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Abstract

We analyze optimal monetary policy under commitment in an economy with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, long-term nominal claims and costly inflation. Our model features two prominent redistributive channels of monetary policy: the classic Fisherian channel, and unhedged interest rate exposure (URE). The former introduces a “redistributive inflationary bias”, stemming from the fact that debtors (who benefit from inflation) have a higher marginal utility than creditors. This bias is counteracted over time by a disinflationary motive: a commitment to low future inflation raises bond prices, benefiting bond-issuing households (i.e. those with negative URE), who also have a higher marginal utility than bond-purchasing ones. The result is optimal inflation front-loading. Under certain conditions, both motives cancel out asymptotically and optimal long-run inflation is zero. Numerically, we find that optimal policy achieves first-order consumption and welfare redistribution vis-à-vis a zero inflation policy.

Keywords: optimal monetary policy, incomplete markets, Gâteaux derivative, nominal debt, inflation, redistributive effects, continuous time.

JEL classification: E5, E62, F34.
Resumen

Este trabajo analiza la política monetaria óptima con compromiso en una economía con riesgo idiosincrásico no asegurable, deuda nominal a largo plazo y costes de inflación. El modelo destaca dos importantes canales redistributivos de la política monetaria: el clásico canal Fisheriano y la exposición no cubierta a los tipos de interés (URE por sus siglas inglesas). El primero de ellos introduce un «sesgo inflacionario redistributivo» consecuencia del hecho de que los deudores (que se benefician de la inflación) tienen una mayor utilidad marginal que los acreedores. Este sesgo se ve compensando a lo largo del tiempo por un motivo desinflacionario: el compromiso a una baja inflación futura eleva el precio de los bonos, lo que beneficia a los hogares que emiten deuda (aquellos con URE negativa), quienes tienen una mayor utilidad marginal que los hogares que compran deuda. El resultado es un aumento inicial de la inflación seguido por una posterior disminución hacia niveles cercanos a cero. Numéricamente, se destaca como la inflación óptima consigue una redistribución del bienestar de primer orden comparado con el caso de inflación cero.

Palabras clave: política monetaria óptima, mercados incompletos, derivada de Gâteaux, deuda nominal, efectos redistributivos de la inflación, tiempo continuo.

Códigos JEL: E5, E62, F34.
1 Introduction

In recent years the redistributive effects of monetary policy have come to the forefront both of policy discussions and academic research. On the research side, aided by the development of new computational techniques, a burgeoning literature has analyzed the transmission of monetary policy in macroeconomic models featuring rich household heterogeneity.

By and large, this literature has focused on positive questions, such as what are the different redistributive channels of monetary policy and how they shape its aggregate and redistributive effects (e.g. Auclert, 2019; Kaplan, Moll and Violante, 2018). However, progress on the normative front has been much scarcer. This has been particularly true in the context of incomplete-markets models with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk in the Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari tradition (Bewley, 1983; Huggett, 1993; Aiyagari, 1994). Such models have become very popular for analyzing policy in environments with heterogeneous agents, thanks to their rigorous microfoundations and realistic description of household heterogeneity. But solving for fully optimal policy is a hard endeavor, because the policy-maker faces an infinite-dimensional, endogenously-evolving wealth and income distribution. Our paper aims precisely at making progress in this direction.

Our starting point is Huggett’s (1993) classic model of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. As in the latter, households trade non-contingent claims, subject to an exogenous borrowing limit, in order to smooth consumption in the face of idiosyncratic income shocks. We depart from Huggett’s real framework with one-period claims by considering nominal bonds with an arbitrarily long maturity. This opens two redistributive channels of monetary policy that have become prominent in the literature. The first is the classic Fisherian channel (Fisher, 1933), by which current inflation redistributes wealth from creditors to debtors. The second is what Auclert (2019) refers to as unhedged interest rate exposure (URE). Contrary to the Fisherian one, in our framework this channel operates through expectations of future inflation: households with net financing needs (i.e. those with negative URE in Auclert’s terminology) benefit from low future inflation, because the latter raises the price at which they issue new bonds; this comes at the expense of bond-purchasing households (those with positive URE). In order to have a meaningful trade-off in the choice of the inflation path, we also assume that inflation is costly, which can be rationalized on the basis of price adjustment costs. Finally, we depart from the standard closed-economy setup by considering a small open economy, with the aforementioned bonds being also held (and priced) by risk-neutral foreign investors.

In this context, we analyze the Ramsey optimal monetary policy. To address the aforementioned difficulty of solving for optimal policy in models of this kind we employ a variational approach, which extends the concept of classical derivatives to infinite-dimensional spaces. As

1 For discussions in policy-making circles, see e.g. Yellen (2016) or Constâncio (2017). For academic analyses of this issue, see our literature review below.

2 The small open economy assumption makes the analysis somewhat more tractable. The usual bond market clearing condition in closed-economy models is replaced by a no-arbitrage condition for foreign investors that effectively prices the nominal bond. This allows us to reduce the number of constraints in the policy-maker’s problem featuring the infinite-dimensional wealth distribution.
it turns out, we are able to provide a tight analytical characterization of optimal monetary policy. The two key equations determining the optimal inflation path are in fact disarmingly simple and can be expressed as

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{marginal inflation cost} & \quad = \mathbb{E}_{f_t(a,y)} \left[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{net liabilities} \\
\text{marginal utility of cons.}
\end{array} \right] + \mu_t Q_t, \\
\mu_t & = -\int_0^t e^{-\int_s^t (\bar{r} + \pi + \delta - \rho)dz} \frac{1}{Q_s} \mathbb{E}_{f_t(a,y)} \left[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{net financing needs} \\
\text{unhedged interest rate exposure}
\end{array} \right] ds,
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \mathbb{E}_{f_t(a,y)} [ \cdot ] \) denotes the average across real net wealth \((a)\) and income \((y)\) levels at time \(t\), with joint distribution \( f_t(\cdot) \), \( u'(x') \) is the marginal (dis)utility of consumption (inflation), with \( x'' > 0 > u'' \), \( Q_t \) is the price of the long-term bond with amortization rate \( \delta \), and \( \mu_t \) is a costate.

These equations shed light on the crucial role played by the two redistributive channels (Fisherian and unhedged interest rate exposure) in shaping the path of optimal inflation. On the one hand, through the Fisherian channel current inflation benefits debtors (i.e. households with negative nominal net positions, \( NNP_t < 0 \)) at the expense of creditors (\( NNP_t > 0 \)). But debtors have lower consumption and (under standard concave preferences) higher marginal utility thereof than creditors, so the central bank has at all times an incentive to inflate so as to redistribute from the latter to the former. This 'redistributive inflationary bias' is novel in the literature and distinct from the classical inflationary bias in the New Keynesian literature.

On the other hand, under commitment the central bank internalizes how private agents’ expectations of future inflation affect current outcomes. In particular, expectations of low inflation over the life of the long-term bond raise current bond prices. This benefits the households that need to sell new bonds to cover their current financing needs (i.e. those with a negative unhedged interest rate exposure, \( URE_t < 0 \)), at the expense of bond-purchasing households (\( URE_t > 0 \)). In equilibrium, households with negative URE have lower net wealth, so they also have a higher marginal utility of consumption. As a result, the costate that captures the value of keeping past promises about inflation (\( \mu_t \)) becomes more and more negative over time. In other words, the central bank commits to lowering inflation over time. This gradual disinflationary motive is also novel in the literature.

How does the relative strength of both redistributive motives evolve over time? Provided there is some initial dispersion in net nominal positions, the redistributive inflationary bias operates from the start of the optimal plan, whereas the URE-driven disinflationary motive is absent initially (given the lack of pre-commitments at 'time zero', i.e. \( \mu_0 = 0 \) in equation 1) and works only gradually. The result is optimal inflation 'front-loading'. In this regard, we find another important result: provided households’ and foreign investors’ discount rates (the parameters \( \rho \) and \( \bar{r} \) in equation 2) are arbitrarily similar, both redistributive motives cancel out asymptotically, such that optimal long-run inflation is zero. Again, this result is reminiscent
of the optimality of zero long-run inflation in standard (representative-agent) New Keynesian models, but it arises from entirely different reasons, namely the existence of two counteracting redistributive motives.

After calibrating the model, we then solve numerically for the full transitional dynamics. Initial inflation is first-order in magnitude, reflecting the above mentioned redistributive motive, and thereafter falls gradually towards its long-run value. The latter is very close to zero, consistently with the fact that under our calibration households’ and investors’ discount rates are very similar. To summarize, the central bank front-loads inflation so as to transitorily redistribute nominal wealth from creditors to debtors, but commits to gradually undo such initial inflation.

Besides the aggregate implications, we also analyze the redistributive effects of optimal monetary policy. We show that, relative to a zero-inflation regime, the optimal policy redistributes consumption from creditors to debtors. These effects find an echo in the welfare analysis. Compared to a zero inflation policy, optimal inflationary policy achieves welfare gains for debtors and losses for creditors which, when translated into consumption equivalents, are first-order in magnitude.

Finally, we compute the optimal monetary policy response to an aggregate shock, such as a fall in aggregate income. In the analysis of aggregate shocks we focus on the optimal commitment plan ‘from a timeless perspective,’ as discussed in Woodford (2003). We find that inflation rises slightly on impact, as the central bank tries to partially counteract the negative effect of the shock on household consumption. However, the inflation reaction is an order of magnitude smaller than that of the shock itself. Intuitively, the value of sticking to past commitments to keep inflation near zero weighs more in the central bank’s decision than the value of using inflation transitorily so as to stabilize consumption in response to an unforeseen event.

Overall, our findings shed some light on current policy and academic debates regarding the appropriate conduct of monetary policy once household heterogeneity is taken into account. In particular, our results suggest that, while some inflation may be justified in the short-run so as to redistribute resources to households with higher marginal utilities, a central bank with the ability to commit should not sustain such an inflationary stance, but should instead promise to undo it over time, precisely in order to favor the same households.

Also, we stress that our results are not meant to suggest that monetary policy is the best tool to address redistributive issues, as there are probably more direct policy instruments. What our results indicate is that, in the context of economies with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, the optimal design of monetary policy will to some extent reflect redistributive motives,

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3 Given our open economy assumption, the above redistributive motives also have a cross-border dimension. Under our calibration, the domestic economy is a net debtor vis-à-vis the rest of the World, so the central bank also has an incentive to redistribute from foreign investors to domestic creditors. However, our results show that, even if the country is assumed to start with a zero net nominal position (thus effectively shutting down cross-border redistribution at time zero), the purely (and more interesting) domestic redistributive motive is enough to justify relatively high (first-order) inflation rates in the first few years of the optimal plan.
the more so the less other policies (e.g. fiscal policy) are able to achieve optimal redistributive outcomes.

**Related literature.** The main contribution of the paper relates to our normative insights on monetary policy. A recent literature addresses, from a *positive* perspective, the redistributive channels of monetary policy transmission in the context of general equilibrium models with incomplete markets and household heterogeneity. In terms of modeling, our paper is closest to Auclert (2019), Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2018), Gornemann, Kuester and Nakajima (2016), McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson (2016) or Luetticke (2018), who also employ different versions of the incomplete markets model with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. Other contributions, such as Doepke and Schneider (2006b), Meh, Ríos-Rull and Terajima (2010), Sheedy (2014), Werning, (2015), Ravn and Sterk (2017), Challe et al. (2017), Sterk and Tenreyro (2018) or Bilbiie (2019) analyze monetary policy in environments where heterogeneity is kept finite-dimensional. We contribute to this literature by analyzing *optimal* monetary policy, in an economy with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk.

As explained before, our analysis focuses on the Fisherian and interest rate exposure channels. These are two of the three redistributive channels of monetary policy identified by Auclert (2019) in a general framework of dynamic consumer optimization. Auclert (2019) then analyzes the importance of these channels for the aggregate consumption effects of monetary policy shocks using a sufficient statistics approach. The Fisherian channel is of course a long-standing topic that has experienced a revival in recent years. Doepke and Schneider (2006a) document net nominal asset positions across US sectors and household groups and estimate empirically the redistributive effects of different inflation scenarios; Adam and Zhu (2014) perform a similar analysis for Euro Area countries. We show how, in a model with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk featuring long-term nominal debt and costly inflation, both channels interact to shape optimal monetary policy under commitment. In doing so, we uncover two novel normative insights. First, the Fisherian channel gives rise to a ‘redistributive inflationary bias’: the central bank has a permanent incentive to redistribute from creditors to debtors, who have a higher marginal utility of consumption. Second, such bias is counteracted over time by a disinflationary motive related to the interest rate exposure channel: the central bank promises lower inflation going forward in order to favor bond-issuing households (those with negative URE), who largely coincide with the indebted ones and hence have too a higher marginal utility. We argue that both redistributive motives would carry over to more fully-fledged incomplete-markets models that incorporate the above channels.

Our second contribution is methodological. We contribute to the emergent literature on optimal policy problems in general equilibrium models with incomplete markets and uninsurable idiosyncratic risk in a general framework of dynamic consumer optimization. We contribute to this literature by analyzing *optimal* monetary policy, in an economy with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk.

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4 For work studying the effects of different aggregate shocks in related environments, see e.g. Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017), Den Haan, Rendahl and Riegler (2018), Auclert, Roglinie and Straub (2019) and Bayer et al. (2019).

5 The third channel is the *earnings heterogeneity channel*, namely the fact that not all households experience the same (endogenous) change in income following a monetary policy shock. This channel is absent in our model given our assumption of exogenous income.
surable idiosyncratic risk. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to solve for a fully dynamic optimal policy problem in a general equilibrium model with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk in which the cross-sectional net wealth distribution (an infinite-dimensional, endogenously evolving object) is a state in the planner’s optimization problem. Even if the model considered here is relatively simple, our methodology has been successfully applied to more complex settings, such as Bigio and Sannikov (2019), who analyze optimal monetary policy in an incomplete-markets economy where credit is intermediated by banks operating in an over-the-counter market.6

Different papers have analyzed Ramsey problems in similar setups. Some papers such as Gottardi, Kajii, and Nakajima (2011), Bilbiie and Ragot (2017), Le Grand and Ragot (2017), Challe (2019) and Acharya et al. (2019), analyze optimal Ramsey policies in incomplete-market models in which the policy-maker does not need to keep track of the wealth distribution. This is due either to particular assumptions that facilitate aggregation or to the fact that the equilibrium net wealth distribution is degenerate at zero. In contrast to these papers, we introduce a methodology for computing the fully dynamic, nonlinear optimal policy under commitment in an incomplete markets setting where the policy-maker needs to keep track of the entire wealth distribution.

Dyrda and Pedroni (2018) and Itskhoki and Moll (2019) employ numerical optimization to study optimal dynamic Ramsey taxation in an Aiyagari economy and in a model with heterogeneous entrepreneurs, respectively. Dyrda and Pedroni (2018) assume that the paths for the optimal taxes follow splines with nodes set at a few exogenously selected periods whereas Itskhoki and Moll (2019) restrict the time paths of the tax policy to be an exponential function of time. Both papers perform a numerical search of the optimal node values or coefficients. In our paper we do not impose ex-ante any parametric form for the optimal policy, instead we derive analytically the first order conditions and compute the optimal policy. Our approach improves considerably both the accuracy and the efficiency of the numerical computations.7 Bhandari et al. (2018) analyze optimal fiscal and monetary policy in a heterogeneous agents New Keynesian environment with aggregate uncertainty. They employ a local method (second-order perturbations) and hence their methodology cannot address problems with exogenous, occasionally binding borrowing limits such as those used in models à la Aiyagari-Bewley-Huggett, which are precisely the focus of our paper. AÇíkgöz et al. (2018) analyze optimal fiscal policy with commitment in an Aiyagari economy. Similar to us, they solve a Lagrangian problem that includes the first order conditions of the households as constraints. However, instead of working with the complete income-wealth distribution as a state variable by means of infinite dimensional

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6Although this paper focuses on optimal monetary policy, the techniques developed here lend themselves naturally to the analysis of other policy problems, e.g. optimal fiscal policy, in this class of models. Recent work analyzing fiscal policy issues in incomplete-markets, heterogeneous-agent models includes Heathcote (2005), Oh and Reis (2012), Kaplan and Violante (2014) and McKay and Reis (2016).

7As an illustration, Dyrda and Pedroni (2018) compute the optimal paths of three taxes employing 15 nodes in total. As reported in their paper, the numerical optimization took 120 hours using 576 cores at a Supercomputing Institute. In our case, we consider 9600 nodes (800 years at monthly frequency) and the code runs in less than 5 minutes in a home PC.
calculus, they analyze the problem of individual agents employing standard calculus and then aggregate, which imposes some extra constraints on the distributions that can be analyzed. Moreover, none of the above papers analyze optimal monetary policy in a model featuring both the Fisherian and unhedged interest rate exposure channels, which is at the core of our analysis.

The use of infinite-dimensional calculus in problems with non-degenerate distributions is employed in Davila et al. (2012), Lucas and Moll (2014) and Nuño and Moll (2018) to find the first-best and the constrained-efficient allocation in heterogeneous-agents models. In these papers a social planner directly decides on individual policies in order to control a distribution of agents subject to idiosyncratic shocks. Here, by contrast, we show how these techniques may be extended to game-theoretical settings involving several agents who are moreover forward-looking. This requires the policy-maker to internalize how her promised future decisions affect private agents’ expectations; the problem is then augmented by introducing costates that reflect the value of deviating from the promises made at time zero. This relates to the literature on mean-field games in mathematics. In particular, the paper is related to Bensoussan, Chau and Yam (2016), who analyze a model of a major player and a distribution of atomistic agents.

2 Model

We extend the basic Huggett framework to an open-economy setting with nominal, non-contingent, long-term debt and nominal rigidities. Time is continuous: \( t \geq 0 \). The domestic economy is composed of a measure-one continuum of households. There is a single, freely traded consumption good, the World price of which is normalized to 1. The domestic price (equivalently, the nominal exchange rate) at time \( t \) is denoted by \( P_t \) and evolves according to

\[
dP_t = \pi_t P_t dt,
\]

where \( \pi_t \) is the domestic inflation rate (equivalently, the rate of nominal exchange rate depreciation).

2.1 Households

2.1.1 Income and net assets

Household \( k \in [0, 1] \) is endowed at time \( t \) with \( y_{kt} \) units of the good, where \( y_{kt} \) follows a two-state Poisson process: \( y_{kt} \in \{y_1, y_2\} \), with \( y_1 < y_2 \). The process jumps from state 1 to state 2 with intensity \( \lambda_1 \) and vice versa with intensity \( \lambda_2 \).

Households trade nominal, non-contingent, long-term bonds (denominated in domestic currency) with one another and with foreign investors. Following standard practice in the literature, we model long-term debt in a tractable way by assuming that bonds pay exponentially decaying coupons (see, for instance, Leland and Toft, 1996). In particular, a bond issued at time \( t \) promises a stream of nominal payments \( \{\delta e^{-\delta (s-t)}\}_{s \in (t, \infty)} \), totaling 1 unit of domestic
currency over the (infinite) life of the bond. Thus, from the point of view of time \( t \), a bond issued at \( \tilde{t} < t \) is equivalent to \( e^{-\delta(t-\tilde{t})} \) newly issued bonds. This implies that a household’s entire bond portfolio can be summarized by the current total nominal coupon payment, which we denote by \( \delta A_{kt} \). One can then interpret \( \delta \) as the ‘amortization rate’ and \( A_{kt} \) as the nominal face value of the bond portfolio. The latter evolves according to

\[
dA_{kt} = (A_{kt}^{\text{new}} - \delta A_{kt}) \, dt,
\]

where \( A_{kt}^{\text{new}} \) represents the face value of the flow of new bonds purchased at time \( t \). For households with a negative net position, \((-) A_{kt} \) represents the face value of outstanding net liabilities (‘debt’ for short). Our formulation also implies that at each \( t \) one needs only consider the price of one bond cohort, e.g., newly issued bonds. Let \( Q_t \) denote the nominal market price of bonds issued at time \( t \). The budget constraint of household \( k \) is then

\[
Q_t A_{kt}^{\text{new}} = P_t (y_{kt} - c_{kt}) + \delta A_{kt},
\]

where \( c_{kt} \) is the household’s consumption. Combining the last two equations, we obtain the following dynamics for the nominal face value of net wealth,

\[
dA_{kt} = \left( \frac{\delta A_{kt} + P_t (y_{kt} - c_{kt})}{Q_t} - \delta A_{kt} \right) \, dt. \tag{4}
\]

We define the real face value of net wealth as \( a_{kt} \equiv A_{kt}/P_t \). Its dynamics are obtained by combining equations (3) and (4),

\[
da_{kt} = \left[ \frac{\delta a_{kt} + y_{kt} - c_{kt}}{Q_t} - (\delta + \pi_t) a_{kt} \right] \, dt, \tag{5}
\]

where \( \frac{\delta a_{kt} + y_{kt} - c_{kt}}{Q_t} = A_{kt}^{\text{new}}/P_t = a_{kt}^{\text{new}} \) is the real face value of new bonds acquired at \( t \). We assume that each household faces the following exogenous borrowing limit,

\[
a_{kt} \geq \phi, \tag{6}
\]

where \( \phi \leq 0 \). Therefore, the real face value of debt \((-) a_{kt} \) cannot exceed the level \((-) \phi \geq 0 \). In Section 5 we analyze the alternative case, considered in Auclert (2019), in which the borrowing limit is defined in terms of the real market value of net wealth, given by \( Q_t a_{kt} \) in our model.

### 2.1.2 Preferences

Household have preferences over paths for consumption \( c_{kt} \) and domestic inflation \( \pi_t \) discounted at rate \( \rho > 0 \),

\[
\mathbb{E}_0 \left\{ \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left[ u(c_{kt}) - x(\pi_t) \right] \, dt \right\}. 
\]
The consumption utility function $u$ is bounded and continuous, with $u' > 0$, $u'' < 0$ for $c > 0$. The inflation disutility function $x$ satisfies $x' > 0$ for $\pi > 0$, $x' < 0$ for $\pi < 0$, $x'' > 0$ for all $\pi$, and $x(0) = x'(0) = 0$. Utility costs of inflation can be microfounded on the basis e.g. of costly price adjustment. In Appendix A we show that a quadratic specification of the form $x(\pi) = \frac{\psi}{2}\pi^2$, $\psi > 0$, can be derived in a model version where firms are modeled explicitly and set prices subject to quadratic price adjustment costs à la Rotemberg (1982).

From now onwards we drop subscripts $k$ for ease of exposition. The household chooses consumption at each point in time in order to maximize its welfare. The value function of the household at time $t$ can be expressed as

$$v_t(a, y) = \max_{\{c_s\}_{s \in [t, \infty)}} E_t \left\{ \int_t^\infty e^{-\rho(s-t)} [u(c_s) - x(\pi_s)] ds \right\},$$

subject to the law of motion of net wealth (5) and the borrowing limit (6). We use the shorthand notation $v_{it}(a) = v_t(a, y_t)$ for the value function when household income is low ($i = 1$) and high ($i = 2$). The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation corresponding to the problem above is

$$\rho v_{it}(a) = \frac{\partial v_{it}}{\partial t} + \max_{c} \left\{ u(c) - x(\pi_t) + s_{it}(a, c) \frac{\partial v_{it}}{\partial a} \right\} + \lambda_t [v_{jt}(a) - v_{it}(a)],$$

for $i, j = 1, 2$, and $j \neq i$, where $s_{it}(a, c)$ is the drift function, given by

$$s_{it}(a, c) \equiv \frac{\delta a + y_t - c}{Q_t} - (\delta + \pi_t) a,$$

$i = 1, 2$. The first order condition for consumption is

$$u'(c_{it}(a)) = \frac{1}{Q_t} \frac{\partial v_{it}(a)}{\partial a},$$

where $c_{it}(a) \equiv c(a, y_t)$. Therefore, household consumption increases with nominal bond prices and falls with the slope of the value function. Intuitively, a higher bond price (equivalently, a lower yield) gives the household an incentive to save less and consume more. A steeper value function, on the contrary, makes it more attractive to save so as to increase net bond holdings.

### 2.2 Foreign investors

Households trade bonds with competitive risk-neutral foreign investors that can invest elsewhere at the risk-free real rate $\bar{r}$. As explained before, bonds are amortized at rate $\delta$. Foreign investors also discount future nominal payoffs with the accumulated domestic inflation (i.e. exchange rate depreciation) between the time of the bond purchase and the time such payoffs accrue. Therefore, the nominal price of the bond at time $t$ is given by

$$Q_t = \int_t^\infty \delta e^{-(\bar{r}+\delta)(s-t)-\int_t^s \pi_u du} ds.$$
Taking the derivative with respect to time, we obtain
\[ Q_t (\bar{r} + \delta + \pi_t) = \delta + \dot{Q}_t, \]  
(11)

where \( \dot{Q}_t \equiv dQ_t/dt \). The ordinary differential equation (11) provides the risk-neutral pricing of the nominal bond. The boundary condition is \( \lim_{T \to \infty} e^{-(\bar{r}+\delta)T-\int_0^T \pi_u du} Q_T = 0 \). The steady state bond price is \( Q_\infty = \frac{\delta}{\bar{r} + \delta + \pi_\infty} \), where \( \pi_\infty \) is the inflation level in the steady state.

### 2.3 Central Bank

There is a central bank that chooses monetary policy. We assume that there are no monetary frictions so that the only role of money is that of a unit of account. The central bank can trade a short-term (instantaneous) nominal claim with foreign investors. The central bank sets the instantaneous nominal interest rate \( R_t \) of that facility. A no-arbitrage condition implies \( R_t = \bar{r} + \pi_t \). This is the Fisher equation with a constant real interest rate \( \bar{r} \). Therefore the monetary authority effectively chooses the inflation rate \( \pi_t \). In Section 3, we will study in detail the optimal inflation policy of the central bank.

### 2.4 Equilibrium

The state of the economy at time \( t \) is the joint density of net wealth and income, \( f_t(a, y) \equiv \{ f_t(a, y_i) \}_{i=1}^2 \equiv \{ f_{it}(a) \}_{i=1}^2 \). Let \( s_{it}(a, c_{it}(a)) \equiv s_{it}(a) \) be the drift of individual real net wealth evaluated at the optimal consumption policy. The density satisfies the normalization \( \sum_{i=1}^2 \int_\phi^\infty f_{it}(a) da = 1 \). The dynamics of the density are given by the Kolmogorov Forward (KF) equation,
\[ \frac{\partial f_{it}(a)}{\partial t} = -\frac{\partial}{\partial a} [s_{it}(a) f_{it}(a)] - \lambda_i f_{it}(a) + \lambda_j f_{jt}(a), \quad i, j = 1, 2, j \neq i. \]  
(12)

Given a central bank interest rate policy \( \{ R_t \}_{t \geq 0} \), we define an equilibrium in this economy as paths for prices \( \{ w_t, Q_t, \pi_t \}_{t \geq 0} \), the consumption policy function \( \{ c_t(\cdot) \}_{t \geq 0} \), the household value function \( \{ v_t(\cdot) \}_{t \geq 0} \) and the income-wealth density \( \{ f_t(\cdot) \}_{t \geq 0} \) such that, at every time \( t \), (i) households and firms maximize their corresponding objective functions taking as given equilibrium prices, (ii) all markets clear. There are three markets in the economy: the bond market, the labor market, and the goods market. Notice that, given the inflation path, bond prices can be computed independently of the rest of the economy.

We henceforth use the notation
\[ \mathbb{E}_{f_t(a, y)} [g_t(a, y)] = \sum_{i=1}^2 \int_\phi^\infty g_t(a, y_i) f_t(a, y_i) da \]

to denote the cross-household average at time \( t \) of any function \( g_t \) of individual net wealth and income levels, or equivalently the aggregate value of such a function (given that the household
population is normalized to 1). We can define some aggregate variables of interest. The aggregate real face value of net wealth in the economy is \( \bar{a}_t \equiv E_{ft(a,y)} [a] \). Aggregate consumption is \( \bar{c}_t \equiv E_{ft(a,y)} [c_t(a,y)] \), and aggregate income is \( \bar{y}_t \equiv E_{ft(a,y)} [y_t] \). These quantities are linked by the current account identity,

\[
\frac{d\bar{a}_t}{dt} = \frac{\delta \bar{a}_t + \bar{y}_t - \bar{c}_t}{Q_t} - (\delta + \pi_t) \bar{a}_t \equiv \bar{a}_t^{new} - (\delta + \pi_t) \bar{a}_t,
\]  

(13)

For future reference, we may also define the real face value of gross household debt, \( \bar{b}_t \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_0^1 (-a) f_{it}(a) da. \)

3 Optimal monetary policy

3.1 Redistributive (and other) transmission channels of monetary policy

Before starting the formal analysis of optimal monetary policy, it is worthwhile to briefly discuss the channels through which inflation operates in this economy. The first one affects all households symmetrically, namely the fact that non-zero inflation reduces household welfare as shown in equation (7). As argued before, such welfare costs from inflation can be microfounded in a model version with price-setting firms and costly price adjustment. In this sense, this is a standard channel that is present in the (representative-agent) New Keynesian literature. Our simple model abstract from other New-Keynesian transmission channels. In particular, the fixed labor supply precludes changes in aggregate output, despite the presence of nominal rigidities. This allows us to simplify the analysis and focus on the already hard question of how to optimally design monetary policy in the presence of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk.

Monetary policy has two additional transmission channels, both of which are redistributive. Both are readily visible from the law of motion of individual net wealth (eq. 5) and the bond pricing condition (eq. 10). We reproduce both equations here for convenience,

\[
\dot{a}_t = \frac{\delta a_t + y_t - c_t}{Q_t} - a_t \pi_t - \delta a_t,
\]  

(14)

\[
Q_t = \int_t^\infty \delta e^{-(r+\delta)(s-t)-\int_t^s \pi_u du} ds.
\]  

(15)

First, as shown in (14), contemporaneous inflation \( \pi_t \) erodes the real value of nominal claims and thus redistributes net wealth from creditors (those with \( a_t > 0 \)) to debtors (\( a_t < 0 \)). This is of course the classical Fisherian redistribution channel. Second, according to equation (15) expected inflation at any future point in time \( \pi_{s>t} \) lowers current bond prices \( Q_t \) through higher inflation premia. From equation (14), this hurts the households that need to sell new bonds to cover their funding needs (i.e. those with \( \delta a_t + y_t - c_t < 0 \)) by making them to do so at a lower price and thus speeding up the rate at which they accumulate debt (in face value terms); the
opposite is true for households that purchase new bonds \((\delta a_t + y_t - c_t > 0)\).

The above channels represent instances of two of the three redistributive channels of monetary policy identified by Auclert (2019) in a general model of dynamic consumer optimization.\(^8\) The first is the classic Fisherian channel, which works through each household’s net nominal position (NNP). The latter is given in our model by

\[
Q_t a_t \equiv NNP_t(a, y).
\]  

NNP is proportional to the face value of its net wealth, \(a_t\), so a household benefits from current inflation only if it has a negative NNP. The second channel works through what Auclert (2019) refers to as the unhedged interest rate exposure (URE). The latter is the difference between maturing assets (including income) and liabilities (including planned consumption), or equivalently the household’s net saving requirement in a given period. In our model, the URE is given by

\[
\delta a_t + y_t - c_t(a, y) \equiv URE_t(a, y),
\]  

which is precisely the term divided by the bond price in equation (15). This channel operates through changes in asset prices induced by monetary policy. In Auclert (2019) these changes are driven by movements in real interest rates (hence his terminology of interest rate exposure). In our model, where the real interest rate \(\bar{r}\) is constant, movements in asset prices are exclusively due to changes in the future path of inflation, but the channel is otherwise the same as the one identified by Auclert (2019).

As our subsequent analysis will highlight, both channels are key at shaping the inflation path under the Ramsey optimal plan.

### 3.2 Central bank problem

We now turn to the design of the optimal monetary policy. Following standard practice, we assume that the central bank is utilitarian, i.e. it gives the same Pareto weight to each household. We consider the case in which the central bank can credibly commit to a future inflation path (the Ramsey problem).

The central bank is assumed to be benevolent and hence maximizes economy-wide aggregate welfare, defined as

\[
W_0 \equiv E_{f_0(a,y)} \left[ v_0(a, y) \right].
\]  

It will turn out to be useful to express the above welfare criterion as follows. Lemma 1 in Appendix B shows how the welfare criterion (18) can alternatively be expressed as\(^9\)

\[
W_0 = \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} E_{f_0(a,y)} \left[ a (c_t(a, y)) - x (\pi_t) \right] dt.
\]

---

\(^8\)The third channel he analyzes is the earnings heterogeneity channel, namely the fact that not all households experience the same (endogenous) change in income following a monetary policy shock. This channel is absent in our model given our assumption of exogenous income.

\(^9\)All lemmas and propositions can be found in Appendix B.
The central bank credibly commits at time zero to an inflation path \( \{ \pi_t \}_{t \geq 0} \). The value functional of the central bank is given by

\[
W [f_0 (\cdot)] = \max_{\{ \pi_t, Q_t, v_t, c_t \}_{t \geq 0}} W_0,
\]

subject to the law of motion of the distribution (12), the bond pricing equation (11), and households’ HJB equation (7) and optimal consumption choice (9).

Notice that the optimal value \( W \) and the optimal policies are not ordinary functions, but functionals, as they map the infinite-dimensional initial distribution \( f_0 (\cdot) \) into \( \mathbb{R} \). In particular, the optimal inflation path depends on the initial distribution \( f_0 (a, y) \) and on time: \( \pi_t \equiv \pi [f_0 (\cdot), t] \). The central bank maximizes welfare taking into account not only the state dynamics (12), but also households’ HJB equation (7) and investors’ bond pricing condition (11), both of which are forward-looking. That is, the central bank understands how it can steer households’ and foreign investors’ expectations by committing to an inflation path.

Given an initial distribution \( f_0(a, y) \), a Ramsey allocation is composed of a sequence of inflation rates \( \{ \pi_t \}_{t \geq 0} \), a household value function \( \{ v_t (\cdot) \}_{t \geq 0} \), a consumption policy \( \{ c_t (\cdot) \}_{t \geq 0} \), a bond price function \( \{ Q_t \}_{t \geq 0} \) and a distribution \( \{ f_t (\cdot) \}_{t \geq 0} \) such that they solve the central bank problem (19).

The Ramsey problem is an optimal control problem in a suitable function space. In order to solve this problem, we should construct a Lagrangian in such a space. In Appendix B, we show that the Lagrangian \( \mathcal{L} [\pi, Q, f, v, c] \equiv \mathcal{L}_0 \) is given by

\[
\mathcal{L}_0 \equiv \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left( \sum_{i=1}^2 \int_0^\infty \left[ u(c_{it} (a)) - x (\pi_t) \right] f_{it} (a) \right. \\
+ \zeta_{it} (a) \left. \left[ - \frac{\partial f_{it} (a)}{\partial t} - \frac{\partial}{\partial a} [s_{it} (a) f_{it} (a)] - \lambda_i f_{it} (a) + \lambda_j f_{jt} (a) \right] \right) \\
+ \theta_{it} (a) \left[ \frac{\partial v_{it} (a)}{\partial t} + u(c_{it} (a)) - x (\pi_t) + s_{it} (a) \frac{\partial v_{it} (a)}{\partial a} + \lambda_i [v_{jt} (a) - v_{it} (a)] - \rho v_{it} (a) \right] \\
+ \eta_{it} (a) \left[ u'(c_{it} (a)) - \frac{1}{Q_t} \frac{\partial v_{it} (a)}{\partial a} \right] \big] \text{d}a \text{d}t \\
+ \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \mu_t \left[ Q_t (\bar{\pi}_t + \pi_t + \delta) - \delta - \dot{Q}_t \right] dt,
\]

where \( j = 1, 2, j \neq i \) and \( \zeta, \theta, \eta \) and \( \mu \) are Lagrange multipliers.

### 3.3 Optimal inflation

In order to maximize the Lagrangian (20) with respect to the functions \( \pi, Q, f, v, c \) we employ a variational approach. In particular, we compute the Gâteaux derivatives, which extend the concept of derivative from \( \mathbb{R} \) to infinite-dimensional spaces (see Appendix B.1 for further details).
As an example, the Gâteaux derivative with respect to the income-wealth density $f$ is

$$\lim_{\alpha \to 0} \frac{\mathcal{L}_0 [f + \alpha h, \pi, Q, v, c] - \mathcal{L}_0 [f, \pi, Q, v, c]}{\alpha}$$

where $h$ is an arbitrary function in the same function space as $f$. The first-order conditions require that the Gâteaux derivatives should be zero for any function $h$.

In Appendix B.2 we show that in equilibrium the Lagrange multiplier $\zeta$ associated with the Kolmogorov Forward equation (12), which represents the social value of an individual household, coincides with the private value $v$. In addition, the Lagrange multipliers $\theta$ and $\eta$ associated with the households’ HJB equation (7) and first-order condition (9), respectively, are both zero. That is, households’ forward-looking optimizing behavior does not represent a source of time-inconsistency, as the monetary authority would choose at all times the same individual consumption and saving policies as the households themselves. Therefore, the only nontrivial Lagrange multiplier is $\mu_t$, the one associated with the bond pricing equation (11). As shown in the appendix, the first order condition with respect to bond prices yields

$$\frac{d\mu_t}{dt} = \left( \rho - \bar{r} - \pi_t - \delta \right) \mu_t - E_{f_t(a,y)} \left[ -a_t^{new} (a, y) u' (c_t (a, y)) \right], \quad (21)$$

with initial condition $\mu_0 = 0$, where $a_t^{new} (a, y) \equiv \frac{\delta a+y-c_t(a,y)}{Q_t}$. The first order condition with respect to inflation is

$$x' (\pi_t) = E_{f_t(a,y)} [Q_t (-a) u' (c_t (a, y))] + \mu_t Q_t, \quad (22)$$

The following proposition characterizes the solution to this problem.

**Proposition 1 (Optimal inflation)** In addition to equations (12), (11), (7) and (9), if a solution to the Ramsey problem (19) exists, the inflation path $\pi_t$ must satisfy (22), where the costate $\mu_t$ follows (21).

Equations (22) and (21) reflect in simple and intuitive terms how the two redistributive channels of inflation discussed in section 3.1 (Fisherian and unhedged interest rate exposure) shape the central bank’s motives to inflate or disinflate under the Ramsey optimal commitment. Moreover, they encapsulate incentives to redistribute both among domestic households and between the latter and foreign investors (cross-border redistribution). To see both aspects more clearly, we use the definitions of nominal net position and unhedged interest rate exposure (equations 16 and 17 respectively) and the identity $\text{cov}(x, y) = \mathbb{E}(xy) - \mathbb{E}(x)\mathbb{E}(y)$ to express (22) and (21) as:

$$x' (\pi_t) = \frac{\text{Domestic Fisherian motive}}{\text{Cross-border Fisherian motive}} \frac{\text{COV}_{f_t(a,y)} [\neg NNP_t (a, y), \text{MUC}_t (a, y)]}{\mathbb{E}_{f_t(a,y)} [\neg NNP_t (a, y)] \mathbb{E}_{f_t(a,y)} [\text{MUC}_t (a, y)] + \mu_t Q_t}, \quad (23)$$
Lemma 2 in the Appendix proves that, given strictly concave preferences, \( MUC \) falls with equals the sum of three terms. The first term, \( \text{cov}_{f_t} [-NNP_t (\cdot), MUC_t (\cdot)] \), represents the domestic Fisherian redistributive motive. It captures the fact that, to the extent that such covariance is positive such that households with a negative nominal net position (i.e. indebted households) have a higher marginal utility, then the central bank has an incentive to create inflation so as to redistribute resources from domestic creditors to domestic debtors. Indeed, Lemma 2 in the Appendix proves that, given strictly concave preferences, \( MUC \) falls with net wealth, \( \partial u'/\partial a < 0 \): debtors (those with \( NNP < 0 \)) have a higher marginal utility of consumption than creditors (\( NNP > 0 \)) and hence receive a higher effective weight in the central bank’s inflation decision. Thus, even if the country has a zero net position vis-à-vis the rest of the World, as long as there is dispersion in net wealth the central bank has a reason to redistribute from creditors to debtors.

The second term, \( \mathbb{E}_{f_t} [-NNP_t (\cdot)] \mathbb{E}_{f_t} [MUC_t (\cdot)] \), captures the cross-border Fisherian redistributive motive. If the country is a net debtor, such that \( \mathbb{E}_{f_t} (-NNP_t) > 0 \), the central bank has a motive to redistribute wealth from foreign investors to domestic borrowers (who have an average marginal utility of \( \mathbb{E}_{f_t} [MUC_t (\cdot)] \)) as it only cares about the welfare of the latter.

The third term on the right-hand side of equation (23) captures the value to the central bank of promises about time-\( t \) inflation made to foreign investors (the agents effectively pricing the bond) at time 0. The costate \( \mu_t \) is zero at the time of announcing the Ramsey plan (\( t = 0 \)), because the central bank is not bound by previous commitments. From then on, it evolves according to equation (24). In the latter equation, the term \( \text{cov}_{f_t} [URE_t (\cdot), MUC_t (\cdot)] \) represents the domestic interest rate exposure redistributive motive. Intuitively, the central bank understands that a commitment to higher inflation in the future lowers bond prices today, which hurts those households that need to sell new bonds (i.e. those with \( URE < 0 \)) and vice versa for those that purchase new bonds (\( URE > 0 \)). If the former households have a higher marginal utility than the latter ones, such that the covariance between \( URE \) and \( MUC \) is negative, then \( \mu_t \) should become more and more negative over time. (Indeed this will be the case in our numerical analysis.) From equation (23), this would give the central bank an incentive to reduce inflation over time, thus tempering the above-discussed Fisherian redistributive motive.

Finally, the term \( \mathbb{E}_{f_t} [URE_t (\cdot)] \mathbb{E}_{f_t} [MUC_t (\cdot)] \) captures the cross-border interest rate exposure redistributive motive. Intuitively, to the extent that the domestic economy is a net
issuer of new bonds to the rest of the World, such that $E_{\tilde{f}_t} [URE_t] < 0$, then expectations of future inflation that reduce bond prices today are welfare-detrimental for domestic households in the aggregate, thus giving the central bank a further incentive to commit to lowering inflation in the future. Notice how the two URE-related redistributive terms are discounted at a rate $(\bar{r} + \pi_t + \delta - \rho)$, the difference between the instantaneous rate at which future nominal coupons are discounted (see equation 15) and household’s discount factor $\rho$.

The Ramsey problem is not time-consistent, due to the presence of the forward-looking bond pricing condition (10). If at some future point in time $t > 0$ the central bank decided to reoptimize given the state at that point, $f_t (\cdot)$, the new path for optimal inflation would not need to coincide with the original path, as the costate at that point would be $\mu_t = 0$ (corresponding to a new commitment formulated at time $t$).

**Initial and terminal optimal inflation.** We conclude this section by providing two additional theoretical results, related to the initial and terminal points of the optimal inflation path. First, if we assume that the economy as a whole is not a net creditor, then initial optimal inflation is strictly positive.

**Proposition 2 (Redistributive inflationary bias at time 0)** Provided the aggregate nominal net position is non-positive, $E_{f_{0}(a,y)} [-NNP_{0}(a,y)]/Q_{0} = -\bar{a}_{0} \geq 0$, optimal inflation at time-0 is strictly positive, $\pi_{0} > 0$.

The formal proof can be found in Appendix B.3, although the result follows quite directly from equation (23) evaluated at time 0 (at which $\mu_{0} = 0$). As explained before, the strict concavity of preferences implies that indebted households ($NNP < 0$) have a higher marginal utility of consumption than lending ones ($NNP > 0$) and hence $\text{cov}_{f_{0}(a)} [-NNP_{0}, MUC_{0}]$ is strictly positive. Provided the economy as a whole is not a net creditor, $E_{f_{0}(a)} [-NNP_{0}] \geq 0$, then the right-hand side of equation (23) is strictly positive. Since $x'(\pi) > 0$ only for $\pi > 0$, it follows that initial inflation must be strictly positive. It is important to stress that this result is independent of the open economy dimension: even if the economy as a whole is neither a creditor or a debtor ($\bar{a}_{t} = 0$), the fact that $u'$ is strictly decreasing in net wealth implies that, as long as there is wealth dispersion, the central bank will have a reason to inflate.

To the best of our knowledge, this redistributive inflationary bias is a novel result in the context of incomplete markets models with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. It is also different from the classical inflationary bias of discretionary monetary policy originally emphasized by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). In those papers, and more generally in the New Keynesian literature, the source of the inflation bias is a persistent attempt by the monetary authority to raise output above its natural level. Here, by contrast, it arises from the welfare gains that can be achieved for the country as a whole by redistributing wealth towards indebted households. Importantly, while the model analyzed here is deliberately simple with a view to illustrating our methodology, this redistributive motive to inflate would carry over to fully fledged models with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk that feature a Fisherian channel.
Second, in the steady state the Fisherian and interest rate exposure channels cancel each other as long as households are patient enough, in the following sense:

**Proposition 3 (Optimal long-run inflation)** In the limit as $\rho \to \bar{\rho}$, the optimal steady-state inflation rate under commitment tends to zero: $\lim_{\rho \to \bar{\rho}} \pi_\infty = 0$.

That is, as long as households’ discount factor (and hence that of the benevolent central bank) is close enough to that of foreign investors, optimal long-run inflation will be close to zero. The intuition is the following. As explained before, at each point in time the optimal inflation reflects the tension between two redistributive motives: current inflation helps currently indebted households through the Fisherian channel, but past expectations of such inflation hurts past issuers of the long-term bond by lowering the price at which they did so (the interest rate exposure channel). In the long run, both motives cancel each other out at zero inflation for the case of $\rho$ arbitrarily close to $r$. Proposition 3 provides a useful benchmark to understand the long-run properties of optimal policy when $\rho$ is close to $\bar{\rho}$. This will indeed be the case in our numerical analysis.

Proposition 3 is reminiscent of a well-known result from the New Keynesian literature, namely that optimal long-run inflation in the standard New Keynesian framework is exactly zero (see e.g. Benigno and Woodford, 2005). In that framework, the optimality of zero long-run inflation arises from the fact that, at that level, the welfare gains from trying to exploit the short-run output-inflation trade-off (i.e. raising output towards its socially efficient level) exactly cancel out with the welfare losses from permanently worsening that trade-off (through higher inflation expectations). Key to that result is the fact that, in that model, price-setters and the (benevolent) central bank have the same (steady-state) discount factor. Here, the optimality of zero long-run inflation reflects instead the fact that, provided the discount rate of the investors pricing the bonds is arbitrarily close to that of the central bank, the aggregate welfare gains from trying to redistribute wealth from creditors to debtors becomes arbitrarily close to the aggregate welfare losses from lowering the price of new bond issuances.

4 Numerical analysis

4.1 Numerical solution

Despite its tight characterization in Proposition 1, a closed-form solution to the Ramsey problem remains elusive and hence we need to resort to numerical techniques to compute the equilibrium. In Appendix C we propose an algorithm to find the solution. The general idea is to guess a path for inflation and use it to find an equilibrium of this economy. We then use the equilibrium objects to compute the path of the costate $\mu_t$ from equation (21) and, given the latter, the optimal inflation path using equation (22). If the latter does not coincide with the initial guess, we update it and then iterate again until numerical convergence is reached. In order to find the
equilibrium at each iteration, we employ a finite difference method similar to the ones employed in Achdou et al. (2017) or Nuño and Moll (2018).

It is worthwhile to highlight here that the assumption of continuous time improves the efficiency of the numerical solution in several dimensions. First, the HJB equation (7) can be solved using fast sparse-matrix methods. Second, the solution of the HJB equation makes straightforward the computation of the dynamics of the distribution (equation 12) as the operators in both equations are adjoint. This efficiency is crucial as the computation of the optimal policies requires several iterations along the complete time-path of the distribution. In a home PC, the Ramsey problem presented here can be solved in a few minutes. In any case, optimal monetary policy can be analyzed in discrete time following a similar approach, as discussed in an earlier version of this paper (Nuño and Thomas, 2016).

4.2 Calibration

The calibration is intended to be mainly illustrative, given the model’s simplicity and parsimoniousness. We calibrate the model to replicate some relevant features of a prototypical European small open economy. We will focus for illustration on the UK, Sweden, and the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). We choose these countries because they (separately) feature desirable properties for the purpose at hand.¹⁰ Let the time unit be one year. For the calibration, we consider that the initial distribution coincides with the steady state implied by a zero inflation policy. This squares reasonably well with the experience of our target economies, which have displayed low and stable inflation for most of the recent past. When integrating across households, we therefore use the stationary wealth distribution associated to such steady state.¹¹

We assume the following functional forms for preferences: \( u(c) = \log(c), \quad x(\pi) = \frac{\psi}{2} \pi^2. \) As mentioned before, the quadratic specification for the inflation utility cost, \( \frac{\psi}{2} \pi^2 t \), can be micro-founded by modeling firms explicitly and allowing them to set prices subject to standard quadratic price adjustment costs à la Rotemberg (1982); see Appendix A for further details. We set the scale parameter \( \psi \) such that the slope of the inflation equation in a Rotemberg pricing setup replicates that in a Calvo pricing setup for reasonable calibrations of price adjustment frequencies and demand curve elasticities. The slope of the continuous-time New Keynesian Phillips curve in the Calvo model is given by \( \chi(\chi + \rho) \), where \( \chi \) is the price adjustment rate. In the Rotemberg model the slope is given by \( \frac{\varepsilon - 1}{\varepsilon} \), where \( \varepsilon \) is the elasticity of firms’ demand

¹⁰On the one hand, UK and Sweden are two prominent examples of relatively small open economies that retain an independent monetary policy, like the economy in our framework. This is unlike the Baltic states, who recently joined the euro. However, historically the latter states have been relatively large debtors against the rest of the World, which makes them appealing for our analysis (UK and Sweden have also remained net debtors in basically each quarter for the last 20 years, but on average their net balance has been much closer to zero).

¹¹The wealth dimension is discretized by using 1000 equally-spaced grid points from \( a = \phi \) to \( a = 10 \). The upper bound is needed only for operational purposes but is fully innocuous, because the stationary distribution places essentially zero mass for wealth levels above \( a = 8 \).
curves and $\psi$ is the scale parameter in the quadratic price adjustment cost function in that model. It follows that, for the slope to be the same in both models, we need $\psi = \frac{\varepsilon}{\chi(\chi + \rho)}$. Setting $\varepsilon$ to 11 (such that the gross markup $\varepsilon / (\varepsilon - 1)$ equals 1.10) and $\chi$ to 4/3 (such that price last on average for 3 quarters), and given our calibration for $\rho$, we obtain $\psi = 5.5$.

We jointly set households’ discount rate $\rho$ and borrowing limit $\phi$ such that the steady-state net international investment position (NIIP) over GDP ($\bar{a}/\bar{y}$) and gross household debt to GDP ($\bar{b}/\bar{y}$) replicate those in our target economies. According to Eurostat, the NIIP/GDP ratio averaged minus 48.6% across the Baltic states in 2016:Q1, and only minus 3.8% across UK-Sweden. We thus target a NIIP/GDP ratio of minus 25%, which is about the midpoint of both values. Regarding gross household debt, we use BIS data on ‘total credit to households’, which averaged 85.9% of GDP across Sweden-UK in 2015:Q4 (data for the Baltic countries are not available). We thus target a 90% household debt to GDP ratio.

We target an average bond duration of 4.5 years, as in Auclert (2019). In our model, the Macaulay bond duration equals $1 / (\delta + \bar{r})$. We set the world real interest rate $\bar{r}$ to 3 percent. Our duration target then implies an amortization rate of $\delta = 0.19$.

The idiosyncratic income process parameters are calibrated as follows. We follow Huggett (1993) in interpreting states 1 and 2 as ‘unemployment’ and ‘employment’, respectively. The transition rates between unemployment and employment ($\lambda_1, \lambda_2$) are chosen such that (i) the unemployment rate $\lambda_2 / (\lambda_1 + \lambda_2)$ is 10 percent and (ii) the job finding rate is 0.1 at monthly frequency or $\lambda_1 = 0.72$ at annual frequency. These numbers describe the ‘European’ labor market calibration in Blanchard and Gali (2010). We normalize average income $\bar{y} = \frac{\lambda_2}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2} y_1 + \frac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2} y_2$ to 1. We also set $y_1$ equal to 71 percent of $y_2$, as in Hall and Milgrom (2008). Both targets allow us to solve for $y_1$ and $y_2$. Table 1 summarizes our baseline calibration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source/Target</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{r}$</td>
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<td>world real interest rate</td>
<td>standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\psi$</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>scale inflation disutility</td>
<td>slope NKPC in Calvo model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta$</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>bond amortization rate</td>
<td>Macaulay duration = 4.5 yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_1$</td>
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<td>transition rate unemp-to-employment</td>
<td>monthly job finding rate 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_2$</td>
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<td>transition rate emplo-to-unemployment</td>
<td>unemployment rate 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y_1$</td>
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<td>income in unemployment state</td>
<td>Hall&amp;Milgrom(2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y_2$</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>income in employment state</td>
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</tr>
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<td>subjective discount rate</td>
<td>NIIP -25% of GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi$</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>borrowing limit</td>
<td>HH debt/GDP 90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12 Analogously to Blanchard and Gali (2010; see their footnote 20), we compute the equivalent annual rate $\lambda_1$ as $\lambda_1 = \sum_{n=1}^{12} (1 - \lambda_1^n)^{-1} \lambda_1^n$, where $\lambda_1^n$ is the monthly job finding rate.
4.3 Optimal transitional dynamics

We are ready to analyze optimal transitional dynamics. As explained in Section 3, the optimal policy paths depend on the initial (time-0) distribution of net wealth and income across households, \( f_0(a,y) \), which is an (infinite-dimensional) primitive in our model. For the purpose of illustration, we consider the stationary distribution under zero inflation as the initial distribution. We thus assume \( f_0(a,y_i) = f_{\pi=0}^{\text{inv}}(a \mid y_i) f^y(y_i), \ i = 1, 2 \), where \( f^y(y_i) = \lambda_{j\neq i} / (\lambda_1 + \lambda_2), \ i, j = 1, 2, \) and \( f_{\pi=0}^{\text{inv}} \) is the stationary conditional density of net wealth under zero inflation.

Figure 1: Transitional dynamics.

Notice that aggregate income is constant at \( \bar{y} \), given our calibration of \( \{y_t\}_{t=1}^{19} \). Later we will analyze the robustness of our results to a wide range of alternative initial distributions.

The optimal paths are shown by the green solid lines in Figure 1 whereas the red dashed lines display the (invariant) paths under the zero-inflation policy, \( \pi_t = 0 \) for all \( t \geq 0 \). We simulate 800 years of data at monthly frequency and display the first 30 years. It follows from equation (23) and the fact that \( \mu_0 = 0 \) (no pre-commitments at time zero) that initial optimal inflation is

\[
\pi_0 = \frac{1}{\psi} \left\{ \text{cov}_{f_0(\cdot)} [-NNP_0(\cdot), MUC_0(\cdot)] + \mathbb{E}_{f_0(\cdot)} [-NNP_0(\cdot)] \mathbb{E}_{f_0(\cdot)} [MUC_0(\cdot)] \right\}. \tag{25}
\]
Therefore, the time-0 inflation rate, of about 4.6 percent, reflects exclusively the redistributive inflationary bias discussed in Proposition 2. As explained in Section 3.3, the Fisherian redistributive motive has both a cross-border and a domestic dimension, where the latter arises from the fact that households with different nominal net positions have different marginal utilities of consumption. To illustrate this last dimension, panels (a), (d) and (c) in Figure 2 display respectively the NNP and MUC as functions of net wealth and (in the second case) income, as well as the net wealth-income distribution at time zero. As shown there, agents with lower net wealth and hence lower NNP have a higher MUC, implying a positive covariance between both. This gives the central bank an incentive to inflate so as to redistribute domestically. This inflationary bias is reinforced by the fact that the economy as a whole is initially a net debtor vis-à-vis the rest of the World (\(\mathbb{E}_{f_0} \cdot [-NNP] > 0\)) under our calibration.

From time zero onwards, Ramsey optimal inflation follows (23). As shown in the figure, inflation gradually declines towards its long-run level; the latter equals -0.05 per cent, i.e. very close to zero. This is consistent with Proposition 3 and the fact \(\hat{\rho}\) and \(\hat{\tau}\) are very close to each other in our calibration (\(\hat{\tau} = 0.03\) and \(\rho = 0.0302\)). Panels (b) and (c) show why inflation declines over time: while the Fisherian redistributive motive to inflate (the first two right-hand-side terms in equation 23) remains roughly stable, the costate \(\mu_t\) becomes more and more negative over time. As explained in Section 3, this captures the central bank’s understanding of

Figure 2: Time-0 equilibrium objects.
the fact that a commitment to lower future inflation raises bond prices today, which redistributes resources towards the households that issue new bonds today. Panels (b) and (d) in Figure 2 show that the latter households (i.e. those with $URE_t < 0$) have lower net wealth and hence higher marginal utility than bond-purchasing households ($URE_t > 0$). This implies a negative covariance between URE and MUC, giving the central bank an incentive to gradually disinflate over time. This disinflationary motive is reinforced by the fact that the country is a net issuer of new bonds at all times ($E_{f_t(c)}[-URE_t] > 0$) and therefore a commitment to lower future inflation benefits domestic households as a whole vis-à-vis international investors.

In summary, under the optimal commitment the central bank front-loads inflation in order to redistribute net wealth towards indebted households, but commits to gradually reducing inflation in order to prevent the households that issue new debt (who largely coincide with the indebted households) from doing so at excessively low prices.

Finally, panels (e) and (g) in Figure 1 shows that the optimal policy succeeds at reducing the country’s net liabilities with the rest of the World and to temporarily increase aggregate consumption, despite an initial spell of consumption below the zero-inflation counterfactual. This aggregate behavior however masks important redistributive effects across households, to which we turn next.

### 4.4 Redistributive effects of optimal inflation

Having analyzed the aggregate dynamics, one may now ask to what extent the central bank succeeds at redistributing consumption and welfare across households.

**Consumption redistribution.** Figure 3 shows how the time-0 distribution of consumption across households, $f_{0}(c, y) \equiv f_0(c^{-1}(c, y), y) / (∂c/∂a)$, is affected in the optimal inflationary regime vis-à-vis the zero inflation regime. Clearly, the Fisherian channel of optimal inflation policy succeeds in raising consumption for consumption-poor households (which are also the wealth-poor households, given the monotonically increasing relationship between net wealth and consumption) and vice versa for consumption-rich households, thus narrowing the consumption distribution relative to the zero inflation regime.

Panels (h) and (i) in Figure 1 offer a dynamic perspective on consumption redistribution after time 0. The gradual recovery in bond prices (panel d), together with the decreasing path of inflation, progressively reverses the time-0 consumption redistribution, as creditors increase their consumption whereas debtors reduce it. Notwithstanding, the speed of this adjustment is heterogeneous across households, with creditors increasing consumption at a faster rate. The result is an initial increase in aggregate consumption (panel g), which peaks after around 10 years, followed by a steady decline towards its long-run value.

---

13 Asterisks in the figure account for the mass of the Dirac delta at the borrowing limit of the unemployed households, as explained in Achdou et al. (2017).
**Welfare.** We now turn to the welfare analysis. Aggregate welfare is defined as

\[ \mathbb{E}_{f_0(a,y)}[v_0(a, y)] = \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \mathbb{E}_{f_t(a,y)}[u(c_t(a, y)) - x(\pi_t)] dt \equiv W[c], \]

Table 2 displays the welfare losses of the suboptimal zero-inflation policy vis-à-vis the Ramsey optimal allocation. We express welfare losses as a permanent consumption equivalent, i.e. the number \( \Theta \) (in %) that satisfies in each case \( W^R[c^R] = W^\pi=0[(1 + \Theta)c] \), where \( R \) denotes the Ramsey allocation. Under our assumed separable preferences with log consumption utility, it is possible to show that \( \Theta = \exp \{ \rho (W^R[c^R] - W[c]) \} - 1 \). The table also displays the welfare losses incurred respectively by lending and indebted households.\(^{14}\) The aggregate welfare loss from the suboptimal policy equals 0.05 percent of permanent consumption. This aggregate effect masks a substantial welfare redistribution between groups: the absence of inflation produces welfare losses of 0.22 percent for indebted households and welfare gains of 0.17 percent for lending households.

---

\(^{14}\)That is, we report \( \Theta^{a>0} \) and \( \Theta^{a<0} \), where \( \Theta^{a>0} = \exp \{ \rho (W^{R,a>0} - W^{\pi=0,a>0}) \} - 1 \), with \( \Theta^{a<0} \) defined analogously, and where for each policy regime we have defined \( W^{a>0} \equiv \int_0^{\infty} \sum_{i=1}^2 v_0(a) f_i(a)da, \) \( W^{a<0} \equiv \int_0^{\infty} \sum_{i=1}^2 v_0(a) f_i(a)da. \) Notice that \( \Theta^{a>0} \) and \( \Theta^{a>0} \) do not exactly add up to \( \Theta \), as the exponential function is not a linear operator. However, \( \Theta \) is sufficiently small that \( \Theta \approx \Theta^{a>0} + \Theta^{a>0}. \)
Table 2. Welfare losses of a zero-inflation policy relative to the optimal commitment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Economy-wide</th>
<th>Lending HHs</th>
<th>Indebted HHs</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.22</td>
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Note: welfare losses are expressed as a % of permanent consumption

4.5 Robustness

**Bond maturity.** We now assess how sensitive the baseline results are to alternative calibrations. Arguably a key parameter is the average maturity of nominal liabilities. In our baseline calibration we are assuming an average duration of 4.5 years. By contrast, and with the exception of Auclert (2019), existing analyses of monetary policy with heterogeneous agents and nominal debt consider one-period (quarterly or annual) debt (e.g., Lueticke, 2019; or Bhandari et al., 2018). In order to analyze how debt maturity affects optimal policy, in Figure 4 we show the optimal path of inflation when $\delta$ is recalibrated to match an average duration of 1 year (red dashed-dotted line) or 1 quarter (0.25 years, blue dashed lines) and compare them with the baseline (green solid line).

**Figure 4:** Optimal inflation under different debt durations.

As debt duration is reduced, the front-loading of inflation discussed above is amplified. For instance, with one-quarter average bond duration, initial inflation jumps over 13 percent but reverts back to (near) zero in less than a year. The intuition is as follows. From equation (25),
the strength of the time-0 Fisherian redistributive motive depends crucially on the initial distribution of net nominal positions, \(NNP_0 = Q_0a\): a larger dispersion thereof across households strengthens the domestic Fisherian motive, whereas a larger aggregate indebtedness strengthens the cross-border Fisherian motive (provided the economy as a whole is a net debtor, as assumed in our baseline calibration). The fall in \(Q_0\) produced by a given future inflation path attenuates the time-0 Fisherian motive, because it compresses the domestic NNP distribution \((Q_0a\) becomes less negative for indebted households and less positive for lending ones) and makes the country’s aggregate NNP less negative. As debt duration is reduced, bond prices became less responsive to future inflation, which weakens the above attenuation effect. Therefore the initial Fisherian motive becomes stronger, which explains the higher initial inflation. In parallel, the higher value of \(\delta\) (3.9 with quarterly debt versus 0.9 in the baseline) affects the term \(\exp\left(-\int_s^t (\bar{r} + \pi_z + \delta - \rho) \, dz\right)\) in equation (24), which produces a steeper decline in the value of the costate \(\mu_t\) and thus a faster fall in inflation.

**Discount rates and initial wealth dispersion.** Appendix G contains two additional robustness exercises analyzing (i) the sensitivity of optimal steady-state inflation to the gap between domestic households’ and foreign investors’ discount rates \((\rho - \bar{r})\), and (ii) the sensitivity of initial inflation \(\pi_0\) to the initial net wealth distribution. The results can be summarized as follows. First, optimal steady-state inflation decreases approximately linearly with the gap \(\rho - \bar{r}\), because the central bank’s incentive to protect households with negative URE –by committing to lower future inflation and thus raising bond prices– becomes more and more dominant relative to its incentive to redistribute resources towards currently indebted households –by raising current inflation.

Second, initial inflation increases with the dispersion of the initial net wealth distribution (while holding constant the initial net foreign asset position), reflecting a stronger Fisherian redistributive motive. This exercise also reveals that both the domestic and cross-border redistributive motives are quantitatively important for explaining initial inflation, with contributions of about one third and two thirds, respectively. In particular, even if the country is assumed to have a zero NNP vis-à-vis the rest of the World at time 0, the purely domestic Fisherian motive is enough to justify an optimal initial inflation of \(\pi_0\) about 1.5 percent.

### 4.6 Optimal response to shocks from a timeless perspective

So far we have restricted our analysis to the transitional dynamics, given the initial state of the economy, while abstracting from aggregate shocks. We now extend our analysis to allow for aggregate disturbances. For the purpose of illustration we consider a so-called “MIT shock” to aggregate income. In particular, let individual income now be given by \(\{y_1Y_t, y_2Y_t\}\), such that aggregate income equals \(Y_t\) (given our assumption that \(\bar{y} = 1\)).\(^{15}\) Assume a one-time,
unanticipated decrease of 1 percentage point in $Y_t$, after which it returns gradually to its steady-state value $Y_{ss} = 1$ according to

$$dY_t = \eta_Y (1 - Y_t) \, dt,$$

with $\eta_Y = 0.5$. As discussed by Boppart, Krusell and Mittman (2018), this is equivalent to solving a model with an aggregate stochastic process $dY_t = \eta_Y (1 - Y_t) \, dt + \sigma dZ_t$, with $\sigma = 0.01$ and $Z_t$ a Brownian motion, around the deterministic steady state using a first order approximation as in the method of Ahn et al. (2017). The methodology in Boppart, Krusell and Mittman (2018) would also allow us to compute aggregate moments, a feature that we do not exploit in this paper.

An issue that arises here is how long after 'time 0' (the implementation date of the Ramsey optimal commitment) the aggregate shock is assumed to take place. Since we do not want to take a stand on this dimension, we consider the limiting case in which the Ramsey optimal commitment has been going on for a sufficiently long time that the economy rests at its stationary equilibrium by the time the shock arrives. This can be viewed as an example of optimal policy 'from a timeless perspective', in the sense of Woodford (2003). In practical terms, it requires solving the optimal commitment problem analyzed in Section 3 with two modifications (apart of course from the time variation in $Y_t$): (i) the initial wealth distribution is the stationary distribution implied by the optimal commitment itself, and (ii) the initial condition $\mu_0 = 0$.

Figure 5: Generalized impulse response function of an aggregate income shock.
(absence of precommitments) is replaced by \( \mu_0 = \mu_\infty \), where the latter object is the stationary value of the costate in the commitment case. Both modifications guarantee that the central bank behaves as if it had been following the time-0 optimal commitment for an arbitrarily long time.

The dashed red lines in Figure 5 display the responses to the shock under a zero inflation policy. The shock leads households to reduce their consumption on impact and to progressively accumulate more debt (negative wealth) \( \text{vis-à-vis} \) the rest of the World. The solid green lines display the economy’s response under the optimal commitment policy. Inflation rises slightly on impact, as the central bank tries to partially counteract the negative effect of the shock on household consumption. However, the inflation reaction is an order of magnitude smaller than that of the shock itself. Intuitively, the value of sticking to past commitments to keep inflation near zero weighs more in the central bank’s decision than the value of using inflation transitorily so as to stabilize consumption in response to an unforeseen event.

The main conclusion of this exercise is that, despite the strong incentives to redistribute in the absence of precommitments, once the central bank has committed to an optimal (near) zero inflation path it does not exploit in a significant way the redistributional channels of monetary policy to accommodate aggregate shocks. Naturally this conclusion depends on the specific nature of the shock, but it is robust to other standard shocks such as an increase in the World interest rate (analyzed in Nuño and Thomas, 2016).

5 Further analysis: market value representation and alternative borrowing limit

As noted in Section 2, our baseline model assumes an exogenous limit on the real face value of net liabilities, \((-) a_t\). It is also interesting to assess the robustness of our results to considering instead that the limit applies to the real \( \text{market} \) value of net debt, given by \((-) Q_t a_t\) in our model. This is the case assumed e.g. by Auclert (2019).

5.1 Market value representation of baseline model

In order to understand why the formulation of the debt limit matters, it is useful to first rewrite our baseline model in terms of the real market value of net wealth. Denoting the latter as \( a_t^m \equiv Q_t a_t \), its dynamics are given by

\[
\begin{align*}
\dot{a}_t^m &= Q_t a_t + Q_t \dot{a}_t = \bar{r} a_t^m + y_t - c_t, \quad (26) \\
0 &= Q_0 a_0, \quad (27)
\end{align*}
\]

where we have used equations (5) and (11) in the second equality of (26). Also, our baseline borrowing limit (6) can be expressed in terms of the market value of net wealth as

\[
a_t^m \geq Q_t \phi. \quad (28)
\]
The channels through which monetary policy transmits to the market value of net wealth are different from the channels through which it affects its face value, discussed in Section 3. Notice first that monetary policy cannot affect the real return on \( a_t^m \), which is given by the World real interest rate \( \bar{r} \) as shown in equation (26). This is a consequence of the fact that bonds are priced by competitive foreign investors.

However, as shown by equation (27) the central bank can affect the initial real market value of net assets through changes in time-0 bond prices \( Q_0 \) — the initial asset position in face value, \( a_0 \), is predetermined as of time 0. That is, unanticipated inflation may redistribute net wealth in market value terms from creditors (those with \( a_0^m > 0 \)) to debtors (\( a_0^m < 0 \)). The complete path of future inflation \( \{ \pi_t \}_{t \geq 0} \) affects time-0 bond prices, as shown in the bond pricing condition (10).

The second channel through which monetary policy can affect the distribution of \( a_t^m \) is the borrowing limit. As shown by equation (28), at any time \( t \) the central bank can tighten or relax the debt limit in market value terms by affecting contemporaneous bond prices \( Q_t \). In particular, deflationary policies relax the market-value-based borrowing limit by increasing bond prices, and vice versa for inflationary policies. By altering such borrowing limit, inflation modifies households’ precautionary savings.

In section 3, the optimal monetary policy problem was represented in terms of the face value of net wealth because mathematically it is much easier to handle than its market value representation. The difficulty with the market-value formulation is that the central bank controls an income-wealth distribution with a (non-zero) domain \( \{ Q_t, \phi, \infty \} \) which depends endogenously on the central bank’s policy \( \{ \pi_s \}_{s \geq t} \) through bond prices. This complicates both the mathematical and computational solution. However, the two channels just discussed continued to operate throughout as far as the dynamics of the net wealth distribution in market value terms is concerned.

### 5.2 A limit on the market value of debt

Consider now the alternative of placing an exogenous limit on the real market value of net liabilities: \( Q_t a_t \geq \phi^m \), or equivalently

\[
a_t^m \geq \phi^m,
\]

with \( \phi^m \leq 0 \).\(^{16}\) This differs from the market-value representation of our baseline borrowing limit (eq. 28) in that the central bank can no longer tighten or relax it by affecting bond prices. In other words, this alternative borrowing constraint effectively shuts down one of the transmission channels of monetary policy operating in our baseline analysis. Thus, monetary policy can only affect the net wealth distribution (in market value terms) through its impact on time-0 bond prices.

\(^{16}\)In our numerical analysis of this specification, we maintain the same calibration described in section 4, with \( \phi^m = Q^{x=0} \delta, \) where \( Q^{x=0} = \delta / (\bar{r} + \delta) \) is the nominal bond price in the case of zero inflation. This allows both specifications to produce the same results in the particular case of zero inflation.
In order to assess the numerical impact of abstracting from the debt limit transmission channel, we solve the optimal monetary policy problem in this alternative model. Appendix E explains in detail the derivations. This model is tractable because the domain \([\varphi^m, \infty)\) is policy invariant. The optimal inflation in this case is determined by

\[
\psi \pi_t = \frac{Q_t}{Q_0} e^{\int_{t}^{\infty} [\varphi_0 - (\varphi_0 + \varphi_1 - \varphi_2) ds]} (-Q_0) \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_{\varphi^m}^{\infty} \frac{d}{dQ_0} \left[ \frac{1}{Q_0} f_0 \left( \frac{a^m}{Q_0} \right) \right] da^m.
\]

According to equation (29), the marginal disutility of inflation \(x' (\pi_t) = \psi \pi_t\) must equal its marginal benefit. The latter is represented as the product of optimal time-0 inflation (times \(\psi\)) and a term capturing the dynamic evolution of optimal inflation after time 0. Optimal time-0 inflation reflects the marginal increase in aggregate welfare due to the fall in the initial bond price \(Q_0\) (due in turn to the marginal increase in inflation). The initial bond price modifies the initial distribution of wealth in terms of market value,

\[
f_0^m (a^m) = \frac{1}{Q_0} f_0 \left( \frac{a^m}{Q_0} \right),
\]

Figure 6: Transitional dynamics with alternative exogenous debt limits.
by redistributing wealth between creditors and debtors. This formulation is convenient in the sense that only the initial net wealth distribution \( f^m_0 (a^m) \) matters for the optimal inflation path. However, solving for that path is still complicated by the fact that such initial distribution is endogenous to the policy-maker’s actions. In fact, the inflation rate at any time \( t \geq 0 \) affects the time-0 distribution of the market value of net wealth through its effect on \( Q_0 \) (eq. 30). In Appendix C.3, we sketch the algorithm that we use to solve the problem.

Figure 6 displays the transitional dynamics of the model in the case of a limit on the market value of debt, compared with the baseline (already shown in Figure 1). Notice first that the optimal inflation path is barely affected by the specification of the borrowing limit. We will return to this issue below. However, the responses of consumption are markedly different across both specifications. As in the baseline case, time-0 consumption is lower for creditors and higher for debtors, compared to the zero inflation case. However, in the case of a market-value debt limit, debtor’s initial consumption gain is much larger than under the face-value debt limit, and hence time-0 aggregate consumption is higher too.

To understand this difference, Figure 7 displays the time-0 consumption policies and the wealth distribution, both as functions of market-value net wealth, \( a^m \). Panels (c) and (d) show how, given the same initial decline in bond prices—a consequence of almost identical inflation paths—, the wealth distribution in market value terms practically coincides in both cases. The difference lies in the behavior of the consumption policy function: whereas it remains unaltered (relative to zero inflation) in the case of a debt limit in market value, it varies in the baseline model, because the initial fall in bond prices tightens the borrowing limit through equation (28). This explains why debtors’ initial consumption increases (relative to zero inflation) by a smaller amount in the baseline model, thus producing the initial decline in aggregate consumption discussed in Section 4.3.

Why is optimal inflation so similar in both models despite the different consumption dynamics? To understand this, we may express initial inflation in our baseline model (equation 22) evaluated at time 0 in terms of the market value of debt. This is done in Lemma 3 in Appendix B. We obtain

\[
\psi \pi_0 = -Q_0 \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_{\phi Q_0}^{\infty} v_{i0} \left( \frac{a^m}{Q_0} \right) \frac{d}{dQ_0} \left[ \frac{1}{Q_0} f_{i0} \left( \frac{a^m}{Q_0} \right) \right] da^m, \tag{31}
\]

which is very similar to time-0 inflation in equation (29). There are, nevertheless, two important differences. First, the lower limit is \( \phi Q_0 \) instead of \( \phi^m \), reflecting the existence of the above-explained debt limit channel in our baseline model. Second, the complete path of bond prices affects the time-0 value function in the baseline model \( v_{i0} (\cdot) \) by altering at each time \( t \) the borrowing limit expressed in terms of market value, \( \phi Q_t \), whereas it is independent of bond prices in the case of a market-value debt limit. The difference in the lower limits plays no role,

\[\text{Footnote 17: Notice that under zero inflation it does not matter whether the debt limit is on the face or market value of debt, since bond prices are constant.}\]
as there is no mass in the wealth distribution below $\phi Q_0$ in the case with a debt limit in the market value of debt (as shown in Panel (c) of Figure 7). The difference between the time-0 value functions is quantitatively small, as displayed in Figure 10 in Appendix F, which explains the similarity in the optimal inflation paths.

To summarize, while the debt limit specification (face vs. market value) matters for the transmission channels of monetary policy, numerically this appears to have a relatively limited quantitative impact on the optimal policy in our particular framework. An open question is whether the same would hold true in a richer, more complex, environment such as those considered in the recent HANK literature (e.g., Kaplan, Moll and Violante, 2018; or Gornemann, Kuester and Nakajima, 2016) expanded with long-term debt.

6 Conclusion

We have analyzed optimal monetary policy in a continuous-time, small-open-economy version of a standard incomplete-markets model extended to allow for nominal, long-term claims and costly inflation. Our analysis sheds light on a recent policy and academic debate on the conse-
quences that wealth heterogeneity across households should have for the appropriate conduct of monetary policy.

Our first contribution relates to our normative results. Our model features two prominent redistributive channels of monetary policy: the classic Fisherian channel, and URE. The former introduces a 'redistributive inflationary bias': under incomplete markets and standard concave preferences, indebted households have a higher marginal utility than lending ones, giving the central bank an incentive to use inflation in order to redistribute wealth from the latter to the former. This bias is counteracted over time by a URE-driven disinflationary motive. A commitment to low future inflation raises bond prices. This favors the households that issue new bonds (i.e. those with negative URE), who also have a higher marginal utility than those that purchase new bonds. In the long run, and under certain parametric conditions, both effects exactly cancel each other out and optimal inflation is zero. Numerically, the optimal commitment policy is found indeed to imply inflation 'front-loading', with a gradual undoing of the initial inflationary stance.

Our second contribution is methodological: we solve for a fully dynamic optimal policy problem in an incomplete-markets model with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. While models of this kind have been established as a workhorse for policy analysis in macro models with heterogeneous agents, the fact that in such models the infinite-dimensional, endogenously-evolving wealth distribution is a state in the policy-maker’s problem has made it difficult to make progress in the analysis of fully optimal policy problems. Our analysis proposes a novel methodology, based on infinite dimensional calculus, for dealing with problems of this kind.

Finally, we stress that our results should not be interpreted as suggesting that monetary policy is the best tool to address redistributive issues, as there are probably more direct policy instruments such as taxes or transfers. What our results indicate is that, in the context of economies with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, the optimal design of monetary policy will typically reflect redistributive motives, the more so the less other policies (e.g. fiscal policy) are able to achieve optimal redistributive outcomes.
evolving wealth distribution is a state in the policy-maker’s problem has made it difficult to make progress in the analysis of fully optimal policy problems. Our analysis proposes a novel methodology, based on infinite dimensional calculus, for dealing with problems of this kind. Finally, we stress that our results should not be interpreted as suggesting that monetary policy is the best tool to address redistributive issues, as there are probably more direct policy instruments such as taxes or transfers. What our results indicate is that, in the context of economies with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, the optimal design of monetary policy will typically reflect redistributive motives, the more so the less other policies (e.g. fiscal policy) are able to achieve optimal redistributive outcomes.

References


Online appendix (not for publication)

A. An economy with costly price adjustment

In this appendix, we lay out a model economy with the following characteristics: (i) firms are explicitly modeled, (ii) a subset of them are price-setters but incur a convex cost for changing their nominal price, and (iii) the social welfare function and the equilibrium conditions constraining the central bank’s problem are the same as in the model economy in the main text.

A.1. Final good producer

In the model laid out in the main text, we assumed that output of the consumption good was exogenous. Consider now an alternative setup in which the consumption good is produced by a representative, perfectly competitive final good producer with the following Dixit-Stiglitz technology,

$$y_t = \left( \int_0^1 y_{jt}^{(e-1)/e} d_j \right)^{e/(e-1)},$$ \hspace{1cm} (32)

where \( \{y_{jt}\} \) is a continuum of intermediate goods and \( e > 1 \). Let \( P_{jt} \) denote the nominal price of intermediate good \( j \in [0, 1] \). The firm chooses \( \{y_{jt}\} \) to maximize profits, \( P_t y_t - \int_0^1 P_{jt} y_{jt} d_j \), subject to (32). The first order conditions are

$$y_{jt} = \left( \frac{P_{jt}}{P_t} \right)^{-e} y_t,$$ \hspace{1cm} (33)

for each \( j \in [0, 1] \). Assuming free entry, the zero profit condition and equations (33) imply

$$P_t = \left( \int_0^1 P_{jt}^{1/e} d_j \right)^{1/(1-e)}.$$ \hspace{1cm} (34)

A.2. Intermediate goods producers

Each intermediate good \( j \) is produced by a monopolistically competitive intermediate-good producer, which we will refer to as ‘firm \( j \)’ henceforth for brevity. Firm \( j \) operates a linear production technology,

$$y_{jt} = n_{jt},$$ \hspace{1cm} (35)

where \( n_{jt} \) is labor input. At each point in time, firms can change the price of their product but face quadratic price adjustment cost as in Rotemberg (1982). Letting \( \dot{P}_{jt} = dP_{jt}/dt \) denote the change in the firm’s price, price adjustment costs in units of the final good are given by

$$\Psi_t \left( \frac{\dot{P}_{jt}}{P_{jt}} \right) = \frac{\psi}{2} \left( \frac{\dot{P}_{jt}}{P_{jt}} \right)^2 \tilde{C}_t,$$ \hspace{1cm} (36)
where $\tilde{C}_t$ is aggregate consumption. Let $\pi_{jt} \equiv \dot{P}_{jt}/P_{jt}$ denote the rate of increase in the firm’s price. The instantaneous profit function in units of the final good is given by

$$
\Pi_{jt} = \left( \frac{P_{jt}}{P_t} - w_t \right) \left( \frac{P_{jt}}{P_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon} y_t - \Psi_t(\pi_{jt}),
$$

(36)

where $w_t$ is the perfectly competitive real wage and in the second equality we have used (33) and (34). Without loss of generality, firms are assumed to be risk neutral and have the same discount factor as households, $\rho$. Then firm $j$’s objective function is

$$
E_0 \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \Pi_{jt} dt,
$$

with $\Pi_{jt}$ given by (36). The state variable specific to firm $j$, $P_{jt}$, evolves according to $dP_{jt} = \pi_{jt} P_{jt} dt$. The aggregate state relevant to the firm’s decisions is simply time: $t$. Then firm $j$’s value function $V(P_{jt}, t)$ must satisfy the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation,

$$
\rho V(P_j, t) = \max_{\pi_j} \left\{ \left( \frac{P_j}{P_t} - w_t \right) \left( \frac{P_j}{P_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon} y_t - \Psi_t(\pi_j) + \pi_j P_j \frac{\partial V}{\partial P_j}(P_j, t) \right\} + \frac{\partial V}{\partial t}(P_j, t).
$$

The first order and envelope conditions of this problem are (we omit the arguments of $V$ to ease the notation),

$$
\psi \pi_{jt} \tilde{C}_t = P_j \frac{\partial V}{\partial P_j},
$$

(37)

$$
\rho \frac{\partial V}{\partial P_j} = \left[ \varepsilon w_t - (\varepsilon - 1) \frac{P_j}{P_t} \right] \left( \frac{P_j}{P_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon} y_t + \pi_j \left( \frac{\partial V}{\partial P_j} + P_j \frac{\partial^2 V}{\partial P_j^2} \right).
$$

In what follows, we will consider a symmetric equilibrium in which all firms choose the same price: $P_j = P, \pi_j = \pi$ for all $j$. After some algebra, it can be shown that the above conditions imply the following pricing Euler equation,

$$
\left[ \rho - \frac{d\tilde{C}_t}{dt} \frac{1}{\tilde{C}_t} \right] \pi_t = \frac{\varepsilon - 1}{\psi} \left( \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon - 1} w_t - 1 \right) \frac{1}{\tilde{C}_t} + \frac{d\pi_t}{dt}.
$$

(38)

Equation (38) determines the market clearing wage $w_t$.

**A.3. Households**

The preferences of household $k \in [0, 1]$ are given by

$$
E_0 \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \log (\tilde{c}_{kt}) dt,
$$

$$
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$$
where $\tilde{c}_{kt}$ is household consumption of the final good. We now define the following object,

$$c_{kt} \equiv \tilde{c}_{kt} + \frac{\tilde{c}_{kt}}{\check{C}_t} \int_0^1 \Psi_t (\pi_{jt}) \, dj,$$

i.e. household $k$’s consumption plus a fraction of total price adjustment costs ($\int \Psi_t (\cdot) \, dj$) equal to that household’s share of total consumption ($\tilde{c}_{kt}/\check{C}_t$). Using the definition of $\Psi_t$ (eq. 35) and the symmetry across firms in equilibrium ($\check{P}_{jt}/P_{jt} = \pi_t, \forall j$), we can write

$$c_{kt} = \tilde{c}_{kt} + \tilde{c}_{kt} \frac{\psi}{2} \pi_t^2 = \tilde{c}_{kt} \left( 1 + \frac{\psi}{2} \pi_t^2 \right).$$

(39)

Therefore, household $k$’s instantaneous utility can be expressed as

$$\log(\tilde{c}_{kt}) = \log(c_{kt}) - \log \left( 1 + \frac{\psi}{2} \pi_t^2 \right) = \log(c_{kt}) - \frac{\psi}{2} \pi_t^2 + o \left( \left\| \frac{\psi}{2} \pi_t^2 \right\|^2 \right),$$

(40)

where $o(\|x\|^2)$ denotes terms of order second and higher in $x$. Expression (40) is the same as the utility function in the main text, up to a first order approximation of $\log(1 + x)$ around $x = 0$, where $x \equiv \frac{\psi}{2} \pi_t^2$ represents the percentage of aggregate spending that is lost to price adjustment.

For our baseline calibration ($\psi = 5.5$), the latter object is relatively small even for relatively high inflation rates, and therefore so is the approximation error in computing the utility losses from price adjustment. Therefore, the utility function used in the main text provides a fairly accurate approximation of the welfare losses caused by inflation in the economy with costly price adjustment described here.

Households can be in one of two idiosyncratic states. Those in state $i = 1$ do not work. Those in state $i = 2$ work and provide $z$ units of labor inelastically. As in the main text, the instantaneous transition rates between both states are given by $\lambda_1$ and $\lambda_2$, and the share of households in each state is assumed to have reached its ergodic distribution; therefore, the fraction of working and non-working households is $\frac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2}$ and $\frac{\lambda_2}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2}$, respectively.

Hours per worker $z$ are such that total labor supply $\frac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2} z$ is normalized to 1.

An exogenous government insurance scheme imposes a (total) lump-sum transfer $\tau_t$ from working to non-working households. All households receive, in a lump-sum manner, an equal share of aggregate firm profits gross of price adjustment costs, which we denote by $\hat{\Pi}_t \equiv P_t^{-1} \int_0^1 P_{jt} y_{jt} \, dj - w_t \int_0^1 n_{jt} \, dj$. Therefore, disposable income (gross of price adjustment costs) for non-working and working households are given respectively by

$$I_{1t} \equiv \frac{\tau_t}{\lambda_2/ (\lambda_1 + \lambda_2)} + \hat{\Pi}_t,$$

$$I_{2t} \equiv w_t z - \frac{\tau_t}{\lambda_1/ (\lambda_1 + \lambda_2)} + \hat{\Pi}_t.$$
We assume that the transfer $\tau_t$ is such that gross disposable income for households in state $i$ equals a constant level $y_i$, $i = 1, 2$, with $y_1 < y_2$. As in our baseline model, both income levels satisfy the normalization

$$\frac{\lambda_2}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2} y_1 + \frac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2} y_2 = 1.$$ 

Also, later we show that in equilibrium gross income equals one: $\hat{\Pi}_t + w_t \frac{\lambda_2}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2} z = 1$. It is then easy to verify that implementing the gross disposable income allocation $I_{it} = y_i$, $i = 1, 2$, requires a transfer equal to $\tau_t = \frac{\lambda_2}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2} y_1 - \frac{\lambda_2}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2} \hat{\Pi}_t$. Finally, total price adjustment costs are assumed to be distributed in proportion to each household’s share of total consumption, i.e. household $k$ incurs adjustment costs in the amount $(\tilde{c}_{kt}/\tilde{C}_t)(\frac{Q}{2}\tilde{\pi}_t^2 \tilde{C}_t) = \tilde{c}_{kt} \frac{Q}{2} \tilde{\pi}_t^2$. Letting $I_{kt} = y_{kt} \in \{y_1, y_2\}$ denote household $k$’s gross disposable income, the law of motion of that household’s real net wealth is thus given by

$$da_{kt} = \left[\frac{\delta}{Q_t} - \delta - \pi_t\right] a_{kt} + \frac{I_{kt} - \tilde{c}_{kt} - \tilde{c}_{kt} \psi \pi_t / 2}{Q_t} dt$$

$$= \left[\frac{\delta}{Q_t} - \delta - \pi_t\right] a_{kt} + \frac{y_{kt} - c_{kt} Q_t}{Q_t} dt,$$

where in the second equality we have used (39). Equation (41) is exactly the same as its counterpart in the main text, equation (5). Since household’s welfare criterion is also the same, it follows that so is the corresponding maximization problem.

### A.4. Aggregation and market clearing

In the symmetric equilibrium, each firm’s labor demand is $n_{jt} = y_{jt} = \bar{y}_t$. Since labor supply $\frac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2} z = 1$ equals one, labor market clearing requires

$$\int_0^1 n_{jt} dj = \bar{y}_t = 1.$$ 

Therefore, in equilibrium aggregate output is equal to one. Firms’ profits gross of price adjustment costs equal

$$\hat{\Pi}_t = \int_0^1 \frac{P_{jt}}{P_t} y_{jt} dj - w_t \int_0^1 n_{jt} dj = \bar{y}_t - w_t,$$

such that gross income equals $\hat{\Pi}_t + w_t = \bar{y}_t = 1$.

### A.5. Central bank and monetary policy

We have shown that households’ welfare criterion and maximization problem are as in our baseline model. Thus the dynamics of the net wealth distribution continue to be given by equation (12). Foreign investors can be modeled exactly as in Section 2. Therefore, the central bank’s optimal policy problems, both under commitment and discretion, are exactly as in our baseline model.
B. Proofs

B.1. Mathematical preliminaries

First we need to introduce some mathematical notation. Given the stochastic process \( a_t \) in (5), we define the operator \( \mathcal{A} \),

\[
\mathcal{A} v \equiv \left( \begin{array}{c} s_1(t, a) \frac{\partial v_1(t, a)}{\partial a} + \lambda_1 [v_2(t, a) - v_1(t, a)] \\ s_2(t, a) \frac{\partial v_2(t, a)}{\partial a} + \lambda_2 [v_1(t, a) - v_2(t, a)] \end{array} \right),
\]

(42)

so that the HJB equation (7) can be expressed as

\[
\rho v = \frac{\partial v}{\partial t} + \max_c \{ u(c) - x(\pi) + \mathcal{A} v \},
\]

where \( v \equiv (v_1(t, a), v_2(t, a)) \) and \( u(c) - x(\pi) \equiv (u(c_1) - x(\pi)), \)

Let \( \Phi \equiv \{1, 2\} \times \mathbb{R} \) and \( \hat{\Phi} = [0, \infty) \times \Phi \), we employ the notation

\[
\langle f, g \rangle_\Phi = \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_{\Phi} f_i g_i \, da = \int_{\hat{\Phi}} f^T g \, da, \ \forall f, g \in L^2(\Phi),
\]

(43)

\[
(f, g) = \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-pt} f(t)g(t) \, dt, \ \forall f, g \in L^2[0, \infty)
\]

(44)

\[
(f, g)_{\hat{\Phi}} = \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-pt} \langle f, g \rangle_\Phi \, dt = \langle e^{-pt} f, g \rangle_{\hat{\Phi}}, \ \forall f, g \in L^2(\hat{\Phi}),
\]

(45)

The spaces of Lebesgue-integrable functions \( L^2(\Phi) \) and \( L^2[0, \infty) \) with the inner products (43) and (44), respectively, are Hilbert spaces (see Luenberger, 1969; or Brezis, 2011). The space \( L^2(\hat{\Phi}) \) with the inner product (45) is also a Hilbert space (See Nuño and Moll, 2018).\(^{19}\)

Given an operator \( \mathcal{A} \), its adjoint is an operator \( \mathcal{A}^\ast \) such that \( \langle f, \mathcal{A} v \rangle_\Phi = \langle \mathcal{A}^\ast f, v \rangle_\Phi \). In the case of the operator defined by (42) its adjoint is the operator

\[
\mathcal{A}^\ast f \equiv \left( \begin{array}{c} -\frac{\partial (s_1 f_1)}{\partial a} - \lambda_1 f_1 + \lambda_2 f_2 \\ -\frac{\partial (s_2 f_2)}{\partial a} - \lambda_2 f_2 + \lambda_1 f_1 \end{array} \right),
\]

(46)

such that the KF equation (12) results in

\[
\frac{\partial f}{\partial t} = \mathcal{A}^\ast f,
\]

(47)

\(^{18}\)The infinitesimal generator of the process is thus \( \frac{\partial v}{\partial t} + \mathcal{A} v \).

\(^{19}\)To be more precise, we should work in the Sobolev space \( H^2(\hat{\Phi}) \), defined as the space of functions such that

\[
\int_{\hat{\Phi}} e^{-pt} |f|^2 + |f'|^2 + |f''|^2 < \infty.
\]

However we stick to \( L^2(\hat{\Phi}) \) as all the results coincide and the proofs would be more cumbersome.
for \( f \equiv (f_1(t,a)) \). We can see that \( \mathcal{A} \) and \( \mathcal{A}^\ast \) are adjoints as

\[
\langle \mathcal{A} v, f \rangle_\Phi = \int_\Phi (\mathcal{A} v)^T f \, da = \sum_{i=1}^2 \int_\Phi \left[ s_i \frac{\partial v_i}{\partial a} + \lambda_i [v_j - v_i] \right] f_i \, da,
\]

\[
= \sum_{i=1}^2 v_i s_i f_i \big|_{-\infty}^\infty + \sum_{i=1}^2 \int_\Phi v_i \left[ -\frac{\partial}{\partial a} (s_i f_i) - \lambda_i f_i + \lambda_j f_j \right] \, da,
\]

\[
= \int_\Phi v^T \mathcal{A}^\ast f \, da = \langle v, \mathcal{A}^\ast f \rangle_\Phi.
\]

The Gâteaux and Frechet derivatives generalize the standard derivative to infinite-dimensional spaces (See Luenberger, 1969, Gelfand and Fomin, 1991, or Sagan, 1992). In particular, if \( W[f] \) is a functional in function space such as \( L^2(\Phi) \) or \( L^2 \left( \hat{\Phi} \right) \), and \( h \) is an arbitrary function in that space, the Gâteaux derivative of \( W \) at \( f \) with increment \( h \) is defined as

\[
\delta W[f;h] = \lim_{\alpha \to 0} \frac{W[f + \alpha h] - W[f]}{\alpha} = \frac{d}{d\alpha} W[f + \alpha h] |_{\alpha=0}, \quad (48)
\]

Nuño and Moll (2018) discuss the key theorems for the application of these concepts to the solution of infinite dimensional dynamic programming problems. We summarize their findings by stating that, if \( W[f] \) is a functional in function space such as \( L^2(\Phi) \) and \( H[f] \) is a mapping from the same functional space into \( \mathbb{R}^p \) —where \( p \) is a natural number—, then a necessary condition for \( W \) to have a maximum (or minimum) at \( f \) under the constraint \( H[f] = 0 \) is that there exists another function \( \eta \in L^2(\Phi) \) (the Lagrange multiplier) such that the Gâteaux derivative of the Lagrangian \( \mathcal{L}[f] \equiv W[f] + \langle \eta, H[f] \rangle_\Phi \) is zero when evaluated at \( f \) for any increment \( h \) in the same space:

\[
\delta \mathcal{L}[f;h] = 0, \quad \text{for any } h \in L^2(\Phi).
\]

And equivalently for the spaces \( L^2(0, \infty) \) or \( L^2 \left( \hat{\Phi} \right) \).

**B.2. Proof of Proposition 1. Solution to the Ramsey problem**

The idea of the proof is to construct a Lagrangian in a Hilbert function space and to obtain the first-order conditions by taking the Gâteaux derivatives.

**Statement of the problem.** The problem of the central bank is given by

\[
W[f_0(\cdot)] = \max_{\{\pi_t, Q_t, v(\cdot), c_t(\cdot), f_t(\cdot)\}} \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^2 \int_\Phi \left( u \left( c_i \right) - x \left( \pi_i \right) \right) f_i(a) \, da \right] \, dt,
\]

subject to the law of motion of the distribution (12), the bond pricing equation (11) and the individual HJB equation (7).

**The Lagrangian.** From now on, for compactness we use the operator \( \mathcal{A} \), its adjoint operator \( \mathcal{A}^\ast \), and the inner product \( \langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle \) defined in expressions (42), (46), and (43), respectively. The
Lagrangian is defined in $L^2 \left( \Phi \right)$ as

$$\mathcal{L} [\pi, Q, f, v, c] \equiv \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \langle u (c_t) - x (\pi_t), f_t \rangle_\Phi dt + \int_0^\infty \langle e^{-\rho t} \zeta_t, A^* f_t - \frac{\partial f}{\partial t} \rangle_\Phi dt$$

$$+ \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \mu_t \left( Q_t (\bar{r} + \pi_t + \delta) - \dot{Q}_t \right) dt$$

$$+ \int_0^\infty \langle e^{-\rho t} \theta_t, u (c_t) - x (\pi_t) + Av_t + \frac{\partial v}{\partial t} - \rho v_t \rangle_\Phi dt$$

$$+ \int_0^\infty \langle e^{-\rho t} \eta_t, u' (c_t) - \frac{1}{Q_t} \frac{\partial v}{\partial a} \rangle_\Phi dt$$

where $\zeta_t, \eta_t, \theta_t \in L^2 \left( \Phi \right)$ and $\mu_t \in L^2 [0, \infty)$ are the Lagrange multipliers associated to equations (12), (9), (7) and (11), respectively. The Lagrangian can be expressed as

$$\mathcal{L} = \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left( \langle u (c_t) - x (\pi_t), \frac{\partial \zeta_t}{\partial t} + A \zeta_t - \rho \zeta_t + \mu_t \left( Q_t (\bar{r} + \pi_t + \delta) - \dot{Q}_t \right), f_t \rangle_\Phi \right) dt$$

$$+ \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left( \langle \theta_t, u (c_t) - x (\pi_t) \rangle_\Phi + \langle A^* \theta_t - \frac{\partial \theta}{\partial t}, v_t \rangle_\Phi \right) + \langle \eta_t, u' (c_t) - \frac{1}{Q_t} \frac{\partial v}{\partial a} \rangle_\Phi \right) dt$$

$$+ \lim_{T \to \infty} \langle e^{-\rho T} \zeta_T, f_T \rangle_{\Phi_{\infty}}$$

$$+ \lim_{T \to \infty} \langle e^{-\rho T} \theta_T, v_T \rangle_{\Phi_{\infty}} - \langle \theta_0, v_0 \rangle_{\Phi_{\infty}} + \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \sum_{i=1}^2 v_{it} (a) s_{it} (a) \theta_{it} (a) \big|_{-\infty}^\infty dt,$$

where we have applied the definition of adjoint operator

$$\langle \zeta_t, A^* f_t \rangle_{\Phi_{\infty}} = \langle A \zeta_t, f_t \rangle_{\Phi_{\infty}},$$

$$\langle \theta_t, Av_t \rangle_{\Phi_{\infty}} = \langle A^* \theta_t, v_t \rangle_{\Phi_{\infty}} + \sum_{i=1}^2 v_{it} (a) s_{it} (a) \theta_{it} (a) \big|_{-\infty}^\infty$$

and integrated by parts

$$\int_0^\infty \langle e^{-\rho t} \zeta_t, -\frac{\partial f}{\partial t} \rangle_\Phi dt = -\sum_{i=1}^2 \int_0^\infty \int_\Phi e^{-\rho t} \zeta_{it} (a) \frac{\partial f_i}{\partial t} da dt$$

$$= -\sum_{i=1}^2 \int_\Phi f_{it} (a) e^{-\rho t} \zeta_{it} (a) \big|_0^\infty da$$

$$+ \sum_{i=1}^2 \int_0^\infty \int_\Phi f_{it} (a) \frac{\partial}{\partial t} \left( e^{-\rho t} \zeta_{it} (a) \right) da dt$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^2 \int_\Phi f_{i0} (a) \zeta_{0i} (a) da - \lim_{T \to \infty} \sum_{i=1}^2 \int_\Phi e^{-\rho T} f_{iT} (a) \zeta_{iT} (a) da$$

$$+ \sum_{i=1}^2 \int_0^\infty \int_\Phi e^{-\rho t} f_{it} \left( \frac{\partial \zeta_i}{\partial t} - \rho \zeta_{it} \right) da dt$$

$$= \langle \zeta_0, f_0 \rangle_{\Phi} - \lim_{T \to \infty} \langle e^{-\rho T} \zeta_T, f_T \rangle_{\Phi_{\infty}}$$

$$+ \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left( \frac{\partial \zeta_t}{\partial t} - \rho \zeta_t, f_t \right)_{\Phi_{\infty}} dt.$$
and

\[
\int_0^\infty \left\langle e^{-\rho t} \theta_t, \frac{\partial v}{\partial t} - \rho v_t \right\rangle dt = \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_0^\infty \int_{\Phi} e^{-\rho t} \theta_{it} (a) \left( \frac{\partial v_i}{\partial t} - \rho v_{it} (a) \right) dadt
\]

\[
= \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_0^\infty \int_{\Phi} \left( e^{-\rho t} \theta_{it} (a) \right) \bigg|_0^\infty \, da
\]

\[
- \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_0^\infty \int_{\Phi} v_i \left( \frac{\partial}{\partial t} \left( e^{-\rho t} \theta_{it} (a) \right) + \rho \theta_{it} (a) \right) \, dadt
\]

\[
= \lim_{T \to \infty} \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho T} \theta_{iT} (a) \, da - \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_0^\infty \int_{\Phi} v_{i0} (a) \theta_{i0} (a) \, da
\]

\[
- \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_0^\infty \int_{\Phi} e^{-\rho t} v_{it} (a) \frac{\partial \theta_i}{\partial t} \, dadt
\]

\[
= \lim_{T \to \infty} \left\langle e^{-\rho T} \theta_T, v_T \right\rangle \Phi - \left\langle \theta_0, v_0 \right\rangle \Phi
\]

\[
+ \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left\langle -\frac{\partial \theta}{\partial t}, v_t \right\rangle \Phi \, dt,
\]

**Step 3: Necessary conditions.** In order to find the maximum, we need to take the Gâteaux derivatives with respect to the controls \( f, \pi, Q, v \) and \( c \).

The Gâteaux derivative with respect to \( f \) is

\[
\frac{d}{d\alpha} \mathcal{L} [\pi, Q, f + \alpha h, v, c] \bigg|_{\alpha=0} = \left\langle \zeta_0, h_0 \right\rangle \Phi - \lim_{T \to \infty} \left\langle e^{-\rho T} \zeta_T, h_T \right\rangle \Phi
\]

\[
- \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left\langle u (c_t) - x (\pi_t) + \frac{\partial \zeta}{\partial t} + \mathcal{A} \zeta - \rho \zeta_t, h_t \right\rangle \Phi \, dt,
\]

which should equal zero for any perturbation \( h \in L^2 \left( \Phi \right) \) such that \( h_0 (\cdot) = 0 \), as the initial value of \( f_0 (\cdot) \). We obtain

\[
\rho \zeta_t = u (c_t) - x (\pi_t) + \frac{\partial \zeta}{\partial t} + \mathcal{A} \zeta, \text{ for } t \geq 0
\]

(49)

Given that \( \zeta \in L^2 \left( \Phi \right) \), we obtain the transversality condition \( \lim_{T \to \infty} e^{-\rho T} \zeta_T (a) = 0 \). Equation (49) is the same as the individual HJB equation (7). The boundary conditions are also the same (state constraints on the domain \( \Phi \)) and therefore their solutions should coincide: \( \zeta_t (\cdot) = v_t (\cdot) \).

In the case of \( c \), the Gâteaux derivative is

\[
\frac{d}{d\alpha} \mathcal{L} [\pi, Q, f, v, c + \alpha h] \bigg|_{\alpha=0} = \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left\langle \left( u' (c_t) - \frac{1}{Q_t} \frac{\partial u}{\partial a} \right) h_t, f_t \right\rangle \Phi \, dt
\]

\[
+ \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left\langle \theta_t, \left( u' (c_t) - \frac{1}{Q_t} \frac{\partial u}{\partial a} \right) h_t \right\rangle \Phi + \left\langle \eta_t, u'' (c_t) h_t \right\rangle \Phi \, dt,
\]

\[
= \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_0^\infty \int_{\Phi} e^{-\rho t} \theta_{it} (a) \left( \frac{\partial v_i}{\partial t} - \rho v_{it} (a) \right) \, dadt
\]

\[
- \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_0^\infty \int_{\Phi} v_i \left( \frac{\partial}{\partial t} \left( e^{-\rho t} \theta_{it} (a) \right) + \rho \theta_{it} (a) \right) \, dadt
\]

\[
= \lim_{T \to \infty} \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho T} \theta_{iT} (a) \, da - \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_0^\infty \int_{\Phi} v_{i0} (a) \theta_{i0} (a) \, da
\]

\[
- \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_0^\infty \int_{\Phi} e^{-\rho t} v_{it} (a) \frac{\partial \theta_i}{\partial t} \, dadt
\]

\[
= \lim_{T \to \infty} \left\langle e^{-\rho T} \theta_T, v_T \right\rangle \Phi - \left\langle \theta_0, v_0 \right\rangle \Phi
\]

\[
+ \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left\langle -\frac{\partial \theta}{\partial t}, v_t \right\rangle \Phi \, dt.
\]
where we have already taken into account the fact that $\eta = 0$. Given that $\theta \in L^2 (\hat{\Phi})$, we obtain the transversality condition $\lim_{T \to \infty} e^{-\rho T} \theta_T = 0$. As the Gâteaux derivative should be zero at the maximum for any suitable $h$, we obtain a Kolmogorov forward equation in $\theta$

$$\frac{\partial \theta}{\partial t} = A^\ast \theta_t, \quad \text{for } a > \phi, \ t > 0,$$

with boundary conditions

$$\lim_{a \to -\infty} s_{it} (a) \theta_{it} (a) = \lim_{a \to -\infty} s_{it} (a) \theta_{it} (a) = 0, \ i = 1, 2,$$

$$\theta_{i0} (\cdot) = 0, \ i = 1, 2.$$

This is a KF equation with an initial density of $\theta_0 (\cdot) = 0$. Therefore, the distribution at any point in time should be zero $\theta = 0$. Both the Lagrange multiplier of the households’ HJB equation $\theta$ and that of the first-order condition $\eta$ are zero, reflecting the fact that the HJB equation is slack, that is, that the monetary authority would choose the same consumption as the households. This would not be the case in a closed economy, in which some externalities may arise, as discussed, for instance, in Nuño and Moll (2018).

The Gâteaux derivative in the case of $\pi$ is

$$\frac{d}{da} \mathcal{L} [\pi + \alpha h, Q, f, v, c] |_{\alpha = 0} = \int_0^\infty \dot{\pi} \left( -x' (\pi_t) - a \left( \frac{\partial v}{\partial a} + \mu_t Q_t, f_t \right) \phi \right) dt,$$

where we have already taken into account the fact that $\dot{\theta} (\cdot) = \eta (\cdot) = 0$. and $\zeta (\cdot) = v (\cdot)$. As the Gâteaux derivative should be zero for any $h_t \in L^2 [0, \infty)$, the optimality condition then results in

$$\mu_t Q_t = \sum_{i=1}^2 \int_{\Phi} \left( a \frac{\partial v}{\partial a} + x' (\pi_t) \right) f_{it} (a) da,$$

where we have applied the normalization condition: $\langle 1, f \rangle = 1$.

In the case of $Q$ the Gâteaux derivative is

$$\frac{d}{da} \mathcal{L} [\pi, Q + \alpha h, \cdot] |_{\alpha = 0} = \int_0^\infty \dot{\pi} \left( \frac{\delta h_t}{Q_t^2} \frac{\partial v}{\partial a} - \frac{(y - c_t) h \partial v}{Q_t^2} \frac{\partial a}{\partial a} + \mu_t \left( h (\ddot{r} + \pi_t + \delta) - \dot{h}_t \right), f_t \phi \right) dt,$$

where we have also taken into account the fact that $\zeta = v$ and $\theta = \eta = 0$. Integrating by parts

$$\int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left( -\mu_t \dot{h}_t, f_t \right) \phi dt = - \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \mu_t \dot{h}_t \langle 1, f_t \rangle \phi dt = - \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \mu_t \dot{h}_t dt$$

$$= - \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \mu_t \dot{h}_t dt |_{t = 0} + \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} (\mu_t - \rho \mu_t) \dot{h}_t dt$$

$$= \mu_0 h_0 + \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \langle (\mu_t - \rho \mu_t) \dot{h}_t, f_t \rangle dt.$$

---

20 Notice that if we denote $g_t \equiv \langle A^\ast \theta_t - \frac{\partial \theta}{\partial a}, 1 \rangle$, and $G_t \equiv \int_t^\infty e^{-\rho s} g_s ds$ then the fact that $A^\ast \theta_t - \frac{\partial \theta}{\partial a} = 0$, for $a \geq \phi, t > 0$, implies that $G_t = 0$, for $t > 0$. As $G_t$ is differentiable, then it is continuous and hence $G_0 = 0$ so that the condition $G_0 + \langle \theta_0, h_0 \rangle _\Phi = 0$ for any $h_0 \in L^2 (\Phi)$ requires $\theta_0 = 0$. A similar argument can be employed to analyzed the boundary conditions in $\Phi$. 

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Therefore, the optimality condition in this case is
\[
\int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left( -\frac{\delta}{Q_t^2} \frac{\partial v}{\partial a} - \frac{(y-c_t)}{Q_t^2} \frac{\partial v}{\partial a} + \mu_t (\bar{r} + \pi_t + \delta - \rho) + \hat{\mu}_t, f_t \right)_\Phi \, h_t \, dt + \mu_0 h_0 = 0.
\]

The Gâteaux derivative should be zero for any \( h_t \in L^2[0, \infty) \). Thus we obtain
\[
\left( -\frac{\delta}{Q_t^2} \frac{\partial v}{\partial a} - \frac{(y-c_t)}{Q_t^2} \frac{\partial v}{\partial a}, f_t \right)_\Phi + \mu_t (\bar{r} + \pi_t + \delta - \rho) + \hat{\mu}_t = 0, \quad t > 0,
\]
or equivalently,
\[\frac{d\mu}{dt} = (\rho - \bar{r} - \pi_t - \delta) \mu_t + 2 \sum_{i=1}^2 \int_\Phi \frac{\partial v_{it}}{\partial a} \frac{\partial a + (y-c_i)}{Q_t^2 f_{it}} (t, a) \, da, \quad t > 0, \quad \mu_0 = 0. \tag{52}\]

Finally, using the household’s first order condition \( \frac{\partial u_t}{\partial a} = Q_t u'(c_t) \) to substitute for \( \frac{\partial u_t}{\partial a} \) in equations (51) and (52) yields the expressions in the main text.

**B.3. Proof of Proposition 2: Inflationary bias**

As the value function is strictly concave in \( a \) by Lemma 2, it satisfies
\[
\frac{\partial v_t (\hat{a})}{\partial a} < \frac{\partial v_t (0)}{\partial a} < \frac{\partial v_t (\hat{a})}{\partial a}, \quad \text{for all } \hat{a} \in (0, \infty), \hat{a} \in (\phi, 0), \quad t \geq 0, \quad i = 1, 2. \tag{53}\]

In addition, Assumption 1 (the country is a always a net debtor: \( \bar{a}_t \leq 0 \)) implies
\[
\sum_{i=1}^2 \int_{-\infty}^0 (a) f_{it}(a) \, da \leq \sum_{i=1}^2 \int_{-\infty}^0 (-a) f_{it}(a) \, da, \quad \forall t \geq 0. \tag{54}\]

Therefore,
\[
\sum_{i=1}^2 \int_{0}^\infty a f_{it}(a) \frac{\partial v_{it}(a)}{\partial a} \, da < \frac{\partial v_{it}(0)}{\partial a} \sum_{i=1}^2 \int_{0}^\infty a f_{it}(a) \, da \leq \frac{\partial v_{it}(0)}{\partial a} \sum_{i=1}^2 \int_{-\infty}^0 (-a) f_{it}(a) \, da
\]
\[
< \sum_{i=1}^2 \int_{-\infty}^0 (-a) f_{it}(a) \frac{\partial v_{it}(a)}{\partial a} \, da, \tag{55}\]

where we have applied (53) in the first and last inequalities and (54) in the intermediate one.\(^{21}\)

The optimal inflation (23) at time-0 (\( \mu_0 = 0 \)) satisfies
\[
\sum_{i=1}^2 \int_{\phi}^{\infty} a f_{i0} \frac{\partial v_{i0}}{\partial a} \, da + x'(\pi_0) = 0.
\]

\(^{21}\)We have also used the fact that \( a f(a) > 0 \) for all \( a > 0 \) and \( (-a)f(a) > 0 \) for all \( a < 0 \), as well as \( \partial v_{it}(0) / \partial a > 0 \) (which follows from the household first order condition and the assumption that \( u' > 0 \)).
Combining this expression with (55) we obtain

$$x'(\pi_0) = \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_{\phi}^{\infty} (-a) Q_0 u'(c_i) f_0 da = \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_{\phi}^{\infty} (-a) \frac{\partial v_i}{\partial a} f_0 da > 0.$$ 

Finally, taking into account the fact that $x'(\pi_0) = \pi_0/\psi > 0$ only for $\pi_0 > 0$, we have that $\pi_0 > 0$.

**B.4. Proof of Proposition 3: Optimal long-run inflation in the limit as $\bar{r} \to \rho$**

In the steady state, equations (24) and (23) in the main text become

$$(\rho - \bar{r} - \pi - \delta) \mu + \frac{1}{Q^2} \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int \frac{\partial v_i}{\partial a} [\delta a + (y_i - c_i)] f_i(a) da = 0,$$

$$\mu Q = x'(\pi) + \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int a \frac{\partial v_i}{\partial a} f_i(a) da,$$

respectively. Notice that we have replaced $Qu'(c_i)$ by $\frac{\partial v_i}{\partial a}$. Consider now the limiting case $\rho \to \bar{r}$, and guess that $\pi \to 0$. The above two equations then become

$$\mu Q = \frac{1}{\delta Q} \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int \frac{\partial v_i}{\partial a} [\delta a + (y_i - c_i)] f_i(a) da,$$

$$\mu Q = \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int a \frac{\partial v_i}{\partial a} f_i(a) da,$$

as $x'(0) = 0$. Combining both equations, and using the fact that in the zero-inflation steady state the bond price equals $Q = \frac{\delta}{\sigma + \phi}$, we obtain

$$\sum_{i=1}^{2} \int \frac{\partial v_i}{\partial a} \left(\bar{r}a + \frac{y_i - c_i}{Q}\right) f_i(a) da = 0. \tag{56}$$

In the zero inflation steady state, the value function $v$ satisfies the HJB equation

$$\rho v_i(a) = u(c_i(a)) + \left(\bar{r}a + \frac{y_i - c_i(a)}{Q}\right) \frac{\partial v_i}{\partial a} + \lambda_i \left[ v_j(a) - v_i(a) \right], \quad i = 1, 2, \ j \neq i, \tag{57}$$

where we have used $x(0) = 0$. We also have the first-order condition

$$u'(c_i(a)) = Q \frac{\partial v_i}{\partial a} \Rightarrow c_i(a) = u'^{-1} \left( Q \frac{\partial v_i}{\partial a} \right).$$
We guess and verify a solution of the form \( v_i(a) = \kappa_i a + \bar{v}_i \), so that \( u'(c_i) = Q\kappa_i \). Using our guess in (57), and grouping terms that depend on \( a \) and those that do not, we have that

\[
\rho\kappa_i = r\kappa_i + \lambda_i (\kappa_j - \kappa_i),
\]

\[
\rho\bar{v}_i = u\left( u^{-1}(Q\kappa_i) \right) + \frac{y_i - u^{-1}(Q\kappa_i)}{Q} \kappa_i + \lambda_i (\bar{v}_j - \bar{v}_i),
\]

for \( i, j = 1, 2 \) and \( j \neq i \). In the limit as \( r \to \rho \), equation (58) results in \( \kappa_j = \kappa_i \equiv \kappa \), so that consumption is the same in both states. The value of the slope \( \kappa \) can be computed from the boundary conditions.\(^{22}\) We can solve for \( \{\bar{v}_i\}_{i=1,2} \) from equations (59),

\[
\bar{v}_i = \frac{1}{\rho} u\left( u^{-1}(Q\kappa) \right) + \frac{y_i - u^{-1}(Q\kappa)}{\rho Q} \kappa + \frac{\lambda_i (y_j - y_i)}{\rho (\lambda_i + \lambda_j + \rho) Q} \kappa,
\]

for \( i, j = 1, 2 \) and \( j \neq i \). Substituting \( \frac{\partial \bar{v}_i}{\partial a} = \kappa \) in (56), we obtain

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_{\phi}^{\infty} \left( \bar{r}a + \frac{y_i - c_i}{Q} \right) f_i(a) \, da = 0.
\]

Equation (60) is exactly the zero-inflation steady-state limit of equation (13) in the main text (once we use the definitions of \( \bar{a}, \bar{y} \) and \( \bar{c} \)), and is therefore satisfied in equilibrium. We have thus verified our guess that \( \pi \to 0 \).

**B.5. Proof of Proposition 4. Solution to the Ramsey problem with a borrowing limit in the market value of wealth**

The problem of the central bank is to find inflation and bond prices paths \( \{\pi_t, Q_t\}_{t \geq 0} \) that maximize the Lagrangian in \( L^2[0, \infty) \):

\[
\mathcal{L}[\pi, Q] = \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_{0}^{\infty} \left\{ v^c_m(a^m) - \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} x(\pi_t) \, dt \right\} \left[ \frac{1}{Q_0} f_{\phi} \left( \frac{a^m}{Q_0} \right) \right] \, da^m
\]

\[
+ \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} \mu_t \left[ Q_t (\bar{r} + \pi_t + \delta) - \delta - \dot{Q}_t \right] \, dt,
\]

where \( \mu_t \in L^2[0, \infty) \) is the Lagrange multipliers associated to equation (11).

\(^{22}\)The condition that the drift should be positive at the borrowing constraint, \( s_i(\phi) \geq 0 \), \( i = 1, 2 \), implies that

\[
s_1(\phi) = \bar{r} \phi + \frac{y_1 - u^{-1}(Q\kappa)}{Q} = 0,
\]

and

\[
\kappa = \frac{u'(\bar{r} \phi + y_1)}{Q}.
\]

In the case of state \( i = 2 \), this guarantees \( s_2(\phi) > 0 \).
The first order condition with respect to inflation is obtained by computing the Gâteaux derivative with respect to a perturbation \( h_t \):

\[
\frac{d}{d\alpha} \mathcal{L} [\pi + \alpha h, Q] |_{\alpha=0} = \frac{d}{d\alpha} \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_{a}^{m} \left\{ v_i^c (a^m) - \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-pt} x (\pi_t + \alpha h_t) dt \right\} \left[ \frac{1}{Q_0 f_{\Theta} \left( \frac{a^m}{Q_0} \right)} \right] da^m + \frac{d}{d\alpha} \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-pt} \mu_t \left[ Q_t (\bar{t} + \pi_t + \alpha h_t + \delta) - \delta - \dot{Q}_t \right] dt = \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_{a}^{m} \left\{ v_i^c (a^m) - \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-pt} x' (\pi_t) h_t dt \right\} \left[ \frac{1}{Q_0 f_{\Theta} \left( \frac{a^m}{Q_0} \right)} \right] da^m + \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-pt} \mu_t Q_t h_t dt.
\]

As the Gâteaux derivative should be zero for any \( h_t \), the optimality condition then results in

\[
x' (\pi_t) = \mu_t Q_t.
\]

where we have applied the normalization condition: \( \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_{a}^{m} \frac{1}{Q_0 f_{\Theta} \left( \frac{a^m}{Q_0} \right)} da^m = 1 \).

Similarly, the first order condition with respect to bond prices is given by

\[
\frac{d}{d\alpha} \mathcal{L} [\pi, Q + \alpha h] |_{\alpha=0} = \frac{d}{d\alpha} \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_{a}^{m} \left\{ v_i^c (a^m) - \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-pt} x (\pi_t) dt \right\} \left[ \frac{f_{\Theta} \left( \frac{a^m}{Q_0 + \alpha h_0} \right)}{Q_0 + \alpha h_0} \right] da^m + \frac{d}{d\alpha} \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-pt} \mu_t \left[ (Q_t + \alpha h_t) (\bar{t} + \pi_t + \delta) - \delta - \dot{Q}_t + \alpha \dot{h}_t \right] dt = \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_{a}^{m} \left\{ v_i^c (a^m) - \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-pt} x' (\pi_t) h_t dt \right\} \frac{d}{dQ_0} \left[ \frac{1}{Q_0 f_{\Theta} \left( \frac{a^m}{Q_0} \right)} \right] h_0 da^m + \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-pt} \mu_t \left[ (\bar{t} + \pi_t + \delta) h_t - \dot{h}_t \right] dt.
\]

Integrating by parts

\[
\int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-pt} \mu_t \left( -\dot{h}_t \right) dt = - e^{-pt} \mu_t h_t |_{t=0}^{\infty} + \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-pt} \left( \mu_t - \rho \mu_t \right) h_t dt = \mu_0 h_0 - \lim_{t\to\infty} e^{-pt} \mu_t h_t + \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-pt} \left( \mu_t - \rho \mu_t \right) h_t dt.
\]

Therefore, the optimality condition in this case is

\[
\mu_t = \mu_t (\rho - \bar{t} - \pi_t - \delta), \quad \mu_0 = - \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_{a}^{m} \left\{ v_i^c (a^m) - \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-pt} x' (\pi_t) h_t dt \right\} \frac{d}{dQ_0} \left[ \frac{1}{Q_0 f_{\Theta} \left( \frac{a^m}{Q_0} \right)} \right] h_0 da^m.
\]
B.6. Lemma 1

\[ \mathbb{E}_{f_0(a,y)} [v_0(a,y)] = \int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} \mathbb{E}_{f_t(a,y)} [u(c_t(a,y)) - x(\pi_t)] \, dt. \]

**Proof.** We consider the case in which borrowing limit is defined in the face value of debt, as in equation (6). Given the welfare criterion defined in equation (18), we have

\[
W_0 = \int_\phi^\infty \sum_{i=1}^2 v_0(a,y_i) f_0(a,y_i) da
\]

\[
= \int_\phi^\infty \sum_{i=1}^2 \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ \int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} [u(c_t) - x(\pi_t)] \, dt \right] a_0 = a, \quad y_0 = y_i \quad f_{i0}(a) da
\]

\[
= \int_\phi^\infty \sum_{i=1}^2 \left[ \sum_{j=1}^2 \int_\phi^\infty \int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} [u(c_{jt}(\alpha)) - x(\pi_t)] f_t(\alpha, y_j; a, y_i) dt d\alpha \right] f_{i0}(a) da
\]

\[
= \int_0^{\infty} \sum_{j=1}^2 e^{-\rho t} \int_\phi^\infty [u(c_{jt}(\alpha)) - x(\pi_t)] \left[ \sum_{i=1}^2 \int_\phi^\infty f_t(\alpha, y_j; a, y_i) f_{i0}(a) da \right] d\alpha dt
\]

\[
= \int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} \sum_{j=1}^2 \int_\phi^\infty [u(c_{jt}(\alpha)) - x(\pi_t)] f_t(\alpha, y_j) d\alpha dt,
\]

where \( f_t(\alpha, y_j; a, y_i) \) is the transition probability from \( a_0 = a, y_0 = y_i \) to \( a_t = \alpha, y_t = y_j \) and in the last equality we have used the Chapman–Kolmogorov equation,

\[
f_t(\alpha, y_j) = \sum_{i=1}^2 \int_\phi^\infty f_t(\alpha, y_j; a, y_i) f_{i0}(a) da.
\]

B.7. Lemma 2

\[
\partial u'/\partial a < 0
\]

**Proof.** In order to prove the concavity of the value function we express the model in discrete time for an arbitrarily small \( \Delta t \). The Bellman equation of a household is

\[
v^{\Delta t}_t(a, y) = \max_{a' \in \Gamma(a,y)} \left[ u \left( \frac{Q_t}{\Delta t} \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{\delta}{Q_t} - \delta - \pi_t \right) \Delta t \right] a + \frac{y^{\Delta t}}{Q_t} - a' \right) - x(\pi_t) \right] \Delta t
\]

\[
+ e^{-\rho \Delta t} \sum_{i=1}^2 v^{\Delta t}_{t+\Delta t}(a', y_i) \mathbb{P}(y' = y_i|y),
\]

where \( \Gamma(a,y) = \left[ \phi, \left( 1 + \left( \frac{\delta}{Q_t} - \delta - \pi_t \right) \Delta t \right) a + \frac{y^{\Delta t}}{Q_t} \right] \), and \( \mathbb{P}(y' = y_i|y) \) are the transition probabilities of a two-state Markov chain. The Markov transition probabilities are given by \( \lambda_1 \Delta t \) and \( \lambda_2 \Delta t \).

We verify that this problem satisfies the conditions of Theorem 9.8 of Stokey and Lucas (1989): (i) \( \Phi \) is a convex subset of \( \mathbb{R} \), (ii) the Markov chain has a finite number of values; (iii) the correspondence \( \Gamma(a,y) \) is nonempty, compact-valued and continuous; (iv) the
We describe here the numerical algorithm to compute the Ramsey allocation. First we describe how to compute the optimal steady state (Proposition 1). Then, we illustrate how to compute the optimal transition dynamics, given an initial income-wealth distribution $f_0(a,y)$. Finally, we discuss how to modify the algorithm for the case of the borrowing limit in the market.

### C. Computational method

We verify that this problem satisfies the conditions of Theorem 9.8 of Stokey and Lucas (1989). In order to prove the concavity of the value function we express the model in discrete time and write the Bellman equation as

$$ v_t (a, y) = \max_{c_t} \left\{ u(c_t) + \delta \mathbb{E} [v_{t+1}(a', y')] \right\}, $$

where $\mathbb{E}$ is the expectation operator and $a'$, $y'$ are the next state variables.

The Bellman equation can be written in the form

$$ v_t (a, y) = \max_{c_t} \left\{ u(c_t) + \delta \sum_{a', y'} \pi_t (a', y') v_{t+1}(a', y') \right\}, $$

where $\pi_t (a', y')$ are the transition probabilities from state $(a, y)$ to state $(a', y')$. The optimal policy function $\pi_t (a, y)$ satisfies

$$ \pi_t (a, y) = \frac{d}{da} \left[ \frac{v_t (a, y)}{\psi} \right], $$

where $\psi$ is the discount factor.

The value function $v_t (a, y)$ is given by

$$ v_t (a, y) = \frac{1}{\psi} \int_0^\infty \left[ f_0(a) \left( a f_0(a) \right) + \int_0^\infty \left( -Q_0 a \right) u' \left( c_{it} (a) \right) f_0 (a) \right] da. $$

Integrating by parts and taking into account the first order condition for consumption (9), we get

$$ v_t (a, y) = \frac{1}{\psi} \int_0^\infty \left( -Q_0 a \right) u' \left( c_{it} (a) \right) f_0 (a) \right] da, $$

which is exactly equation (23) in the main text evaluated at $t = 0$ (given that $\mu_0 = 0$).
we discuss how to modify the algorithm for the case of of the borrowing limit in the market value of wealth.

C.1. Optimal steady state

We describe the numerical algorithm used to jointly solve for the equilibrium objects in steady state. The algorithm proceeds in 3 steps. We describe each step in turn. We assume that there is an upper bound arbitrarily large \( \pi \) such that \( f(a, y) = 0 \) for all \( a > \pi \). In steady state this can be proved in general following the same reasoning as in Proposition 2 of Achdou et al. (2017). Alternatively, we may assume that there is a maximum constraint in asset holding such that \( a \leq \pi \), and that this constraint is so large that it does not affect to the results. In any case, let \( [\phi, \pi] \) be the valid domain.

Solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Given \( \pi \), the bond pricing equation (11) is trivially solved in this case:

\[
Q = \frac{\delta}{r + \pi + \delta}.
\]

The HJB equation is solved using an upwind finite difference scheme similar to Achdou et al. (2017). It approximates the value function \( v(a) \) on a finite grid with step \( \Delta a : a \in \{a_1, ..., a_J\} \), where \( a_j = a_{j-1} + \Delta a = a_1 + (j-1)\Delta a \) for \( 2 \leq j \leq J \). The bounds are \( a_1 = \phi \) and \( a_J = \pi \), such that \( \Delta a = (\pi - \phi) / (J-1) \). We use the notation \( v_{i,j} \equiv v_i(a_j) \), \( i = 1, 2 \), and similarly for the policy function \( c_{i,j} \).

Notice first that the HJB equation involves first derivatives of the value function, \( v'_i(a) \) and \( v''_i(a) \). At each point of the grid, the first derivative can be approximated with a forward (F) or a backward (B) approximation,

\[
v'_i(a_j) \approx \partial_F v_{i,j} \equiv \frac{v_{i,j+1} - v_{i,j}}{\Delta a}, \tag{62}
\]

\[
v'_i(a_j) \approx \partial_B v_{i,j} \equiv \frac{v_{i,j} - v_{i,j-1}}{\Delta a}. \tag{63}
\]

In an upwind scheme, the choice of forward or backward derivative depends on the sign of the drift function for the state variable, given by

\[
s_i(a) \equiv \left( \frac{\delta}{Q} - \delta - \pi \right) a + \frac{(y_i - c_i(a))}{Q}, \tag{64}
\]

for \( \phi \leq a \leq 0 \), where

\[
c_i(a) = \left[ \frac{v'_i(a)}{Q} \right]^{-1/\gamma}. \tag{65}
\]

Let superscript \( n \) denote the iteration counter. The HJB equation is approximated by the following upwind scheme,

\[
\frac{v_{i,j}^{n+1} - v_{i,j}^n}{\Delta} + \rho v_{i,j}^{n+1} = \left( \frac{c_{i,j}^n}{Q} \right)^{1-\gamma} - \frac{\psi}{2} \frac{\partial_F v_{i,j}^{n+1} s_{i,j,F}^{n+1}}{s_{i,j,F}^{n+1} > 0} + \partial_B v_{i,j}^{n+1} s_{i,j,B}^{n+1} 1_{s_{i,j,B}^{n+1} < 0} + \lambda_i \left( v_{i,j}^{n+1} - v_{i,j}^n \right),
\]
for \( i = 1, 2, j = 1, \ldots, J \), where \( 1(\cdot) \) is the indicator function and

\[
\begin{align*}
 s^n_{i,j,F} &= \left( \frac{\delta}{Q} - \delta - \pi \right) a + y_i - \left[ \frac{Q}{\partial_F v^n_{i,j}} \right]^{1/\gamma}, \quad (66) \\
 s^n_{i,j,B} &= \left( \frac{\delta}{Q} - \delta - \pi \right) a + y_i - \left[ \frac{Q}{\partial_B v^n_{i,j}} \right]^{1/\gamma}. \quad (67)
\end{align*}
\]

We consider a CRRA utility function for generality, in the case of the main we restrict it to logarithmic preferences. Therefore, when the drift is positive \( (s^n_{i,j,F} > 0) \) we employ a forward approximation of the derivative, \( \partial_F v^n_{i,j+1} \); when it is negative \( (s^n_{i,j,B} < 0) \) we employ a backward approximation, \( \partial_B v^n_{i,j+1} \). The term \( \frac{v^n_{i,j+1} - v^n_{i,j}}{\Delta} \to 0 \) as \( v^n_{i,j+1} \to v^n_{i,j} \). Moving all terms involving \( v^n_{i,j+1} \) to the left hand side and the rest to the right hand side, we obtain

\[
\frac{v^n_{i,j+1} - v^n_{i,j}}{\Delta} + \rho v^n_{i,j+1} = \left( \frac{c^n_{i,j}}{1 - \gamma} - \frac{\psi}{2} + v^n_{i,j-1} \alpha^n_{i,j} + v^n_{i,j+1} \beta^n_{i,j} + v^n_{i,j+1} \xi^n_{i,j} + \lambda_i v^n_{i,j-1} \right), \quad (68)
\]

where

\[
\begin{align*}
 \alpha^n_{i,j} &\equiv -\frac{s^n_{i,j,B} 1_{s^n_{i,j,B} < 0}}{\Delta a}, \\
 \beta^n_{i,j} &\equiv -\frac{s^n_{i,j,F} 1_{s^n_{i,j,F} > 0}}{\Delta a} + \frac{s^n_{i,j,B} 1_{s^n_{i,j,B} < 0}}{\Delta a} - \lambda_i, \\
 \xi^n_{i,j} &\equiv \frac{s^n_{i,j,F} 1_{s^n_{i,j,F} > 0}}{\Delta a},
\end{align*}
\]

for \( i = 1, 2, j = 1, \ldots, J \). Notice that the state constraints \( \phi \leq a \leq \kappa \) mean that \( s^n_{i,1,B} = s^n_{i,J,F} = 0 \).

In equation (68), the optimal consumption is set to

\[
c^n_{i,j} = \left( \frac{\partial v^n_{i,j}}{Q} \right)^{-1/\gamma}. \quad (69)
\]

where

\[
\partial v^n_{i,j} = \partial_F v^n_{i,j} 1_{s^n_{i,j,F} > 0} + \partial_B v^n_{i,j} 1_{s^n_{i,j,B} < 0} + \partial \tilde{v}^n_{i,j} 1_{s^n_{i,j,F} \leq 0} 1_{s^n_{i,j,B} \geq 0}. \]

In the above expression, \( \partial \tilde{v}^n_{i,j} = Q(\tilde{c}^n_{i,j})^{-\gamma} \) where \( \tilde{c}^n_{i,j} \) is the consumption level such that \( s^n_{i,j} \equiv s^n_t = 0 : \)

\[
\tilde{c}^n_{i,j} = \left( \frac{\delta}{Q} - \delta - \pi \right) a_j Q + y_i.
\]

Equation (68) is a system of \( 2 \times J \) linear equations which can be written in matrix notation as:

\[
\frac{1}{\Delta} (\mathbf{v}^{n+1} - \mathbf{v}^n) + \rho \mathbf{v}^{n+1} = \mathbf{u}^n + \mathbf{A} \mathbf{v}^{n+1}
\]
where the matrix $A^n$ and the vectors $v^{n+1}$ and $u^n$ are defined by

$$A^n = \begin{bmatrix}
\beta^n_{1,1} & \xi^n_{1,1} & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & \lambda_1 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\
\alpha^n_{1,2} & \beta^n_{1,2} & \xi^n_{1,2} & 0 & \cdots & 0 & 0 & \lambda_1 & \cdots & 0 \\
0 & \alpha^n_{1,3} & \beta^n_{1,3} & \xi^n_{1,3} & \cdots & 0 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & \vdots \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \vdots \\
0 & 0 & \cdots & \alpha^n_{1,J-1} & \beta^n_{1,J-1} & \xi^n_{1,J-1} & 0 & \cdots & \lambda_1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & \alpha^n_{1,J} & \beta^n_{1,J} & 0 & 0 & \cdots & \lambda_1 \\
\lambda_2 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & 0 & 0 & \beta^n_{2,1} & \xi^n_{2,1} & \cdots & 0 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \vdots \\
0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & 0 & \lambda_2 & 0 & \cdots & \alpha^n_{2,J} & \beta^n_{2,J}
\end{bmatrix}, \quad v^{n+1} = \\
\begin{bmatrix}
v^{n+1}_{1,1} \\
v^{n+1}_{1,2} \\
v^{n+1}_{1,3} \\
\vdots \\
v^{n+1}_{1,J} \\
v^{n+1}_{2,1} \\
v^{n+1}_{2,2} \\
\vdots \\
v^{n+1}_{2,J}
\end{bmatrix}
$$

(70)

The system in turn can be written as

$$B^n v^{n+1} = d^n$$

(71)

where $B^n = (\frac{1}{\alpha} + \rho) I - A^n$ and $d^n = u^n + \frac{1}{\alpha} v^n$.

The algorithm to solve the HJB equation runs as follows. Begin with an initial guess $\{v^n_{i,j}\}_{j=1}^{J}$, $i = 1, 2$. Set $n = 0$. Then:

1. Compute $\{\partial_F v^n_{i,j}, \partial_B v^n_{i,j}\}_{j=1}^{J}$, $i = 1, 2$ using (62)-(63).

2. Compute $\{c^n_{i,j}\}_{j=1}^{J}$, $i = 1, 2$ using (65) as well as $\{s^n_{i,j,F}, s^n_{i,j,B}\}_{j=1}^{J}$, $i = 1, 2$ using (66) and (67).

3. Find $\{v^{n+1}_{i,j}\}_{j=1}^{J}$, $i = 1, 2$ solving the linear system of equations (71).

4. If $\{v^{n+1}_{i,j}\}$ is close enough to $\{v^{n+1}_{i,j}\}$, stop. If not set $n := n + 1$ and proceed to 1.

Most computer software packages, such as Matlab, include efficient routines to handle sparse matrices such as $A^n$. 
Solution to the Kolmogorov Forward equation  The stationary distribution of debt-to-GDP ratio, \( f(a,y) \), satisfies the Kolmogorov Forward equation:

\[
0 = -\frac{d}{da} [s_i(a) f_i(a)] - \lambda_i f_i(a) + \lambda_{-i} f_{-i}(a), \quad i = 1, 2. \tag{72}
\]

\[
1 = \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_{\phi}^{\infty} f_i(a)da. \tag{73}
\]

We also solve this equation using an finite difference scheme. We use the notation \( f_{i,j} \equiv f_i(a_j) \). The system can be now expressed as

\[
0 = -\frac{f_{i,j}s_{i,j,F}1_{s_{i,j,F}>0} - f_{i,j-1}s_{i,j-1,F}1_{s_{i,j-1,F}>0}}{\Delta a} - \lambda_i f_{i,j} + \lambda_{-i} f_{-i,j},
\]

or equivalently

\[
f_{i,j-1}\xi_{i,j-1} + f_{i,j+1}\alpha_{i,j+1} + f_{i,j}\beta_{i,j} + \lambda_{-i} f_{-i,j} = 0, \tag{74}
\]

then (74) is also a system of \( 2 \times J \) linear equations which can be written in matrix notation as:

\[
A^T f = 0, \tag{75}
\]

where \( A^T \) is the transpose of \( A = \lim_{n \to \infty} A^n \). Notice that \( A^n \) is the approximation to the operator \( \mathcal{A} \) and \( A^T \) is the approximation of the adjoint operator \( \mathcal{A}^* \). In order to impose the normalization constraint (73) we replace one of the entries of the zero vector in equation (75) by a positive constant.\(^{23}\) We solve the system (75) and obtain a solution \( \hat{f} \). Then we renormalize as

\[
f_{i,j} = \frac{\hat{f}_{i,j}}{\sum_{j=1}^{J} (\hat{f}_{1,j} + \hat{f}_{2,j}) \Delta a}.
\]

Complete algorithm  In order to find the value of the inflation and of the costate that satisfy conditions (21) and (23) in steady-state, we consider an initial guess of inflation, \( \pi^{(1)} = 0 \). Set \( m := 1 \). Then:

**Step 1:** Solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Given \( \pi^{(m)} \), compute the bond price \( Q^{(m)} \) using (61) and solve the HJB equation to obtain an estimate of the value function \( v^{(m)} \) and of the matrix \( A^{(m)} \).

**Step 2:** Solution to the Kolmogorov Forward equation. Given \( A^{(m)} \) find the aggregate distribution \( f^{(m)} \).

**Step 3:** Finding the Lagrange multiplier. Given \( f^{(m)}, v^{(m)} \), compute the Lagrange multiplier

\(^{23}\)In particular, we have replaced the entry 2 of the zero vector in (75) by 0.1.
\( \mu^{(m)} \) using condition (23) as

\[
\mu^{(m)} = \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{2} J \sum_{j=1}^{J} a_{ij} f^{(m)}_{i,j} \left( c^{(m)}_{i,j} \right)^{-\gamma} \Delta a + \frac{1}{Q^{(m)}} \psi \pi^{(m)} \right].
\]

**Step 4: Optimal inflation.** Given \( f^{(m)}, v^{(m)} \) and \( \mu^{(m)} \), iterate steps 1-3 until \( \pi^{(m)} \) satisfies

\[
(\rho - \bar{r} - \pi^{(m)} - \delta) \mu^{(m)} + \frac{1}{(Q^{(m)})} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{2} J \sum_{j=2}^{J-1} \left( \delta a_j + y_i - c^{(m)}_{i,j} \right) f^{(m)}_{i,j} \left( c^{(m)}_{i,j} \right)^{-\gamma} \Delta a \right] = 0.
\]

**C.2. Optimal transitional dynamics**

We describe now the numerical algorithm to analyze the transitional dynamics, similar to the one described in Achdou et al. (2017). We define \( T \) as the time interval considered, which should be large enough to ensure a converge to the stationary distribution and discretize it in \( N \) intervals of length

\[
\Delta t = \frac{T}{N}.
\]

**The asymptotic steady-state** The asymptotic steady-state distribution of the model can be computed following the steps described in Section C.1. The result is a stationary distribution \( f_N \), a matrix \( A_N \), a bond price \( Q_N \) and a inflation rate \( \pi_N \) defined at the final time \( T = N \Delta t \).

**Solution to the bond pricing equation** The dynamic bond pricing equation (11) can be approximated backwards as

\[
(\bar{r} + \pi_n + \delta) Q_n = \delta + \frac{Q_{n+1} - Q_n}{\Delta t}, \iff Q_n = \frac{Q_{n+1} + \delta \Delta t}{1 + \Delta t (\bar{r} + \pi_n + \delta)}, \quad n = N - 1, \ldots, 0.
\]

where \( Q_N \) is the asymptotic bond price from Step 0.

**Solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation** The dynamic HJB equation (7) can approximated using an upwind approximation as

\[
\rho v^n = u^n + A_{n+1} v^n + \frac{(v^{n+1} - v^n)}{\Delta t},
\]

where \( A^n \) is constructing backwards in time using a procedure similar to the one described in Step 1 of Section B. By defining \( B^n = \left( \frac{1}{\Delta t} + \rho \right) I - A_{n+1} \) and \( d^{n+1} = u^{n+1} + \frac{\Sigma^{n+1}}{\Delta t} \), we have

\[
v^n = (B^n)^{-1} d^{n+1}.
\]

**Solution to the Kolmogorov Forward equation** Let \( A_n \) defined in (70) be the approximation to the operator \( A \). Using a finite difference scheme similar to the one employed in the
Step 2 of Section A, we obtain:

\[
\frac{f_{n+1} - f_n}{\Delta t} = A_n^T f_{n+1}, \iff f_{n+1} = \left( I - \Delta t A_n^T \right)^{-1} f_n, \quad n = 1, \ldots, N
\]  

(78)

where \( f_0 \) is the discretized approximation to the initial distribution \( f_0(a) \).

**Complete algorithm**  The algorithm proceeds as follows:

**Step 0:** *Steady-state.* Compute the stationary distribution \( f_N \), matrix \( A_N \), bond price \( Q_N \) and inflation rate \( \pi_N \). Set \( \pi(0) \equiv \{ \pi_n(0) \}_{n=0}^{N-1} = \pi_N \) and \( k := 1 \).

**Step 1:** *Bond pricing.* Given \( \pi(k-1) \), compute the bond price path \( Q(k) \equiv \{ Q_n(k) \}_{n=0}^{N-1} \) using (76).

**Step 2:** *Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation.* Given \( \pi(k-1) \) and \( Q(k) \) solve the HJB equation (77) backwards to obtain an estimate of the value function \( v(k) \equiv \{ v_n(k) \}_{n=0}^{N-1} \) and of the matrix \( A(k) \equiv \{ A_n(k) \}_{n=0}^{N-1} \).

**Step 3:** *Kolmogorov Forward equation.* Given \( A(k) \) find the aggregate distribution forward \( f(k) \) using (78).

**Step 4:** *Lagrange multiplier.* Given \( f(k) \) and \( v(k) \), compute the Lagrange multiplier \( \mu(k) \equiv \{ \mu_n(k) \}_{n=0}^{N-1} \) using (21):

\[
\mu_{n+1}^{(k)} = \mu_n^{(k)} \left[ 1 + \Delta t \left( \rho - \bar{r} - \pi_n^{(k)} - \delta \right) \right] + \frac{\Delta t}{Q_n^{(k)}} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{J} \sum_{j=1}^{J} \left( \delta a_j + y_i - c_n^{(k)} \right) f_{n,i,j}^{(k+1)} \left( c_n^{(k)} \right)^{-\gamma} \Delta a \right),
\]

with \( \mu_0^{(k)} = 0 \).

**Step 5:** *Optimal inflation.* Given \( f(k) \), \( v(k) \) and \( \mu(k) \) iterate steps 1-4 until \( \pi(k) \) satisfies

\[
\Theta_n^{(k)} \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{J} \sum_{j=1}^{J} a_{i,j} f_{n,i,j}^{(k)} Q_n^{(k)} \left( c_n^{(k)} \right)^{-\gamma} \Delta a + \psi \pi_n^{(k)} - Q_n^{(k)} \mu_n^{(k)} = 0.
\]

This is done by iterating \( \pi_n^{(k)} = \pi_n^{(k-1)} - \xi \Theta_n^{(k)} \), with constant \( \xi = 0.05 \).

**C.3. Optimal transitional dynamics with a borrowing limit in the market value of wealth**

In this case, a number of changes should be made to the previous algorithm to adapt it to the results in Proposition 4. First, the optimal steady state inflation is zero, and hence there is no need to iterate when computing the steady state. Second, we employ as a state the debt
expressed in market value \(a^m\), and hence the drift simplifies to

\[
\begin{align*}
    s_{i,j,F} &= \bar{r}a^m + y_i - \left[ \frac{1}{\partial F v_{i,j}} \right]^{1/\gamma}, \\
    s_{i,j,B} &= \bar{r}a^m + y_i - \left[ \frac{1}{\partial B v_{i,j}} \right]^{1/\gamma}.
\end{align*}
\]

Third, as the initial distribution \(f_0(a, y)\) is given in terms of the face value of wealth and we need to recompute it in market value \(f_0^m(a^m, y) = \frac{1}{Q_0}f_0\left(\frac{a^m}{Q_0}, y\right)\) we need to interpolate over a grid defined in the market value of wealth. Fourth, the Lagrange multiplier \(\mu^{(k)}(k) \equiv \mu_n^{(k)}\) using (87) and (88):

\[
\mu_n^{(k+1)} = \mu_n^{(k)} \left[ 1 + \Delta t \left( \rho - \bar{r} - \pi_n^{(k)} - \delta \right) \right],
\]

with \(\mu_0^{(k)} = -\sum_{i=1}^2 \sum_{j=1}^J v_{0,i,j}^{(k)} \frac{\Delta f_{0,i,j}}{\Delta Q_0} \Delta a\) where \(\Delta f_{0,i,j}\) is the difference between the initial density in market prices given a bond price \(Q_0 + \Delta Q_0\) and the density given a bond price \(Q_0\). We set \(\Delta Q_0 = 0.01\). Fifth, the optimal inflation is given by (86):

\[
\Theta_n^{(k)} \equiv \psi \pi_n^{(k)} - Q_n^{(k)} \mu_n^{(k)} = 0.
\]

**D. Robustness**

**Steady state Ramsey inflation.** In Proposition 3, we established that the Ramsey optimal long-run inflation rate converges to zero as the central bank’s discount rate \(\rho\) converges to that of foreign investors, \(\bar{r}\). In our baseline calibration, both discount rates are indeed very close to each other, implying that Ramsey optimal long-run inflation is essentially zero. We now evaluate the sensitivity of Ramsey optimal steady state inflation to the difference between both discount rates. From equation (23), optimal steady state inflation is

\[
\pi_\infty = \frac{1}{\psi} \mathbb{E}_{f_\infty(a,y)} \left[ NNP_\infty(a,y) MUC_\infty(a,y) \right] + \frac{1}{\psi} \mu_\infty Q_\infty,
\]

where from equation (24)

\[
\mu_\infty = \frac{\mathbb{E}_{f_\infty(a,y)} \left[ NNP_\infty(a,y) MUC_\infty(a,y) \right]}{Q_\infty \left[ \pi_\infty + \delta - (\rho - \bar{r}) \right]}.
\]

Figure 8 displays \(\pi\) (left axis), as well as its two determinants (right axis) on the right-hand side of equation (81). Optimal inflation decreases approximately linearly with the gap \(\rho - \bar{r}\). As the latter increases, two counteracting effects take place. On the one hand, it can be shown that as the households become more impatient relative to foreign investors, the net asset distribution shifts towards the left, i.e. more and more households become net borrowers and come close to the borrowing limit, where the marginal utility of wealth is highest. As shown in the figure, this increases the central bank’s incentive to inflate for the purpose of redistributing wealth towards debtors. On the other hand, higher indebtedness implies also more issuance of new
Initial inflation. As explained before, time-0 optimal inflation and its subsequent path depend on the initial net wealth distribution across households, which is an infinite-dimensional object. In our baseline numerical analysis, we set it equal to the stationary distribution in the case of zero inflation. We now investigate how initial inflation depends on such initial distribution. To make the analysis operational, we restrict our attention to the class of Normal distributions truncated at the borrowing limit φ.

That is,

\[ f_0(a) = \begin{cases} \phi(a; \mu, \sigma) / [1 - \Phi(\phi; \mu, \sigma)], & a \geq \phi \\ 0, & a < \phi \end{cases} \]  

where φ(·; μ, σ) and Φ(·; μ, σ) are the Normal pdf and cdf, respectively. Figure 8 displays the sensitivity analysis to changes in ρ – ˜r.

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24 In these simulations, we assume that the initial net asset distribution conditional on income is the same for high- and low-income households: \( f_0^{0|y}(a \mid y) = f_0^{1|y}(a \mid y) \equiv f_0(a) \). This implies that the marginal asset density coincides with its conditional density: \( f_0^a(a) = \sum_{i=1,2} f_0^{a|y}(a \mid y_i) f^y(y_i) = f_0(a) \).
and σ, the former not to be confused with the costate in equation (24), allow us to control both (i) the initial net foreign asset position and (ii) the domestic dispersion in household wealth, and hence to isolate the effect of each factor on the optimal inflation path. Notice also that optimal long-run inflation rates do not depend on \( f_0 (a) \) and are therefore exactly the same as in our baseline numerical analysis regardless of \( \mu \) and \( \sigma \). This allows us to focus here on inflation at time 0, while noting that the transition paths towards the respective long-run levels are isomorphic to those displayed in Figure 1.

Figure 9 displays optimal initial inflation rates for alternative initial net wealth distributions. In panels (a) and (b), we show the effect of increasing wealth dispersion while restricting the country to have a zero net position vis-à-vis the rest of the World, i.e. we increase \( \sigma \) and simultaneously adjust \( \mu \) to ensure that \( \bar{a}_0 = 0 \). In the extreme case of a (quasi) degenerate initial distribution at zero net assets (solid black line in panel a), the central bank has no incentive to create inflation, and thus optimal initial inflation is zero. As the degree of initial wealth dispersion increases, so does optimal initial inflation.

Panels (c) and (d) in Figure 9 isolate instead the effect of increasing the liabilities with the rest of the World, while assuming at the same time \( \sigma \simeq 0 \), i.e. eliminating any wealth dispersion. That is, we approximate ‘Dirac delta’ distributions centered at different values of \( \mu \). Since such distributions are not affected by the truncation at \( a = \phi \), we have \( \bar{a} (0) = \mu \), i.e. the net foreign asset position coincides with \( \mu \). As shown by the lower right panel, optimal inflation increases...
fairly quickly with the external indebtedness; for instance, an external debt-to-GDP ratio of 50 percent justifies an initial inflation of over 6 percent.

We can finally use Figure 9 to shed some light on the contribution of each redistributive motive (cross-border and domestic) to the initial optimal inflation rate, \( \pi_0 = 4.6\% \), found in our baseline analysis. We may do so in two different ways. First, we note that the initial wealth distribution used in our baseline analysis implies a consolidated net foreign asset position of \( \bar{a}_0 = -25\% \) of GDP \((\bar{y} = 1)\). Using as initial condition a degenerate distribution at exactly that level (i.e. \( \mu = -0.205 \) and \( \sigma \approx 0 \)) delivers \( \pi_0 = 3.1\% \) (see panel d). Therefore, the pure cross-border redistributive motive explains a significant part (about two thirds) but not all of the optimal time-0 inflation under the Ramsey policy. Alternatively, we may note that our baseline initial distribution has a standard deviation of 1.95. We then find the \((\sigma, \mu)\) pair such that the (truncated) normal distribution has the same standard deviation while ensuring that \( \bar{a}_0 = 0 \) (thus switching off the cross-border redistributive motive); this requires \( \sigma = 2.1 \), which delivers \( \pi_0 = 1.5\% \) (panel b). We thus find again that the pure domestic redistributive motive explains about a third of the baseline optimal initial inflation. We conclude that both the cross-border and the domestic redistributive motives are quantitatively important for explaining the optimal inflation chosen by the monetary authority.

E. The case with the borrowing limit in the market value of debt

In this Appendix we consider the case of a exogenous borrowing limit in terms of the market value of wealth

\[
Q_t a_t \geq \phi^m,
\]

where \( \phi^m \leq 0 \).

In this case, the Ramsey problem (19) is then greatly simplified. If we separate the utility in consumption and inflation and express the value functional \( W_0 \) in terms of the market value of wealth, we get:

\[
W_0 = \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_{\phi^m}^{\infty} \left[ v_i^c(a^m) - \int_{t}^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} x(\pi_t) dt \right] \left[ \frac{1}{Q_0} f_{0} \left( \frac{a^m}{Q_0} \right) \right] da^m,
\]

where \( v_i^c(a^m) = \mathbb{E}_0 \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} u(c_t) dt \) is the value function of consumption as a function of initial market-value wealth. This value function does not depend on time as neither the drift in the law of motion of wealth (equation 26) nor the borrowing limit (84) depend on any aggregate variable. Therefore, we do not need to condition on the individual HJB equation. Similarly, the law of motion of the distribution is not a constraint in this case, as the central bank only cares about its impact on the initial distribution.
The Lagrangian of the problem in this case simplifies to

\[
L_0 \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_{\phi^m}^{\infty} \left\{ v_i^c (a^m) - \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} x (\pi_t) \, dt \right\} \left[ \frac{1}{Q_0} f_{Q_0} \left( \frac{a^m}{Q_0} \right) \right] da^m \\
+ \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} \mu_t \left[ Q_t (\bar{r} + \pi_t + \delta) - \delta - \dot{Q}_t \right] dt.
\]

and we obtain the first-order conditions with respect to the functions \(\pi, Q\) by variational arguments. The following proposition characterizes the solution to this problem.

**Proposition 4 (Optimal inflation - borrowing limit in market-value)** In addition to equations (12), (11), (7) and (9), if a solution to the Ramsey problem (19) exists, the inflation path \(\pi_t\) must satisfy

\[
x' (\pi_t) = \mu_t Q_t, \tag{86}
\]

where \(\mu_t\) is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the bond pricing condition (11) with law of motion

\[
d\mu_t \over dt = (\rho - \bar{r} - \pi_t - \delta) \mu_t, \tag{87}
\]

and initial value

\[
\mu_0 = -dW_0 \over dQ_0 = -\sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_{\phi^m}^{\infty} \left\{ v_i^c (a^m) - \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} x (\pi_t) \, dt \right\} \frac{d}{dQ_0} \left[ \frac{1}{Q_0} f_{Q_0} \left( \frac{a^m}{Q_0} \right) \right] da^m. \tag{88}
\]

Notice how time-0 optimal inflation is only driven by the trade-off between the controlling time-0 bond prices to redistribute wealth and the disutility cost of inflation. As the market-valued borrowing limit \(\phi^m\) is constant, the individual value function only depends on the future path of inflation

\[
v_{i0} (a^m) = v_i^c (a^m) - \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} x (\pi_t) \, dt.
\]

Optimal inflation is zero in the steady state. To check this, it is enough to verify that the steady-state value of the Lagrange multiplier \(\mu\) is zero in equation (87) and hence inflation is zero in equation (86). Inflation in the distant future cannot affect current bond prices and hence the only relevant channel in the long run is the disutility cost of inflation, which calls for zero inflation.

Finally, if we solve equation (87) and combine it with equations (88) and (86) we obtain equation (29).
F. Additional figures

Figure 10: Time-0 value functions.

Value function, $y = y_1$

- Const. face v.
- $\pi = 0$
- Const. market v.

Value function, $y = y_2$

- Const. face v.
- $\pi = 0$
- Const. market v.
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