Discussion of "Monetary Policy and Endogenous Financial Crises" by F. Boissay, F. Collard, J. Galí, and C. Manea

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Roadmap

• Summarize the paper in a single slide.

Zoom in on the modelling of credit markets.

• Provide comments.

The paper in a single slide

Research questions:

- 1. Through which channels does monetary policy influence financial stability?
- 2. Should monetary policy deviate from inflation stabilization to reduce likelihood of disruptions in financial markets?

Approach → model-based

• Standard New Keynesian economy (Galí 2015) with endogenous freezes in credit markets (more in next two slides).

Main results:

- Monetary policy affects occurrence of market freezes through both aggregate demand (in short term) and capital accumulation (in long term) channels.
- Strict inflation targeting is not socially optimal. Augmented Taylor rules or "backstop" interest-rate rules attain better outcomes.


Credit markets in the model

- Why is credit useful?
 - Ex ante, firms are identical and have same quantity of productive assets.
 - Ex post, firms differ in productivity because of idiosyncratic shocks.
- Why credit may be limited?
 - Because of frictions on leverage.
- Given a monetary policy rule, aggregate quantity of productive assets is key state variable that determines equilibrium in credit markets.


Equilibrium in credit markets (1/3)

State variable: K_t . Unknows: (K_t^c, r_t^c) .

Aggregate supply of credit



Aggregate demand of credit




Equilibrium in credit markets (2/3)

Two different equilibrium outcomes depending on value of K_t :

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
A. Low $K_t \rightarrow$ no market freeze




Equilibrium in credit markets (2/3)

Two different equilibrium outcomes depending on value of K_t :

A. Low $K_t \rightarrow$ no market freeze B. High $K_t \rightarrow$ market freeze






Equilibrium in credit markets (3/3)

Monetary policy indirectly influences the equilibrium outcome:


Aggregate demand channel (on impact)



Comments

#1.A: Testable predictions

• In model around half of financial crises (i.e., market freezes) are triggered by abrupt declines in aggregate productivity:



Before t = 0:

productivity above mean (by around 1 std. dev.)

After t = 0:


productivity below mean (by around 1 std. dev.)

At t = 0: Size of shock > 2 std. dev.

Questions: Are financial crises triggered by such large changes in TFP? Is this implication consistent with data?

#1.B: Testable predictions

• In model financial crises occur when firm assets / firm equity peak:




Ex ante: No debt / No leverage

Thus: Productive assets == Firm equity

Questions: Does ratio of firm equity / firm assets to GDP in itself pose threats to financial stability? (Or it is more the debt-to-GDP ratio?)

#1.C: Testable predictions

Model derives formula for probability of financial crises:



Formula:

$$\mathbb{E}_{t-1} \left(\mathbb{1} \left(\frac{Y_t}{\mathscr{M}_t K_t} < \frac{1-\tau}{\alpha} \left(\frac{(1-\theta)\mu - \delta}{1-\mu} + \delta \right) \right) \right)$$

Question: Is it possible to estimate this probability with data and check whether the estimate behaves in accord with model?

#2.A: Policy interventions

Model restricts attention to interest-rate policies.

 In positive analysis model identifies two channels through which monetary policy influences financial stability.

Question: Is it possible to determine which channel is more important? (Maybe in an economy with full depreciation of physical capital?)

#2.B: Policy interventions

• In normative analysis model restricts attention to variants of Taylor rules and to backstop interest-rate rules.

Questions:


Is it possible to derive the optimal interest-rate policy?

More generally, is it possible to derive the constrained efficient allocation? That allocation can provide more guidance on the type of optimal policy interventions.

In next slides I conjecture on both ex-ante and ex-post socially beneficial interventions.

#2.C: Ex-post policy interventions

Equilibrium outcome with market freezes:



Comment:

Ex post large scale asset purchases (LSAP) can prevent market freezes.

Only a small fraction of asset must be purchased to prevent the freezes.

#2.D: Ex-ante policy interventions

In model tight monetary policy can reduce excessive capital accumulation by temporarily discouraging consumption.

Question:

Can't macroprudential or fiscal policy attain similar outcomes without necessarily distorting price setting and price stability?

#3: Calibration

• In paper parameter values are calibrated as follows:

Parameter	Target	Value
Preferences		
β	4% annual real interest rate	0.989
σ	Logarithmic utility on consumption	1
φ	Inverse Frish elasticity equals 2	0.5
χ	Steady state hours equal 1	0.81
Technology	and price setting	
α	64% labor share	0.36
δ	6% annual capital depreciation rate	0.015
ϱ	Same slope of the Phillips curve as with Calvo price setting	58.22
ϵ	20% markup rate	6
Aggregate 7	TFP (supply) shocks	
$ ho_a$	Standard persistence	0.95
σ_a	Volatility of inflation and output in normal times (in %)	0.81
Aggregate L	Demand shocks	
$ ho_z$	Standard persistence	0.95
σ_z	Volatility of inflation and output in normal times (in $\%$)	0.16
Interest rate	e rule	
ϕ_{π}	Response to inflation under TR93	1.5
ϕ_y	Response to output under TR93	0.125
Financial F	rictions	
μ	Productivity falls by 1.8% due to financial frictions during a crisis	0.05
θ	The economy spends 10% of the time in a crisis	0.52

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σ	Logarithmic utility on consumption	1	Why not setting the highlighted
φ	Inverse Frish elasticity equals 2	0.5	as follows:
χ	Steady state hours equal 1	0.81	as follows.
Technology	and price setting		0
α	64% labor share	0.36	$\beta \rightarrow$ target 2% real interest rate
δ	6% annual capital depreciation rate	0.015	
ϱ	Same slope of the Phillips curve as with Calvo price setting	58.22	$\theta, \mu \rightarrow \text{target Prob}(y/ys<0.95) \cong$
ϵ	20% markup rate	6	$\sigma, \mu \rightarrow \text{carget rob}(y, y) = 0.55$
Aggregate'	TFP (supply) shocks		Alaa aliatuilatiana afialiaaaati
$ ho_a$	Standard persistence	0.95	Also, distribution of idiosyncrati
σ_a	Volatility of inflation and output in normal times (in $\%$)	0.81	productivity not consistent with
Aggregate 1	Demand shocks		productivity not consistent with
$ ho_z$	Standard persistence	0.95	
σ_z	Volatility of inflation and output in normal times (in $\%$)	0.16	$\omega_i \sim \text{Log Normal (0,0.63)};$
Interest rat	te rule		
ϕ_{π}	Response to inflation under TR93	1.5	$\log \omega_i$ follows over time AR(1) w
ϕ_y	Response to output under TR93	0.125	
Financial I	Frictions		$\rho = 0.8, \ \sigma = 0.5.$
μ	Productivity falls by 1.8% due to financial frictions during a crisis	0.05	•
θ	The economy spends 10% of the time in a crisis	0.52	

#4: Interpretation of main results

Paper suggests that deviations from strict inflation targeting (SIT) may significantly (my reading) improve financial stability and social welfare:

	Rule			Mod	Frictionless				
	parameters			Time in	Length	Output	$\operatorname{Std}(\pi_t)$	Welfare	Welfare
	ϕ_π	$\phi_{m{y}}$	ϕ_r	Crisis/Stress (in $\%)$	(quarters)	Loss (in $\%)$	$(\mathrm{in}\ \mathrm{pp})$	Loss (in $\%$)	Loss (in $\%$)
				T	aylor-ty	pe Rules			
(1)	1.5	0.125	_	[10]	4.8	6.6	1.2	0.82	0.56
(2)	1.5	0.250	_	7.2	4.0	5.4	1.8	1.48	1.21
(3)	1.5	0.375	_	4.1	3.1	4.4	2.5	3.10	2.07
(4)	2.0	0.125	_	9.7	5.0	7.2	0.6	0.41	0.17
(5)	2.5	0.125	_	9.6	5.1	7.5	0.5	0.31	0.08
					\mathbf{SI}'	Γ			
(6)	$+\infty$	_	_	9.4	5.1	8.1	_	0.23	0.00
				Augmei	nted Tay	lor-type l	Rules		
(7)	1.5	0.125	5.0	5.4	3.9	5.5	1.16	0.65	_
(8)	5.0	0.125	5.0	8.8	5.0	7.4	0.18	0.22	_
(9)	5.0	0.125	25.0	6.9	4.7	6.6	0.19	0.18	_
(10)	10.0	0.125	75.0	6.3	4.6	6.4	0.09	0.16	_
					Backstop	Rules			
(11)	1.5	0.125	_	15.5	_	_	1.21	0.56	_
(12)	$+\infty$	_	_	17.1	_	_	0.50	0.10	_

Comment:

Not very large welfare gains.

Interpretation could be: SIT does not perform so bad.

Conclusion

Great paper! Highly recommended it!

Interesting NK model economy with endogenous market freezes.

Summary of comments:

- Consider also risk shocks to idiosyncratic productivity;
- Derive constrained efficient allocation and more general socially improving policy interventions;
- Adjust calibration.

Many thanks! / Muchas gracias!