

The Network Origins of Bank Influence: Evidence from Bank-to-firm and Firm-to-Firm Linkages¹

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Outline

Motivation

The model

Model analysis

Application

Calibration

Size of volatility

Financial sector policy

Conclusion

Motivation (i)

(Old) empirical banking literature

Loan characteristics (costs, loan-to-value,...)

Idiosyncratic bank shocks to credit supply affect firm behaviour

Bank-level restructuring

Bank-level shift lending policies

Bank-level shift risk appetite

etc.

firm-level sales

firm-level investment

firm-level tfp

etc.

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Loan characteristics (costs, loan-to-value,...)

Idiosyncratic bank shocks to credit supply affect firm behaviour

Bank-level restructuring

firm-level sales

Bank-level shift lending policies

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Bank-level shift risk appetite

firm-level tfp

etc.

etc.

(Recent) empirical banking literature

Idiosyncratic bank shocks to credit supply affect macroeconomic outcomes

Economywide sales

Economywide investment

Economywide tfp

Motivation (ii)

Empirical banking literature

Idiosyncratic variation in lending affects aggregate real economy

- ▶ *Amiti & Weinstein (2018): Investment*
- ▶ *Manaresi & Pierri (2018): TFP*
- ▶ *Niepmann & Eisenlohr (2017): Trade patterns*
- ▶ *Bremus et al. (2018): GDP*
- ▶ etc.

Macroeconomic literature

Idiosyncratic variation does not affect aggregate real economy

- ▶ Atomistic/representative bank(s)
- ▶ Lucas argument: things average out

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This paper

What we do

1. Consensus between both literatures
2. Application to Belgium
3. Some financial sector policy implications

Literature

Crossroads of multiple literatures

1. Empirical Banking Literature

Amiti & Weinstein (JPE, 2018); Buch et al. (JMCB, 2014); Niepmann & Eisenlohr (JIE, 2017); Greenstone et al. (AEJ, 2019), etc.

2. Macro literature

Gerali et al. (JMCB, 2010); Andrés et al. (JMCB, 2013); Andrés & Arce. (EJ, 2012); Iacoviello (AER, 2005); etc.

3. Propagation mechanisms

Acemoglu et al. (EM, 2012); Di Giovanni et al. (EM, 2014); Fahri & Baqaee (EM, 2018); Ozdagli & Weber (EM, 2018); Atalay (AEJ, 2017); Acemoglu et al. (AER, 2017) etc.

4. I-O in DSGE

Smets et al. (2019); Long & Plosser (JPE, 1983; AER, 1987); Bouakez et al. (EER, 2014; IER, 2009); Dixon et al. (BoE, 2007); Pasten et al. (2018, 2017) etc.

5. Macroprudential LTV requirements

Jensen et al. (EER, 2018); Walentin (tSJE, 2014); etc.

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The model: Ingredients

Two ingredients


Iacoviello (2006, AER)

+

Collateral constraint

Pasten et al (2018, JME)

Production network




The model: Households

Consumption Land Labour

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{Utility} \\
 & \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left(\log(c_t) + \iota h_t - \sum_{j=1}^J g_j \frac{l_{jt}^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi} \right) \right] \\
 & \text{s.t.} \\
 & c_t + q_t(h_t - h_{t-1}) + \frac{R_{t-1}d_{t-1}}{\pi_t} \\
 & = \\
 & d_t + \sum_{j=1}^J w_{jt}l_{jt} + \sum_{j=1}^J \Delta_{jt} + \sum_{b=1}^B \Delta_{bt} \\
 & \text{and} \\
 & c_t = \left(\sum_{j=1}^J \theta_j^{\frac{1}{\eta}} c_{jt}^{1-\frac{1}{\eta}} \right)^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}}
 \end{aligned}$$

Consumption weight



The model: Firms

Production Function

$$y_{jt} = A_j \left(n_{jt}^{\phi_j} m_{jt}^{1-\phi_j} \right)^{\delta_j} k_{jt}^{1-\delta_j} - \Phi_j$$

↓
Capital services

↓
Intermediates

↓
Labour


$$m_{jt} = \left(\sum_{j'=1}^J \omega_{jj'}^{\frac{1}{\eta}} m_{jj't}^{1-\frac{1}{\eta}} \right)^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}}$$

↑
IO interactions, Ω

Subject to

Calvo

Demand



The model: Banks

Profit

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \Lambda_{t,t+s} P_{t+s} \Delta_{bt+s}$$

Flow of funds constraint

$$\Delta_{bt} + \frac{R_{t-1} d_{bt-1}}{\pi_t} + \sum_{j=1}^J s_{jbt} =$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^J \frac{R_{jbt-1} s_{jbt-1}}{\pi_t} + d_{bt}$$


Credit demand

$$s_{jt} = \left(\sum_{b=1}^B \psi_{jb}^{\frac{1}{\mu_{jt}}} s_{jbt}^{1-\frac{1}{\mu_{jt}}} \right)^{\frac{\mu_{jt}}{\mu_{jt}-1}}$$

Bank-firm credit network

Shocks

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Loan-to-value shocks: } (\epsilon_t^{(\ell)}, \epsilon_{bt}^{(\ell)}) \\ \text{Interest rate shocks: } (\epsilon_t^{(r)}, \epsilon_{bt}^{(r)}) \end{array} \right.$$



 Idiosyncratic bank shock
 Aggregate bank shock

The model: Entrepreneurs

Produce capital services

$$k_{jt} = \tilde{n}_{jt}^{1-\nu_j} h_{jt-1}^{\nu_j}$$

Utility function

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t \tilde{c}_{jt} \quad (\gamma < \beta)$$

Flow of funds


$$f_{jt} k_{jt} + s_{jt}$$

=



$$\tilde{c}_{jt} + q_t(h_{jt} - h_{jt-1}) + \frac{R_{jt-1} s_{jt-1}}{\pi_t} + w_{jt} \tilde{n}_{jt}$$

Collateral constraint



$$s_{jt} \leq \ell_{jt} \mathbb{E}_t \frac{q_{t+1} h_{jt} \pi_{t+1}}{R_{jt}}$$



Model mechanics (i): Aggregate LTV shock



Model mechanics (ii): Bank–level LTV shocks



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Model analysis (i): Simplifying assumptions

1. Households have linear disutility of labor ($\varphi = 0$).
2. Monetary policy targets steady state nominal gross domestic product ($P_t c_t = P_c$)
3. All firms are equally capital intensive ($\{\delta_j = \delta\}_{j=1}^J$).
4. Entrepreneurs have zero consumption mass, $\{\tilde{c}_{jt} = 0\}_{j=1}^J$ and the collateral constraint does not bind.
5. We replace the Calvo framework of staggered price setting

$$P_{jt} = \begin{cases} \mathbb{E}_{t-1}[P_{jt}^*] & \text{with probability } \alpha \\ P_{jt}^* & \text{with probability } 1 - \alpha \end{cases}$$

Model analysis (iii)

$$\widehat{gdp}_{t|B} = \nu \epsilon_t^{(r)} + \boldsymbol{\nu}'_B \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{t|B}^{(r)}$$

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Aggregate shock

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Vector of idiosyncratic shocks

Model analysis (iii)

Aggregate shock

$$\widehat{gdp}_{t|B} = \nu \epsilon_t^{(r)} + \boldsymbol{\nu}'_B \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{t|B}^{(r)}$$

Vector of idiosyncratic shocks

$$\boldsymbol{\nu}_B \equiv -\kappa \boldsymbol{\Psi}' [\mathbb{I} - \tilde{\boldsymbol{\Omega}}']^{-1} \boldsymbol{\theta}$$

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Influence of individual firms

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Bank-firm credit network Influence of individual firms

$$[\mathbb{I} - \tilde{\boldsymbol{\Omega}}']^{-1} = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \tilde{\boldsymbol{\Omega}}^n \quad (\text{c.f. Waugh (1950)})$$

$$= \mathbb{I} + \tilde{\boldsymbol{\Omega}} + \tilde{\boldsymbol{\Omega}} \tilde{\boldsymbol{\Omega}} + \dots$$

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
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
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
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
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$$Var(\widehat{gdp}_{t|B}) = (\sum_{b=1}^B \nu_b^2) \sigma_{idio}^2 + \nu^2 \sigma_{agg}^2$$

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Aggregate origin
Depends on structure of the economy
Does not depend on B

Model analysis (iii)

$$Var(\widehat{gdp}_{t|B}) = \left[\left(\sum_{b=1}^B \nu_b^2 \right) \sigma_{idio}^2 + \nu^2 \sigma_{agg}^2 \right]$$

Aggregate origin
Depends on structure of the economy
Does not depend on B

Idiosyncratic bank-level origin
Depends on structure of the economy
Depends on B : Decays as B increases

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Aggregate origin
Depends on structure of the economy
Does not depend on B

Idiosyncratic bank-level origin
Depends on structure of the economy
Depends on B : Decays as B increases

How fast does this decay?

Model analysis (iv): Step 1 - no production network

Definition

The *first-order outdegree of firm j* is defined as $d_{j|J}^{(1)} \equiv \theta_j$.

Definition

The *first-order outdegree of bank b* is defined as:

$$d_{b|B}^{(1)} \equiv \sum_{j=1}^J (1 - \delta) \psi_{jb|B} d_{j|J}^{(1)}.$$

Definition

The (population) *coefficient of variation* of $d_B^{(1)}$ is

$$CV_{d_B^{(1)}} \equiv \frac{\sqrt{\mathbb{V}(d_B^{(1)})}}{\bar{d}_B^{(1)}}$$

where $\bar{d}_B^{(1)} \equiv \frac{1}{B} \sum_{b=1}^B d_{b|B}^{(1)}$ is the average bank outdegree and

$\mathbb{V}(d_B^{(1)}) = \left(\frac{1}{B} \sum_{b=1}^B (d_{b|B}^{(1)} - \bar{d}_B^{(1)})^2 \right)^{\frac{1}{2}}$ is the population variance of $d_B^{(1)}$.

Model analysis (v): Step 1 - no production network

Proposition

Provided an economy with a first-order outdegree sequence of the financial sector $d_B^{(1)}$, aggregate volatility satisfies

$$\sqrt{\text{Var}(\widehat{\text{gdp}}_{t|B})} \geq \frac{\kappa}{\sqrt{B}} \sqrt{1 + CV_{d_B^{(1)}}^2} \sigma_{idio}$$

1. Representative bank: $B = 1$ and $CV_{d_B^{(1)}}^2 = 0$
2. Atomistic banks: $B = \infty$
3. Empirical banking literature: $B \in (1, \infty)$ and $CV_{d_B^{(1)}}^2 = ?$

Model analysis (vi): Step 2 - one step propagation

Definition

The *second-order outdegree of firm j* is defined as

$$d_{j|J}^{(2)} \equiv \sum_{j'=1}^J \theta_{j'} [\tilde{\Omega}]_{j'j}.$$

Definition

The *second-order outdegree of bank b* is defined as:

$$d_{b|B}^{(2)} \equiv \sum_{j=1}^J (1 - \delta) \psi_{jb|B} d_{j|J}^{(2)}.$$

Definition

The *(population) coefficient of variation of $d_B^{(2)}$* is

$$CV_{d_B^{(2)}} \equiv \frac{\sqrt{\mathbb{V}(d_B^{(2)})}}{\bar{d}_B^{(2)}}$$

Model analysis (vii): Step 2 - one step propagation

Proposition

Provided an economy with a first and second-order outdegree sequence of the financial sector $d_B^{(1)}$, $d_B^{(2)}$, aggregate volatility satisfies

$$\sqrt{\text{Var}(\widehat{\text{gdp}}_{t|B})} \geq \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{B}} \sqrt{1 + CV_{d_{b|B}^{(1)}}} + \frac{\theta' \tilde{\Omega} \iota}{\sqrt{B}} \sqrt{1 + CV_{d_{b|B}^{(2)}}} \right) \kappa \sigma_{idio}$$

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Model mechanics (v): Relaxing assumptions

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
Calibration model parameters

1. Production Linkages

B2B database

Annual, time span 2002 – 2014

Reporting threshold



Calibration model parameters

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Annual, time span 2002 – 2014


Reporting threshold

2. Credit lines & LTVs

Belgian Corporate Credit Register

Annual, time span 2002 – 2014

Reporting threshold



Calibration model parameters

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
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3. Production function parameters

Annual accounts



Calibration model parameters

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
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3. Production function parameters

Annual accounts

4. Price stickiness

Prices underlying PPI



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
3. Production function parameters

Annual accounts

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Prices underlying PPI

5. Other parameters



Volatility: Simplified framework

$$Var(\widehat{gdp}_{t|B}) = (\sum_{b=1}^B \nu_{b|B}^2) \sigma_{idio}^2 + \nu^2 \sigma_{agg}^2$$

This table: $\frac{\sqrt{(\sum_{b=1}^B \nu_{b|B}^2)}}{\nu}$

Household demand	Production network			Credit network				
				Hom α	Het α	Het α	Hom α	Hom α
	θ	Ω	Ψ	Het ϕ	Het ϕ	Hom ϕ	Hom ϕ	Hom ϕ
(1)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$				0.447	
(2)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}$				0.134	
(3)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$				0.386	
(4)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}$				0.134	
(5)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$				0.357	
(6)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}$				0.134	
(7)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$				0.318	
(8)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}$				0.134	

- Calvo parameter
- Labour intensity
- Capital intensity

Volatility: Simplified framework

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	θ	Ω	Ψ	Het ϕ	Het ϕ	Hom ϕ	Hom ϕ	Hom ϕ
(1)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$				0.447	
(2)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}$				0.134	
(3)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$				0.386	
(4)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}$				0.134	
(5)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$				0.357	
(6)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}$				0.134	
(7)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$				0.318	
(8)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}$				0.134	

- Calvo parameter
- Labour intensity
- Capital intensity

Volatility: Simplified framework

$$Var(\widehat{gdp}_{t|B}) = (\sum_{b=1}^B \nu_{b|B}^2) \sigma_{idio}^2 + \nu^2 \sigma_{agg}^2$$

This table: $\frac{\sqrt{(\sum_{b=1}^B \nu_{b|B}^2)}}{\nu}$

Household demand	Production network			Credit network				
				Hom α	Het α	Het α	Hom α	Hom α
	θ	Ω	Ψ	Het ϕ	Het ϕ	Hom ϕ	Hom ϕ	Hom ϕ
(1)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$	Hom δ		Het δ	Hom δ	Hom δ
(2)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}$	0.447	0.134	0.386	0.134	0.357
(3)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$					
(4)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}$					
(5)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$					
(6)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}$					
(7)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$					
(8)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}$					

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Household demand	Production network			Credit network				
				Hom α	Het α	Het α	Hom α	Hom α
	θ	Ω	Ψ	Het ϕ	Het ϕ	Hom ϕ	Hom ϕ	Hom ϕ
(1)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$	0.447	0.464	0.445	0.473	0.440
(2)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}$	0.134	0.134	0.134	0.134	0.134
(3)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$	0.386	0.400	0.384	0.408	0.380
(4)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}$	0.134	0.134	0.134	0.134	0.134
(5)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$	0.357	0.370	0.355	0.378	0.352
(6)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}$	0.134	0.134	0.134	0.134	0.134
(7)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$	0.318	0.330	0.317	0.336	0.313
(8)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}$	0.134	0.134	0.134	0.134	0.134

- Calvo parameter
- Labour intensity
- Capital intensity

Volatility (ii): full framework

	Household demand	Production network	Credit network	Homogeneous (Economywide)	Homogeneous (Bank level)	Heterogeneous
				LTV rates	LTV rates	LTV rates
(1)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$	0.465	0.473	0.492
(2)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}^S$	0.134	0.134	0.134
(3)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}^S$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$	0.386	0.392	0.408
(4)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}^S$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}^S$	0.134	0.134	0.134
(5)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}^S$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$	0.348	0.354	0.368
(6)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}^S$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}^S$	0.134	0.134	0.134
(7)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}^S$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}^S$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$	0.277	0.282	0.293
(8)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}^S$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}^S$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}^S$	0.134	0.134	0.134

Volatility (ii): full framework

	Household demand	Production network	Credit network	Homogeneous LTV rates (Economywide)	Homogeneous LTV rates (Bank level)	Heterogeneous LTV rates
(1)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$	0.465	0.473	0.492
(2)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}^S$	0.134	0.134	0.134
(3)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}^S$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$	0.386	0.392	0.408
(4)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}^S$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}^S$	0.134	0.134	0.134
(5)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}^S$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$	0.348	0.354	0.368
(6)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}^S$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}^S$	0.134	0.134	0.134
(7)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}^S$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}^S$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$	0.277	0.282	0.293
(8)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}^S$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}^S$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}^S$	0.134	0.134	0.134

Volatility (ii): full framework

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(1)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$	0.465	0.473	0.492
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(8)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}^S$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}^S$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}^S$	0.134	0.134	0.134

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(4)	Het, $\hat{\theta}$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}^S$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}^S$	0.134	0.134	0.134
(5)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}^S$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$	0.348	0.354	0.368
(6)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}^S$	Het, $\hat{\Omega}$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}^S$	0.134	0.134	0.134
(7)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}^S$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}^S$	Het, $\hat{\Psi}$	0.277	0.282	0.293
(8)	Hom, $\hat{\theta}^S$	Hom, $\hat{\Omega}^S$	Hom, $\hat{\Psi}^S$	0.134	0.134	0.134

Plan

Motivation

The model

Model analysis

Application

Calibration

Size of volatility

Financial sector policy


Conclusion

Financial sector policy (i): Usability Herfindahl index

$$\begin{aligned}\sqrt{\text{Var}(\widehat{\text{gdp}}_{t|B})} &= \text{HHI} \times \sigma_{idio} \quad (\text{Gabaix 2011, Buch et al. (2018)}) \\ &= \|\boldsymbol{\nu}_B\|_2 \sigma_{idio} \quad (\text{This paper, simplified}) \\ &\neq \|\boldsymbol{\nu}_B\|_2 \sigma_{idio} \quad (\text{This paper})\end{aligned}$$

- ▶ Buch et al. (2014, JMBC): $\Delta \text{HHI} \uparrow \sqrt{\text{Var}(\widehat{\text{gdp}}_{t|B})} \uparrow$
- ▶ This paper: $\Delta \text{HHI} \uparrow \stackrel{?}{\Rightarrow} \sqrt{\text{Var}(\widehat{\text{gdp}}_{t|B})} \uparrow \downarrow$

Financial sector policy (i): Usability Herfindahl index



Financial sector policy (ii): Sectoral Specialization

- ▶ Large evidence of sector specialization²

Pros


- ▶ Screening/monitoring
- ▶ Assessment collateral
- ▶ Below avg. default risk
- ▶ Above avg. recovery risk
- ▶ Macroeconomic volatility?

Cons

- ▶ Portfolio concentration
- ▶ Macroeconomic volatility?

²De Jonghe et al. (2018, Belgium), Niepmann (2018, US), Paravisini (2018, Chile), Boeve (2017, Germany) etc.

Financial sector policy (ii): Sectoral Specialization



Financial sector policy (iii): Identifying significant banks

- ▶ Criteria for significance of banks
 1. Size
 2. Cross-border activities
 3. Direct public financial assistance
 4. Economic importance

Table: KENDALL RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENT

Year	All banks	Below median size	Above median size	Top 10
2002	0.701	0.594	0.390	0.672
2003	0.665	0.651	0.346	0.745
2004	0.673	0.597	0.304	0.600
2005	0.666	0.558	0.350	0.709
2006	0.668	0.493	0.517	0.709
2007	0.678	0.622	0.412	0.709
2008	0.651	0.552	0.371	0.672
2009	0.684	0.640	0.453	0.709
2010	0.650	0.443	0.446	0.672
2011	0.636	0.384	0.516	0.709
2012	0.664	0.407	0.484	0.709
2013	0.638	0.522	0.398	0.709
2014	0.622	0.608	0.431	0.636

Financial sector policy (iii): Identifying significant banks




Figure: Decomposition of bank-specific influence (calibration for 2002, $B = 78$).

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Conclusion

1. Consensus between both literatures
 - Empirical banking literature
 - Macroeconomic models
2. Application to Belgium
3. Some financial sector policy implications
 - Usability HHI
 - Bank specialization
 - Identifying important banks