15)	1,717.00	589.97	1,606.47	526.59	1,911.70	909.25
Observations (14)	1,207	742	726	564	586	270
Observations (15)	1,460	887	952	781	639	215
Window	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]

Changes in Labor Supply or Productivity

Back

	Hours Worked		Full-time		Weekly Earnings	
	Men (1)	Women (2)	Men (3)	Women (4)	Men (5)	Women (6)
Faster Access	-0.156	-0.051	-0.014	-0.002	1.968*	5.222***
Mean	39.38	26.06	0.937	0.398	50.43	41.22
Mean (14)	39.27	26.04	0.929	0.397	51.52	43.86
Mean (15)	39.42	26.09	0.943	0.399	49.55	38.64
Observations (14)	1,137	529	1,137	529	1,095	516
Observations (15)	1,392	551	1,392	551	1,347	535
Window	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]

Investments in Human Capital

Back

	Skilled		Language Intensive Job	
	Men (1)	Women (2)	Men (3)	Women (4)
Faster Access	0.042**	0.111***	0.033	0.069**
Mean	0.419	0.264	0.563	0.759
Mean (14)	0.442	0.325	0.582	0.792
Mean (15)	0.400	0.213	0.548	0.723
Observations (14)	1,361	853	772	351
Observations (15)	1,643	1,026	952	328
Window	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]

Job Characteristics

Back

	Public Sector		White-collar		Self-employed		Job Tenure		Job Mobility		Geographic Mobility	
	Men (1)	Women (2)	Men (3)	Women (4)	Men (5)	Women (6)	Men (7)	Women (8)	Men (9)	Women (10)	Men (11)	Women (12)
Faster Access	0.019**	0.007	0.011	0.093***	0.005	0.001	−1.125***	−1.129**	0.009	0.008	−0.007	0.014
Mean	0.044	0.136	0.296	0.493	0.084	0.048	13.68	8.87	0.034	0.057	0.061	0.048
Mean (14)	0.055	0.140	0.302	0.540	0.086	0.049	13.08	8.29	0.040	0.062	0.057	0.056
Mean (15)	0.036	0.132	0.291	0.447	0.081	0.048	14.20	9.42	0.030	0.055	0.064	0.042
Observations (14)	1,136	529	1,016	467	1,337	812	1,109	515	1,135	529	1,249	799
Observations (15)	1,391	551	1,253	481	1,611	953	1,372	535	1,391	1,079	1,512	950
Window	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]

Family formation

Back

	Never Married		Any Kids	
	Men (1)	Women (2)	Men (3)	Women (4)
Faster Access	0.032***	0.003	0.007	0.025
Mean	0.077	0.062	0.832	0.857
Mean (14)	0.095	0.064	0.836	0.871
Mean (15)	0.063	0.061	0.829	0.846
Observations (14)	1,364	855	1,364	855
Observations (15)	1,647	1,027	1,647	1,027
Window	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]	[14, 15]

Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Desgin

Back

	Men				Women			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Labor Force Participation							
Faster Access	0.022***	0.014***	0.017***	0.021***	0.044	0.033	0.080**	0.073**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.033)
Mean	0.917	0.917	0.917	0.917	0.660	0.660	0.660	0.660
Mean left	0.926	0.926	0.926	0.926	0.683	0.683	0.683	0.683
Mean right	0.903	0.903	0.903	0.903	0.613	0.613	0.613	0.613
Observations left	9,438	9,438	9,438	9,438	9,497	9,497	9,497	9,497
Observations right	6,146	6,146	6,146	6,146	4,659	4,659	4,659	4,659
Bandwidth	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Order polynomial	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Desgin

Back

	Men				Women			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Real Monthly Personal Income							
Faster Access	55.57***	30.72	31.96	26.33	114.11**	87.70**	172.78***	155.17***
	(18.81)	(26.38)	(27.23)	(33.94)	(44.28)	(35.91)	(28.16)	(26.24)
Mean	1,730.52	1,730.52	1,730.52	1,730.52	732.65	732.65	732.65	732.65
Mean left	1,739.26	1,739.26	1,739.26	1,739.26	778.66	778.66	778.66	778.66
Mean right	1,717.08	1,717.08	1,717.08	1,717.08	639.61	639.61	639.61	639.61
Observations left	9,083	9,083	9,083	9,083	9,154	9,154	9,154	9,154
Observations right	5,906	5,906	5,906	5,906	4,527	4,527	4,527	4,527
Bandwidth	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Order polynomial	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes