

# Exchange Rates and Monetary Policy

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BROWN

Capital Flows, Exchange Rates and Geopolitics

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**New insights** from ongoing projects at the **Global Linkages Lab (GLL)** + **revisit previous findings** from the literature.


1. **Global Trade, Tariff Uncertainty, and the U.S. Dollar**, w/Can Soylu and Muhammed Yildirim.  
AEA, Papers and Proceedings, January 2026.
2. **Global Networks, Monetary Policy and Trade**, w/Can Soylu and Muhammed Yildirim  
NBER, CEPR, March 2025.
3. **Global Transmission of Fed Hikes: The Role of Policy Credibility and Balance Sheets**,  
w/Filiz Unsal  
Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 2023.
4. **U.S. Monetary Policy and International Risk Spillovers**  
Jackson Hole Symposium Proceedings, 2019.

# Increase Use of Tools of Economic Leverage/Economic Security Shaping Global Outcomes

## Rise of Economic Security Tools, 2010-2024

Number of new policy interventions per year, by category

Subsidies Import restrictions Localization and public procurement Export promotion Export restrictions Investment restrictions Other



# Geopolitics and Trade: Stability vs. Weaponization

## Two foundational views on hegemons, trade, and international monetary system

### **Stabilizer: Kindleberger (1941, 1973):**

A stable world economy requires a dominant power to supply: an open market, countercyclical lending, stable exchange rates, and lender of last resort.

### **Weaponizer: Hirschman (1945):**


Asymmetric trade relationships generate "influence" and "supply" effects: the larger, less-dependent partner gains coercive leverage over the smaller one.

We show that the same trade and finance network can give stabilization and weaponization at the same time from a macro inflation-output perspective.


# Tariffs

# The 2025-2026 tariff episode: U.S. effective tariff rate went from 2.4 (J25) to 22.7 (M25) to 10.8 (M26)

(a) Effective U.S. tariff rate



(b) Country-sector heterogeneity.




**Central question.** What is the macroeconomic impact of tariffs?

# Textbook Case

# Textbook Effects of Large Country Tariffs


- Autarky, no trade.



Adapted from Krugman, Obstfeld & Melitz (2022).

Similar reasoning in Ossa and Redding (2026).

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


- Autarky, no trade.
- Opening up to trade.
  - World price is lower:  $P_W < P_A$ .
  - Home imports.

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


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  - Home imports.
  - Suppliers lose, consumers benefit.
  - Consumer benefits are larger  $\Rightarrow$  Home as a whole is better off.
- Home imposes a tariff.
  - Home prices increase:  $P_T^H > P_W$ .
  - If home is large, ROW demand for home goods will be lower.
  - The prices in ROW decrease:  $P_T^F < P_W$  with Tariff =  $P_T^H - P_T^F$ .
  - Home imports less, efficiency loss.
  - TOT gains if tariff revenue compensates inefficiencies. Basis for optimum tariff.

# What is Missing?


## Central Banks' and financial markets' responses

- SOE vs global general equilibrium
- Complete vs incomplete markets

# A New Open Economy Macro Framework with I-O, NK and Incomplete Financial Markets


# N-Country, J-Sector NKOE Model

Consumption shares  $\Gamma$ : ToT gains vs. distorted labor supply




# N-Country, J-Sector NKOE Model

I-O matrix  $\Omega$ : ToT gains vs. higher marginal cost propagated by network




# N-Country, J-Sector NKOE Model

EoS  $\theta$ : high  $\theta \Rightarrow$  easy to substitute  $\Rightarrow \hat{Y}_t \uparrow$  or low  $\theta \Rightarrow$  complements & bottlenecks,  $\rightarrow \hat{Y}_t \downarrow$




# N-Country, J-Sector NKOE Model

Stickiness  $\Lambda$ : Combines PCP&DCP. Low  $\Lambda \Rightarrow$  flatter NKPC or high  $\Lambda \Rightarrow$  steeper NKPC




# N-Country, J-Sector NKOE Model

Policy  $\Phi$ : response to  $\pi_t^P \Rightarrow$  tariffs contract demand



# N-Country, J-Sector NKOE Model

Tariffs lead to intertemporal tradeoffs  $\Leftrightarrow$  via expectations



# Two new analytical objects in global general equilibrium w/SR +LR effects:

## The risk-sharing wedge $\hat{w}_t$

Martingale deviation from Backus-Smith complete markets.

- Sign determines whether the tariff-imposing country gains or loses.
- Sign depends on network, elasticities, and shock persistence.
- Static transfers in balanced trade models overstate it.

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## The NKOE propagation matrix $\Psi^{\text{NKOE}}$


Coefficient on lagged real marginal cost.

- With  $J = 1$ ,  $\Psi^{\text{NKOE}} = \mathbf{0}$ ; with  $J > 1$ ,  $\Psi^{\text{NKOE}} \neq \mathbf{0}$ .
- Inflation persistence rises with  $J$ ; I-O linkages strengthen persistence.
- Open-economy heterogeneity (monetary policy, exchange rate) amplifies propagation.

**Important for evolution of global trade flows and supply-chain re-shaping**


# Real Trade Flows Before

Gross Trade Flows Before Tariffs




# Predicted Trade Flows 12 quarters After

## Final and Intermediate Trade 12 Quarters After Tariffs



# Network granularity and persistence



**Setup.** CPI-weighted real marginal cost, 10% U.S. tariff on RoW, passive monetary policy.



All granular networks aggregate to the *same*  $2 \times 2$  matrices  $\Gamma$  and  $\Omega$ .

- $J = 1$ : fastest decay; inherited distortions vanish quickly.
- $J > 1$ : slower decay; larger initial impact.
- Persistence varies across granular networks even conditional on  $J > 1$ .

# Inflation-output trade-off is also persistent




**Three policy regimes.** Passive; perfect CPI stabilization; employment stabilization.

**Result.**  $J > 1$  slows convergence. Multi-sector economy remains farther from terminal equilibrium for longer.

**Normative implication.** Stabilization burden is larger under granular networks, regardless of policy rule. Whether it falls on inflation, output, or both depends on the rule.







# Reality

# Global trade and production network—Interconnected and complex




Source: OECD ICIO

# 2025-2026 implemented tariffs





- **U.S. aggregate effects.:** Real GDP: +0.15% on impact, -0.4% in subsequent periods, Inflation: +0.13pp.
- **Reversed threats.** Sizeable macro effects: Inflation +0.34pp. Consumption -0.25%. Real GDP +0.27%.

# Why did dollar depreciated after ‘Liberation Day’?





# Tariff vs Tariff Volatility Impact on Exchange Rate

$$\hat{\epsilon}_t = \underbrace{\left( \left( R_H^{-1} - \frac{1}{2} \right) (1 - 2\gamma)^2 - \frac{1}{2} \right)}_{<0} \hat{\tau}_t + \underbrace{R_H^{-1} (1 - 2\gamma)^2 (\eta + \kappa)}_{>0} \sigma_t^2 + \underbrace{\frac{(1 - R_H^{-1}) (1 - 2\gamma)^2}{\gamma}}_{>0} \hat{V}_{H,t-1}$$





# International Transmission

# Exchange Rates during 2022-2023 US-FED Tightening



# EM vs AE Government Spreads w/ US Monetary Policy Shocks



# Takeaways

# The open-economy and network dimensions are both important for the impact of geopolitical tools, as tariffs, on domestic macro outcomes

## 1. The risk-sharing wedge $\hat{w}_t$

Summarizes wealth transfers, shaped by trade and finance network.

## 2. The NKOE propagation matrix $\Psi^{\text{NKOE}}$

Persistence of real marginal cost distortions. N-country monetary policy + exchange-rate adjustment do not suffice.

- 1. Implemented U.S. tariffs (2025-2026): MODEST, hurting the U.S., trade diversion to Europe—if liberation day tariffs were to pass, result would be global stagflation.**
- 2. Models without I-O linkages overstate inflation and understate output decline.**
  - **Back to Kindleberger vs Hirshman:** Network centrality and granularity can give stabilization and weaponization at the same time for macroeconomic outcomes.



<https://www.globallinkages.org/>

Global Linkages Lab at Brown University

Thank you!