Information guide for TARGET2 users

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1. Introduction

This information guide aims to provide credit institutions and ancillary systems using TARGET2 with a standard set of information, in order to give them a better understanding of the overall functioning of the system and enable them to make use of it as efficiently as possible. It answers the most frequently asked questions relating to TARGET2 and tries, in particular, to give users a clear understanding of which features are common and which are specific to each country. Documentation on country-specific features can be found on the websites of the respective national central banks. This information guide is intended purely to give information on the current TARGET2 system.

This information guide has been designed specifically with a view to being updated as necessary and as a document to which national central banks (NCBs), the European Central Bank (ECB), the 3CB1 and TARGET users can contribute. It is intended to serve as a dynamic tool, reflecting such market tendencies and recommendations of best practice as may emerge either from the national TARGET2 User Groups or from meetings organised for TARGET2 users at the euro area level by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). The contents of this document confer no legal rights on participants/operations or any other person or entity.

All times in this document are given using the 24-hour clock and refer to European Central Bank time, i.e. the local time at the seat of the ECB.

1.1. What is TARGET2?

TARGET (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer) is the Eurosystem interbank funds transfer system, which is designed to support the Eurosystem’s objectives of defining and implementing the monetary policy of the euro area and promoting the smooth operation of payment systems, thus contributing to the integration and stability of the euro area money market. While the first TARGET system was made up of an RTGS (real-time gross settlement) system in each participating country and the ECB payment mechanism (EPM), connected by an interlinking component, TARGET2 is a single system, offering the same level of service to all participants. It has been designed and built to meet the highest standards of robustness and operational reliability.

1 The 3CB comprises the Banca d’Italia, the Banque de France and the Deutsche Bundesbank.
The system has been designed in such a way that it is able to process cross-border payments denominated in euro as smoothly as if they were domestic payments.

TARGET2 processes only transfers denominated in euro. The aim is to allow payments – especially large-value payments such as those relating to foreign exchange and money market transactions – to be made throughout the euro area at low cost with high security and very short processing times.

As it is a RTGS system, payments are handled individually. Unconditional payment orders are automatically processed one at a time on a continuous basis. Therefore, TARGET2 provides immediate and final settlement of all payments, provided that there are sufficient funds or overdraft facilities available on the payer’s account with its central bank. There is no set minimum amount for a payment made through TARGET2.

1.2. How to use the Information guide for TARGET2 users?

The Information guide for TARGET2 users is a reference guide to assist participants in TARGET2 during daily operations. It also contains information about which other documents are of high relevance for the users and where these can be found.

This document is structured as follows:

The part on “Fundamentals” in Chapter 2 describes the TARGET2 structure, the organisational structure at central bank level, the TARGET2 working days, the TARGET2 transactions, the settlement of ancillary systems and operational communication.

The part on “Participation” in Chapter 3 describes the access criteria, the static data collection, the TARGET2 directory, the certification testing, the measures to ensure security and operational reliability, and the termination or suspension of participants, and gives an overview of TARGET2 billing.

Then, in Chapter 4, the procedures in the different phases of a normal operational day are described. Chapters 5 and 6 describe the procedures to be followed in the event of a contingency or other problem in TARGET2. These parts (Chapters 4 to 6) are described in the chronological order of a TARGET2 operational day, i.e. commencing with the start-of-day procedures (on the evening of the previous calendar day), then moving on to the night-time settlement phase and the day trade phase, before finishing with the end-of-day procedures. Where it will help in understanding the procedures, the information guide provides general information on the subject at the beginning of the relevant chapter.
Finally, there is a description of the procedures for the TARGET2 compensation scheme in Chapter 7. This structure allows the reader to refer directly to the procedures he/she needs, based on the point in time and whether it is a normal or abnormal event. For general questions, the section on fundamentals should be consulted.

1.3. Scope of the Information guide for TARGET2 users

The Information guide for TARGET2 users is intended to cover all those operational matters which concern the TARGET2 users in their daily use of TARGET2.

1.4. Further relevant documentation

Legal documentation

- Guideline on TARGET2

The Guideline on TARGET2 is the legal framework for TARGET2 with which the Information guide for TARGET2 users has to be fully compliant.

- Harmonised conditions

Each participating NCB adopts arrangements implementing the harmonised conditions for participation in TARGET2 that are laid down in Annex II of the Guideline on TARGET2. These arrangements shall exclusively govern the relationship between the relevant participating NCB and its participants in respect of the processing of payments in the payments module (PM).
**Other relevant documentation**

- **User guide for the TARGET2 Information System (T2IS)**

This document provides information on how to access and read information provided in T2IS.

- **User guide for static data collection**

The aim of this document is to provide the future TARGET2 participants with all the information needed to complete the registration forms.

- **TARGET2 pricing guide for users**

This document provides detailed information on the pricing and billing scheme of TARGET2.

- **General functional specifications (GFS) and user detailed functional specifications (UDFS)**

These documents provide details on the functioning of the single shared platform (SSP). While the Information guide for TARGET2 users addresses the daily operational procedures for TARGET2 as a whole, of course the documents have to be consistent.

- **ICM handbook I**

This document provides details on the functioning of the information and control module (ICM).

- **Routing/mapping of payments and ancillary system transactions**
This document describes addressing and routing examples of certain payments and ancillary system (AS) transactions on the SSP.

- Settlement times of ancillary systems

This document provides information in particular about the settlement times of ancillary systems.

- Presentation on TARGET2 inter-region failover

The presentation provides detailed information about the processes in the event of an inter-region failover with loss of data. This also includes a description of the impact on each settlement procedure.

- SWIFT documentation

The SWIFT documentation provides details of the different SWIFT standards.

All the above-mentioned documents are available in their most recent version on the TARGET2 website under “Documentation”, except the SWIFT documentation, which is available on the SWIFT website. In addition, the NCBs provide further information on specific national characteristics and procedures. Each NCB will also provide documentation on local certification testing if applicable.
2. Fundamentals

2.1. TARGET2 structure

2.1.1. Governance structure

The management of TARGET2 is based on a three-level governance scheme. The tasks are assigned to the Governing Council (Level 1), the Eurosystem central banks (Level 2) and the SSP-providing central banks (Level 3). The Governing Council is responsible for the direction, management and control of TARGET2. The tasks assigned to Level 1 fall within the exclusive competence of the Governing Council. The ESCB’s Payment and Settlement Systems Committee (PSSC) assists the Governing Council as an advisory body in all matters relating to TARGET2. The Eurosystem central banks are responsible for the tasks assigned to Level 2, within the general framework defined by the Governing Council. In addition to its advisory role, the PSSC performs the tasks assigned to Level 2. The SSP-providing central banks (Level 3) take decisions on the daily running of the single shared platform on the basis of the defined service levels.

Table 1  Governance structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 1 – Governing Council</th>
<th>Level 2 – Eurosystem central banks</th>
<th>Level 3 – SSP-providing central banks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managing severe crisis situations</td>
<td>Management with regard to system-owner responsibilities</td>
<td>Managing the system on the basis of the agreement referred to in the TARGET2 Guideline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintaining contacts with users at European level (subject to the sole responsibility of Eurosystem central banks for the business relationship with their customers) and monitoring daily user activity from a business perspective (Eurosystem central bank task)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monitoring business developments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Budgeting, financing, invoicing (Eurosystem central bank task) and other administrative tasks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.1.2. Technical structure

From a technical point of view, TARGET2 is structured as described below and illustrated in Diagram 3:

- the single shared platform (SSP) with payment and accounting processing services systems (PAPSS) and customer-related services systems (CRSS);
- the PAPSS with the payments module (PM), the standing facilities module (SF), the reserve management module (RM), the home accounting module (HAM), the static data module (SD), the contingency module (CM) and the information and control module (ICM);
- customer-related services systems for central banks only (CROSS, CRAKS and CRISP);
- central banks with a proprietary home account (PHA), reserve management and intraday credit;
- banks are connected via SWIFT;
- ancillary systems are connected via SWIFT.

In order to ensure the highest levels of resilience, the SSP is based on a “two regions, four sites” concept. This structure, its functionality and its procedures are described in Chapter 5 which covers abnormal situations.
2.2. Organisational structure at central bank level

The sole contact point for TARGET2 users is their national service desk. Within the Eurosystem, the national service desk is represented by the settlement manager (as illustrated in the diagram below). All settlement managers are interlinked by means of a standing teleconference facility.

Diagram 5  Overview of TARGET2 players

Each NCB also has a TARGET2 crisis manager who is informed via the respective settlement...
manager and is involved in the case of problem escalation. The TARGET2 crisis managers are also interlinked via a standing teleconference facility.

### 2.3. TARGET2 working days

TARGET2 is open on all days, except Saturdays, Sundays, New Year’s Day, Good Friday and Easter Monday (according to the calendar applicable at the seat of the ECB), 1 May, Christmas Day and 26 December. TARGET2 operating days are the de facto settlement days for the financial markets in euro, as well as for foreign exchange transactions involving the euro.

The table below shows the different phases of the TARGET2 operational day. Over a weekend or on a TARGET2 holiday, the technical window is open throughout the weekend or the holiday, i.e. from Friday 22:00 until Monday 01:00 or, in the case of a holiday, from 22:00 on the last working day until 01:00 on the next working day.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2</th>
<th>Operational day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time</strong></td>
<td><strong>Description</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Start of day</strong></td>
<td><strong>D-1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:45–19:00</td>
<td>Start-of-day processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Night-time settlement</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:00–19:30</td>
<td>Provision of liquidity to the PM (SF to HAM, SF to PM, HAM to PM, PHA to PM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:30–22:00</td>
<td>Start-of-procedure message, setting aside of liquidity on the basis of standing orders and AS night-time processing (AS settlement procedure 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technical window</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22:00–01:00</td>
<td>Technical maintenance window</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Night-time settlement</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01:00–06:45</td>
<td>Night-time processing (AS settlement procedure 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Business window</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day trade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06:45–07:00</td>
<td>Business window to prepare daylight operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07:00–18:00</td>
<td>Day trade phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:00</td>
<td>Cut-off for customer payments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:00</td>
<td>Cut-off for interbank payments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>End of day</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:15</td>
<td>Cut-off for use of SF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:30</td>
<td>Central bank accounting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Plus 15 minutes on the last day of the minimum reserve period.
Over a weekend or on a TARGET holiday, the technical window is open from 22:00 on the last business day until 01:00 on the next business day.

### 2.4. TARGET2 transactions

In TARGET2, messages can be generally separated into SWIFT FIN messages (in particular customer and interbank payments as well as direct debits) and XML traffic (InterAct and FileAct messages).

The payments module (PM) of the SSP uses the SWIFTNet FIN Y-Copy\(^2\) service for the processing of all payments with a dedicated SWIFT Closed User Group (CUG) for this purpose. The PM receives a full copy of each payment to allow an efficient and comprehensive provision of information in the information and control module (ICM).

---

\(^2\) In the HAM, V-shape is used.
If the participant connects to the ICM in application-to-application mode, SWIFTNet InterAct and SWIFTNet FileAct are used. The various information and control options are set up as XML messages\(^3\). SWIFTNet Browse allows the initiation of InterAct or FileAct exchanges via a secure browser link.

### 2.4.1. Customer payments

Customer payments are defined as payments in the SWIFT MT 103 format (standard or STP). Customer payments can be processed via TARGET2 from 07:00 until 17:00.

### 2.4.2. Interbank payments

Interbank payments are defined as payment messages in the SWIFT MT 202 format. This type of message is sent by or on behalf of the ordering institution either directly or through any correspondent(s) to the financial institution of the beneficiary institution.

Interbank payments are payments, such as the payment leg of money market, foreign exchange and derivatives transactions, which take place between credit institutions or between NCBs/the ECB and credit institutions. Interbank payments can be processed via TARGET2 from 07:00 until 18:00.

### 2.4.3. Direct debits

Direct debits are defined as payment messages in the SWIFT MT 204 format. Direct debits in TARGET2 are intended for wholesale purposes only and are restricted to interbank transactions. In any case, the respective participants have to agree with the parties allowing the debiting of their accounts on the terms and conditions for using this service. The participant authorises another participant to issue a direct debit order. The participant also has to inform its central bank, which is responsible for recording and administrating the pre-agreements. Direct debits can be processed via TARGET2 from 07:00 until 18:00.

### 2.4.4. Liquidity transfers

Liquidity holdings in central bank money can be in the PM of the SSP but also in home accounts. It is possible to transfer liquidity between the different accounts via the ICM, as well as via SWIFTNet FIN. Liquidity transfers via SWIFTNet FIN can be processed via TARGET2 from 07:00 until 18:00. Liquidity transfers via the ICM are initiated via SWIFTNet InterAct. Basically, manual liquidity

\(^3\) Detailed descriptions of XML messages can be found in UDFS Book 4.
transfers transmitted via the ICM are executed immediately after transmission during the operating hours of the PM until the cut-off time for interbank payments (18:00) and from the start of night-time processing (19:30), except in specific time windows which are used for the SSP maintenance period.\textsuperscript{4}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|p{\textwidth}|}
\hline
The UDFS 1\textsuperscript{st} book (see 9.1.2.1.1.3 SWIFTNet FIN messages- User header – “Structure when sending a message” and “Structure when receiving a message”) provides information on tag 113 “Banking priority”. As it is explained there, the third and fourth characters of the field 113 are not used (and not checked by the SSP). TARGET2 users should be aware of national arrangements on the use of the tag. The Eurosystem is investigating how to come form national to common arrangements. \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\subsection*{2.4.5. SWIFTNet FileAct}

SWIFTNet FileAct allows the transfer of files and is typically used to exchange batches of structured financial messages and large reports. FileAct messages are accepted whenever the PM is open, except in the following specific time windows:

\begin{itemize}
\item SSP maintenance period;
\item end-of-day processing, start-of-day processing, provisioning of liquidity;
\item business window to prepare the next day trade phase.
\end{itemize}

\subsection*{2.4.6. SWIFTNet InterAct}

SWIFTNet InterAct allows the transfer of XML requests via the Secure IP Network (SIPN) by SWIFT to the ICM and the ancillary systems interface (ASI). XML messages are used for requests and responses related to the ICM (A2A) and for ancillary system business. Concerning ancillary system business, the messages are accepted as explained in Section 2.4.5. With regard to ICM (A2A) business, the messages are accepted depending on the underlying business case. During the maintenance period, no InterAct messages are accepted at all.

\subsection*{2.5. Settlement of ancillary systems\textsuperscript{5}}

For an ancillary system, access to settlement within the SSP will be possible both via the standard participant interface (PI) and the ancillary systems interface (ASI). In the first case, ancillary systems which fulfil the participation criteria to become a direct participant can use the functionalities of the

\textsuperscript{4} See UDFS Book 1 for the processing times of standing orders.

\textsuperscript{5} For further information, see TARGET2 UDFS, section 2.8 (Settlement of ancillary systems).
system as any other direct participant, and will in particular have an RTGS account on the platform. In the second case, the ancillary systems will access the SSP via a specific interface (the ASI), which includes a number of specific features specially designed to facilitate AS settlement, such as centralised control of the authorisation to debit a given account, use of mandated payments, specific settlement procedures, optional mechanisms and the use of specific kinds of accounts (technical account, mirror account, guarantee account). An ancillary system which uses the ASI can, if it fulfils the participation criteria, in parallel become a direct participant and open an RTGS account. Thus, it could be using the ASI (and its specific kinds of accounts) for its settlement activities and the RTGS account for other purposes. To support different business cases related to the various types of ancillary systems, six generic settlement procedures are provided by the PM via the ASI.

Table 3  Settlement procedures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement procedure&lt;sup&gt;6&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>PM generic settlement procedure</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Procedure 1</td>
<td>Liquidity transfer</td>
<td>Transfer between the cash position of a participant in the AS and in the PM through a mirror account. Settlement occurs in the AS itself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedure 2</td>
<td>Real-time settlement</td>
<td>Transfer between the accounts of two PM participants, aiming at finalising a transaction already able to settle in the AS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedure 3</td>
<td>Bilateral settlement</td>
<td>AS sends simultaneously debits and credits to the PM. Each transaction (both the debit and the credit leg) is processed independently from the other one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedure 4</td>
<td>Standard multilateral settlement</td>
<td>Debits and credits are posted simultaneously in the PM but all debits have to be settled before credits are made.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedure 5</td>
<td>Simultaneous multilateral settlement</td>
<td>Debits and credits are posted simultaneously in the PM but all debits and credits are simultaneously checked for settlement and can only be settled on an all-or-nothing basis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>6</sup> Integrated model: The final settlement of the cash leg takes place in the SSS itself. Interfaced model: The final settlement of the cash leg takes place in the PM.
Procedure 6 | Dedicated liquidity | PM participants dedicate liquidity for the settlement of the AS transactions, either on specific sub-accounts or on the mirror account. Settlement occurs either on the sub-accounts (interfaced model) or in the AS itself (integrated model). Such a settlement procedure can be used especially for night-time business, but also in daylight.

In addition, the above-mentioned mandatory settlement procedures can be adjusted to the specific needs of each ancillary system through the following mechanisms:

- an information period for pre-announcing the settlement of AS procedures 3, 4 and 5;

- a settlement period for the settlement of ancillary systems, in order not to prevent the settlement of other operations; if the ancillary system transactions are not settled at the end of this period, either the respective balances will be rejected or a guarantee mechanism will be activated;

- a guarantee fund mechanism provides the complementary liquidity needed in case ancillary system transactions cannot be settled using the liquidity of participants;

- scheduled time is a mechanism which stores the ancillary system transactions until the scheduled settlement time is reached.

Ancillary systems using the settlement procedures 3, 4, 5 and 6 can use FileAct to settle the cash leg of the AS transactions. Basically, FileAct messages based on settlement procedure 6 can be processed during the whole time the PM is open, i.e. until the cut-off time for interbank payments (18:00), and from the start of night-time processing/provision of liquidity (19:30), except in the specific time windows used for maintenance. FileAct messages based on settlement procedures 3, 4 and 5 can be processed during the day trade phase from 07:00 until 18:00.
2.6. Operational communication

2.6.1. Information and control module

The functionality of the information and control module (ICM) gives users access to a wide range of general information, e.g. on account balances or transactions. It also allows the national service desks to broadcast messages to their national banking community. If necessary, a broadcast message can be sent to all TARGET2 users. In addition, there will be a “ticker” disseminating important information.

2.6.2. Local tools

Local tools refer to national communication means. The respective national service desk is the contact point for the national users. The national service desks are interconnected via an internal ESCB teleconference system (for settlement managers). A teleconference of the settlement managers also includes SSP representatives and is coordinated by the ECB. In the event of a crisis, the settlement managers will escalate the problem to the TARGET2 crisis managers, who are also interconnected via an internal ESCB teleconference system, including the SSP crisis manager.

The relevant NCB will inform its users about the available local communication channels. National
Fundamentals

contact details are available in the ICM, together with other national information, under Contact Items.

2.6.3. TARGET2 information system

The TARGET2 information system (T2IS) gives up-to-date information on the operational status of the TARGET2 system. It is used by news agencies to receive and disseminate information on the TARGET2 systems to external parties. Hence, parties with access to the news agencies have access to this information, e.g. money market traders and the media. The T2IS is also propagated via the ECB website on the sheet “Payments & Markets” in the section “TARGET2”.

In the event that TARGET2 is not fully operational, the T2IS is used to provide information about the type of failure, its impact and the measures envisaged to solve the problem.
3. Participation

3.1. Access criteria

The Eurosystem has developed the general legal structure and principles of participation in TARGET2, which should allow participants to decide on the form of their participation in the system. As described in the general functional specifications, TARGET2 provides a number of possibilities to access the system. These include direct and indirect participation, “addressable BICs” and “multiple-addressee access” to the system. Participants must meet the TARGET2 security requirements and controls as described in section 3.5 below.

3.1.1. Direct participation

The following types of entities are eligible for direct participation in TARGET2:

(a) credit institutions established in the European Economic Area (EEA), including when they act through a branch established in the EEA;

(b) credit institutions established outside the EEA, provided that they act through a branch established in the EEA; and

(c) NCBs of EU Member States and the ECB.

The respective central bank may, at its discretion, also admit the following entities as direct participants:

(a) treasury departments of central or regional governments of Member States active in the money markets;

(b) public sector bodies of Member States authorised to hold accounts for customers;

(c) investment firms established in the EEA;

(d) organisations providing clearing or settlement services that are established in the EEA and are subject to oversight by a competent authority; and

(e) credit institutions or any of the entities of the types listed under (a) to (d), in both cases where these are established in a country with which the European Community has entered into a monetary agreement allowing access by any such entities to payment systems in the European Community, subject to the conditions set out in the monetary agreement and provided that the relevant legal regime applying in the country is equivalent to the relevant Community legislation.

Direct participants hold at least one account in the payments module of the single shared platform and
are able to: (i) submit/receive payments directly to/from the system; and (ii) settle directly with their central bank. Direct participants are responsible for all payments sent from or received on their account by any entity registered through them in TARGET2 (indirect participants, multi-addressee access entities and addressable BICs as described below).

In addition, the direct participants are able to open special-purpose accounts for non-payment activity (e.g. for the maintenance of reserve requirements) in the PM. These special-purpose accounts will be identified by a separate BIC11.

3.1.2. Indirect participation

Credit institutions established in the EEA may each enter into a contract with one direct participant that is either a credit institution or a central bank, in order to submit payment orders and/or receive payments, and to settle them via the PM account of that direct participant. TARGET2 central banks recognise indirect participants by registering such indirect participation in the TARGET2 directory.

Where a direct participant which is a credit institution and an indirect participant belong to the same group, the direct participant may expressly authorise the indirect participant to use the direct participant’s PM account directly to submit payment orders and/or receive payments by way of group-related multi-addressee access.

3.1.3. Multi-addressee access

In the TARGET2 system, direct participants are able to authorise their branches and credit institutions belonging to their group, located in EEA countries, to channel payments through the direct participant’s RTGS account without its involvement by submitting/receiving payments directly to/from the system. This offers affiliate banks or a group of banks efficient features for liquidity management and payments business.

More precisely, multi-addressee access through branches may be provided as follows:

(a) a credit institution which has been admitted as a direct participant may grant access to its PM account to one or more of its branches established in the EEA in order to submit payment orders and/or receive payments directly, provided that the respective central bank has been informed accordingly;

(b) where a branch of a credit institution has been admitted as a direct participant, the other branches of the same legal entity and/or its head office, in both cases provided that they are established in the EEA, may access the branch’s PM account, provided that it has informed the respective central bank.
In practice, a multi-addressee bank is able to send and receive payments from/at its own BIC address. The payments, however, are booked on the account of its direct participant.

### 3.1.4. Addressable BICs

The TARGET2 addressable BICs are not subject to any system rules. Any direct participant’s correspondent or branch that holds a BIC is eligible to be listed in the TARGET2 directory, irrespective of its place of establishment. Moreover, no financial or administrative criteria have been established by the Eurosystem for such addressable BICs, meaning that it is up to the direct participant to define a marketing strategy for offering such status. It is the responsibility of the direct participant to forward the relevant information to the respective central bank for inclusion in the TARGET2 directory.

Payment orders to/from addressable BICs are always sent and received via a direct participant. Their payments are settled in the account of the direct participant in the PM of the SSP.

Table 4  Participation structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Account in PM</th>
<th>Way to submit / receive payments</th>
<th>Settlement of payments</th>
<th>Subject to the system rules</th>
<th>Listed in TARGET2 directory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct participation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Directly</td>
<td>Own account in the PM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-addressee access</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Directly</td>
<td>Account of the direct participant</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect participation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Via direct participant</td>
<td>Account of the direct participant</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressable BICs</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Via direct participant</td>
<td>Account of the direct participant</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.1.5. Group of accounts

Different categories exist for receiving the group of accounts status:

**Category 1**: credit institutions that consolidate according to IAS 27;

**Category 2**: credit institutions that do not consolidate or consolidate according to other standards but which are in line with the definition provided under IAS 27; and

**Category 3**: bilateral and multilateral networks of savings and cooperative banks based on statutory/cooperation rules in line with national legal requirements.

Accordingly, the procedures for submitting an application for group status are as follows:

**Category 1**: submit an extract from the official consolidated statement of accounts or a certified declaration from an external auditor specifying which entities are included in the consolidation;

**Category 2**: submit a statement from an external auditor demonstrating to the NCB that the consolidation is equivalent to IAS 27; and

**Category 3**: the NCB will first prepare an assessment demonstrating that the “group” is in accordance with the national legal requirements and/or the statutory framework and that it fulfils the policy requirements as specified in the TARGET2 legal framework. In addition, the ECB Governing Council has to approve an application to be considered as constituting a group.

3.2. Static data collection

Registering in TARGET2 requires that direct participants register separately with SWIFT and with the SSP.\(^7\) For payments purposes only TARGET2 Directory published BICs can be used.

3.2.1. SWIFT registration process

The SWIFT registration allows participants to get the appropriate SWIFT services for TARGET2. It will be done electronically via the SWIFT website, based on an electronic form developed by SWIFT and customised for TARGET2 (the so-called “e-ordering”). Publication in the BIC directory will only become effective on one day per month. For the e-ordering process, central banks will first validate and approve all registration requests and the SSP service desk will make the second approval. The full

\(^7\) The user guide for static data collection provides information on changes in the static data of existing participants.
Participation

process, including validations and implementation by SWIFT, can take two to five weeks. To ensure
the consistency of static data between SWIFT and SSP the TARGET2 users should preferably use the
e-ordering via www.swift.com for any modification, especially for the ones related to Message
Routing Rules (MRR). In case the participant uses “my.swift.com”, which is a SWIFT customer
relationship management website, the change should be made in coordination with the NCB. The NCB
has to be informed, before the implementation date. Further information on the SWIFT registration is

3.2.2. SWIFT authentication

Direct PM participants need to have a SWIFT Relationship Management Application (RMA)
authorisation in place with TRGTXEPM, HAM participants with TRGTXEHM, the HAM co-manager
with TRGTXEPM and TRGTXEHM, and central bank customers with TRGTXECB. This step is
compulsory for all direct PM, HAM or central bank customers, regardless of whether they are already
“SWIFTNet Phase2 enabled”.

3.2.3. SSP registration process

The collection of static data for the SSP is a prerequisite for participants to access the SSP. The
collection of static data is paper-based via the TARGET2 forms. Central banks will key in the
information from the forms via the ICM. From a procedural point of view, there are four steps to be
followed.

• Analysis

The participant performs its analysis of the changes needed according to its change management
procedure and fills in the necessary forms. The forms are then submitted to the respective central bank.

The processing of changes to the static data is mainly driven by the participant. The participant defines
its requirements; often in contact with SWIFT and/or the central bank to get information on the
feasibility, in particular for complex changes, a prior communication with the central bank is
necessary. Participants may start with a business description of their future organisation/change.

The time required for the analysis depends on the participant’s organisation. For some changes, the
related tasks might require some time (e.g. new BIC, legal opinion, certification phases, etc.), while
for minor static data changes this phase should be short.

8 A detailed description of the forms can be found in “User guide for the collection of static data”.
As a result, the participant submits to its central bank:

- where applicable, a business description of the change and the process (e.g. technical changes, need for specific testing and support);
- where applicable, an updated version of the participant’s profile;
- where applicable, relevant legal documentation (e.g. country opinion);
- where applicable, technical documentation (e.g. on resiliency information); and
- SSP registration forms.

### Assessment and validation

At the legal and technical levels, the central bank checks the forms according to its local rules. In case of significant changes, the above-mentioned analysis should involve the central bank. Additionally, the central bank checks if the SWIFT registration is consistent with the static data collection forms.

The checks by the central bank aim at maintaining legal and operational safety for the whole TARGET2 system.

The central bank has to check that the certification of the participant will still be valid under the new conditions. Otherwise a new certification phase (the content of which depends on the current certification status and the nature of the change to be made) has to be planned\(^9\) and successfully performed. A participant might also request testing activities before moving to the live environment.

The checks also include the validation of the registration forms.

As a result, the central bank either validates or rejects the request.

### Processing of the static data collection

After validation, the central bank keys in the data from the forms via the ICM. If there is an impact on the TARGET2 directory, the weekly deadline for updates of the TARGET2 directory has to be taken into account.

### Final check

The participants should check the validity of the modification using the ICM.

### 3.2.4. Conflicting registration

The TARGET2 directory allows only one registration per participant BIC (direct or indirect) and only

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\(^9\) According to the change, the modification planned could have to be also implemented in the testing environment.
a single relationship between an addressable BIC/indirect participant and the direct participant which provides the access to TARGET2. It is therefore possible that two or more participants will send conflicting registration forms to their central banks. Therefore, banks should check in the TARGET2 directory whether or not the BIC they wish to register as an addressable BIC/indirect participant is already registered with another direct TARGET2 participant before they send a registration form to their central bank for the registration of addressable BICs.

If the addressable BIC/indirect participant (participant A) is already registered in the TARGET2 directory in connection with another direct participant (participant B), the requesting participant (A) will have to contact the other direct participant (B) to inform it that the routing instructions for the correspondent will change.

The participant (B) which is currently the relationship of the correspondent, will then have to fill in a form to request the deletion of the existing relationship and will submit this form to its central bank (central bank of B) and to the requestor (A).

The requestor (A) will then forward its own form for the registration of the correspondent as an addressable BIC/indirect participant together with a copy of the form for deletion of the former relationship signed by the other participant (B) to its central bank (central bank of A).

In the event that the addressable BIC/indirect participant is not in the TARGET2 directory at the time when the participant makes the check, but during the same week another participant requests the registration of the same BIC as an addressable BIC/indirect participant, one central bank request to create the new record would be rejected. That central bank would have to inform the banks about the conflicting registration request. It is up to the banks to reach an agreement on which bank should be the direct participant representing the correspondent.

### 3.3. TARGET2 directory

To support the routing of payment instructions, a TARGET2 directory is available. The TARGET2 directory uses SWIFT-related information in combination with TARGET2-specific information provided by the users during the SSP registration. The TARGET2 directory is the database of BICs used for the routing of payment orders.

Unless otherwise requested by the participant, BICs shall be published in the TARGET2 directory.10

The content of the TARGET2 directory is based on the SSP static data, as collected from direct participants on designated forms. The forms will be used by direct participants to request the opening

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10 BICs that are unpublished in the TARGET2 directory are still published in SWIFT’s BIC directory.
of their account(s) and to collect all other information required by the system. In particular, the direct participant is responsible for the registration of its indirect participants, multi-addressee access entities or addressable BICs and is liable for any mistakes or misuse during this process.

The TARGET2 directory contains information on each institution that can be addressed in TARGET2. Apart from the participant’s BIC (bank identifier code), it also contains the addressee BIC (i.e. the BIC to be used to receive and send payments), account holder (i.e. the BIC of the RTGS account), institution name, city heading and national sorting code (if available). The following is an example of an entry for a direct participant in the TARGET2 directory:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BIC</th>
<th>BANKBEBBXXX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Addressee</td>
<td>BANKBEBBXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Account holder</td>
<td>BANKBEBBXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution name</td>
<td>Bank S.A. Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City heading</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National sorting code</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main BIC flag</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of change</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid from</td>
<td>20080218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid until</td>
<td>99991231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of participation</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The TARGET2 directory is distributed only to direct participants. Distribution takes place via SWIFTNet FileAct (pull mode only for the full directory; pull mode or push mode for updates). Downloading the full content might mainly be envisaged for the initial loading of the directory or where there is a need to rebuild it. Owing to the size of the file, the use of compression is strongly recommended. Furthermore, users might download the TARGET2 directory at a central point and distribute it internally. Participants may only distribute the TARGET2 directory to their branches and entities with multi-addressee access. They are not allowed to forward the TARGET2 directory to any
other third parties via any other means.

There will be no paper version of the TARGET2 directory. The TARGET2 directory will be updated on a weekly basis. Updates will be delivered overnight, between Thursday and Friday, for activation the following Monday. The full version will be available from Friday morning. It is highly recommended that banks submit change requests to their central banks well in advance, possibly indicating a future activation date. For static data changes impacting the TARGET2 directory it is advisable to choose a Monday as activation date to ensure consistency between static data and the TARGET2 directory. Furthermore it is suggested to choose the first Monday after the monthly update of the SWIFT BICPlusIBAN Directory, in order to be consistent with it.

3.4. Certification testing

Each user must undergo a number of certification testing activities depending on the SSP modules chosen by the respective central bank and the functionality chosen by the participant. Another factor having an impact on the type and number of tests to be performed is, for example, the participation in different ancillary systems. Certification can be split into technical certification, which will consist of the successful individual completion of a number of connectivity and interoperability test cases, and operational certification, which will be assessed based on the participation in country and business day testing.

The test environment of the user should be as similar to the future live environment as possible. Any component used should have already undergone an internal acceptance test procedure.

The respective central bank must be informed in writing about any changes in the test environment and/or the future live environment of the user during or after the certification testing. That includes any technical change (e.g. to technical components or software) as well as any business change related to the interaction with TARGET2. By business change it is meant a change of the account structure or specifically the use of optional functions which were not used in the past and therefore were not part of a previous certification process. Besides clearly describing the nature and scope of the change and the associated risks, this information should contain a proposal with regard to the test cases to be re-run due to the change (non-regression testing). The central bank will assess the proposal made. In principle, changes during the technical certification (i.e. connectivity and interoperability tests) are possible, changes during the business certification (i.e. country and business day tests) should be avoided and changes after a participant’s certification are not allowed and would require a new certification process. Nevertheless, to keep the necessary flexibility, exemptions to these principles may be granted by central banks if duly justified.
Although extensive internal testing took place before opening the systems for user testing, changes to the SSP and/or the PHA cannot be completely excluded (e.g. bug fixing). For such cases, the central banks will assess the impact of the corrections on the certification process already carried out by users and will inform them accordingly. In some cases, users may be required to re-run a limited number of certification test cases (non-regression testing). Such requests to run non-regression tests will be kept to the strict minimum.

3.5. Measures to ensure the security and operational reliability of TARGET2 participants

The measures to ensure the security and operational reliability of TARGET2 participants have been finalised and endorsed by the PSSC.

3.5.1. Tasks and responsibilities

In order to ensure the security and operational reliability of TARGET2 participants, the following four main tasks and responsibilities can be distinguished:

- **framework setting by the Eurosystem**: producing guidelines to be followed by all parties involved and specifying common requirements that should be met by the TARGET2 participants;
- **compliance check by central banks**: checking whether TARGET2 participants are in compliance with the measures laid down in the framework;
- **provision of information by TARGET2 participants**: providing central banks with the relevant information as specified in the framework; and
- **monitoring and follow-up activities by central banks**: identification of weaknesses and monitoring of follow-up activities initiated to address these weaknesses.

In order to ensure that all TARGET2 participants will have to meet the same criteria and to facilitate that the compliance checks are carried out in a harmonised manner, consistent and effective guidelines and procedures have to be in place. The responsibility for establishing and maintaining this framework is assumed by the Eurosystem.

As regards compliance checks, the guiding principle is that the customer relationship remains under the full responsibility of the NCB with which the TARGET2 participant has a legal relationship. In this context, it must be stressed that the decisive criterion is not whether the TARGET2 participant is

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11 In the context of this information guide, the term “TARGET2 participant” refers to financial institutions holding a central bank account that is used for RTGS transactions in the TARGET2 system (so-called direct participants).
located inside or outside the euro area. Rather, it has to be considered whether a central bank is within the TARGET2 area\(^{12}\).

**Examples:** Denmark has not adopted the euro, but the Danish central bank is participating in TARGET2. Consequently, direct TARGET2 participants with their head office located in Denmark will typically establish a legal relationship with Danmarks Nationalbank. The situation is different for TARGET2 participants with their head office located in the United Kingdom. The Bank of England has decided not to participate in TARGET2. Therefore, any UK-based TARGET2 participant will have to select a TARGET2 central bank with which it will establish the legal relationship.

From a central bank perspective, the following questions should be asked in order to identify whether they are responsible for collecting the relevant information from a particular direct participant.

Does the direct participant manage its own technical infrastructure used for routing payments to TARGET2?

- If the answer is “Yes”: the central bank of this direct participant is the responsible central bank.
- If the answer is “No”: is the infrastructure used for routing payments to TARGET2 managed by another direct participant based in a different country (e.g. member/concentrator, branch/subsidiary, head office of a direct participant)?
  - If the answer is “Yes”: the central bank of the direct participant managing the technical infrastructure is the responsible one.
  - If the answer is “No”: does the institution managing the infrastructure offer the same service to other direct participants (e.g. service bureau)?
    - If the answer is “Yes”: the central bank having the legal relationship with the biggest direct participant in terms of value using this infrastructure is responsible.
    - If the answer is “No”: the central bank having the legal relationship with the direct participant is responsible.

If a TARGET2 participant wants to determine which central bank is responsible for its institution the following table provides some guidance by describing different possible combinations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of the situation</th>
<th>Central bank responsible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

\(^{12}\) The TARGET2 area comprises the countries of all central banks participating in TARGET2.
### Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation</th>
<th>Central bank having the legal relationship with</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head office located inside/outside(^\text{13}) the TARGET2 area; no branches/subsidiaries.</td>
<td>the head office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head office and branches/subsidiaries located inside/outside the TARGET2 area; both are direct TARGET2 participants and payments traffic is routed to TARGET2 via the technical infrastructure of the head office.</td>
<td>Central bank having the legal relationship with the head office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head office and branches/subsidiaries located inside/outside the TARGET2 area; both are direct TARGET2 participants but have their own technical infrastructure used for routing payments to TARGET2.</td>
<td>Each individual central bank having the legal relationship with the head office and the branches/subsidiaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head office located inside/outside the TARGET2 area not having a legal relationship with a TARGET2 central bank but payments traffic is routed via a branch/subsidiary which is a direct TARGET2 participant (no matter where the technical infrastructure is located).</td>
<td>Central bank having the legal relationship with the branch/subsidiary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service provider not having a legal relationship (no matter whether located inside or outside the TARGET2 area) is managing the technical infrastructure for financial institutions which are direct TARGET2 participants.</td>
<td>Central bank having the legal relationship with the financial institution generating the biggest turnover in terms of value when routing payments to TARGET2 using the technical infrastructure of a service provider.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As suggested by the table above, there might be an exception to the rule as regards service bureaus (see the section entitled “Service bureau and member/concentrator”). It is conceivable that a number of (low-volume) participants located in different countries share the technical infrastructure provided by such an organisation. However, service bureaus do not establish a legal relationship with a central bank. Rather, they maintain a legal relationship only with customers using their technical infrastructure for routing transactions to TARGET2. However, TARGET2 participants using a service bureau are legally bound by the harmonised conditions to provide their central bank with information.

\(^{13}\) In case the head office is located outside the TARGET2 area, it needs to be within the EEA.
about a failure of such an organisation. In such a case and in order to avoid the collection of identical information via different TARGET2 participants, it is the task of the central bank maintaining the legal relationship with the biggest TARGET2 participant in terms of value of those participants using the same service bureau to check whether it is in compliance with the measures laid down in the framework for ensuring the security and operational reliability of TARGET2 participants (see the section on “Critical participants and normal players”).

When TARGET2 participants use a member/concentrator, two possibilities exist: either the member/concentrator is a TARGET2 participant itself, in which case the central bank that has the legal relationship with this participant will assume the responsibilities set out in this information guide; or the member/concentrator is only a connectivity service provider (not having a legal relationship with a central bank), in which case the central bank maintaining the legal relationship with the biggest TARGET2 participant in terms of value of those participants using the same member/concentrator is responsible for checking compliance with the relevant security requirements.

To ensure that these checks can be effectively performed, TARGET2 participants will have to provide their central bank, upon request, with the necessary information and documentation.

Any weakness identified will have to be carefully evaluated, based on a harmonised approach. Follow-up action to address these weaknesses will have to be agreed and their implementation will have to be monitored. This is also a task to be performed by the central banks.

Finally, there should be no overlap between the tasks performed by central banks in the context of this framework and the activities carried out by other regulatory bodies, e.g. banking supervisors or overseers. If a redundancy of activities is identified once the framework has come into force, it will have to be investigated how this situation can be rectified.

3.5.2. Critical participants and normal players

Notwithstanding the overarching requirement to ensure a level playing-field between TARGET2 participants, all stakeholders recognise that the impact of a security failure affecting the systems of financial institutions can vary depending on the market share in terms of value and/or the type of

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14 Harmonised conditions, Article 28 (2): “Participants shall inform the [central bank responsible] of any security-related incidents in their technical infrastructure and, where appropriate, security-related incidents that occur in the technical infrastructure of the third party providers.”

15 The biggest TARGET2 participant using a service bureau might change, for example following a merger. If such a situation arises, it will have to be considered how to proceed.

16 The same principle applies when TARGET2 participants establish other arrangements for sharing IT infrastructure, e.g. by outsourcing the processing of payments to a specialised company (in some cases a joint venture with other TARGET2 participants).

17 See footnote 14.
transactions processed (e.g. settlement transactions of systemically important ancillary systems). Taking this into account, a distinction can be made between critical participants and normal players.\(^{18}\)

A basic set of instruments will be used for both critical participants and normal players. However, in recognition of the vital importance that critical participants have for the smooth functioning of the TARGET2 system, such participants will have to implement some additional measures.

In the following, TARGET2 participants are subdivided into credit institutions, ancillary systems and service bureaus/concentrators. For each group, it is explained which participants are classified as critical and which ones are considered normal players.

3.5.2.1. Credit institutions

**General considerations and rationale**

The guiding principle applied when establishing criteria to determine whether a credit institution is critical was that organisations with a sufficient market share in terms of value are eligible, as well as those where “the inability of one of the [system] participants to meet its obligations [...] could result in the inability of other system participants or of financial institutions in other parts of the financial system to meet their obligations as they become due”.\(^{19}\) In other words, an operational disruption\(^{20}\) could result in the accumulation of liquidity on a TARGET2 participant’s account, which in turn could prevent other system participants from making payments and thus potentially create systemic risk.

When addressing this issue, it had to be acknowledged that the systemic risk concept is so far only a theoretical model. There is no empirical evidence on the amount of (a) transaction(s) that, if not executed, could have systemic implications. Moreover, the amount of such (a) payment(s) could vary from system to system. Consequently, there are no objective criteria specifying exactly when the failure of a credit institution could pose a systemic risk.

**Criteria**

The definition of criteria to distinguish critical credit institutions from non-critical ones should logically depend on the statistical distribution profile of the participants’ turnover figures in terms of

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\(^{18}\) This is also in line with the document “Business continuity oversight expectations for systemically important payment systems” approved by the Governing Council of the ECB on 31 May 2006. In this document, it is stated that critical participants “… are identified as such by SIPS operators ….”


\(^{20}\) As opposed to balance sheet problems.
value. For instance, in a system with very few equal participants, these are all critical. In a system with many equal participants, it is probable that none of them are critical. Since the participation structure in TARGET2 is unknown for the moment, but will probably consist of a few high-value participants and many low-value ones, the criteria can only be based on intuitive assumptions.21

While there might be different ways to determine the criticality of credit institutions, the Eurosystem has defined three criteria that should be applied:

1. As a general guideline, the Eurosystem considers a credit institution critical for the TARGET2 market infrastructure if it consistently settles at least 2% in terms of value of the TARGET2 turnover (including liquidity transfers22) on a daily average.

2. The accumulated market share of those credit institutions settling at least 2% of the value of transactions should reach at least 25% of the overall TARGET2 turnover in terms of value. If this threshold is not reached by adding the individual figures of those credit institutions fulfilling the 2% criterion, banks with a lower market share will be added to the list of critical credit institutions.

3. There should be a noticeable difference (e.g. 0.1%) between the market share settled by the last-ranked critical credit institution and the top-ranked bank in the normal player category.

It is possible that two or more credit institutions share the technical infrastructure used for participating in the TARGET2 system (see also footnote 10). If the overall value of the transactions settled by these credit institutions in the shared environment is equal to or greater than 2% in terms of value, the organisation (for instance a transaction bank) operating the infrastructure in the legal sense is classified as a critical participant. It is noteworthy that in addition to these criteria which are commonly agreed by the Eurosystem, central banks may take into account the specific national features when classifying credit institutions with whom they maintain a business relationship. As a consequence, central banks can classify participants as critical even if none of the criteria are met. The relevant central bank has to inform the ECB about this reclassification and to explain the rationale behind it. The ECB will then form an opinion on whether the reclassification is reasonable. This opinion will be submitted to the relevant Eurosystem committee23 for further consideration and this

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21 The criteria will be reviewed at regular intervals. The review clause described in Section 3.5.8 is the mechanism that will be used to ensure that the criteria are brought into line with business practices.

22 Due to the central banks’ choice, in some central banks end-of-day/start-of-day liquidity transfers to/from the proprietary home account (PHA) take place, in which participants are not actively involved given that the former are automatically executed by the SSP and the latter are triggered by the central bank. In such cases the liquidity transfers should be deducted from the overall turnover. Whether this can be done in an automated way or requires manual calculations will have to be investigated in the context of the first review exercise (see section “Review clause”).

23 The relevant committee is the Payment and Settlement Systems Committee (PSSC) which assists the decision-making bodies of the Eurosystem in the fulfilment of the ESCB’s basic tasks, more specifically to promote the smooth operation of payment systems.
committee might decide that the criteria used by the reclassifying central bank should be commonly used. Finally, it should be noted that if a participant falls within the scope of the three above-listed criteria, central banks are not able to categorise this participant as a normal player.

### 3.5.2.2. Ancillary systems

The group of ancillary systems is composed of organisations in the field of securities clearing and settlement, retail payment systems (systemically important retail payment systems (SIRPS), prominently important retail payment systems (PIRPS) and other retail payment systems), and other large-value payment systems (e.g. CLS and EURO1).

As with credit institutions, for ancillary systems there is no empirical evidence on what exactly could cause systemic risk. Therefore, criteria for determining the criticality of ancillary systems were defined based on the results of a consultation of the relevant Eurosystem entities and available documentation.

**Retail and large-value payment systems**

Large-value payment systems are by definition classified as systemically important. Considering that a failure to settle payments for these large-value payment systems in TARGET2 could transmit shocks across the financial system (and because of CLS even globally), these systems are classified as critical.

Following the same logic, SIRPS settling via TARGET2 are also assigned to the category of critical participants.

As regards PIRPS and other retail payment systems, it was felt that a failure to clear the net balances in central bank money would not have systemic implications for the TARGET2 system or its participants. Therefore, these systems are classified as normal players.

**Organisations in the field of securities clearing and settlement**

Organisations in the field of securities clearing and settlement are CSDs (central securities depositories), ICSDs (international central securities depositories) and CCPs (central counterparties).

In the opinion of the Eurosystem, all these systems are of systemic importance and the failure of an (I)CSD/CCP would have knock-on effects on the smooth functioning of TARGET2. Consequently, all organisations in the field of securities clearing and settlement are considered critical participants.

In order to avoid over-regulation, the relevant central bank may have to examine on a case-by-case
basis whether a particular organisation in the field of securities clearing and settlement should indeed be classified as a critical participant. If the outcome of this examination were to demonstrate that the failure of such an organisation would not have systemic implications for the TARGET2 system or its participants, the relevant central bank could classify it as a normal player. The relevant central bank has to inform the ECB about this reclassification and to explain the rationale behind it. The ECB will then form an opinion on whether the reclassification is reasonable. This opinion will be submitted to the relevant Eurosystem committee for further consideration and this committee might decide that the criteria used by the reclassifying central bank should be commonly used.

3.5.2.3. Service bureaus and member/concentrators

Apart from sharing the connection to SWIFTNet of another SWIFT customer, there are two other ways for a TARGET2 participant to connect indirectly\(^{24}\) to SWIFTNet. These are:

- outsourcing the day-to-day operation to a third party, called a service bureau\(^{25}\); and

- in addition to the technical connectivity (see previous bullet point), using a member/concentrator which provides supplementary business services, e.g. taking care of the SWIFT administration and invoicing on behalf of the TARGET2 participant.

Credit institutions and potentially also ancillary systems could decide to use one of these connectivity models. Considering that these organisations obtain a BIC8 for addressing through SWIFT and take responsibility for their messages, they are direct TARGET2 participants, although they are only indirectly connected. Since the payments traffic of multiple TARGET2 participants would be routed via an indirect connection, an operational failure of the service bureaus’ or member/concentrators’ technical infrastructure might have systemic implications.

Currently, insufficient information is available on the extent to which these two connectivity models will be used and how much traffic in terms of value they will generate. The number of service bureaus and member/concentrators and the participants using a connection via these organisations will be determined during the migration period. Although the Eurosystem has provisionally concluded that service bureaus are not per se considered critical at this stage, it seems advisable that, if the total payments traffic routed via such an organisation exceeds the 2% criterion applicable to credit institutions (see section “Criteria”), it is treated like a critical participant.

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\(^{24}\) An indirect connection to SWIFTNet is typically used by smaller institutions which are looking for a cost-effective SWIFTNet connectivity solution.

\(^{25}\) A service bureau is defined as a “non-SWIFT organisation entitled under the SWIFT Service Bureau Policy to provide facilities management and/or data processing services to one or more SWIFT Users, including operation of a SWIFT interface for prime connection to the network and/or for disaster recovery. A Service Bureau may not send or receive messages through the SWIFT network for its own account and accordingly is not entitled to a SWIFT address” (SWIFT Glossary, March 2005 edition).
Since service bureaus and member/concentrators do not have a legal relationship with the Eurosystem, the legal basis for such organisations to fulfil the requirements laid down in this information guide can only be created via the participants.

### 3.5.3. Measures to ensure the security and operational reliability of TARGET2 participants

The guiding policy principle is that measures applied to ensure the security and operational reliability of TARGET2 participants should be commensurate with their criticality. In the previous sections criteria for determining critical participants were outlined. Section 3.5.3.1 describes the measures that should be used for both critical participants and normal players. Section 3.5.3.2 outlines the procedures that should be applied for critical participants only.

#### 3.5.3.1. Measures applied for critical participants and normal players

### Measures applied for critical participants and normal players

One measure to address security issues from a general perspective is the insertion of a clause in the legal arrangements between the central banks and the TARGET2 participants.

In particular, Article 28 (1) of the harmonised conditions for participation in TARGET2 (which will be part of the relevant arrangements with TARGET2 participants) clearly states that it is under the full responsibility of the TARGET2 participant to ensure that the confidentiality, integrity and availability of its system are adequately protected.

Moreover, Article 31 (4) of these conditions states, *inter alia*, that central banks will not be liable if a loss is caused by the TARGET2 participant. It implies that if the smooth functioning of TARGET2 is affected because of an incident caused by the malfunction of the TARGET2 participant’s system, the TARGET2 system operator will not accept any liabilities towards this participant. However, the TARGET2 participant which caused the problem would have to reimburse the central bank (subject to the conditions set out in the harmonised conditions and under the applicable law) if the latter had to compensate other TARGET2 participants because of this incident.

### Monitoring and incident reporting

A participant’s capability to prevent liquidity accumulation on its account is of crucial importance for the smooth functioning of the TARGET2 system. Therefore, monitoring the performance in terms of availability of a participant’s component and incident reporting are two means that can – in the longer
Participation

run – contribute to the stability and robustness of the TARGET2 system.

Once a participant is live in the TARGET2 system, the participant’s performance is closely monitored\textsuperscript{26} by the respective central bank.

In the event that a TARGET2 participant is affected by an operational disruption, staff responsible are requested to inform, upon their own initiative, the relevant central bank immediately. Once the participant has resumed operations, the central bank may send an incident report form (Annex II) to the participant for completion. This report requires the participant to describe the root cause of the problem, the impact, the steps taken to resolve the issue and mitigating action that should prevent the incident from reoccurring.

A minor operational disruption, although it might cause inconvenience when making some payments, is not considered critical as long as the duration\textsuperscript{27} does not exceed 30 minutes for critical participants. As long as the duration of an incident is below this limit, an incident report would not be required. For normal participants, it is up to the relevant central bank to decide whether an incident report is required. The decisive factor is whether the incident had an impact on the smooth functioning of TARGET2 or other system participants. In this context, it is worth mentioning that an incident report is not required when a TARGET2 participant makes a conscious decision to suspend payment processing activities for a certain period of time, although it is not facing any technical problems. In order to avoid confusion, the TARGET2 participant is invited to inform its home central bank about the suspension as soon as possible.

As stated above, a formal incident report is not required if the operational disruption is less than 30 minutes or based on a conscious decision to suspend payment processing activities. However, if a central bank observes repetitive short service interruptions, it will contact its participant and ask for clarification which could ultimately result in the need for a formal response.

TARGET2 participants must return the incident report to the relevant central bank within two business days of the occurrence of the incident. The character of this report could be twofold:

- If the incident has already been evaluated at that time, this first incident report is considered as the final evaluation report.
- If the incident is still under investigation, the initial information that can already be provided should be considered as an interim report. The final evaluation report, which complements the information given in the interim report, should then be sent to the central bank no later than one

\textsuperscript{26} CP VII (7.7.4): System operator activities should also involve “monitoring the security and operational reliability of the participants, for example the availability of their components during normal business hours”.

\textsuperscript{27} Calculated from the moment the downtime was detected until the moment the system was operational again.
Participation

month after the incident occurred.

Once the incident report is marked final, it is reviewed, analysed and recorded in a service incident log. If a participant’s performance was posing risks to the smooth functioning of TARGET2 or other participants, adequate measures will have to be taken, e.g. it should be drawn to the attention of senior officials of the participant.

Incidents affecting the participants’ availability are probably the only ones that could be identified by the system operator itself by comparing actual payment processing with normal patterns. When a central bank notices a deviation from the normal pattern and suspects that the participant may be experiencing potentially serious availability problems it has not been informed about, the participant will be contacted and an explanation will be requested.

In addition, TARGET2 participants are requested, upon their initiative, to report security problems concerning confidentiality and integrity. If information about such problems is made publicly available, this could have a negative effect on the reputation of the TARGET2 system as a whole. Only if the system operator is informed about such incidents can it be ensured that an appropriate communication strategy is in place to reassure financial markets and the public.

3.5.3.2. Measures to be used for critical participants only

System security in accordance with standards

Core Principle VII identifies different standards as being appropriate to the payment and banking industry. According to section 7.7.5 of the Core Principles, compliance with such national or international standards will help to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability.

Taking this into account, critical TARGET2 participants are asked to self-certify that security within their organisation is addressed in line with internationally recognised standards such as ISO/IEC 17799:2005, which is explicitly listed in the Core Principles28. Compliance with other standards focusing on information security might also be acceptable.

For this purpose, senior management responsible for the business area (i.e. board level) of the critical TARGET2 participant shall file with the relevant central bank a self-certification statement29 indicating the process by which compliance with one of these standards is envisaged and the actual

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29 The statement will be developed once TARGET2 has commenced live operations.
extent of compliance with the standard. Given the heavy reliance on information technology (IT), the self-certificate must, in addition, be signed by a senior official from the IT area (also board level) of the critical TARGET2 participant’s organisation. If one senior official of the critical TARGET2 participant is responsible for both, the business and the IT area, one signature is sufficient.

Central banks will send the self-certification form to their critical TARGET2 participants, which have three months to respond. Central banks monitor whether the signed form is returned by the indicated deadline and, if not, contact the TARGET2 participant to clarify the situation.

In case of any non-compliance with the (self-imposed) standard, the self-certificate should be complemented with a description of the major risks associated with this situation. Furthermore, an action plan for rectifying the situation and the planned dates for implementing the particular measures should be included. This information is evaluated and the implementation of mitigation measures monitored by the central bank responsible.

**Business continuity**

On 31 May 2006 the Governing Council of the ECB approved the “Business continuity oversight expectations for systemically important payment systems (SIPS)” (in the following referred to as “oversight expectations”). This report lays down new oversight expectations with regard to business continuity for systemically important payment systems processing the euro.

The oversight expectations include a section dedicated to participants because “the technical failure of critical participants in the system may induce systemic risk”. According to this document, participants which are identified as critical by the system operator have to meet certain minimum requirements to ensure that business can be continued in the event of an operational disruption. The oversight expectations allocate the responsibility for verifying whether these requirements have been fulfilled to the system operator.

In particular, critical TARGET2 participants are requested to confirm that:

- business continuity plans are produced and procedures for maintaining them are in place;
- there is an alternate site in place; and
- the risk profile of the alternate site is different from the one of the primary site. Having a different risk profile shall mean that the alternate site must be a significant distance away from, and does

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30 Major risks could be: insufficient measures against denial of service attacks; uninterruptible power supply not in place; the four-eyes control is not effective.
not depend on the same physical infrastructure components\textsuperscript{31} as the primary business location. This minimises the risk that both could be affected by the same event. For example, the alternate site should be on a different power grid and central telecommunication circuit from the primary business location.\textsuperscript{32}

In this context, it is acknowledged that TARGET2 participants can only be responsible for what is within their immediate sphere of control. There is an element of reliance on suppliers and participants cannot be held liable if the resilience of a service provided by a third party is less robust than expected. However, the participants should make efforts to ensure that an appropriate level of resilience is stipulated in the contract with the suppliers. For example, a telecom provider should commit on multiple routing facilities and this should be laid down in the contractual arrangements.

- in the event of a major operational disruption rendering the primary site inaccessible and/or rendering critical staff unavailable, the participant is able to resume normal operations from the alternate site where the business day can be properly closed and reopened the following business day;
- in order to bridge the time needed for moving business from the primary to the alternate site, procedures are in place to ensure that the most critical business transactions can be performed; and
- the ability to cope with operational disruptions is tested at least once a year and critical staff are adequately trained.

TARGET2 participants should confirm their level of compliance with the oversight expectations in the context of the self-certification process. Central banks will then check whether the oversight expectations are being met. A testing programme will verify whether the provisions for business continuity are effective (see the section on “Testing”).

**Testing**

In order to verify that business continuity arrangements are effective, they have to be tested at regular intervals.

CP VII (7.7.19) stipulates that testing of the clearly documented business continuity arrangements

\textsuperscript{31} It should be noted that there is no obligation to use different hardware brands and/or software components, e.g. to install MS Windows infrastructure in the primary site and UNIX systems in the alternate location. The statement “…should not depend on the same physical infrastructure…” emphasizes that alternate sites should not rely on the same infrastructure components (e.g. transportation, telecommunications, water and electricity supply) as those used by the primary site.

should also involve the system’s participants.

Testing activities can, in principle, be subdivided into two different scenarios. The first scenario comprises bilateral testing of contingency arrangements between TARGET2 participants and a central bank. These activities are already an integral part of the TARGET2 user testing programme that participants have to perform prior to joining TARGET2.

Additionally, in the context of TARGET2 the need for a more comprehensive scenario emerged comprising a failover from the primary to the alternate site. For this reason, a testing programme will be developed by the Eurosystem describing for example the precise scope of testing (test scenarios, e.g. minor operational disruptions, widespread regional disaster), the test intervals, etc. Such a programme will be established in close cooperation with the financial industry. Owing to the fact that establishing such a testing programme is quite time consuming and considering that it should only be used once all countries have migrated to TARGET2, the objective is to complete the work on this item by mid-2009. A first test cycle should then be completed by mid-2010. Finally, when the testing programme is being developed, the cost of the business continuity testing activities will have to be assessed.

For critical TARGET2 participants, it is mandatory to take part in the testing activities. The successful completion of the tests will be monitored by the relevant central banks.

**Annual self-recertification**

Systems processing information like payment transactions are operating in an ever-changing environment. New threats, new business requirements or newly identified vulnerabilities might change the security situation of a particular system considerably.

For this reason, the TARGET2 system operator would like to be reassured that the security of participants’ components continues to meet the requirements specified by the Eurosystem. Therefore, on a yearly basis critical TARGET2 participants will be asked to recertify that compliance with the Eurosystem’s requirements is still being observed.

In this context, it is noteworthy that the annual self-recertification should not be confused with the technical testing activities each participant has to successfully complete before a connection to TARGET2 will be permitted.
3.5.4. Implementation

3.5.4.1. Legal enforceability

The harmonised conditions for participation in TARGET2, more specifically Article 28, outline at a high level the security measures, thus setting the framework for the legal enforceability of the detailed measures specified in this information guide. However, the practical and legal implementation which makes the individual measures binding for TARGET2 participants is a national responsibility of each central bank. Consequently, it is up to the central banks to decide how to integrate the security measures for TARGET2 participants into the legal arrangements with their customers (e.g. annex to the contract, publication on the website with a reference in the contract, letter from the central bank, etc.). As the legislation varies from country to country, to ensure that the measures are legally enforced in a similar way and in accordance with the provisions of the harmonised conditions for participation in TARGET2 in all countries participating in TARGET2, central banks will be invited at a later stage to report through which means this has been achieved.

3.5.4.2. Interim period

The measures described in the previous sections are applicable with immediate effect following approval by the Governing Council of the ECB.

With respect to the measures for critical participants, they define access criteria which would ideally have to be met prior to joining the TARGET2 system. Critical TARGET2 participants would have to self-certify that information security is addressed in accordance with internationally recognised standards and that the business continuity requirements specified in the section “Business continuity” are being met. Moreover, business continuity arrangements would have to be successfully tested in accordance with the defined testing programme (see the section on “Testing”).

The Eurosystem is aware that a common concept similar to the one described in this information guide did not exist for the current TARGET system and that the requirements are new to the market in the context of TARGET2. It is furthermore acknowledged that some preparatory work might need to be done in order to meet the requirements. Moreover, the data for determining which credit institutions are critical will only be available once all central banks have migrated to TARGET2. Finally, it is noted that work on one element of the framework, namely the business continuity testing programme (see the section on “Testing”), has not started yet. Taking these aspects into consideration, the Eurosystem concluded that a transition period is needed allowing critical participants to make the
necessary arrangements in order to meet the criteria.

For critical participants, the implementation deadline is consistent with the one specified in the oversight expectations. According to this document, critical participants should have implemented the necessary arrangements by mid-2010. Consequently, this deadline also applies in respect of the requirements critical participants would have to fulfil from a TARGET2 system operator perspective.

### 3.5.4.3. Constructive approach

It should be stressed that the objective of the framework is not to prevent institutions from participating in TARGET2. Rather, the specified measures aim at strengthening the resilience and robustness of the TARGET2 system as a whole, thus contributing to the stability of financial markets.

If a critical TARGET2 participant fails to meet one of the requirements, the central bank responsible will start leading and coordinating a moral suasion process by raising awareness about the risks arising from the identified weaknesses. In close cooperation with the participant in question, the central bank responsible will develop a programme to gradually improve the situation. In case a persistent situation of unwillingness and bad faith impedes such a gradual improvement, the participant should normally not be allowed to participate in the TARGET2 system anymore. However, a final decision will only be made following a careful evaluation of the situation at Eurosystem level.

While there will be a transition period for implementing the measures applicable to critical participants, only the legal arrangements and the incident reporting scheme will come into force as soon as the concept has been approved by the decision-making bodies of the ECB and TARGET2 has commenced live operations.

Finally, once the critical participants have been identified, the relevant central banks should contact them and ask them to indicate their level of preparedness considering the above-mentioned deadline for implementation. If significant gaps between the requirements outlined in this guide and the actual situation are identified, a work plan should be established. This plan should be monitored by the central bank responsible to ensure that the required measures are implemented by the above-mentioned deadline.

### 3.5.5. Communication and coordination

A sound organisational structure is essential for the communication and coordination of security issues between central banks and their participants to be managed in an effective and trustworthy manner. Each central bank and its TARGET2 participants have the responsibility to ensure that the necessary activities within the respective organisations are organised in a proper and efficient way. When
sensitive information is exchanged between the parties involved, it must be ensured that this information is properly labelled and receives an appropriate level of protection.

3.5.6. Confidentiality

All information provided by the TARGET2 participants will be treated as confidential by the Eurosystem. It will only be used to assess whether TARGET2 participants are in compliance with the measures required by the Eurosystem in order to fulfil its system operator responsibilities as requested through the Core Principles.

In the event that TARGET2 participants receive sensitive information in the context of the overall framework, it goes without saying that they must treat this information as confidential.

3.5.7. Reporting

As outlined above, central banks are responsible for maintaining the relationship with their customers. In this respect, they are responsible for collecting the required information and monitoring any follow-up activities. For example, if a participant’s provisions for business continuity were considered to be ineffective, it would need to be discussed how the identified shortcomings could be resolved and by when the mitigating measures would be implemented.

Given the fact that the Eurosystem, as a whole, assumes payment system operator responsibilities, the information about incidents which could have an impact on the smooth functioning of TARGET2 gathered by the central banks will have to be made available to the responsible committee at Eurosystem level. Given the sensitivity of this information, it is of utmost importance that it is treated in strict confidentiality. It might even be considered to present the information in an anonymous form.

The committee will have to review the information and consider on a case-by-case basis which measures should be taken in order to ensure that a particular TARGET2 participant does not pose any risk to the smooth functioning of TARGET2 and its participants.

The reporting format and the detailed procedures for submitting information to the responsible committee are defined at Eurosystem level. These Eurosystem internal procedures should ensure that central banks not actively involved in the data collection process get access to these data and that information is shared in an effective and consistent manner.

3.5.8. Review clause

Regular reviews of the overall framework are necessary to deliver assurance that it remains appropriate.
For example, the criteria used to determine critical credit institutions are not set in stone. The Eurosystem has the responsibility to adapt the criteria in the light of experience gained during TARGET2 business operations or when new research results on systemic risk become available.

Another example could be that the payments traffic generated by individual credit institutions is subject to changes. If following a merger a credit institution is suddenly processing more than 2% of the value of transactions in TARGET2, this credit institution would need to be classified as critical and would have to meet the requirements specified for that type of organisation.\(^{33}\)

Therefore, the criteria for determining critical players and the classification of critical players are reviewed at least on an annual basis. In addition to that, TARGET2 participants are obliged to inform their central banks well in advance of significant changes in their business practices.

A first review exercise (including the identification of critical participants) will be conducted once all central banks have migrated to the TARGET2 system and the statistics for the third quarter of 2008 are available.

### 3.6. Termination or suspension of a participant

Eurosystem CBs shall immediately terminate without prior notice or suspend a participant’s participation in the relevant TARGET2 component system if:

(a) insolvency proceedings are opened in relation to a participant; and/or

(b) a participant no longer meets the access criteria for the participation in the relevant TARGET2 component system.

If a Eurosystem CB suspends or terminates a participant’s participation in TARGET2 it shall immediately notify all other Eurosystem CBs thereof. Each Eurosystem CB shall, if so requested by another Eurosystem CB, exchange information in relation such participant, including information in relation to payments addressed to it. It initiates the termination or suspension via the ICM. The termination or suspension becomes effective in all modules at the same time.

From a technical point of view the termination or suspension of a participant is possible at any time the SSP is running. As next step the CB informs the T2 Coordinator which in turn initiates a teleconference to inform all Settlement Managers about the termination or suspension of a participant. Additionally the reporting central bank sends an ICM broadcast immediately to its users and to all central banks, with the legal terminology as laid down in the harmonised condition for participation in

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\(^{33}\) If, as a result of the review, a credit institution is classified as “critical” and as a consequence has to meet the requirements applicable for that type of organisation, the TARGET2 participant, in cooperation with its home central bank, will have to establish a plan detailing how and by when compliance will be achieved (see also the section on “Implementation”).
TARGET2. The following text template will be used:

[Suspension/Termination] of the direct TARGET2 participant [BIC and full name]

Please be informed that the [respective central bank] has [suspended/terminated] the TARGET2 participation of [BIC and full name] in the TARGET2 system with immediate effect.

Optional: Further information will follow [by XX:XX/as soon as available].

After reception of the broadcast the central banks disseminate the same broadcast to their users.

**Effects of the termination or suspension of a PM participant**

- RTGS account and sub-accounts are **earmarked immediately**.
- No payments can be settled automatically on these accounts any more.
- Participants are **informed via a broadcast** in the ICM to all users.
- Payments involved in a **running settlement process** are **not affected** by the termination or suspension.
- The CB has to confirm **pending payments** in the queue via ICM before they will be settled on the RTGS account.
- Payments **sent by** the suspended participant after suspension are stored for confirmation by the CB via ICM.
- Payments **sent to** the suspended participant after suspension are stored for confirmation by the CB via ICM.
- It depends on the national rules on which basis the CB gives the confirmation on payments

As concerns liquidity pooling arrangements, the NCBs that are party of an aggregated liquidity (AL) agreement and act as the counterparty for the TARGET2 participants that entered into an AL agreement and participate in its TARGET2 component shall exchange all information that is necessary for the performance of their duties and obligations under an AL agreement. These NCBs shall immediately notify the managing NCB of any enforcement event of which they become aware relating to the AL group or any AL group member, including the head office and branches thereof.

If the terminated or suspended direct PM participant is a **group of accounts (GoA) manager**, he will
not be able to act as a GoA manager from the time the termination or suspension becomes effective.

If the terminated or suspended participant is the co-manager for HAM accounts, it will no more be able to act as co-manager after termination or suspension. It is up to the co-managed HAM account holders to nominate a new co-manager. By default the NCB can co-manage.

If the terminated or suspended direct PM participant is an AS Settlement Bank, it will be treated according to the rules valid for direct PM participants. The CB of the Settlement Bank has to confirm the transactions.

If an Ancillary System is terminated or suspended from the PM it will be treated according to the rules valid for direct PM participants. The CB of the AS has to confirm the transactions.

### Termination or suspension of a HAM participant

- The termination or suspension will also become effective immediately.
- If despite the suspension payments have to be booked on the HAM account of the suspended participant they can only be executed by the relevant central bank. This concerns both, payments sent to the suspended participant and payments to be initiated on behalf of the suspended participant.
- Pending payments in the queue and new payments to and from this participant will be rejected immediately.

### 3.7. TARGET2 billing

The invoice for all the TARGET2 services during a given month is sent to the direct participants by the relevant NCB at the beginning of the next month (no later than on the fifth business day) and it has to be paid at the latest on the tenth business day of that month. The fees will be paid via direct debit (MT204) imitated by the relevant NCB. In case of ancillary systems without PM account, the ancillary system has to initiate a credit transfer to the account specified by the relevant NCB.

The billing period is monthly for the fees that should be paid by the users of TARGET2 services (i.e. core services, ancillary systems, liquidity pooling services), except for the one-off fee.
3.7.1. Transactions initiated by credit institutions

Under the TARGET2 core pricing scheme, every transaction received by the PM of the SSP from a direct participant34 (e.g. normal payments, liquidity transfers initiated in the PM) incurs a transaction fee. The following types of transactions are excluded:

- transactions crediting the account of an ancillary system used for the settlement of transactions/balances of such a system35;
- transactions related to reversal payments in the context of ASI procedure 4;
- liquidity transfers from an RTGS account to a sub-account or vice versa in the context of ASI procedure 6; and
- transactions for levelling out a group of accounts.

The transactions rejected for reasons other than technical reasons (i.e. a payment rejected at the end of the day because of a lack of liquidity, or a payment cancelled by its sender while queued) will be charged the same way as if they had been settled.

The direct participants are invoiced for all the fees of the core pricing scheme. The invoice is created per RTGS account. A legal entity with several accounts (participants) would receive several invoices.

The fee is to be paid by the participant whose account is debited (i.e. the sender of the payment messages for credit transfers and the payer for direct debits).

Other kinds of participants (indirect participants, multi-addressee access entities, addressable BICs) are not subject to the billing and do not receive any invoice. Their fees (i.e. one-off, monthly and transaction fees) are charged to the direct participants which have the business relationship with these entities. The transactions of these kinds of participants are included in those of their direct participant and therefore are implicitly charged.

The other types of participants which do not have an RTGS account in the PM (e.g. central bank customers, participants with a HAM account only, credit institutions subject to reserve management managed in the RM and having no account otherwise) are not concerned by the fees as defined for the TARGET2 core service pricing scheme considering that the fees are determined by their relevant NCB.

34 Including the entities authorised to debit the direct participant’s account for sending payments to the system, i.e. multi-addressee access.
35 An ancillary system may hold an account in the PM of the SSP for other purposes than settlement of balances/transactions, e.g. for the payment of expenses, fees, penalties, and interest related to the participation by members of such a system. In this case, the transactions sent by the participants crediting the account of the ancillary system are subject to the core pricing scheme.
The account of the direct participant is charged with the amount invoiced by the relevant NCB. In the case of a legal entity with several accounts, the several invoices received would be paid by the direct participant from the account announced to its NCB.

### 3.7.2. Transactions on accounts included in a group

The group pricing allows for the aggregation of the transactions of all the participants belonging to a group of accounts. These transactions are charged according to the normal core pricing scheme, but the degressive fee structure is applied to the sum of all transactions on the accounts of the group. In case a group is included in another larger group of accounts (typically, an aggregated liquidity (AL) group and some participants from a consolidated account information (CAI) group), the largest group is always the basis for the invoicing.

The direct participant which holds the main account of the group, i.e. the group manager, will be invoiced for all the fees related to all accounts in the group:

- TARGET2 core service fees (fixed fee, transaction fees and specific fees related to unpublished BICs, multi-addressee access, indirect participation and addressable BICs);
- fees for the liquidity pooling service.

In case the CAI group manager is different from the AL group manager, the participant that holds the main account of the CAI group will be invoiced for the total fees of the group of accounts, according to the degressive scheme applied to all payments of its group.

The account of the group manager (i.e. AL group or CAI group) is debited for all the fees applicable to the entities participating in the group of accounts.

### 3.7.3. Ancillary system transactions

Any transaction sent or received by an ancillary system is considered an ancillary system-related transaction. All the transactions involving accounts belonging to the ancillary systems are invoiced as ancillary system transactions, irrespective of whether they are performed through the ASI or not. Also, the transactions involving the guarantee account are subject to ancillary system transaction pricing. Therefore, in order to avoid charging a system twice, TARGET2 will not charge banks when they send a payment to an ancillary system. The ancillary system would then charge its banks in accordance with its own pricing scheme outside of TARGET2.
With respect to the definition of billable transactions settled via the ASI, the charging modalities for ancillary system transactions are as follows:

- for the ancillary systems settling bilateral transactions under ASI settlement procedures 4, 5 and 6 (i.e. the “double-charging” case): to charge only half of the number of debits and credits on the RTGS accounts/sub-accounts (i.e. the sum of the number of debits and credits on the RTGS accounts/sub-accounts divided by two);

- for the ancillary systems settling bilateral transactions without involving a technical account in the settlement process: to charge for every transaction (i.e. debit) on an RTGS account, similar to a normal TARGET2 payment; and

- for the ancillary systems settling multilateral transactions (necessarily via a technical account): to charge for each debit on the RTGS account/sub-account (to the technical account) and for each credit to an RTGS account/sub-account (from the technical account).

As regards the charging of the liquidity transfers under the ASI settlement procedures, the Eurosystem decided the following:

- not to charge for the liquidity transfers from the RTGS accounts to sub-accounts and vice versa (i.e. in settlement procedure 6 (interfaced)); and

- to charge for the liquidity transfers between the RTGS accounts and mirror accounts for every debit and credit on the RTGS accounts (i.e. in settlement procedures 1, 3 and 6).

As far as the transactions related to auto-collateralisation are concerned, the Eurosystem decided not to charge for these transactions following the same principle as for liquidity transfers from the RTGS accounts to sub-accounts.

The following types of entities will be invoiced according to the ancillary system pricing scheme:

- ancillary system entities: all the transactions involving accounts belonging to these entities are invoiced as ancillary system transactions, irrespective of whether they are performed through the ASI or not;

- central banks: an NCB operating an ancillary system is subject to the ancillary system pricing scheme just like any private ancillary system; and

- entities (e.g. ancillary systems, central banks) holding a guarantee account: transactions involving this account are subject to ancillary system transaction pricing. The core service fixed fee is not invoiced for this account (it is deemed to be covered by the ancillary system
fixed fee for the respective ancillary system).

As a matter of principle, the account of the ancillary system which is used for the settlement of balances/transactions of its participants is never used to pay the TARGET2 invoices. If the ancillary system holds an account on which non-AS-related transactions can be made, this account is charged for all the fees as defined in the ancillary system pricing scheme.

Alternatively, if the ancillary system holds an account with a commercial bank, the invoice could be paid via a direct debit message on the PM account of this bank, or via a credit transfer initiated by the ancillary system via this bank.

3.7.4. Minimum set of information included in the invoice

Given the fact that not all the NCBs are using the optional billing services (i.e. CRISP) provided by the 3CB, a harmonisation with respect to the billing information of the invoices that are sent to the TARGET2 users is needed.

The minimum set of information to be included in the invoice presented to the participants is listed below:

- information on the billing period;
- information on the number of priceable items used by each participant during the billing period;
- information on the participation type of each participant;
- information on the type of settlement and procedure used (in the case of an ancillary system);
- information on the VAT (if needed); and
- information on the option of the TARGET2 core service.

Further information on the billing and pricing scheme for TARGET2 is available in the “TARGET2 pricing guide for users”.

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Participation
4. TARGET2 operational day in normal situations

Each national banking community will be serviced by a national service desk at their home central bank. The national service desk will cater for all the participants’ needs as far as the usage of the services offered within the SSP and local infrastructures are concerned, as well as for general monitoring of business during the day.

The national service desks will give particular attention to payments which are classified as (very) critical or which, according to local experience, deserve a special focus, and in addition to individual players which may have systemic significance (both banks and ancillary systems). Finally, they should carefully look at country-wide/systemic patterns.

In the following sections, the procedures during a normal operational day are described according to the phases of the operational day. It should be kept in mind that the business day starts already in the evening of the previous calendar day.

4.1. Start of the day (18:45 – 19:00)

The new business day in TARGET2 begins after the end-of-previous-day procedures and the start-of-current-day procedures have been successfully completed. This is normally confirmed between 18:45 and 19:00 with a broadcast message which is sent to all users. The time can also be taken from the ICM screen information on the “Operating Day”.

The ICM broadcast has the following text:

“End-of-day procedures for dd-mm-yy have been completed. The dd-mm-yy business day is now open.”

4.2. Liquidity provision (19:00 – 19:30)

Between 19:00 and 19:30 liquidity is provided for the day-time settlement and night-time settlement if applicable. The following liquidity movements can take place:

- from the SF to the PM;
- from the SF to the HAM;
- from the HAM to the PM; or
- from the PHA to the PM (optional).
These 30 minutes could also be used to update credit lines or to settle repos before opening.

4.3. Night-time settlement (NTS) procedures (19:30 – 06:45)

Liquidity for NTS (setting aside to sub-/mirror accounts)

After the liquidity is again in the PM, sub-accounts and mirror accounts are credited to allow ancillary systems to start the night-time settlement.

The night-time window will be available from 19:30 to 06:45, with a technical maintenance period between 22:00 and 01:00. Hence, the night-time settlement of the different ancillary systems in central bank money is facilitated. There will be adequate technical/operational tools available in TARGET2 in order to run the night-time settlement smoothly.

Support for credit institutions or ancillary systems taking part in the night-time settlement will be subject to agreement with their home central bank.

During the night-time settlement window, liquidity transfers via the ICM to and from the RTGS account will, in principle, be possible.
Liquidity provisioning for NTS (“non-concordant orders”)

Concerning the processes of settlement procedure 6, see the diagram below.

A distinction can be made between standing orders and current orders by the settlement bank and the ancillary system:

**Standing order**

The stored amount will be used continuously until the next change. Different orders are possible for day- and night-time business. Standing orders have to be inserted by the user via the ICM by 18:00 at the latest (effective from the forthcoming night-time settlement).

They are executed immediately after the start-of-procedure message is released. A partial execution might apply in case of insufficient liquidity. The remaining part will not be settled.

**Current order by the settlement bank**

A current order is inserted by the settlement bank via the ICM after the start-of-procedure message is sent (but before the end-of-procedure message is sent). The current order gets immediately executed if received prior to the first cycle or between two cycles (in the liquidity adjustment phase). If received during a cycle, the current order will be stored.

In case of insufficient liquidity, a current order will be rejected.
**Current order by the ancillary system**

A current order by an ancillary system is based on internal rules. A pre-agreement between the ancillary system and settlement bank is necessary. A sending of current orders is possible after the start-of-procedure message has been sent. The current order gets immediately executed if it is received prior to the first cycle or between two cycles (in the liquidity adjustment phase). It is stored if it is received during a cycle. A partial execution applies in case of insufficient liquidity. The remaining part will not be settled.

**Concordance of orders**

A parallel execution of standing orders and current orders cannot happen, because standing orders are already executed before current orders can be sent.

Incoming current orders – independent of whether they are from a settlement bank or an ancillary system – will be executed immediately when they are received.

Stored current orders (due to the running of a cycle) will be executed on a FIFO basis.

For night-time settlement, a common start-of-procedure message is automatically released for all participating ancillary systems. Therefore, all standing orders for a single settlement bank belonging to several ancillary systems will be executed at the same time. If there is insufficient liquidity to cover the sum of standing orders, all standing orders will be reduced following a pro-rata rule. The pro-rata rule functions as follows:

**Calculation of a reduction factor:** existing liquidity/sum of standing orders

**Reduction of standing orders:** standing order x reduction factor

4.4. **Business window (06:45 – 07:00)**

The business window is used by the Eurosystem to prepare for the day trade phase.

4.5. **Day trade phase (07:00 – 18:00)**

At 07:00 TARGET2 will open for payment processing; this will be shown on the respective ICM screen. The normal start-up will be confirmed by a message in the T2IS confirming the start of the day trade phase.

During the day trade phase, certain payment flows should be monitored particularly closely due to their systemic importance. It is expected that credit institutions will give these payments priority internally.
TARGET2 operational day in normal situations

• **07:00 – 12:00: CLS-related payments**

The CLS (Continuous Linked Settlement) scheme provides global multi-currency settlement services for the forex contracts using a payment versus payment (PvP) mechanism. In order to allow this, CLS has access to central bank money in each of the eligible currencies. For the settlement of the euro, CLS holds an account with the ECB and receives and sends euro payments via TARGET2. A pay-in schedule (PIS) is issued daily and specifies the funds the settlement members must transfer to CLS at five, hourly deadlines (08:00, 09:00, 10:00, 11:00 and 12:00). Settlement members are free to fund all obligations in “one shot”. A delay in the euro funding could affect the multi-currency settlement of CLS and eventually other currency areas, in particular the Asia-Pacific region which, due to the time difference, are close to their end of day.

• **Payments related to margin calls of CCPs (initial and variation margin)**

A central counterparty (CCP) is situated between counterparties to financial contracts traded in one or more markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer.

A CCP has the potential to reduce significantly risks to market participants by imposing more robust risk controls on all participants and, in many cases, by achieving multilateral netting of trades. It also tends to enhance the liquidity of the markets it serves, because it tends to reduce risks to participants and, in many cases, because it facilitates anonymous trading.

A CCP margin call is a demand by the clearing house to a clearing member for additional funds or collateral to offset position losses in a margin account. If no initial margins were to be received, it would postpone the start of trading in the respective market or, if some margins were not paid, the positions of the concerned member might be closed out and the member might eventually be excluded.

• **16:15 – 16:30: payments related to the end-of-day settlement of EURO1**

EBA Clearing (EBA) offers a cross-border clearing system in euro (the EURO1 system). At the cut-off time of a normal settlement day in EURO1 (at 16:00), all banks with a debit position (short banks) send a TARGET2 payment (or are debited using the direct debit) to the EBA’s settlement account held at the ECB. After the EBA has received all pay-ins, the pay-out phase will begin and all banks with a credit position (long banks) will receive their respective funds via TARGET2.

• **Settlement of ancillary systems**

The interdependencies between TARGET2 and the settlement of ancillary systems other than the above and their criticality vary and are at national discretion. Hence, each central bank will address the extent to which the settlement of ancillary systems is monitored.
• **Processing problems**

In case of problems in the processing of the above-mentioned categories of transactions, problem management procedures should be activated immediately. The relevant TARGET2 users together with the national service desks are expected to do this proactively.

• **17:00: customer cut-off time**

17:00 is the cut-off time for customer payments. As debit and credit booking happens simultaneously, the cut-off is at 17:00 sharp; hence, payments will be rejected immediately afterwards. A rejection of payments occurs after the running of algorithm 3.\(^\text{36}\) The timestamp of the SSP is binding; more precisely, the time when the module receives the message prevails. PHAs have to ensure their compliance, e.g. by setting earlier cut-off times. Only interbank payments will continue to be processed.

• **18:00: interbank cut-off time**

18:00 is the cut-off time for interbank payments and also the cut-off time for processing payments. As debit and credit booking happens simultaneously, the cut-off is at 18:00 sharp; hence, interbank payments will be rejected immediately afterwards. A rejection of payments occurs after the running of algorithm 3.\(^\text{37}\) The timestamp of the SSP is binding; more precisely, the time when the module receives the message prevails. PHAs have to ensure their compliance, e.g. by setting earlier cut-off times.

### 4.6. End-of-day processing (18:00 – 18:45)

TARGET2 closes automatically at 18:00. The closing will be confirmed by a message in the ICM and the T2IS. Between the cut-off time and approximately 18:15, the following events will take place:

- transfer back of liquidity from sub-accounts to main accounts (emergency procedure);
- rejection of pending payments at 18:00 (immediately after the running of algorithm 3);
- automatic emergency procedure if a group of accounts manager was not able to balance the accounts in time and there is one uncovered overdraft on one account belonging to a group of

---

\(^{36}\) Algorithm 3 compares pairs of TARGET2 participants’ PM accounts to determine whether queued payment orders can be settled within the available liquidity of the two TARGET2 participants’ PM accounts concerned and within the limits set by them (by starting from the pair of PM accounts with the smallest difference between the payment orders addressed to each other). The central bank(s) involved shall book those payments simultaneously on the two TARGET2 participants’ PM accounts and if, in relation to a pair of PM accounts, liquidity is insufficient to fund the bilateral position, extract single payment orders until there is sufficient liquidity. In this case, the central bank(s) involved shall settle the remaining payments, except the extracted ones, simultaneously on the two TARGET2 participants’ PM accounts. The check of bilateral relations is followed by the check of multilateral relations. If the settlement of a transaction is not possible due to a lack of liquidity or breached limits, single transactions will remain in the queue. The identified executable transactions are settled.

\(^{37}\) See footnote 37.
accounts;

- automatic transfer of liquidity to the PHA (optional);
- use of the standing facilities until 18:15 (18:30 on the last day of the maintenance period);
- transfer of liquidity to the SF accounts, booking of overnight credit to SF accounts, automatic transfer of overnight credit from the SF to the RTGS account in case of use of intraday credit at the end of the day (optional);
- automatic transfer of liquidity to the HAM account (optional);
- levelling out of group of accounts (emergency procedure);
- sending of balance information to the RM module; and
- sending of account statements MT 940/950 (optional).

After 18:30 the internal central bank accounting takes place.
5. Procedures in abnormal situations in TARGET2

5.1. Fundamentals

5.1.1. Incident definition

Incidents are situations preventing TARGET2\textsuperscript{38} from functioning normally. More specifically, an incident can be defined as an event which is not part of the standard operation and which causes, or may cause, an interruption to, or a reduction in, the quality of services that TARGET2 offers. The effect might be immediately visible, or only detected at a later stage. Each incident must be documented and a solution must be found and implemented as soon as possible.

Incidents may result from one or more of the following events:

i) a failure of any relevant component or software on the system’s technical platform;

ii) a procedural, operational or business failure; and/or

iii) a strike or major external event (e.g. natural disasters, large-scale power outages, terrorist attacks, coinciding events).

The diagram below shows the parties within the scope of TARGET2 abnormal situations.

\textit{Diagram 9  Identified failing parties}

\textsuperscript{38}These can be due to problems in the SSP, PHAs, domestic applications, ancillary systems and banks.
5.1.2. Incident handling procedures

Incident handling starts with problem detection. Problem detection is the main purpose of monitoring the different parties involved. Once an abnormality has been recognised and confirmed to be a problem, the incident communication and incident handling procedures will be activated. In the case of TARGET2, a problem might be spotted by TARGET2 users or the central banks.

In general terms, the TARGET2 incident management measures revolve around:

- fixing the problem/finding a workaround;
- business continuity, i.e. the continuation of full processing capacity by failing over to a secondary system/site/region;
- contingency measures that allow the continued processing of a few payments; and
- delayed closing, i.e. the extension of the operational day.

In the event of a failure which only concerns FIN message traffic, the InterAct and FileAct processing could continue, thus allowing the processing of (very) critical payments.

5.1.3. Incident communication

In an abnormal situation, the flow of information is crucial. During an incident, users keep in touch with their usual contacts for the operational management at their respective central bank via national communication means.

Incidents with a potential systemic impact will be the subject of a coordinated management by the central banks. Moreover, there is an internal decision-making structure at the central banks for TARGET2 incidents that comes on top of the normal organisational structure.

Providing information on a failure

When the central banks become aware of any SSP failure or other failures which might have an impact on TARGET2 transaction flows, the central banks will activate their internal incident communication via established teleconference facilities. Upon agreement on the way forward, the following information will be disseminated simultaneously among TARGET2 users:
- the T2IS will be updated;
- the national service desks will inform their national communities accordingly using the relevant national communication means; and
- if the SSP is still functioning, information will also be disseminated via broadcasts.

To ensure a timely communication, the information should refer to pre-agreed and standardised terms and carry the following information:

- description of the error;
- anticipated delay (if possible);
- information about measures taken; and
- advice to users.

### 5.2. Procedures for handling an SSP failure

#### 5.2.1. Start-of-day incident procedures (18:45 – 19:00)

The completion of the start-of-day procedure is under normal circumstances confirmed with a broadcast to all users. If, for whatever reason, the start-of-day procedure is delayed, this will be communicated by the respective national service desk using national communication means, via the T2IS and, if applicable, via the ICM.

#### 5.2.2. Night-time settlement incident procedures\(^{39}\) (19:00 – 22:00 & 01:00 – 06:45)

If an SSP incident occurs during the NTS, it could have an impact on liquidity provision, the NTS and possibly also the day trade phase. The counterpart for users involved in the NTS would still be the respective national service desk.

Depending on the SSP failure, it might be possible to fix the problem or there might be a need to initiate a failover. It is very important that full information about any events and measures taken during the night that could have an impact on the start of the day trade phase at 07:00 is disseminated. Hence, the national service desk will inform its users via national communication means before the regular start time of the day trade phase at 07:00 and via the T2IS and, if applicable, via the ICM.

\(^{39}\) No procedures during the technical window (22:00 – 01:00).
5.2.3. Business window (06:45 – 07:00)

The business window is used by the Eurosystem to prepare the daylight operations. In case of incidents, the incident management procedures of the day trade phase will apply.

5.2.4. Day trade phase incident procedures (07:00 – 18:00)

5.2.4.1. Business continuity

If an SSP problem cannot be fixed, the main aim is to recover full processing capacity. The decision whether to perform a failover depends on the type of failure, its expected duration, the point in time, etc. However, there is no sequential order for intra-region and inter-region failover. In case of a problem at SSP level, the decision is about whether to conduct either an intra-region or an inter-region failover. The latter is only activated in very rare circumstances.

Diagram 10  Two regions, four sites

Intra-region failover

- While smaller failures are covered by back-ups of the main critical elements within the same site, major failures or disasters (e.g. disruption of major hardware caused by fire, flood or terrorist attacks, or by telecommunications faults) require the activation of the second site in the same region (intra-region failover).

- An intra-region failover means the failing over from site A to site B within a region. As a synchronous mode is applied, the databases at both sites are exactly the same and no
reconciliation is required after the failover.

- An intra-region failover ensures the continuation of normal business within a maximum of one hour after the central banks’ decision-making process.

- Payment processing is interrupted during the failover, but users are encouraged to keep on sending FIN payments to the SSP that will be queued at SWIFT level and to send FileAct messages (in store and forward mode).

**Inter-region failover**

- A wide-scale regional disruption (e.g. severe interruption of transportation, telecommunication, power or other critical infrastructure across a metropolitan or a geographical area) requires the failing over to the second region (inter-region failover).

- An inter-region failover means failing over from Region 1 to Region 2. Usually the inter-region failover allows the closure of the site in Region 1 normally and hence the resumption of operations in Region 2 without any loss of data and within two hours of a decision-making process. The participants will be informed when TARGET2 will be fully available again.

- Due to the asynchronous mode, a loss of data after an inter-region failover could only occur in the extremely rare event of both sites within Region 1 becoming suddenly unavailable at the same time. In such a situation, there is no alternative but to fail over to Region 2 and to reconcile the missing traffic and rebuild the database. Still the resumption of business in Region 2 should be enabled within two hours of the decision-making process and including the retrieval and reconciliation of SWIFT FIN messages\(^{40}\). The process of rebuilding requires the active participation of the users. The procedure for inter-region failover with loss of data is described in Annex I and a detailed presentation is available on the TARGET2 website.

- Payment processing is interrupted during an inter-region failover, but users may keep on sending FIN payments to the SSP; these will be queued at SWIFT level and processed upon the recovery of the SSP. Users should not send XML traffic until further notice (most XML traffic would be rejected).

- In the event that a rebuilding process is required, please refer to the annexed description of the rebuilding process.

\(^{40}\) The retrieval is a service offered by SWIFT, which applies its standard SWIFT pricing scheme to the TARGET2 users.
Handling of payments with execution time

In normal circumstances and according to the UDFS, payments with an execution time are handled as follows:

Table 7  Execution time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Features</th>
<th>Earliest debit time indicator</th>
<th>Latest debit time indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transactions to be executed from a certain time (code word: /FROTIME/).</td>
<td>• Option a: transactions to be executed up to a certain time (code word: /REJTIME/);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Option b: transactions which should be executed up to certain time (only warning indicator) (code word: /TILTIME/).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Effect

• Transaction is stored until the indicated time.
• At the earliest debit time, the transaction runs through the entry check.
• Setting the execution time only means a special identification via the ICM.
• The transaction is treated like any other payment of this type.

Management

If the transaction cannot be settled at the earliest debit time, it will be queued until the cut-off time for the payment type is reached (or revoked).

If the transaction cannot be settled until the indicated debit time:
• Option a: the payment will be rejected;
• Option b: the payment will remain in the queue.

In the event of an inter-region failover without loss of data and if the time indicated after the code word has expired, the SSP will follow the “normal” procedures. This means:

/FROTIME/ ⇒ payments will be included in the settlement
/TILTIME/ ⇒ warning broadcast will be shown in the ICM
/REJTIME/ ⇒ payments will be rejected
Procedures in abnormal situations in TARGET2

In the event of an inter-region failover with loss of data and if the time indicated after the code word has expired, the SSP will follow a special procedure: payments with the code word /REJTIME/ will not be rejected immediately since the time will be changed into a future point of time.

Handling of ancillary system transactions with optional mechanisms

Table 8  Handling of ancillary system transactions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>settlement procedure</th>
<th>optional mechanism</th>
<th>effect in case of time expired</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1, 2</td>
<td>scheduled time (“from”)</td>
<td>settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>settlement period (“till”)</td>
<td>rejection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>information period</td>
<td>settlement attempt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>settlement period (“till”)</td>
<td>rejection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4, 5</td>
<td>information period</td>
<td>settlement attempt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>settlement period (“till”)</td>
<td>rejection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- without guarantee mechanism</td>
<td>rejection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- with guarantee mechanism</td>
<td>activation of guarantee mechanism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the event of an inter-region failover with loss of data, in order not to reject payments after the reopening of the SSP, the 3CB will change the information period to 15 minutes before the customer cut-off and will change the end-of-settlement period to the customer cut-off.

5.2.4.2. Contingency processing

Contingency processing is a temporary means that aims at processing limited business only to avoid the creation of systemic risk. Thus, the contingency module (CM) is used in events where business continuity is impossible or systemically important payments need to be processed during the failover process.41

The concept of (very) critical payments in TARGET2 defines which payments are considered systemically important and thus eligible for contingency processing. Contingency processing via the

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41 The use of the CM does not prevent ancillary systems from making use of their own alternative contingency means (e.g. accepting additional collateral or other currencies).
CM is only possible for interbank credit transfers. The processing of other payments will be delayed until after SSP recovery.

Contingency processing involves the manual processing of payments during a failure of the SSP. The failure of the SSP implies that the banks’ payment capacity would be blocked in the SSP.

Due to the following limitations, the contingency throughput is very limited:

- operational limitations, owing to the limited number of staff;
- liquidity limitations, owing to the need to provide fresh liquidity to the CM; and
- technical limitations of the CM (about 1,000 payments per hour).

The CM is always running in the non-active region. In case the settlement managers confirm that very-critical payments need to be processed the CM will be used immediately. If there are no very-critical payments but only critical payments to be processed, the TARGET2 crisis managers will first have to confirm that these should be processed using the CM.

The value date of the CM is always the same value day as on which the SSP was when the failure occurred. The CM provides only limited functionality; hence, it is not to be compared with a “mini-RTGS” (there are no algorithms to settle payments and there is no support of special functions for ancillary system settlement).
Box 1  Concept of (very) critical payments in TARGET2

Prevailing principles:

- TARGET2 contingency processing should be limited to payments that need to be processed to avoid systemic risk during the day.
- Owing to strict technical and operational volume limitations related to TARGET2 contingencies, the overall number of contingency payments should be minimised.
- Primarily outgoing TARGET2 payments should be considered. Outgoing payments are payments that would be required by other systems.
- Incoming CM payments (e.g. pay-outs of ancillary systems, liquidity transfers between financial institutions, monetary policy transactions) could be considered as critical payments under specific circumstances, i.e. if evidence is provided that they are indispensable for covering (very) critical outgoing payments, the crisis managers might agree on their processing. In any event, the number of these payments should remain very limited.

The following individual categories of payments are considered as very critical or critical, and consequently as eligible for contingency processing:

**Very-critical payments must be processed in contingencies (order: CLS, FIFO)**

- payments related to settlement payments from TARGET2 to CLS (pay-ins);
- payments related to settlement payments from TARGET2 to EURO1 for the end-of-day settlement (pay-ins); and
- payments related to margin payments from TARGET2 to CCPs (pay-ins).

**Critical payments can be processed in a contingency but require prior agreement of the TARGET2 crisis managers**

- settlement payments to interfaced securities settlement systems for the real-time settlement;
- additional outgoing payments if required to avoid the creation of systemic risk; and
- incoming CM payments if evidence is provided that they are indispensable for covering (very) critical outgoing payments.
Box 2 Aspects to be taken into consideration when selecting critical payments

In addition to the three basic principals avoidance of systemic risk, the limitation of processing volumes and the focus on outgoing payments, the following aspects might support the TARGET2 crisis managers in their decision-making:

- The failure situation, in particular the time of occurrence. Besides the beginning of the day and the end of the day, critical times will also be provided by the overview of settlement times of ancillary systems. The possible spillover, the source of the failure and its duration and the expected recovery time are also important aspects.

- The business day – it could be of relevance whether an incident occurs at the end of the maintenance period, on a public holiday or on a day where particularly high volumes are expected.

- The communicated needs of banks, ancillary systems and other central bank business areas (e.g. for monetary policy operations).

- The liquidity limitations – contingency processing would require additional collateral, i.e. the more payments that would be processed in a contingency, the more additional collateral would have to be provided by a bank, and depending on the time of occurrence the provision of additional collateral might be difficult.

- The principle of prioritisation – very critical payments should generally be processed before critical payments (as long as the critical payments are not required to release a “business gridlock” of very critical payments).

- The incident handling measures might alleviate the need for processing contingency payments; for instance, major ancillary systems might delay their settlement by the same amount of time as the delay in TARGET2’s closing and queued payments would be processed at the moment of SSP recovery. Another example is that ancillary systems might try to settle even in the case of a delayed closing of TARGET2.

- The market’s contingency means – possible alternative contingency means at the disposal of an individual ancillary system and banks (e.g. pay-ins in a different currency) could ease the need to process critical payments in a contingency.
Using the contingency module

The decision to activate and use the CM for very critical payments is made by the settlement managers in their teleconference. In the event that contingency processing is initiated, the users are informed via the relevant communication means at national level and the T2IS.

The CM starts with a zero balance, i.e. the payment capacity of the SSP is not available for contingency processing via the CM. In other words, the processing of contingency payments in the CM requires the provision of fresh liquidity by the users.

The CM is solely operated and accessed by the central banks. The users transmit orders to process contingency payments to their respective national service desk using nationally agreed communication means and templates. Information about turnover and account balances in the CM is provided to the users by the respective national service desk using the agreed national communication means.

While the processing of very critical payments is mandatory, a request for the processing of critical payments requires the involvement of the crisis managers by means of a teleconference.

During the use of the CM, no SWIFTNet FIN messages are sent to the account holders in the CM.

Payment processing in the CM

1. Users wishing to make contingency payments have to provide fresh liquidity in the form of additional collateral/account balances or incoming payments and payments (re)distributing liquidity in the euro area (e.g. pay-outs of ancillary systems, liquidity transfers between financial institutions, monetary policy transactions). The procedures for the provision of additional collateral depend on the respective national set-up.

2. Once fresh liquidity has been booked by the NCB in the CM for a participant, contingency processing can start for this participant.

3. The sender instructs its central bank to make contingency payments using the respective national communication means and nationally agreed templates. A request for processing critical payments requires a prior decision of the crisis managers.

4. The sending central bank books the payment in the CM (simultaneous debit and credit).

5. After booking, the sending central bank informs the receiving central bank and the latter, after checking the booking, informs the beneficiary about the incoming payment via the respective
More on the use of the CM

- Requests for information on account balances and debits and credits can only be made by the central banks, so users have to request this information from their central bank.

- Only credit transfers are possible in the CM; hence, all CM transactions have to be initiated by the sending bank. This is of particular relevance for some ancillary systems.

- In order to reduce the number of contingency payments, users are encouraged to make use of bulking.

- If a user has transmitted a payment to the SSP that has been queued and the user processes this payment again via the CM, a “double processing” of the payment (once in the CM and afterwards upon restart of the SSP in the PM) cannot be prevented.

- After the recovery of the SSP, normal payment processing will be continued on the SSP. After confirmation across the central banks that the use of the CM has been completed, the CM will be closed and the CM balances will be transferred to the RTGS accounts in the PM (no transfer of the individual underlying payments) and the account holders will be informed about the bookings by MT 940/950 (optional). When closing the CM, all accounts within the CM will have a zero balance.

- It is possible to restart the CM should a further SSP incident occur on the same day.

- In general, the detailed procedures between the users and their respective central bank are defined at national level.

5.2.4.3. Delayed closing

The decision to delay closing in the event of an SSP failure, i.e. to prolong the day trade phase, is always made by the crisis managers. The announced new closing time is the new cut-off time for interbank payments. The aim is to inform users early about how long the delay might be, rather than their receiving hourly or half-hourly updates of the situation, in particular if the reason is a prolonged outage of the SSP. A delayed closing will also delay the customer cut-off time to the same extent, supposing that the delayed closing is granted at least fifteen minutes before the actual customer cut-off time (i.e. before 16:45 at the latest).
It is not possible to delay the customer cut-off time only.

Apart from the following two situations revolving around an SSP failure, which could lead to a delayed closing, there might be situations where a delayed closing is implemented for the management of a banking crisis.

**Delayed closing due to an earlier SSP failure**

In order to give the market additional operational time, the day trade phase can be extended if an SSP failure occurs during the day but is solved before 18:00. Such a delay should not exceed two hours and should be announced early to provide the users with clarity and certainty. If such a delay is granted before 16:45, the minimum period of one hour between the customer cut-off time and the interbank cut-off time should remain. A delayed closing might also be granted in order to facilitate the management of a banking crisis.

Once a delayed closing is granted, it cannot be withdrawn even if this might be technically possible.

**Delayed closing due to an ongoing SSP failure**

A delayed closing will be granted in the event that an SSP failure occurs before 18:00 and is not solved by 18:00. In such situations, there is no alternative but to wait for the recovery of the SSP.

After the crisis managers agree in their teleconference to grant a delayed closing, this information is disseminated to the users immediately afterwards via the relevant national communication means, the ICM (if available) and the T2IS. The users are requested to change their internal parameters to reflect the delayed closing.

During a delayed closing, users should keep on sending FIN payments to the SSP. These will be queued and processed once the SSP recovers. The underlying principle is that TARGET2 will process all queued payments with same-day value to close the SSP in a clean and final manner.

**Steps after the recovery of the SSP**

The below assumes a SSP outage during the day trade phase. If the failure occurs at a later stage, e.g. during the start of day, only the remaining actions apply (shown as boxes).
Procedures in abnormal situations in TARGET2

On the day of the incident

Diagram 11  Processes on the day of the incident
The SSP recovery is when the SSP is ready again to process messages. Upon the recovery and presupposed the SSP outage occurred during the day trade phase, the following steps will take place:

- Processing of all queued payments (one hour); this time is reduced to 30 minutes if the SSP failure occurs in the 30 minutes before the interbank cut-off time. In this period also new messages can be sent by the users.

- Squaring of banks’ balances between banks (one hour); this time is reduced to 30 minutes if the SSP failure occurs in the 30 minutes before the interbank cut-off time.

- At the cut-off time for interbank payments, the end-of-day processing (45 minutes or one hour at the end of the maintenance period), including the recourse to the standing facilities, takes place.

The total duration of these steps is 2 hours 45 minutes.

Steps after the delayed closing of Day D

Diagram 11  Processes on the day of the incident
The SSP recovery is when the SSP is ready again to process messages. Upon the recovery and presupposed the SSP outage occurred during the day trade phase, the following steps will take place:

- Processing of all queued payments (one hour); this time is reduced to 30 minutes if the SSP failure occurs in the 30 minutes before the interbank cut-off time. In this period also new messages can be sent by the users.

- Squaring of banks’ balances between banks (one hour); this time is reduced to 30 minutes if the SSP failure occurs in the 30 minutes before the interbank cut-off time.

- At the cut-off time for interbank payments, the end-of-day processing (45 minutes or one hour at the end of the maintenance period), including the recourse to the standing facilities, takes place.

The total duration of these steps is 2 hours 45 minutes.
Apart from the above-mentioned mandatory steps on the day of the incident, there are several mandatory steps to be performed after the closing of the current business day. These comprise:

- start of day (15 minutes);
- liquidity provision (30 minutes);
- night-time settlement (liquidity adjustments, 1 hour);
- maintenance period (3 hours);

**Diagram 12  Processes on the following day**

- preparation of day trade phase (15 minutes).

These steps last for six hours. The diagram below shows the overall sequence:

**Diagram 13  Overall processes**

**Prolonged SSP outage**

Given the above steps, a SSP outage that occurs during the day trade phase with a recovery of the SSP by 22:15 would still allow a start of the day trade phase at 07:00. An outage going beyond 22:15
(prolonged outage) may thus prevent a start of the day trade phase at 07:00.

In order to save time and to start the day trade phase as close to 07:00 as possible, the steps “NTS2” and the preparation of the day trade phase might run in parallel immediately after the maintenance period. However, even this procedure might still not allow the day trade phase to start at 07:00.

The ancillary systems needing to receive euro liquidity early in the morning should have established means to cope with such an event.

5.2.5. End-of-day incident procedures (18:00 – 18:45)

An SSP failure during this period would affect the end-of-day processing, and thus possibly also the recourse to standing facilities, the availability of final account balances and the starting time of the new business day. The delayed closing logic applies here to the same extent as above. However, after the SSP recovery the next step would be the continuation of the end-of-day processing.
6. Other failures

In this chapter, the failure of a central bank/proprietary home account (PHA), an ancillary system, a bank and SWIFT are elaborated upon. While an SSP failure concerns all central banks equally and requires common procedures, the procedures for the failures covered in this chapter are largely at the sole discretion of the respective central bank, ancillary system or bank.

In general, the detailed procedures between the users and their respective central bank are defined at national level.

Technical suspension

A technical suspension is a temporary means to protect the SSP from massive and uncontrolled message inflows (e.g. denial of service messages, usually in the non-SWIFT FIN sphere). Such a situation requires immediate action to forestall a disturbance of the smooth functioning of the SSP. It is a purely technical measure. It is envisaged when a central bank, bank or ancillary system sends such an extraordinarily high number of messages to the SSP that it could endanger the SSP’s functioning.

If the Eurosystem becomes aware of such exceptional and massive message inflows that endanger the smooth functioning of the SSP, it can as a precaution technically suspend the sender. The reasons will be immediately investigated with the sender and, upon resolution of the unintentional sending, the Eurosystem will lift the technical suspension. Depending on the circumstances and as a precaution, a delayed closing could be considered by the TARGET2 crisis managers.

6.1. Central bank/proprietary home account failure

In TARGET2, payments will be processed on the SSP. This means that a partial or complete failure of a central bank will no longer prevent access to the TARGET2 system for an entire national banking community. However, each central bank has its role and responsibilities in TARGET2. Even if the effects of a central bank failure may be limited in TARGET2, adequate measures have to be in place to cope with any malfunctioning in order to properly serve the banking community and to avoid any risk of spillover of a central bank problem to the SSP. Moreover, the impact of a failure of a central bank will differ depending on whether the central bank has fully migrated its business to the SSP or is still running a proprietary home account (PHA). Therefore, a distinction is made between a central bank failure and a PHA failure.

As a general rule, each problem in a central bank/PHA that may have an impact on the SSP or the banking community will be discussed within the central banks as soon as possible. Depending on the national rules and procedures, a national service desk might inform the national banking community
directly about national problems. Depending on the incident and the discussions at central bank level, the users will be informed about the problem via the T2IS, the ICM and national communication means.

6.1.1. Central bank failure

The general principle is to avoid the spillover of a problem by containing it. This means that each central bank will at first rely on its own error handling measures. Should this not be possible or efficient, it might request support from the SSP service desk.

For users, the relevant contact point remains the national service desk. If this is not available, the users should follow the national crisis communication procedures.

6.1.1.1. Start-of-day incident procedures (18:45 – 19:00)

For all the incidents which could occur during this phase, the relevant central bank will have appropriate backup measures.

6.1.1.2. Night-time settlement (19:00 – 06:45)

After the liquidity has been provided, problems at the level of a central bank would not have an impact on the processing of the SSP.

6.1.1.3. Business window (06:45 – 07:00)

The business window is used by the Eurosystem to prepare the daylight operations. In case of incidents, the incident management procedures of the day trade phase will apply.

6.1.1.4. Day trade phase incident procedures (07:00 – 18:00)

A failure during the day trade settlement phase will have an impact on the automated updates of credit lines and execution of repo transactions will not be possible.

For all these actions, the relevant central bank will have appropriate backup measures.

6.1.1.5. End-of-day incident procedures (18:00 – 18:45)

A failure during the end-of-day procedures will, in principle, not have an impact on the SSP or the banking community.
6.1.2. Proprietary home account failure

Besides the problems described for a central bank failure, the failure of a proprietary home account (PHA) can lead to the following problems:

1) liquidity supply at the start of the business day is impossible;
2) intraday transfers of liquidity between the PHA and the PM cannot be executed;
3) reserve and standing facility management are unavailable; and
4) the settlement of ancillary systems cannot be executed.

It should be noted that a problem at the level of a PHA is entirely under the national responsibility and is addressed individually by the respective central bank. It is most important that the central bank takes all precautions and measures to limit the impact of a PHA problem on the payment processing on the SSP.

6.1.2.1. Start-of-day and provision of liquidity incident procedures (18:45 – 19:30)

A failure at the start of the business day will prevent an automated transfer of liquidity from a PHA to a PM account.

If no data on the PHA are available, no transactions can be executed. It may be possible to execute transactions (e.g. standing orders) based on the closing balance of the RTGS accounts of the participants concerned. In any case, liquidity can be provided against new collateral.

Special attention should be given to those participants that participate in night-time settlement. For these participants, liquidity needs to be shifted before 19:30. If the liquidity is not transferred before 19:30, the crisis managers may decide to postpone the next stage, i.e. agree on a delayed start.

It is at the discretion of the national service desk whether to communicate PHA problems to the national user community. In the event of TARGET2-wide effects, information will also be provided via the T2IS and the ICM.

6.1.2.2. Night-time settlement (19:30 – 06:45)

After the liquidity has been provided, problems at the level of a central bank would not have an impact on the processing of the SSP.
Other failures

6.1.2.3. Business window (06:45 – 07:00)

The business window is used by the Eurosystem to prepare the daylight operations. In case of incidents, the incident management procedures of the day trade phase will apply.

6.1.2.4. Day trade phase incident procedures (07:00 – 18:00)

A failure in the day trade phase means the PHA is unable to create transactions/operations. Automated updates of credit lines, execution of repo transactions, monetary policy operations and intraday transfers of liquidity between the PHA and the PM will not be possible. Special attention will be given to the settlement of ancillary systems.

PHA data still available

If a PHA failure occurs but the data are still available, the central bank will have appropriate measures to perform these transactions.

PHA data unavailable

If no data on the PHA are available, no transactions can be executed. Liquidity can only be provided against new collateral.

Delayed closing

In the event of a PHA failure, the crisis managers might exceptionally grant a delayed closing for TARGET2 if there is the possibility of systemic risk. This possibility is, of course, closely related to the number and value of payments concerned. The delay should give the central bank concerned more time to solve the problem and alleviate its impact. If a delay is granted, it implies that all central banks have to be available and the SSP must stay open to send and receive payments.

A request for a delay in closing can be made by the central bank concerned until 17:30 and only in exceptional circumstances to avoid a systemic impact. A delay should not exceed two hours (i.e. the system should close no later than 20:00). If a delayed closing is requested and agreed by the crisis managers at 16:50 or earlier, this will result in a delay of the customer cut-off time for the same duration.

A granted delay in the closing time will never be shortened, although this may be technically feasible. The communication on a delay will follow the general procedures.
Other failures

Enforced closing

One of the fundamental principles of TARGET2 is that each business day must end with a final and irrevocable position before the start of the next business day.

In the event that a requested delay is not granted by the crisis managers or a central bank with a PHA is still facing problems and unable to participate in the end-of-day procedures before 20:00, an enforced closing procedure will be activated after agreement of the crisis managers. In other words, a delayed closing due to a PHA failure is granted until 20:00 at the latest. In this case, the account balances given by the SSP are considered to be correct.

6.1.2.5. End-of-day incident procedures (18:00 – 18:45)

A PHA problem at the end of the day may have an impact on the retransfer of balances and the shift of liquidity at the start of the day. The NCBs will have appropriate national procedures to address such scenarios.

6.2. Operational or technical bank failure

In the event that a bank has a problem that prevents it from settling payments in TARGET2, it should inform its central bank and it is encouraged to use its own means during the problem to the maximum extent possible. The tools available to each bank are:

- in-house solutions;
- ICM functionality, i.e. backup lump-sum payments and backup contingency payments (CLS, EURO1, STEP2 pre-fund); and
- ICM functionality via a stand-alone ICM;

- The ICM can be used in A2A mode, but it is only allowed to be used for the processing of the above-mentioned categories of payments.
- If a bank requests its respective central bank to open the functionality for making backup lump-sum payments, the central bank will immediately open this functionality via the ICM. It is completely at the discretion of the bank whether it would like to use the backup lump-sum payments or not and there should be no assessment by the central bank. However, there has to be a prior agreement between the sender and receiver of backup lump-sum payments. Upon the request of a bank, the central bank might make a broadcast to inform the other users about
Other failures

the bank’s use of backup lump-sum payments.

- The follow-up to the use of backup lump-sum payments is also fully under the responsibility of the banks. The PM does not verify whether the original single payments that have been submitted or whether returned backup lump-sum payments are related to payments submitted on preceding days. Also, no check for double submission on preceding days is carried out.

- The parameter for the number of days during which a payment with back value can be sent is set by default to “0”, which means no payment with back value is possible. In case the failed bank knows that it will not solve the problem on the same business day and would like to send back value payments, it can request a parameter change to up to two business days at the respective national central bank. Again, prior agreement should be reached between the sender and receiver.

- If these means are exhausted or their use is not efficient, the bank may ask for the support of its national service desk. The detailed contingency means are subject to the bilateral relationship between a bank and its central bank. A bank failure should be reported by the national service desk to the other central banks if it might have an impact on the settlement of ancillary systems or create systemic risk, especially with a potential cross-border impact. Any announcement to the market which is deemed necessary will be coordinated between all central banks.

- A bank failure should never lead to a delayed closing.

6.3. Ancillary system failure

If an ancillary system is facing a problem, it is encouraged to use as much as possible its own contingency means for the duration of the problem. The main aim should be to process all messages to the SSP via normal means, i.e. via the ASI or, if applicable, via the standard payments interface. It should be noted that the use of the payments interface, as well as the support provided by a central bank, require a pre-agreement and pre-communication between the ancillary system and its central bank.

- Among the tools that are at the sole discretion of the ancillary system are backup sites, and multi-access points to multi-network partners. The use of a possible standard payments interface to the SSP to make “clean” payments could also be included here.

- If necessary, the respective central bank might support the ancillary system, for example by...
processing XML files or making clean payments on its behalf. It depends on the individual central bank whether the ancillary system contingency tool is offered or not.

- In very exceptional circumstances when there may be a Eurosystem-wide risk, the home central bank of the ancillary system may request a delayed closing of TARGET2 to give the system more time to resolve the failure or alleviate its impact. The TARGET2 crisis managers will decide whether a delayed closing should be granted or not.

It is at the discretion of each central bank what level of support it wants to provide to its ancillary systems, especially during the night-time settlement. Whatever the contingency arrangements, they presuppose prearrangements and communication with the ancillary system and its central bank. In events at night time, the ancillary system should in general inform its central bank and both need to agree on the contingency processing and the national communication means. Moreover, the ancillary system needs to inform its settlement members separately about the envisaged procedure.

An ancillary system should report a failure to its national service desk. At the discretion of the national service desk, the problem might be communicated to the central banks, in particular in cases with a cross-border impact. Any announcement to the market which is deemed necessary will be coordinated between all central banks.

6.3.1. Ancillary systems using the ancillary systems interface

Pay-ins (from TARGET2 to the ancillary system) could be processed using one of the following methods:

- the home central bank sends, on behalf of the ancillary system, an XML file to the SSP using the AS contingency tool42;

- the ancillary system sends an MT 204 message if it is able to use the payments interface, i.e. if its SWIFTNet connection is down but its SWIFT FIN connection is still up and running, or the home central bank sends an MT 204 message on behalf of the ancillary system (in this case, all relevant authorisations must have been granted);

- the settlement bank could be requested to make clean PM payments in favour of the ancillary system; or

- the central bank of the settlement bank makes mandated payment on behalf of the settlement bank.

42 In this case, pay-ins and pay-outs can be sent together as in normal settlement with the ASI, if procedures 3, 4, 5 or 6 are used.
Other failures

bank and on the basis of information provided by the ancillary system, or the central bank of
the ancillary system makes these mandated payments on behalf of the settlement bank.

Pay-outs (from the ancillary system to TARGET2) could be processed using one of
the following methods:

- the home central bank sends, on behalf of the ancillary system, an XML file to the SSP using
  the AS contingency tool; or
- the ancillary system makes clean payments using the payments interface.

If the central bank does not process XML files on behalf of the ancillary system using the AS
contingency tool, the order of settlement becomes important for settlement procedures 4 and 5:

- Procedure 4: the central bank checks in coordination with the ancillary system that all pay-ins
  are settled before opening the pay-out phase. If all pay-ins cannot be settled, the central bank
  reverses them by issuing an opposite payment from the AS account to the bank’s account (if
  the pay-in was settled) or by revoking the payment (if it is still pending).
- Procedure 5: procedure 5 is processed like procedure 4, except that there is no reversal of
  payments because the “all or nothing” approach applies.
- For ancillary systems with a guarantee mechanism, procedure 4 applies, except that, if
  necessary, the central bank debits the guarantee account\(^{43}\) in coordination with the ancillary
  system, rather than making a pay-in.

In settlement procedure 6, the control of the settlement phases becomes vital:

- the home central bank can, on behalf of the ancillary system, open procedures and cycles
  using the AS contingency tool;
- the home central bank can, on behalf of the ancillary system, close procedures and cycles
  using the AS contingency tool or directly through the ICM (using the “stop procedure/cycle”
  function).

6.3.2. Ancillary systems using the payments interface

Pay-ins (from TARGET2 to the ancillary system) are still normally processed, but the central bank

\(^{43}\) Specific procedures will have to be set up in case ancillary system is calling the guarantees.
might have to inform the ancillary system via national communication means about incoming payments.

Pay-outs (from the ancillary system to TARGET2) are processed by the ancillary system using one of the following methods:

i. The ancillary system may make clean payments using the payments interface if it still has access to it, or using backup lump-sum payments via the ICM.

ii. The central bank sends a mandated payment (a payment by the central bank, debited to the ancillary system and credited to the settlement bank). The central bank might have to inform the ancillary system via national communication means about the processed payments.

6.4. SWIFT/network operator failure

6.4.1. Global SWIFT outage

In the event of a global SWIFT outage, TARGET2 builds on the resilience of SWIFT. The SSP would still be available and the central banks via the 3CB would have access to the functions of the SSP and could make a very limited number of payments. Hence, payments identified as (very) critical could be processed in the PM on behalf and upon request of the national service desk in a totally manual manner (ordering bank→national service desk→SSP service desk→national service desk→beneficiary). The communication between the national service desk and the users would follow the national agreements.

6.4.2. Local network problems

In order to overcome temporary and local network problems, TARGET2 further builds on the existence of multi-access points to multi-network partners.

If a local SWIFT failure, a local network operator failure or a failure of terrestrial telecommunication lines would have an impact on a central bank and its community, but not the functioning of the SSP, the SSP service desk could manually process (very) critical payments on behalf of the central bank.
7. Compensation scheme

If there is a technical malfunction of TARGET2, direct participants may submit claims for compensation in accordance with the TARGET2 compensation scheme laid down in appendix II of the harmonised conditions.

Unless otherwise decided by the ECB’s Governing Council, the TARGET2 compensation scheme shall not apply if the technical malfunction of TARGET2 arises as a result of external events beyond the reasonable control of the central banks concerned or of acts or omissions by third parties.

Compensation under the TARGET2 compensation scheme shall be the only compensation procedure offered in the event of a technical malfunction of TARGET2. Participants may, however, use other legal means to claim for losses. If a participant accepts a compensation offer under the TARGET2 compensation scheme, this shall constitute the participant’s irrevocable agreement that it thereby waives all claims in relation to the payment orders concerning which it accepts compensation (including any claims for consequential loss) it may have against any central bank, and that the receipt by it of the corresponding compensation payment constitutes full and final settlement of all such claims. The participant shall indemnify the central banks concerned, up to a maximum of the amount received under the TARGET2 compensation scheme, in respect of any further claims which are made by any other participant or any other third party in relation to the payment order or payment concerned.

The making of a compensation offer shall not constitute an admission of liability by the respective central bank or any other central bank in respect of a technical malfunction of TARGET2.

Further information is available in appendix II of the harmonised conditions.

Procedural rules

- A claim for compensation shall be submitted on the claim form available on the website of the respective central bank in English. Payers shall submit a separate claim form in respect of each payee and payees shall submit a separate claim form in respect of each payer. Sufficient additional information and documents shall be provided to support the information indicated on the claim form. Only one claim may be submitted in relation to a specific payment or payment order.

- Within four weeks of a technical malfunction of TARGET2, participants shall submit their claim form(s) to the respective central bank. Any additional information and evidence requested by the respective central bank shall be supplied within two weeks of such request.
The respective central bank shall review the claims and forward them to the ECB. Unless otherwise decided by the ECB’s Governing Council and communicated to the participants, all received claims shall be assessed no later than 14 weeks after the technical malfunction of TARGET2 occurs.

The respective central bank shall communicate the result of the assessment to the relevant participants. If the assessment entails a compensation offer, the participants concerned shall, within four weeks of the communication of such offer, either accept or reject it, in respect of each payment or payment order comprised within each claim, by signing a standard letter of acceptance (in the form available on the website of the respective central bank). If such letter has not been received by the respective central bank within four weeks, the participants concerned shall be deemed to have rejected the compensation offer.

The respective central bank shall make compensation payments on receipt of a participant’s letter of acceptance of compensation. No interest shall be payable on any compensation payment.
8. Future releases

The Eurosystem reviews potential functional and system changes, with the intention of including some of them in the next releases of TARGET2.

The Eurosystem works on these issues in cooperation with the users.

Details on the process are under discussion.
Annex I Inter-region failover with loss of data

Rebuilding process

- According to the 3CB, a rebuilding process in Region 2 is only required in the event that both sites in Region 1 become unavailable at the same time and there is a consequential loss of data:
  - The aim of the rebuilding is to ensure that all messages processed in Region 1 are also shown in Region 2. In order to achieve this, all messages processed in Region 1 in the two minutes preceding the incident are retrieved and reconciled against what is shown in Region 2 to identify possible missing messages.
  - The missing messages could include: (i) SWIFT FIN messages; (ii) FileAct messages (sent by an ancillary system via the ASI); and (iii) InterAct messages (from banks, ancillary systems and central banks).
  - SWIFT FIN messages can be retrieved and the FIN traffic reconciled (this would make up about 80% of the missing traffic).
  - During the outage and the failover, the users might continue to send FIN payments (which would be queued at SWIFT level) but should not send new XML traffic until further notice (InterAct and FileAct messages).
  - Upon the FIN retrieval, all coupled FIN messages (matching messages MT 096 and MT 097) will be booked in Region 2, while all non-coupled messages will be queued in Region 2. Coupled FIN messages that were final in Region 1 but, due to missing coverage, could not be booked in Region 2 would be shown as “newly pending payments”. The SSP service desk would label all pending payments as “highly urgent” and place them at the front of the queue of highly urgent payments. This should all be achieved within two hours of the decision to fail over.
  - The SSP service desk will inform the TARGET2 coordination desk, which will hold a settlement manager teleconference to initiate the resending of XML traffic (InterAct and FileAct messages, which represent about 20% of the missing traffic). This means the SSP service desk will open the SSP for SWIFTNet services, i.e. FileAct and InterAct. Ancillary systems will be required to resend any FileAct messages with the same references that they had sent in the ten minutes preceding the incident in Region 1 or those files that the ancillary system identified as missing. Moreover, ancillary systems, banks and central banks will also be required to redo the InterAct traffic they did in the two minutes preceding the incident.
However, new XML traffic should not be sent. With the opening of the SSP for SWIFTNet, the users would also get access to the ICM to check the processing status.

- The processing of the missing XML traffic should further reduce the “newly pending payments”. Any still remaining “newly pending payments” should be “forced” by the central banks, by this acknowledging that they were final in Region 1 and should remain final in Region 2. Any resulting remaining risk would hence remain with the Eurosystem. Similarly, any remaining “newly pending AS transactions” that were final in Region 1 should remain final in Region 2 and hence be “forced”. In order to become aware of “newly pending AS transactions”, the ancillary system would have to provide evidence to the respective central bank that these transactions were final in Region 1 (e.g. by means of a copy of the received notification).

- After the SSP service desk confirms to the TARGET2 coordination desk that all newly pending payments have been processed, a teleconference of the crisis managers will be held, in order to get their approval that the SSP should be opened for SWIFT FIN traffic. Any queued FIN payments will be processed. Also, new FileAct and InterAct messages can be sent by the users. In case the CM was used, the transfer of balances from the CM to the PM will take place after the opening of the SSP for SWIFT FIN traffic.
Annex II Incident report for TARGET2 participants

**Confidentiality**
The information included in this document will only be used by the Eurosystem to further strengthen the resilience of the TARGET2 system as a whole. Within the Eurosystem, access to this information is only granted to those with a business-related need to know.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the central bank responsible</th>
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<th>Point of contact (POC) information</th>
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<tr>
<td>Name of the TARGET2 participant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name of the contact person</td>
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<tr>
<td>Title/function</td>
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<td>Telephone number</td>
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<td>E-mail address</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>General incident information</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incident ID (to be assigned by the central bank responsible)</td>
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</table>
### Description of the incident

The summary should be a high-level description suitable for senior management and avoiding technical language to the extent possible. The summary should include for instance the following elements:
- basic description of the events and their impact;
- services/systems affected by the incident; and
- external effects (e.g. other TARGET2 participants affected).

### Details of the cause of the incident

Specifically, the root cause of the incident (who, what, where, when, how?).

### Remedial action

This section should include for instance the following elements:
- action taken to resolve the incident; and
- measures taken to prevent the incident from reoccurring/implementation scheduled for.

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44 An incident report is considered “final” when the implementation date of the remedial measure is indicated.
45 Software comprises system software (including DB systems) and application software.
46 Network comprises only the internal network. External network failures should be listed under infrastructure.
47 Infrastructure comprises premises, supporting services (e.g. air conditioning, power supply, telecommunication (including SWIFT)).
Date and signature
Name of the signatory (Print):
Title:

This form should be returned to the central bank mentioned above:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
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<th>Contact person</th>
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Annex III Glossary and Abbreviations

Algorithm
An algorithm is a mathematical method to provide a smooth, fast and liquidity saving resolution of the payment queue, for example by taking offsetting payment flows into account.

Ancillary system (AS)
Ancillary systems are:
- retail payment systems (RS)
- large value payment systems (LVPS)
- foreign exchange (FX) systems
- money market systems
- clearing houses
- securities settlement systems (SSS)

Ancillary System Interface
The ancillary system interface (ASI) is a standardised interface to the payments module (PM) which can be used by ancillary systems (ASs) to perform the cash clearing of their business.

AS Technical Account
Account offered in TARGET2 for specific use of ancillary systems.

Auto collateralisation
The auto collateralisation is a specific mechanism used to provide additional liquidity to the SSS settlement process. This technique is based on the automatic interaction between the collateral manager, the SSS and the SSP to perform collateralisation functions (e.g. eligibility checks, valuation of collateral) and the related increase of liquidity.

The auto collateralisation is activated during the SSS settlement process to cope with liquidity shortage of a participant: the collateral to be transferred is automatically selected by the SSS on
behalf of the participant based on a specific pre-authorisation.

Two distinct auto collateralisation techniques are currently used by the SSSs:

- firm collateralisation (collateralisation on stock: participants single out the eligible securities that could be used)
- self collateralisation (collateralisation on flows: with securities deriving from the settlement process itself)

Available liquidity

Credit balance on the account plus collateralised credit line for overdraft (if available).

- Backup payments

Owing to a breakdown a direct PM participant’s system may be unavailable for the rest of the business day. In order to avoid liquidity concentration on his account or rather to enable him to fulfil his payment obligations against CLS, EURO1 or STEP2, the respective PM participant has the possibility to make backup payments. Backup payments are initiated via ICM. Two kinds of backup payments are available:

- Backup lump-sum payments are used to redistribute the liquidity that has accumulated on the defaulting participant’s account. As soon as the defaulting PM participant is once again able to do so, the original single payments belonging to the backup lump-sum payments previously made are submitted to the PM and the recipients of such backup lump-sum payments have to return the backup lump-sum payments.

- Backup contingency payments are used to fulfil obligations against CLS, EURO1 or STEP2 arising from settlement or pre-fund payments on time. The backup contingency payment replaces the original payment.

Batch

A batch is a group of orders (payment orders and/or securities transfer orders) to be processed as a set.

BIC
Bank Identifier Code

BIC-8
The first 8 characters of the BIC, when used for addressing purposes, are called destination.

BIC-11
In addition to the first 8 characters of the BIC, an optional branch code of 3 characters is used to identify any branch or reference of an institution.

BIC directory
Directory published by SWIFT. It contains the Bank Identifier Codes (BIC) of the credit institutions.

Broadcast
A broadcast is an information message simultaneously available in the ICM to all or a selected group of SSP participants.

Business continuity
Payment system’s arrangements which aim to ensure that it meets agreed service levels even if one or more components of the system fail or if it is affected by an abnormal external event. Include both preventative measures and arrangements to deal with contingencies.

CB
Central bank

CBT
SWIFT Computer Based Terminal

Correspondent Central Banking Model (CCBM)
A mechanism established by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) with the aim of enabling counterparties to obtain credit from the central bank of the country in which they are based using collateral held in another country. In the CCBM, a CB acts as custodian for the other
CBs with regard to the securities held in its domestic securities settlement system.

**Central Counter Party (CCP)**

An entity that interposes itself between the counterparties to the contracts traded in one or more financial markets, becoming buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer.

**Central securities depository (CSD)**

A CSD is an organisation holding securities either in certificated or uncertificated form, to enable book entry transfer of securities. In addition to safekeeping and administration of securities, a central securities depository may incorporate clearing and settlement and assets servicing functions.

**Clearing**

Clearing is the process of calculating the mutual obligations of market participants for the exchange of securities and money. It may include the process of transmitting, reconciling and, in some cases, confirming payment or securities orders.

**Clearing house**

An entity hosting a clearing system, which consists of a set of rules and procedures, whereby financial institutions present and exchange data and/or documents relating to funds or securities transfers to other financial institutions at a single location. The procedures often also include a mechanism for the calculation of participants' mutual positions, possibly on a net basis, with a view to facilitating the settlement of their obligations in the settlement system.

**Closed User Group (CUG)**

A subset of customers grouped for the purpose of their use of the relevant SWIFT services and products when accessing the Payments Module.

**Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS)**

CLS is a global settlement system for foreign exchange transactions, providing participants with simultaneous processing of both sides of the transaction and thereby eliminating the settlement risk.

**Collateral**
Collateral is an asset or a third party commitment that is accepted by the collateral taker to secure an obligation to the collateral provider vis-à-vis the collateral taker. Collateral arrangements may take different legal forms; collateral may be obtained using the method of title transfer or pledge.

**Collateral pool**

Assets owned by members of a transfer system that are collectively available to the systems collateral to enable it to obtain funds in circumstances specified in its rules.

**Contingency**

Contingency refers to running limited business operations in a failure situation. Systemically important payments will be processed in contingency.

**Contingency Module (CM)**

Is a common mandatory tool for the CBs for the management of the emergency situations in order to process critical and very critical payments.

**Country Code (CC)**

Two letter code to identify the country where the respective entity is located; e.g. a country code is used in the SWIFT BIC (digits 5 and 6) of the 8-digit or 11-digit BIC.

**Credit institution (CI)**

It is the definition given to a "bank" in the European Union. The First EC Banking Directive defines it as an undertaking whose business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account.

**Credit line**

Maximum collateralised overdraft position of the balance on an RTGS account in PM or on the PHA. The respective participants can get information about changes regarding their credit lines via the ICM. Changes of credit lines will be executed immediately. In case of a reduction of a credit line this change has a "pending" status if the reduction would lead to an uncovered overdraft position. The change will be executed when the overdraft position is covered by the reduced credit line.

**Credit transfer**
A transfer of funds made on the basis of a payment order or sometimes a sequence of payment orders made for the purpose of placing funds at the disposal of the payee. The payment order may be processed via several intermediaries and/or via one or more funds transfer system.

**Crisis manager**

Each central bank has a crisis manager who is responsible for managing abnormal events.

**CRISP**

SSP block of services dedicated to CBs and to be used on an optional basis by them which provides billing services.

**CROSS**

SSP service dedicated to CBs and to be used on a mandatory basis by them which comprises archiving and storage services, files for billing calculation, files for statistics on intraday credit and profiling information. The CROSS is offered on the CRSS platform.

**Customer Related Services System (CRSS)**

The CRSS is one of the two technical configurations of the SSP (the other is the PAPSS). On this technical configuration the core and optional services reserved to central banks only are totally or partly implemented.

**Customer Relationship and Knowledge of System (CRAKS)**

It gathers all services needed to support customer relationship and knowledge of payment systems by the central banks.

**Customer Relationship Management (CRM)**

Term referring to the management by CBs of customer-oriented information related to participants and customers (CIs, AS, other customers e.g. CB customers in HAM).

-D-

**Day Trade Phase**

Is the period of time in TARGET2 between 7.00 a.m. and 6.00 p.m..

**Dedicated account**
Account in the PM on which dedicated liquidity for ancillary system settlement is held. This can be either a sub-account (interfaced model) or a mirror account (integrated model).

**Dedicated liquidity**

Liquidity held on a PM sub-account or mirror account to allow the settlement of an ancillary system.

**Delayed closing**

A delayed closing is the prolongation of the day trade phase.

**Delivery versus payment (DVP)**

A link between securities transfers and funds transfers system that ensures that delivery occurs if, and only if, payment occurs.

**Deposit facility**

A standing facility of the Eurosystem which counterparties may use to make overnight deposits at a national central bank, which are remunerated at a pre-specified interest rate.

**Depository**

An agent with the primary role of recording securities either physically or electronically and may keep records of the ownership of these securities.

**Direct debit**

Is an authorised debit on the payer's bank account initiated by the payee.

**Direct participant**

Is a participant in a system that directly carries out transactions with other participants in the system. He can perform all activities allowed in the system without intermediary. In some systems direct participants also carry out transactions on behalf of indirect participants.
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-ECB-
European Central Bank

-EEA-
European Economic Area

-Encryption-
Is the use of cryptographic algorithms to encode clear text data (plaintext) into cipher text to prevent unauthorised observation.

-ESCB-
European System of Central Banks

-EU-
European Union

-Euro Banking Association (EBA)-
Is an association which, on behalf of its members, maintains the EURO 1 and STEP2 clearing system.

-Failover-
A failover is the capability to switch over technically from one server to a second server. Within the configuration of the SSP there are two failover situations:

- intra-region failover: from one server to the second server within the same region
- inter-region failover: from one region to the other region.

-FIFO-
First In, First Out: processing sequence in which the payment orders are treated in the same sequence as they arrived (i.e. the first payment arrived is treated first, the latest one is treated at the end). The relevant timestamp of each payment is arrival in the SWIFT interface of SSP.

-FIFO by-passing-
The system tries to process the first transfer in the queue, but if that cannot be executed owing to lack of funds it then tries to settle the next transfer instead; also called Bypass FIFO.
Annexes

Final settlement

The final settlement is the discharge of an obligation by a transfer of funds and a transfer of securities that have become irrevocable, irreversible, or not annullable.

-G-

General Ledger

The General Ledger sometimes known as nominal ledger, is the main accounting record of a business which uses double-entry bookkeeping.

Gridlock

A situation that can arise in a funds or securities transfer system in which the failure of some transfer orders to be executed (because the necessary funds or securities are unavailable) prevents a substantial number of other orders from other participants from being executed.

Gross settlement system

A gross settlement system is a transfer system in which the settlement of funds or securities transfer orders occurs individually (on an order by order basis).

Group of accounts

See Liquidity pooling functionality

Guarantee fund mechanism

Mechanism to provide the complementary liquidity needed according to pre-defined rules in case an AS cannot settle using the settlement banks liquidity only.

Guarantee funds account

Account held on the SSP for maintaining or collecting funds allocated to the settlement of balances of an ancillary system in case of failure of settlement bank(s).

-H-

Home account

Account held by CBs outside of the Payments Module, e.g.

- for entities that cannot have the status of a direct participant in PM
- for entities allowed to open RTGS accounts that are indirect PM participants (or do not participate in PM neither as direct nor as indirect)
- for RTGS account holders for the settlement of operations which are not processed in the Payments Module

The home accounts are managed by the HAM or by a proprietary accounting system.

Home Accounting Module (HAM)

The Home Accounting Module is an optional module. In the case, a central bank opts for the use of this module different standardised account services are offered for the central bank and its customers.

- I-

Information and Control Module (ICM)

Mandatory and unique functional interface between the direct participants and the Payments Module (PM) and the other optional modules like

- Home Accounting Module (HAM)
- Reserve Management (Module) (RM)
- Standing Facilities (Module) (SF)
- Static Data (Management) Module (SD)

Integrity

The quality of being protected against accidental or fraudulent alteration of transmission and of storage, or the quality of indicating whether or not alteration has occurred.

Intraday credit

Credit extended and reimbursed within a period of less than one business day; in a credit transfer system with end-of-day final settlement, intraday credit is tacitly extended by a receiving institution if it accepts and acts on a payment order even though it will not receive final funds until the end of the business day. It can take the form of:

- a collateralised overdraft or
- a lending operation against a pledge or in a repurchase agreement

Intraday liquidity

Funds which can be accessed during the business day, usually to enable financial institutions to make payments on an intraday basis.
Legal entity

Credit institution directly participating in the SSP through (also AS when participating as a direct participant) one or more participants/accounts in the PM and/or HAM is called a legal entity. This allows to group general information about this credit institution in the Static Data (Management) Module.

Level 1

Governing Council of the ESCB

Level 2

Eurosystem central banks

Level 3

SSP providing central banks

Limit

Amount for normal payments a direct PM participant is willing to pay to another participant (bilateral limit) or to the other participants (multilateral - limit towards whom no bilateral limit is defined), without having received payments (that are credits) first. For a direct participant it is possible to establish standing orders or current bilateral (respectively multilateral) limits.

A normal payment can only be settled if it does not breach the respective limit. Setting limits is only possible vis-à-vis RTGS account holders (in case of a group of accounts: only possible vis-à-vis the virtual account) in the SSP. It is not possible to use limits vis-à-vis participating CBs. Incoming urgent payments from a participant towards whom a bilateral/multilateral limit is defined also affect the bilateral/multilateral position.

Liquidity pooling functionality

A facility based on the idea of allowing TARGET2 participants to pool their RTGS accounts in an account group. Such an account group consists of one or more account(s) held by a direct PM participant(s) which has a capital and/or management link. The following two options are offered: virtual accounts (only for euro area participants) and consolidated information (available also to participants from non-euro area countries).

Liquidity transfer

Transfer of funds between accounts of the same participant or between two accounts of a group of accounts.
It is also a generic settlement procedure (procedure 1), where liquidity is transferred from/to a mirror account to/from a settlement bank’s RTGS account.

There are two kinds of liquidity transfers available:

- current order: transfers executed immediately after entry if sufficient liquidity is available
- standing order: transfers of fixed amounts executed regularly at certain points of time, e.g. liquidity injections from HAM accounts to RTGS accounts at the start of the business day. Changes of standing orders become effective on the following business day.

MAC

Message Authentication Code

Mandated payment

Payment initiated by an entity that is not party to the transaction (typically by a CB or an AS in connection with ancillary system settlement) on behalf of another entity. A CB sends a credit transfer (with specific message structure) on behalf of the failed direct participant (only in case of contingency situations).

Marginal lending facility

A standing facility of the Eurosystem which counterparties may use to receive overnight credit from a CB at a pre-specified interest rate against eligible assets.

In general possible options:

- Marginal lending on request: Use on request of the participant in general needed for the fulfilment of reserve requirement.
- Automatic marginal lending: Automatic transformation of intraday credit in overnight credit at the end of the day.

Message type (MT)

A specific type of SWIFT messages as identified by a three-digit number. The first digit defines the message category, indicating the general use of the message, the second digit defines the message group and the third digit defines particular message function.

Mirror account

In fact specific RTGS accounts opened to CBs for the specific use of AS. Mirror accounts are mirrored
by another account opened in the SSS. It is debited or credited in case of liquidity transfer between a participant’s RTGS account in PM and its account in an ancillary system.

-N-

National service desk

The national service desk is the contact point for the banking community and ancillary systems at their home central bank. The national service desk will cater for all the participants’ needs as far as the usage of the services offered within the SSP and local infrastructures are concerned.

NCB

National Central Bank

Netting

An agreed offsetting of positions or obligations by participants in a clearing or settlement system. The netting reduces large number of individual positions or obligations to a smaller number of obligations or positions. Netting may take several forms which have varying degrees of legal enforceability in the event of default of one of the parties.

Night time processing

Period of time for settlement of AS transactions (settlement procedure 6) between 19.30 p.m. and 6.45 a.m. (interruption for technical maintenance between 22.00 p.m. and 1.00 a.m.).

-P-

PAPSS

Payment and Accounting Processing Services Systems

One of the two technical configurations of the SSP (the other one is the CRSS). The following modules of the SSP are implemented on the PAPSS:

- Contingency Module (CM)
- Home Accounting Module (HAM)
- Information and Control Module (ICM)
- Payments Module (PM, including the interface for ancillary systems)
- Reserve Management (Module) (RM)
- Standing Facilities (Module) (SF)
Static Data (Management) Module (SD)

Parts of the following services are also implemented on the PAPSS:

- CRISP
- CRAKS3

Payment

In the SSP two general kinds of payments are possible for direct participants:

- customer payments (MT 103, MT 103+)
- bank-to-bank payments (MT 202, MT 204)

Payment message/instruction

An order or message to transfer funds (in the form of a monetary claim on a party) to the order of the beneficiary. In TARGET2 the order may relate either to a credit transfer or a direct debit.

Payments Module (PM)

Mandatory module which allows the settlement of payments in the RTGS account, held by all direct participants. In addition, it offers advanced services for liquidity management, for the communication with participants and ancillary systems.

Pledge

A delivery of assets to secure the performance of an obligation owed by one party (debtor) to another (secured party). A pledge creates a security interest (lien) in the assets delivered, while leaving ownership with the debtor.

Priority

In general, payments are settled immediately, if sufficient liquidity is available on the RTGS account of the participant. Considering their urgency, they can be submitted by the sender using priorities:

- highly urgent payments (priority class 0)
- urgent payments (priority class 1)
- normal payments (priority class 2).

Payments which cannot be settled immediately are queued according to their priority (highly urgent queue, urgent queue, normal queue). Priorities can be changed via the ICM.

Profiling information
Information delivered to CBs on the past behaviour of a participant or a group of participants, aggregated over a past period, and aimed at being comparable with current business day information.

**Proprietary home account (PHA)**

Account held by CBs outside of the SSP e.g.

- for entities that cannot have the status of direct participants in PM
- for entities allowed to open RTGS accounts that are indirect PM participants (or do not participate in PM neither as direct nor as indirect)
- for RTGS account holders for the settlement of operations which are not processed in the PM

The proprietary home accounts are not implemented in the SSP but within every CB.

**Queuing**

An arrangement whereby transfer orders are held pending by the sending participant or by the system until it can be processed according the rules of the system.

**Raw data file**

The raw data file

- serves as check file for the verification of the positions of the General Ledger
- can be used for archiving purposes of CBs not using CRAKS1 services
- can be used for own reports of the CBs

**Real-time gross settlement (RTGS)**

The continuous (real-time) settlement of funds or securities transfers individually on an order by order basis (without netting).

**Real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system**

A settlement system in which processing and settlement take place in real-time on a gross basis. An RTGS system may provide centralised queues for orders which cannot be settled at the time of the submission due to insufficient funds or quantitative limits on the funds.

**Remote participant**

A direct participant in the SSP which does not have any representation in the SSP country via he takes
Annexes

part in the SSP.

Repurchase agreement (Repo)
A contract to sell and subsequently repurchase securities at a specified date and price.

Reservation
With the usage of the reservation facility liquidity can be reserved by RTGS account holders for the execution of special transactions with a certain priority class. HAM account holders can use the reservation facility to reserve liquidity for the execution of cash withdrawals. Reservations can be effected and adjusted using the ICM.

Reserve holdings
Liquidity intraday and overnight maintained on the RTGS account at the end-of-day.

Reserve Management Module (RM)
Module enabling CBs to perform some functionality for the reserve requirements management e.g. verify the minimum reserves fulfilment or calculate the interest to be paid to credit institutions for minimum reserves.

Reserve requirement
The obligation of euro area credit institutions to hold minimum reserves on reserve accounts with their home NCBs. The reserve requirement is determined in relation to certain elements of the credit institutions' balance sheet. Institutions' holding of required reserves are remunerated at the rate of the Eurosystem's main refinancing operations.

RM Interest and Penalty Account
Account held by a CB for performing bookings related to the payment of interest on minimum reserves and to the payment of penalties of a CI which has not fulfilled minimum reserve requirements (optional).

Relationship management application (RMA)
See SWIFT relationship management application (RMA)

RTGS account
Account managed within the PM and maintained by a direct participant to settle all transactions submitted to and processed by the PM (except for transactions of the AS settlement procedure 6 which are settled on sub accounts).
Securities settlement system (SSS)

The full set of institutional arrangements for confirmation, clearing, settlement, custody and registration of securities.

Settlement manager

Each central bank has a settlement manager who is responsible for managing, monitoring and communicating with other settlement managers within the Eurosystem.

Single Shared Platform (SSP)

TARGET2 is based on a single technical platform, known as the Single Shared Platform which includes the PAPSS (Payment and Accounting Processing Services Systems) and the CRSS (Customer Related Services System).

SSP Interlinking Account

Technical account held by the SSP and used for debiting/crediting payments from/to other external CBs (not migrated) which are processed via the Interlinking component of the SSP during the migration period.

Standing Facilities Module (SF)

The Standing Facilities (Module) is an optional module and enables to manage the overnight standing facilities (deposit facility, marginal lending facility).

Standing facility

A central bank facility available to counterparties on their own initiative. The Eurosystem offers two overnight standing facilities:

- the marginal lending facility and
- the deposit facility.

Standing order

Instruction of a direct participant to transfer regularly a fixed amount from his home account to an RTGS account (PM) and also from the RTGS (main) account to the sub-accounts (interfaced model) or to a mirror account (integrated model).

Static Data Management Module (SD)

This module ensures a proper and reliable management of static data by storing all statistic data...
actually used. It caters for data consistency between all modules of the SSP. Inter alia the Static Data
(Management) Module is used to generate the TARGET2 directory.

**Sub-account**

Specific account, belonging to an RTGS account, holding dedicated liquidity to allow the settlement of
an ancillary system.

**SWIFT**

Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication

**SWIFT Alliance Access (SAA)**

SWIFT Alliance Access is a messaging interface that allows the user to connect in-house applications
with SWIFTNet FIN (MT) and MX-based SWIFT solutions.

**SWIFT Alliance Gateway (SAG)**

SWIFT Alliance Gateway is the single window to all SWIFTNet communications. All SWIFTNet
message flows can be concentrated through one interface. This includes applications connected via
WebSphere MQ, and also those designed for linking to SWIFTNet Link or based on SWIFTAlliance
WebStation.

**SWIFT-BIC**

A bank identifier code of a financial institution connected to the SWIFT network.

**SWIFTNet Browse**

SWIFT service based on the "https" internet standard protocol, enabling users to browse remote web
servers. In SSP the use of the Browse service provides access to the Information and Control Module
(ICM) via the Secure IP Network (SIPN) of SWIFT.

**SWIFTNet FileAct**

File transfer service provided by SWIFT, typically used to exchange batches of structured financial
messages and large reports. In the SSP, e.g. the TARGET2 directory is transferred via the Secure IP
Network (SIPN) by SWIFT using the FileAct service.

**SWIFTNet InterAct**

SWIFT interactive messaging service supporting the exchange of messages between two parties. On
the SSP the InterAct service is used for the transfer of XML requests via the Secure IP Network
(SIPN) by SWIFT to the ICM.
SWIFT payment message
An instruction to transfer funds; the exchange of funds (settlement) subsequently takes place over a payment system or through correspondent banking relationships; used for all payments and the related transactions on the SSP.

SWIFT relationship management application (RMA)
Service provided by SWIFT to manage the business relationships between financial institutions. RMA operates by managing which message types are permitted to be exchanged between users of a SWIFT service.

TARGET
Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer

TARGET2
TARGET2 replaces the current decentralised infrastructure and has a single technical platform.

TARGET working day
The TARGET working day (d) equals the calendar day with the exception of the days when the TARGET system is not operated.

TARGET2 directory
Directory used by participants to find out where a payment has to be addressed by SWIFTNet Y-Copy mode. On a domestic level, it could be used to find the relation between the national sorting codes and the related BICs.

TARGET2 Fees Account
Account held by a CB for the collection of TARGET2 fees of direct participants (optional).

Technical account
Account used in the context of ancillary systems operations as intermediary account for the collection of debits/credits resulting from the settlement of balances or DVP operations. The balance of such an account is always zero because debits (resp. credits) are always followed by credits (resp. debits) of an overall equal amount.

Transaction Reference Number (TRN)
An alphanumeric reference of up to 16 characters assigned by the sender to messages sent over the
SWIFT network.

Transfer

Operationally, the sending (or movement) of funds or securities or of a right relating to funds or securities from one party to another party by

- conveyance of physical instruments/money,
- accounting entries on the books of a financial intermediary or
- accounting entries processed through a funds and/or securities transfer system.

The act of transfer affects the legal rights of the transferor, transferee and possibly third parties in relation to the money balance, security or other financial instrument being transferred.

TSRC

TARGET Security Requirements and Controls

-U-

User-to-application (U2A)

The objective is to permit direct communication between a participant's users and the ICM. The information is displayed in a browser running on a PC system. Control activities are performed manually by the user.

User

Each participant (direct and indirect).

-V-

Virtual account

Method for aggregating data among accounts within a group of accounts that are held on the books of euro area CBs. Payments made by holders of an account within a virtual account are checked against the global liquidity of the virtual account, which is the sum of the available liquidity of all accounts composing it.

-W-

Warehoused Payment

Payments submitted up to five TARGET working days in advance. In this case, the payment message will be warehoused until the day trade phase of SSP with the respective date starts.
XML

Acronym for Extensible Markup Language Subset of Standard Generalized Markup Language (SGML - ISO 8879) designed especially for use on the Web and in Web-based applications.

Y-Copy

Standard type of transmission of SWIFT messages on the SSP which is used in the context of payments processed via PM.