

EURO AREA ECONOMIC OUTLOOK AND THE ECB'S MONETARY POLICY

Pablo Hernández de Cos
Governor

TAVERNA CONFERENCE

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- The ECB's Governing Council (GC) interest rates decisions follow a **data-dependent approach**. In particular, they are based on its assessment of:

The inflation outlook in light of the incoming economic and financial data

The dynamics of underlying inflation

The strength of monetary policy transmission

- The October decision of keeping **the three ECB interest rates unchanged** was based on the assessment of these three elements.
 - The decision was taken after ten consecutive hikes, which implied a cumulative increase of 450 bps and took the deposit facility rate up to 4%, and in a context in which the speed of reduction of the Eurosystem's balance has been extraordinary.


ROADMAP

1. **The economic growth outlook**
2. The inflation outlook, including the dynamics of underlying inflation
3. The strength of monetary policy transmission
4. What can we expect going forward from the ECB's monetary policy?




A NEW GEOPOLITICAL RISK HAS MATERIALIZED RECENTLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WITH A RELATIVELY LIMITED IMPACT ON GLOBAL RISK TO DATE


Geopolitical risk index




Oil price



Natural gas Price (TTF)




EPU Spain



Commodity prices


Oil and gas



Food




10-year bond interest rates



Euro exchange rates




Consensus: GDP growth forecasts




EMU GDP quarter-on-quarter growth forecasts


Short-term models



Eurosting. Fourth quarter




EMU: CE confidence indicators (a)




(a): Normalized series.

EMU: Sectoral PMI




Composite PMI by countries




EMU employment indicators

Employment (NA) and employment expectations



Employment PMI




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


HICP. Energy and food excluded




■ MOMENTUM (a)

HICP. Non-energy industrial goods




— YEAR-ON-YEAR (T1,12)

HICP. Services




(a): Momentum is defined as the rate of change of the three-month average HICP over the average of the immediately preceding three months, in annualized terms.

EMU. Inflation



— HEADLINE — EXCL. ENERGY AND FOOD - - - MPE SEPTEMBER


Inflation and contribution of components




■ CORE ■ ENERGY ■ FOOD ● HEADLINE

Negotiated wages (year-on-year growth)

EMU. New signature agreements (a)




EMU. Forecasts (b)




(a) Salary increases for the following 12 months.
(b) They include one-off payments.

EMU. Contributions to the GDP deflator (y-o-y variation) (a)



(a) The unitary gross surplus is defined as the ratio between the gross operating surplus (EBE, including mixed incomes) and real GDP.

Analysts and market long-term expectations



Very weak growth is expected for the second half of 2023.

Headline and core inflation slow down is in line with expectations.

RISKS:

- **ACTIVITY: TILTED TO THE DOWNSIDE**

- **DOWNSIDE** : Stronger-than-expected effects of monetary policy, further weakness in the global economy, and geopolitical risks (Ukraine, Middle East)
- **UPSIDE**: tighter labor markets and real income increase

- **INFLATION: BALANCED**


- **UPSIDE** : energy commodity price increase mainly in the short-run due to the geopolitical crisis in the Middle East, wage increases and higher-than-expected margins
- **DOWNSIDE** : more intense transmission of monetary policy, greater weakness of the economy also on account of new geopolitical crisis

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
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
NFC Bond yields



Cost of new bank loans (a)



Lending rates on outstanding amounts




a. Narrowly defined effective rates (NDER) adjusted seasonally and for the irregular component.

Loans to households for house purchase


Loans to firms

Households' time deposits


Interest rate fixation period of over 1 year (a)



Interest rate fixation period of up to 1 year (a)




Agreed maturity of up to 1 year (a)




a. Interest rates are narrowly defined effective rates (NDER), which exclude related charges, such as repayment insurance premia and fees, and are adjusted seasonally and for the irregular component.
b. Resulting bank interest rate if the interest rate rise in the current cycle had been passed through at the same speed as in the previous cycle in 2005, as estimated based on standard error-correction models.


New financing flows (a)



Net financing flows. Households (b)




Net financing flows. Firms (b)




a. Seasonally adjusted three-month cumulative flows.
b. Seasonally adjusted monthly net flows. Bank loans are adjusted for securitisation.

Financing costs. Banks



Financing costs. General Government



SOURCES: Refinitiv Datastream. Latest observed data: 10/11/2023 (bonds and OIS) and 30/09/2023 (others).

a. Calculated as a daily weighted average of deposit rates and bond yields. The weights are obtained from the balances of deposits and bonds recorded in the aggregate balance sheet of the EMU credit institutions.

b. Monthly interest rates on new deposits weighted by balances, represented daily.

c. "ICE BofA Euro Banking" index.

d. The EMU aggregate is calculated as the GDP-weighted average of the yields of the 16 countries included: Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Ireland, Finland, Portugal, Greece, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Cyprus and Malta.

e. Spread between the average 10-year sovereign yield of the EMU countries, weighted by their GDP, and the 10-year OIS €STR.

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- **Since our Monetary Policy meeting in September, we have observed:**
 - **A materialization of the downside risks to economic growth in the euro area.**
 - Risks for the future remain on the downside.
 - **The evolution of inflation has been in line with expectations**, with a further decline in headline and core inflation.
 - Risks to inflation remain balanced.
 - **A further tightening of financial conditions, higher than expected**, confirming a very strong pass-through of our monetary policy.
 - Moreover, a significant part of the pass-through of monetary policy tightening is still pending.
- **Based on this assessment, the ECB's GC decided to keep the three key ECB interest rates unchanged and it considered that those levels, maintained for a sufficiently long duration, will make a substantial contribution to return inflation to its 2% target over the medium term.**
 - The high level of uncertainty requires to keep our **data-dependent approach**.
 - In any case, **the key ECB interest rates will be set at sufficiently restrictive levels for as long as necessary** to ensure that inflation returns to its 2% medium-term target in a timely manner.
 - For the moment, **it is too early to talk about interest rates decreases**.

- **Geopolitical risks, in particular the potential extension of the war in the Middle East, remain the main determinant of economic developments and inflation in the euro area.**
 - Should this risk materialize, it could have a large negative effect on confidence and financial markets and, in particular, generate a significant increase in energy commodity prices, which would constitute a new negative supply shock.
- **The monetary policy reaction to the eventual materialization of such new supply shock could be different** from that which arose as a result of the war in Ukraine, given that, although in the short term it would generate an increase in inflation, from the perspective of medium-term inflation - which is relevant for the ECB- its effects could be much lower, given that:
 - **Monetary policy now maintains a clearly restrictive stance.** As an illustration, the interest rate on the deposit facility is 4% compared to -0.5% before the start of the war in Ukraine.
 - **Euro area activity is now very weak,** compared to the strong rebound it experienced after COVID and that accompanied the start of the Ukrainian war.
- **In order for monetary policy to have such a different reaction to the eventual materialization of this new negative supply shock, it would be crucial: (i) inflation expectations in the medium term to remain anchored at 2%; and (ii) second-round effects on wages and inflation to be limited.**

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION

