Sovereign Risk and International Portfolio Dynamics

Fernando Broner
CREI and Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Tatiana Didier World Bank


Aitor Erce Banco de España

Sergio Schmukler World Bank

September 2009


VERY PRELIMINARY

United States *Annual Data from IFS*



US Gross Capital (Long-Term Security) Flows

Quarterly Data from US Dept. of the Treasury



Objective

 Provide stylized 	d facts on int	ernational p	ortfolio d	lynamics,	for advanced	and develop	ng countries

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- Gross capital flows are larger and more volatile than net capital flows
- In advanced countries, net flows are driven mostly by gross flows by residents (GIR)
- In developing countries, net flows are driven mostly by gross flows by foreigners (GIF)
- During crises there is retrenchment: foreigners leave $(GIF \downarrow)$, residents come back $(GIR \uparrow)$

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- Interpretation: productivity shocks, sovereign risk and secondary markets, asymmetric information

Some related literature

Theory


- Kraay and Ventura (2000)
- Kraay, Servén, Loayza, and Ventura (2005)
- Devereux (2007)
- Coeurdacier, Kollmann, and Martin (2009)
- Devereux and Sutherland (2009)

• Empirical


- Kraay and Ventura (2000)
- Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2007)
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Some related literature


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- Our emphasis is on high frequency dynamics instead of long-run trends



Gross Capital Flows: Foreigners vs. Residents



Gross Capital Flows: Foreigners vs. Residents



Correlation of gross flows

• Regressions of gross flows on each other

$$GIF_{c,t} = \beta \cdot GIR_{c,t} + \alpha_t + \gamma_c \cdot t + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{c,t}$$

$$GIR_{c,t} = \beta \cdot GIF_{c,t} + \alpha_t + \gamma_c \cdot t + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{c,t}$$

where we include time dummies and country trends

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where we include time dummies and country trends

- Pooled countries by income
 - high income: GNI per capita > US\$ 15,000 (40 countries)
 - middle income: US\$ 15,000 > GNI per capita > US\$ 7,500 (25 countries)
 - low income: US\$ 7,500 > GNI per capita > US\$ 2,000 (38 countries)
 - dropped small countries: GNI < US\$ 5 billions</p>

Fixed Effect Regressions

	High-Incom	e Countries	Middle- Coun		Low-Income	e Countries
	GIF	GIR	GIF	GIR	GIF	GIR
GIR	-0.97***		-0.31**		-0.37***	
	[0.04]		[0.11]		[0.12]	
GIF		-0.98***		-0.22**		-0.15**
		[0.02]		[0.09]		[0.06]
Observations	1,261	1,261	631	631	979	979
R-squared	0.96	0.96	0.58	0.52	0.52	0.49

Country trends, country dummies, and year dummies are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors in brackets

^{*} significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

• (Gross	inflows	by	foreigners	and	residents are	volatile	and	negatively	correlated
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- Gross inflows by foreigners and residents are volatile and negatively correlated
- When do gross flows expand $(GIF \uparrow \text{ and } GIR \downarrow)$? When is there retrenchment $(GIF \downarrow \text{ and } GIR \uparrow)$?

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- Cyclicality of gross flows: Regressions of gross flows on cyclical variables

$$Y_{c,t} = \beta \cdot X_{c,t} + \alpha_t + \gamma_c \cdot t + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{c,t}$$

where Y is GIF or GIR, and X is trade balance, net capital flows, or detrended real GDP growth (with time dummies and country trends)

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• Gross flows during crises: Event studies

$$X_{c,t} = \beta_{-2} \cdot Crisis_{c,t+2} + \beta_{-1} \cdot Crisis_{c,t+1} + \beta \cdot Crisis_{c,t} + \beta_{+1} \cdot Crisis_{c,t-1} + \beta_{+2} \cdot Crisis_{c,t-2} + \alpha_t + \gamma_c \cdot t + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{c,t}$$

where Y is GIF or GIR, and $Crisis_{c,t}$ indicates whether there was a crisis in country c at time t (with time dummies and country trends)

Crisis indicators

- External Debt Crises
 - Reinhart and Reinhart (2008)
 - Laeven and Valencia (2008)
 - S&P's foreign currency default
- Domestic Debt Crises
 - S&P's local currency default
 - Reinhart and Rogoff (2008)
- Banking Crises
 - Reinhart and Rogoff (2008)
 - Laeven and Valencia (2008)
 - Honohan and Laeven (2005)
- Currency Crises
 - Laeven and Valencia (2008)
 - IMF (1998)
 - Reinhart and Reinhart (2008)

Fixed Effect Regressions

	High-Income Countries												
	GIF	GIR	GIF-GIR	GIF	GIR	GIF-GIR	GIF	GIR	GIF-GIR				
Trade Balance	-3.80**	-7.18**	3.38										
	[1.65]	[3.42]	[4.88]										
Net Flows				0.31	0.69***	-0.38							
				[0.20]	[0.20]	[0.40]							
GDP: Cycle							0.29	-0.64*	0.93*				
							[0.21]	[0.34]	[0.48]				
Observations	1,261	1,261	1,261	1,261	1,261	1,261	1,261	1,261	1,261				
R-squared	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.24	0.26	0.25				
	Middle-Income Countries												
	GIF	GIR	GIF-GIR	GIF	GIR	GIF-GIR	GIF	GIR	GIF-GIR				
Trade Balance	-4.95***	-3.22**	-1.73										
	[1.37]	[1.40]	[2.74]										
Net Flows				0.61***	0.39***	0.23							
				[0.14]	[0.14]	[0.28]							
GDP: Cycle							0.09***	0.02	0.07**				
							[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.04]				
Observations	631	631	631	631	631	631	631	631	631				
R-squared	0.71	0.60	0.56	0.76	0.63	0.57	0.56	0.49	0.56				
	Low-Income Countries												
	GIF	GIR	GIF-GIR	GIF	GIR	GIF-GIR	GIF	GIR	GIF-GIR				
Trade Balance	-4.00***	-1.33***	-2.67**										
	[0.99]	[0.46]	[1.02]										
Net Flows				0.77***	0.24***	0.53***							
				[0.07]	[0.07]	[0.14]							
GDP: Cycle							0.10**	0.00	0.10**				
							[0.04]	[0.02]	[0.04]				
Observations	979	979	979	979	979	979	979	979	979				
R-squared	0.58	0.49	0.52	0.82	0.54	0.59	0.50	0.46	0.50				

Country trends, country dummies, and year dummies are included in all regressions.

^{*} significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Event Studies: Any Crises

		Middle-Income									
	High-Incom	e Countries	Coun	tries	Low-Income	Countries					
	GIF	GIR	GIF	GIR	GIF	GIR					
Year t - 2	3.8	-2.7	-0.1	0.1	0.2	0.0					
Year t - 1	1.3	0.9	-0.3	0.2	0.8	-0.3					
Crisis Year	0.6	1.2	-1.7**	1.6***	-0.9	0.4					
Year t + 1	0.0	2.4	-1.9**	-1.0	-2.3***	-0.9**					
Year t + 2	-0.3	1.0	-1.7***	-0.3	-1.1*	-0.4					
No. of Crises	151	151	143	143	179	179					
Observations	1,093	1,093	531	531	827	827					
R-squared	0.46	0.46	0.50	0.44	0.53	0.45					
Wald Tests:											
Ct vs (Ct-1+Ct-2)/2	1.3	1.6	9.6***	5.9**	7.8***	0.9					


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Event Studies: Any Crisis


High-Income Countries

Gross Inflows




Middle-Income Countries

Gross Inflows



Low-Income Countries

Gross Inflows




Event Studies: Intensity of Crises


			Middle-	Income		
	High-Incom	e Countries	Coun	tries	Low-Income	Countries
	GIF	GIR	GIF	GIR	GIF	GIR
Year t - 2: Only 1 Crisis	3.7	-2.8	0.0	-0.2	-0.2	0.0
Year t - 1: Only 1 Crisis	1.3	0.9	-0.4	0.4	0.5	-0.2
Crisis Year: Only 1 Crisis	0.6	1.4	-0.7	1.0*	-0.6	0.2
Year t + 1: Only 1 Crisis	0.0	2.6	-1.6**	-0.5	-1.8***	-1.0**
Year t + 2: Only 1 Crisis	-0.3	1.2	-1.6***	0.1	-1.2**	-0.3
Year t - 2: More than 1 Crisis	5.9	-2.4	-0.8	2.1	2.6**	-0.2
Year t - 1: More than 1 Crisis	1.4	-1.1	-0.2	-0.1	1.6	-0.2
Crisis Year: More than 1 Crisis	0.4	-2.6	-6.3***	4.6***	-2.8**	1.4*
Year t + 1: More than 1 Crisis	-1.5	-2.6	-2.9*	-3.5**	-5.6**	-0.6
Year t + 2: More than 1 Crisis	-0.2	-1.4	-3.0**	-1.7**	-0.2	-1.4
No. of Unique Crises	143	143	119	119	155	155
No. of Severe Crises	8	8	24	24	24	24
Observations	1,093	1,093	531	531	827	827
R-squared	0.46	0.46	0.52	0.48	0.54	0.45
Wald Tests:						
C1 t vs (C1 t-1+ C1 t-2)/2	1.2	1.7	1.3	2.2	2.2	0.3
C2 t vs (C2 t-1+ C2 t-2)/2	1.1	0.0	17.2***	3.1*	16.2***	2.1


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
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Event Studies: Intensity of Crises Only 1 Crisis









t+1

t+2

Event Studies: Intensity of Crises

High-Income Countries

	GIF			GIR				
	PI	OI	FDI	Reserves	PI	OI	FDI	
Year t - 2: Only 1 Crisis	-0.2	3.6	0.3	0.1	0.0	-2.6	-0.2	
Year t - 1: Only 1 Crisis	-0.5	2.0	-0.1	0.7*	0.4	-0.1	0.0	
Crisis Year: Only 1 Crisis	-0.7	1.4*	-0.1	1.0**	0.6	0.0	-0.3	
Year t + 1: Only 1 Crisis	-0.1	0.3	-0.1	0.8**	0.0	1.9	-0.1	
Year t + 2: Only 1 Crisis	0.3	-0.8	0.2	-0.2	0.2	1.3	0.0	
Year t - 2: More than 1 Crisis	0.3	6.9	-1.3*	3.6	-0.8	-5.1	0.0	
Year t - 1: More than 1 Crisis	0.2	2.2	-1.1	2.4*	-0.9	-2.5	-0.2	
Crisis Year: More than 1 Crisis	-0.4	1.6	-0.8	1.1	-0.2	-3.3	-0.2	
Year t + 1: More than 1 Crisis	-0.8*	-0.6	-0.2	-2.0**	-0.7	0.2	-0.2	
Year t + 2: More than 1 Crisis	0.6	-0.7	0.0	-1.8*	-0.8	1.3	-0.1	
No. of Unique Crises	143	143	143	143	143	143	143	
No. of Severe Crises	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	
Observations	1,093	1,093	1,093	1,093	1,093	1,093	1,093	
R-squared	0.67	0.36	0.62	0.28	0.71	0.34	0.61	
Wald Tests:								
C1t vs (C1t-1+C1t-2)/2	1.1	0.7	0.7	1.8	2.2	0.7	0.4	
C2 t vs (C2 t-1+ C2 t-2)/2	1.3	1.5	0.3	0.8	0.7	0.0	0.1	

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Event Studies: Intensity of Crises

Middle-Income Countries

		GIF		GIR				
	PI	Ol	FDI	Reserves	PI	OI	FDI	
Year t - 2: Only 1 Crisis	0.1	0.1	-0.2	0.1	-0.1	-0.3	0.1*	
Year t - 1: Only 1 Crisis	-0.1	-0.1	-0.2	0.6*	0.0	-0.3	0.1	
Crisis Year: Only 1 Crisis	0.0	-0.5	-0.2	1.0**	-0.1	-0.1	0.1	
Year t + 1: Only 1 Crisis	0.1	-1.3**	-0.4**	-0.4	-0.2	-0.1	0.1	
Year t + 2: Only 1 Crisis	-0.3	-1.0**	-0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	
Year t - 2: More than 1 Crisis	-0.6	0.2	-0.5	1.6*	0.2	0.3	0.1	
Year t - 1: More than 1 Crisis	-0.1	0.1	-0.2	0.0	0.1	-0.3	0.1	
Crisis Year: More than 1 Crisis	-1.4*	-4.1**	-0.8*	3.5***	0.3**	0.7	0.2*	
Year t + 1: More than 1 Crisis	-1.0	-1.0	-0.9**	-1.9*	-0.1	-1.6**	0.2	
Year t + 2: More than 1 Crisis	-1.1*	-1.3**	-0.6	-0.8	-0.6**	-0.4	0.1	
No. of Unique Crises	119	119	119	119	119	119	119	
No. of Severe Crises	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	
Observations	531	531	531	531	531	531	531	
R-squared	0.19	0.41	0.61	0.42	0.40	0.40	0.45	
Wald Tests:								
C1t vs (C1t-1+C1t-2)/2	0.0	0.6	0.0	2.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	
C2 t vs (C2 t-1+ C2 t-2)/2	11.6***	8.8***	2.3	4.2**	0.6	0.4	0.9	

Country trends, country dummies, and year dummies are included in all regressions.

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Event Studies: Intensity of Crises

Low-Income Countries

	GIF						
	PI	OI	FDI	Reserves	PI	01	FDI
Year t - 2: Only 1 Crisis	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.2	-0.1	0.0
Year t - 1: Only 1 Crisis	0.0	0.8**	-0.2	-0.1	0.1	-0.3*	0.0
Crisis Year: Only 1 Crisis	-0.1	-0.9*	0.3	0.6**	0.1	-0.5*	0.0
Year t + 1: Only 1 Crisis	-0.1	-1.4**	-0.3	-0.3	0.1*	-0.9**	0.1
Year t + 2: Only 1 Crisis	-0.3	-0.6	-0.3	-0.4	0.1	0.0	0.0
Year t - 2: More than 1 Crisis	0.5***	2.1**	-0.1	-0.3	-0.1	0.2	0.0
Year t - 1: More than 1 Crisis	0.5	1.3	-0.2	0.4	0.0	-0.5	-0.1
Crisis Year: More than 1 Crisis	-0.2	-2.4**	-0.2	1.6*	-0.1	0.0	0.0
Year t + 1: More than 1 Crisis	-1.2	-3.6*	-0.8**	-0.2	-0.1	-0.4	0.0
Year t + 2: More than 1 Crisis	0.1	0.0	-0.3	-2.3	-0.1	1.0	0.0
No. of Unique Crises	155	155	155	155	155	155	155
No. of Severe Crises	24	24	24	24	24	24	24
Observations	827	827	827	827	827	827	827
R-squared	0.32	0.58	0.57	0.28	0.74	0.39	0.68
Wald Tests:							
C1t vs (C1t-1+C1t-2)/2	0.1	8.7***	1.1	2.2	0.4	1.2	0.0
C2 t vs (C2 t-1+ C2 t-2)/2	3.0*	9.6***	0.0	2.0	0.3	0.1	0.4

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Interpretation

 \bullet Very large negative correlation between GIF and GIR in high-income countries

– puzzle?

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- ullet Very large negative correlation between GIF and GIR in high-income countries
 - puzzle?
- ullet In high-income countries, net flows are driven mostly by GIR. In middle- and low-income countries, net flows are driven mostly by GIF
 - probably due to higher frequency of crises in the latter

Interpretation

- ullet Very large negative correlation between GIF and GIR in high-income countries
 - puzzle?
- ullet In high-income countries, net flows are driven mostly by GIR. In middle- and low-income countries, net flows are driven mostly by GIF
 - probably due to higher frequency of crises in the latter
- During crises there is retrenchment: $GIF \downarrow$ and $GIR \uparrow$
 - difficult to explain solely with productivity shocks; negative shocks would lead to $GIF \downarrow$ and $GIR \downarrow$
 - we need shocks that affect domestic and foreign investors asymmetrically
 - sovereign risk (and secondary markets?) likely plays a role: e.g. Broner, Martin, and Ventura (2006)
 - asymmetric information is a possible alternative: e.g. Brennan and Cao (1997)