

**REAL WAGE RESPONSIVENESS
TO UNEMPLOYMENT IN SPAIN:
ASYMMETRIES ALONG
THE BUSINESS CYCLE**

2015

Paulino Font, Mario Izquierdo
and Sergio Puente

**Documentos de Trabajo
N.º 1504**

BANCO DE ESPAÑA
Eurosistema



**REAL WAGE RESPONSIVENESS TO UNEMPLOYMENT IN SPAIN:
ASYMMETRIES ALONG THE BUSINESS CYCLE**

REAL WAGE RESPONSIVENESS TO UNEMPLOYMENT IN SPAIN: ASYMMETRIES ALONG THE BUSINESS CYCLE (*)

Paulino Font, Mario Izquierdo and Sergio Puente

BANCO DE ESPAÑA

(*) This paper is the sole responsibility of its authors and the views represented here do not necessarily reflect those of the Banco de España.

Acknowledgements: We thank participants at the Banco de España seminar for their insightful comments and the *Dirección General de Ordenación de la Seguridad Social* for kindly providing the *Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales* (MCVL, social security administrative labour records).

The Working Paper Series seeks to disseminate original research in economics and finance. All papers have been anonymously refereed. By publishing these papers, the Banco de España aims to contribute to economic analysis and, in particular, to knowledge of the Spanish economy and its international environment.

The opinions and analyses in the Working Paper Series are the responsibility of the authors and, therefore, do not necessarily coincide with those of the Banco de España or the Eurosystem.

The Banco de España disseminates its main reports and most of its publications via the Internet at the following website: <http://www.bde.es>.

Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged.

© BANCO DE ESPAÑA, Madrid, 2015

ISSN: 1579-8666 (on line)

Abstract

We estimate real wage cyclicality in the period between 1987 and 2013 using a large administrative dataset of workers in Spain. Real wages are weakly procyclical in Spain and, focusing on different phases of the business cycle, we find significant differences between expansions and recessions, with even lower real wage cyclicality in recessions. Furthermore, higher levels of unemployment do not translate into additional real wage adjustments when the economy is contracting, while lower levels of unemployment during expansions have incremental effects on wage elasticity. This general result holds after accounting for differences in tenure, type of contract and age. Nevertheless, wages of newly hired workers are the most sensitive to the business cycle and exhibit the lowest asymmetric pattern between expansions and recessions. At the other end of the scale, wages of workers with more than six years' tenure provide the most protection against economic downturns. The same is true for fixed-term vs. permanent workers and for young vs. older workers.

Keywords: wage cyclicality, downward wage rigidity, social security data.

JEL Classification: E32, J31.

Resumen

En este trabajo se estima la sensibilidad cíclica de los salarios en España entre 1987 y 2013 a partir de los datos proporcionados por la Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL). La ciclicidad de los salarios en el mercado de trabajo español es reducida, encontrándose, además, que esta ciclicidad es aún más baja en las épocas de recesión. Por otro lado, no se encuentra que niveles más elevados de desempleo provoquen un mayor descenso salarial en los períodos de recesión, mientras que una menor tasa de paro tiende a incrementar los aumentos salariales en épocas expansivas. Estos resultados a nivel agregado se mantienen cuando se analizan las posibles diferencias en la ciclicidad de los salarios en función de la antigüedad en el empleo, el tipo de contrato y la edad de los trabajadores. No obstante, los salarios de los entrantes al mercado, con menos de un año en el empleo, muestran la mayor sensibilidad a las condiciones cíclicas de la economía y el menor grado de asimetría entre las expansiones y las recesiones. Por el contrario, los salarios de los trabajadores con más de seis años de antigüedad en el empleo se caracterizan como los más protegidos frente a los ajustes salariales en las recesiones. Los resultados son similares cuando se analizan las diferencias entre trabajadores con contrato indefinido y aquellos con un contrato temporal y entre trabajadores jóvenes y trabajadores mayores.

Palabras clave: ciclicidad salarial, rigideces salariales a la baja, registros administrativos de Seguridad Social.

Códigos JEL: E32, J31.

1 Introduction

Wage reaction to the crisis initiated in 2008 is in the core of the economic and political debate. This is especially so in Euro Area countries like Spain, where unemployment has more than tripled since 2008 while wages, at least in the initial phase of the crisis, failed to react to the strong deterioration of the labor market and a rise in real wages was observed¹.

However, the empirical literature on wage responsiveness to the economic cycle tends to be inconclusive. Studies based on aggregate data tend to fail in finding a pro-cyclical pattern in real wages for most countries, since changes in the composition of the work force induce a countercyclical bias in the aggregate real wage (Mitchell et al. (1985), Solon et al. (1994), for instance). On the other hand, studies based on micro data show a much clearer procyclical behavior of real wages (Shin (1994) and Devereux (2001), for instance). In addition, when worker's heterogeneity is introduced, the procyclical pattern that wages exhibit tends to be more pronounced for newly-hired employees, while wages of incumbent workers are found to be more rigid (Carneiro et al. 2012, for instance). In the case of Spain, mostly due to the absence of individual databases to properly estimate wage elasticity to labor market conditions, the empirical evidence is scarce. A recent exception is De la Roca (2014), who uses Social Security Registers information to estimate wage elasticity to unemployment variation controlling for individual heterogeneity. In his study, De la Roca finds weak procyclicality of real wages in Spain, estimating that a one percentage point decline in the unemployment rate increases real wages by 0.4%. This estimate is considerably lower than the ones estimated for developed countries. In Pissarides (2009), for instance, elasticities are shown to be higher than 1 in most studies covering US and some European labor markets.

In this paper, we follow a similar approach to De la Roca (2014), although we focus on how wage cyclicity varies during the different phases of the business cycle. Theoretically, there are multiple reasons to expect an asymmetric response of wages to the prevailing economic conditions, being downward adjustments much more difficult in the presence of nominal and/or real downward wage rigidities, which are extensively documented in the literature (Dickens et al. (2010)). However, empirical evidence of differences along the business cycle is neither abundant nor conclusive. For instance, Cervini Pla et al (2013), using BHPS data for UK find that wage cyclicity is considerably higher in economic recessions and Martins (1997) finds similar results for Portugal. On the contrary, Shin and Shin (2008) for the US finds the opposite result, that is, wage cyclicity is higher during expansionary periods. As far as we are aware, we present the first empirical results regarding the Spanish labor market in this respect.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we provide a brief description of the dataset. Section 3 discusses the methodology implemented. Section 4 presents our estimated results. Final remarks are then presented in Section 5.

1. It should be noticed that the rise in real wages is observed in 2008-2009 even when composition effects in employment are controlled. See Galan and Puente (2014).

2 Dataset

In this study we make use of Spain's Social Security Administrative Labor Records (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales, MCVL hereinafter), which records the employment histories of a 4% non-stratified random sample of workers registered in the social security system at some point between 2005 and 2013. For these workers, the MCVL records all labor market transitions and job characteristics since 1980 or since first appearance in the social security system. The high frequency of our data² allows us to properly track labor market transitions, many of which would go unnoticed in lower frequency datasets. Altogether with the reliability of the information provided³, the MCVL is a desirable longitudinal dataset to study wage responses to the cycle from a microeconomic point of view.

To estimate wage cyclicity we focus on the evolution of wages of salaried workers in the private sector, and exclude therefore self-employment and public administration employees. Our wage variable records daily real wages in 2011 prices⁴ for those workers that reported at least seven days⁵ of fulltime work in a given month. In this dataset wages are proxied by the Social Security contribution base. For most workers, this is exactly equal to the earned wage. However, the existence of an upper bound in the Social Security contribution base makes it impossible to know the exact wage for the top part of the distribution. Hence, salaries are right-censored for some individuals. We present estimates of the cyclicity excluding right-censored wages, but our results are not affected if we include them in the dataset⁶.

To account for differences of wage response among different job tenure categories, we construct a variable that reflects worker's tenure by accumulating the days worked in a firm. A worker starts a new job from either unemployment or inactivity, or from an employment to employment transition (switches firms). The former is classified as newly-hired, and the latter as a job mover. A worker will either be recorded as newly-hired or as a job mover within the first year in the firm. After that first year, our job tenure categories comprise 1-2 years of work in the firm, 2-4 years, 4-6 years, and 6 or more years⁷. Given the high frequency of our data it is possible to observe multiple transitions from employment to unemployment in a given calendar year by a single worker within the same firm. In this case, we will maintain the worker's accumulated experience as long as the worker's separation from the firm does not expand beyond 11 months⁸ and as long as the worker does not switch firms before returning. If the worker either switches firms or returns after 12 months or later, her accumulated working experience in the firm resets to zero. Table A in the Appendix presents main characteristics of our database, including

2. We have monthly information on wages and information on any change in the activity status of the worker, as the dataset collects information on the initial and expiry date of every contractual relationship of the worker included in the sample.

3. Wage information coming from registers tends to be found more reliable than the one obtained from household surveys due to large measurement errors and underreporting of wages in these later datasets.

4. Using general CPI as deflator.

5. Results are almost identical if we require 21 working days in the month.

6. Around 12% of workers are found to be paid at the maximum level of the contributory base in our database.

7. Results are robust to different tenure grouping.

8. Results are almost identical if we reduce this threshold to 4 months.

more than 12 million observations on a monthly basis from 1987⁹ to 2013 for some 163,000 workers. As it can be seen in this Table, the composition of the workforce across tenure categories shows around one quarter of workers in the group of higher tenure (more than 6 years) while around 30% of workers are either newly-hired or job movers.

9. Although workers' registers start from 1980, our sample begins in 1987 due to the construction of the group with more than six years of tenure.

3 Methodology

The empirical model we use to analyze real wage cyclicality is a monthly level wage equation with individual fixed effects. The introduction of workers fixed effect is needed to address the workforce composition bias that originates along the different phases of the business cycle (Solon et al. 1994). Most commonly, previous studies have estimated a first differences wage regression model to address such composition bias (Solon et al. 1994, Shin 1994, Devereux 2001). However, since we also want to estimate the wage cyclicality for those workers moving from non-employment to employment, we make use of a wage equation in levels¹⁰. Our model's baseline specification is

$$\ln \omega_{im} = \alpha_i + X_{im}\beta + \zeta_0 U_{t-4} + \gamma_0 m + \gamma_1 m^2 + e_{im} \quad (1)$$

Where ω_{im} is the real daily earnings of individual i in month m , X_{im} is a vector of time-varying individual and job type characteristics that include the age, the square of the age, the worker's job tenure category, the type of contract, a proxy for education (the worker's social security contribution group), and sector occupation dummies. In addition, a linear time trend m and its square are included. U_{t-4} is our cycle variable: The level of the aggregated unemployment rate experienced by the economy in quarter $t - 4$ ¹¹. Finally, e_{im} is a zero mean random term with constant variance.

Since all workers in month m are exposed to the same level of unemployment, the standard error of the coefficient of interest ζ_0 would be underestimated in the presence of time-specific errors (Moulton 1986). As in De la Roca (2014), we follow Solon et al. (1994) and Devereux (2001), adopting a two-step estimation procedure to overcome this problem. Our new specification is described in the following equations:

$$\ln \omega_{im} = \alpha_i + X_{im}\beta + \sum_{t=1}^T \kappa_t D_t + \varepsilon_{im} \quad (2)$$

$$\widehat{\kappa}_t = \mu U_{t-4} + \partial_1 t + \partial_2 t^2 + \sum_{t=1}^4 \varphi_t q_t + \nu_{it} \quad (3)$$

Equation 2 incorporates a set of dummy variables D_t that reflect year-quarter combinations¹². The estimated coefficients $\widehat{\kappa}_t$ capture variations in wages that are free from observed characteristics and time-invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity. These coefficients are then regressed against the unemployment rate, a linear time trend and its

¹⁰. This approach also allows us to keep those individuals that do not work in two consecutive periods. A very similar specification is used in De la Roca (2014) and Carneiro et al (2014), although in the latter case the richness of their database allows to include worker, job title and firm fixed effects.

¹¹. Lagged unemployment rate is normally used in the literature to take into account that wages are usually not able to respond contemporaneously to cyclical variations: since wage negotiations last for some time. Results are robust to different unemployment rate lags.

¹². There are a total of a 108 periods, from 1987:1 to 2013:4. Due to the number of coefficients that need to be estimated and the huge weight of the database, results are based on a 20% random sample of the MCVL. Results are not sensitive to this threshold, though.

square, and seasonal dummies (equation 3). The standard error of the elasticity of real wages to the unemployment rate μ , is now free from the grouped or aggregated bias present in equation (1). As our cyclical variable is the level of the unemployment rate, a negative estimate value of μ would imply that real wages are procyclical, while counter-cyclicality of wages would be indicated by a positive value.

Insofar we are interested in tracking down asymmetries along the business cycle, we divide periods in which the economy is in expansion (measured by positive employment growth on a year-on year basis) from those periods that the economy is contracting (negative employment variation)¹³. Moreover, we further divide periods according to the unemployment rate level being above or below the mean of the whole period considered (1987-2013). This distinction allows us to check, for instance, whether downward pressure on wages when employment is falling is more intense after a long recession -when unemployment is also high- or not. In principle, there are different reasons to think this would be the case if, for example, a long recession has left the economy with a large stock of unemployed workers posing extra pressure on wage adjustment. However, the opposite could be true if, for example, the composition of the unemployment rate is biased towards a high percentage of long-term unemployed (possibly less attached to the labor market), resulting in a lower downward pressure on wages.

In other words, we divide the business cycle in four phases. The first one consists of an economy in recession (employment is falling) and with a high level of unemployment (above the historical average), in the second phase the employment starts to rise but the economy still experiences high levels of unemployment. The third phase would consist of an expanding economy that enjoys low levels of unemployment and finally, in the fourth phase, the economy enters in recession but still maintains a low unemployment rate.

In Chart 1, we present the actual evolution of employment growth and unemployment rate in Spain since 1987. The vertical axis is plotted at the average unemployment rate across all the period (16.7%). Hence, the four sub-periods defined above correspond to the four quarters in the graph. The natural movement in such a graph is in counterclockwise circles, and a complete circle represents a complete business cycle.

The chart represents two complete business cycles. Commenting only the most recent, high unemployment levels coexisted with incipient positive employment growth rates at the end of 1994. This situation lasted until the beginning of the 2000s (phase 2 in the above definitions, corresponding to the top-right quarter in the graph). Then, unemployment started to lie below its average (phase 3, top-left quarter). This expansionary period lasted until the end of 2007, with a decreasing unemployment rate below the historical average. Recession initiated in 2008 with a marked decrease in employment, although unemployment rate was still below the average until the beginning of 2010 (phase 4, bottom-left quarter). Finally, the continuing deterioration in the labor market brought unemployment rate above its average until the end of the sample period (phase 1, bottom-right quarter).

13. Results are robust to use year-on-year variations of the unemployment rate.

4 Empirical results

Before presenting our estimated results of real wage cyclicality it is worth presenting some of the main characterizing features of the wage setting in Spain over the period 1987 to 2013. Firstly, collective agreements cover about 90% of the salaried workforce in the private sector despite relatively low unionization levels, due the automatic extensions of collective agreements. Collective agreements are mainly bargained at the province-sector level, with a very low share of firm-level agreements. This predominance of negotiations at an intermediate level of decentralization has been found to provide a low association of wages and labor conditions to firms' individual performance (See, for instance, Bentolila et al (2010) and Izquierdo et al (2004). Recent labor market reforms have indeed tried to increase the decentralization of the collective bargaining system in Spain, although it is still not possible to assess the impact of these reforms on wage cyclicality. Moreover, traditionally, the Spanish labor market has been characterized by a strong wage indexation to inflation, resulting in a high inertia of wages and real downward wage rigidities (Messina et al, 2007).

Table 1 depicts the estimates of our two-step equation model, showing real wage semi-elasticity to unemployment variations along the four business cycle phases defined previously.¹⁴ The first thing to notice is that, regardless of what phase the economy is in, real wages are very weakly procyclical in Spain. Our estimates point-out to an increase (decrease) of between 0.24-0.48 pp in real wages after a decrease (increase) of 1pp in the unemployment rate. These estimates are similar to those reported by De la Roca (2014) for the Spanish case when no differences across the business cycle phases are allowed, and much lower than those found for other countries. For instance, Pissarides (2009) summarizes the evidence of real wage cyclicality in the US and some European countries finding wage to unemployment semi-elasticities being above 1 in the US case, although with large differences between job-movers and job-stayers. Results for different European countries also tend to find this elasticity above 1, especially in the UK (close to 2 according to Deveraux and Hart (2006) and Peng and Siebert (2007), but also in Germany, Italy or Portugal.¹⁵

On top of this low wage sensitivity to business cycle conditions, we also find significant differences depending on the cyclical phase of the economy. That is, wage cyclicality in Spain does not exhibit a symmetric pattern along the business cycle, and wages respond differently depending on what phase of the cycle the economy is operating in.

In particular, looking at the results shown in Table 1, downward wage rigidities seem to be playing a relevant role in the Spanish labor market, as wage cyclicality is much lower in recessions than in expansions, and the level of the unemployment rate appears to be relevant only in expansionary periods. These results are in line to those reported by Shin and Shin (2008) for the US, although in that case no distinction was made according to the level of the unemployment rate.

¹⁴. Using regional data in the definition of the cyclical phases is very demanding computationally, because it multiplies the dimensionality of the first step of the estimation. In any case, we carried-out a test with reducing the sample to one quarter and results were very similar..

¹⁵. See references in Table III in Pissarides (2009).

More specifically, if we analyze how wage cyclicality varies along the four phases defined in this paper, Column 2 would describe how wages are related to unemployment variations in a recovery phase, like the situation in Spain in 2014, where employment is starting to grow, but unemployment rate is still above the historical average. In this situation, wages increase as a response to reductions in the unemployment rate, with a semi-elasticity of 0.38%. If this situation persists, and the expansionary period leads to unemployment falling below its average, the economy would enter in the phase defined by Column 3. In this new phase, higher upward pressure on wages derived from the lower unemployment rate and an increasing level of employment, wage semi-elasticity to unemployment rises to 0.48%. This higher wage sensitivity to the unemployment rate is found to be significantly higher than the one observed under higher unemployment at the 1% confidence level.

Nevertheless, once the expansionary period ends and the economy starts shrinking, a significantly lower wage reaction to unemployment is found. In particular, a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate decreases real wages by 0.25% (column 4). Thus, wage response is almost half that the one observed in the previous expansionary period, being this difference statistically significant at the 1% level. Therefore, these results would be coherent with the existence of significant downward wage rigidities in Spain, since wage cyclicality is much lower in recessions than in expansions. Eventually, as the economy continues deteriorating and the unemployment rate keeps rising, the economy moves into a period that combines a worsening economy and a high level of unemployment. Nonetheless, as we can see in Column (1), the elasticity of wages does not experience any variation (remains at -0.25%), and the increasing level of unemployment fails to induce any additional pressure on wages adjustment.

In other words, the elasticity of wages to unemployment when the economy is in recession is low and it is not found to be dependent of the unemployment level. When the economy moves out of the recession, real wages are found to show a greater link to business cycle conditions, although lower than in other countries. In these expansionary periods, a low level of unemployment rate is associated with additional wage pressures, while this is not the case in recessionary periods. Overall, these results indicate the existence of significant asymmetries in wage formation in Spain, possibly reflecting the impact of the prevailing labor market institutions, such as the interaction between the very high duality between permanent and temporary workers, and the prevalence of sectoral levels of negotiations: Overall, this collective bargaining system could be characterized as providing a high level of protection to working conditions of the incumbents or insiders in the labor market, while concerns over the access to a job for those in unemployment are set aside in the bargaining process. As a result, both high levels of unemployment and wage growth can coexist during the first stages of economic recovery, therefore delaying the necessary reduction in unemployment.

In order to fully understand these differences in wage cyclicality across the business cycle and trying to interpret the low wage elasticity observed in Spain with respect to other countries, we next break down differences in wage response to the business cycle for different firm-specific tenure categories. To this end we interact our six tenure categories with the year-quarter pair dummies in the first stage regression (equation 2 in previous section), and estimate six separate regression models in the second step (equation 3). Estimated results are reported in Table 2.

In this Table, we observe that differences across the four cyclical phases defined in this paper are similar across the six tenure categories used. That is, real wages elasticity to

unemployment is higher when the economy is expanding and presents low levels of unemployment, regardless of the accumulated experience a worker has within a firm. Similarly and during recessions, real wage exhibits a lower elasticity to the unemployment rate evolution, and this downward real wage rigidity seems to be unaffected by the level of unemployment. Again, once the economy initiates its recovery, real wages start increasing again for all tenure categories with a higher sensitivity to our cycle indicator than they showed during recessions. In any case, it should be noted that, as in other countries (Pissarides, 2009, Carneiro et al., 2012), wage cyclicality is found to be higher for newly-hired workers, with point estimates for wage semi-elasticity ranging from -0.41 (in recessions) to -0.65 in expansionary periods with low unemployment. By contrast, long-tenure workers are found to show very weak wage cyclicality, from -0.13 in recessions to a maximum of -0.33 in expansionary periods. Wage cyclicality estimates are, on a general basis, found to show a monotonic inverse relationship with tenure in the Spanish labor market.

In table 2.A we present the significance of these differences across tenure categories and to what extent there is some variation across the business cycle. In this regard, differences in wage cyclicality between new-hired, job movers, and low tenure (less than 2 years) workers tend to be non significant, while long-tenure workers tend to exhibit a significantly lower wage sensitivity to unemployment. Interestingly, downward wage rigidities seem to be playing a relevant role protecting wage falls for workers with a tenure higher than two years in the most adverse cyclical situation (recessions with high unemployment) while, by contrast, in expansionary periods only long tenure workers (more than 6 years) show a significantly lower wage reaction to unemployment.

Another interesting dimension, although closely related to tenure, is to look at differences in wage cyclicality in Spain by type of contract. The Spanish labor market is characterized by a high level of duality, where a large proportion of the salaried workforce (about 24% in 2014, but above 30% over the expansionary period) is under fixed-term contracts with a high turnover rate, while the rest holds over in permanent contracts with high redundancy costs.

Table 3 reflects that wages of workers under fixed-term contracts are more sensitive to the unemployment rate than those wages of workers subject to permanent contracts. In fact, in column (1) we observe that wages of workers under fixed-term contracts are almost two times more responsive to job destruction when the economy is in recession and unemployment is high than wages of workers with a permanent contract (-0.43 vs -0.21). Once the economy starts recovering, and despite the existence of a high level of unemployed stock, real wages become more sensitive than they were during the recession for both contract type workers (Column 2), although the increase in the sensitivity is found to be higher for permanent workers. Thus, the wage elasticity in this phase of the cycle is also higher for workers with temporary jobs, but the asymmetry of the real wage response is higher for workers with a permanent job. Once the unemployment rate has lowered and the economy continues expanding (column 3), real wages of permanent workers become even more sensitive to unemployment reductions, while the increase in wage sensitivity of workers with fixed-term contract is lower. In the next phase (column 4), when the economy enters in recession but still enjoys a low level of unemployed workers, real wages decrease in a less sensitive way for both groups, but more markedly for those with a permanent contract. Overall, as it can be seen in Table 3.A, semi-elasticity of wages to the unemployment rate is statistically higher for those with a temporary contract than for permanent workers, being the exception expansionary periods with low unemployment, when traditionally highly rigid wages

of permanent workers show a wage sensitivity to cyclical conditions similar to the one estimated for temporary workers. In other words, asymmetries in wage adjustment between expansions and recessions are clearly higher in Spain among permanent workers, who are especially protected from wage cuts in recessions.

Finally, Table 4 depicts wage semi-elasticity by age groups. We observe that wages of older workers are the most protected from the business cycle in all four phases, while wages of workers aged 16 to 29 years old are the most affected by changes in the unemployment rate. For all age group categories, we observe that wages are more sensitive to expansions than they are to recessions. Furthermore, a higher unemployment rate does not statistically affect the path at which real wages adjust during a recession, while the opposite is true with a lower unemployment rate when the economy is expanding. This is in fact, a clear example of downwardly rigid wages.

All in all, the estimations for different groups suggests a lower wage elasticity (especially in recessions) for those groups more protected from unemployment (permanent, older, and high tenured).

4.1 Can we identify any difference in the Great Recession?

A tentative question to answer is whether wage responsiveness to the economic conditions has differed between the early 90s crisis and the Great Recession that tripled the unemployment rate in the Spanish labour market between 2008 and 2013. Moreover, different labor market reforms have been adopted in the more recent period, which, in principle, could have had an impact on wage responsiveness to labour market conditions. In particular, 2012 labor market reform¹⁶ introduced different measures to increase the possibility for firms to adjust wages in the presence of adverse shocks, as the easing of opt-out clauses and the prevalence of firm-level agreements over higher-level collective agreements. To answer this question, we first take into account that no significant differences were found between high and low unemployment periods in recessions so we just define one type of recession periods with independence of the level of unemployment. Estimates are reported in table 5, showing very similar results to the ones commented in the previous sections. In recessions, wage elasticity to unemployment is lower (in absolute value) than in expansions, while wage response in expansions is significantly higher when unemployment is low.

To perform our analysis of differences between the “old” recession and the “new” recession, we divide the whole period in 5 periods: the old recession (1991q4 to 1994q3), the first phase of the recent recession (2008q3 to 2012q2, lasting 7 quarters as the 90’s recession), the second phase of the recent crisis after the 2012 reform (2012q3 to 2013q4), and our two expansionary periods with low and high levels of unemployment.

Estimated results (see table 6) show some differences between the three recessionary periods defined in this exercise, although they tend to be non-significant. In particular, in the 90’s crisis, wage elasticity is estimated at $-.24$, very close to the estimate for the second phase of the current crisis ($-.26$), while a lower wage sensitivity to unemployment is estimated in the first phase of the crisis ($-.14$). This is in line with previous results showing the increase in real wages in the first phase of the recent crisis (Galán and Puente, 2014) although no statistical difference is found with the early 90’s crisis. However, if we focus in

¹⁶. Different measures were also adopted in 2010 and 2011 regarding collective bargaining with potential impact on wage determination.

comparing the wage responsiveness between the two phases of the recent crisis, results reported in Table 6 show a significantly higher wage elasticity to unemployment in the second phase of the crisis. This result would be in line with preliminary assessments of the different measures introduced in the 2012 labour market reform¹⁷ that indicated some increase in the possibilities for Spanish firms to adjust wages to the situation of the labour market. In any case, in order to properly interpret this result some caveats should be considered. First, this higher estimated elasticity of wages at the end of our sample period could also be reflecting the effect of a longer and more persistent crisis with no precedents in our sample period. Also, it should be noticed that this higher wage elasticity found is not higher than the historical standards observed in the Spanish economy in previous recessions¹⁸, it keeps the asymmetric pattern observed in the past being lower than the one estimated in expansions and, finally, it remains well below the estimates available for other countries.

17. OECD (2013) and Izquierdo et al (2013)

18. At least the only one in our sample period, between 1991 and 1994.

5 Final Remarks

In this paper, we have carried out an analysis of the wage cyclicality in Spain accounting for worker heterogeneity. Our results show that real wages are very weakly procyclical, showing a much lower association with the cyclical conditions in the labor market than the observed in other European countries. Moreover, wage sensitiveness to unemployment is not constant along the business cycle. In fact, real wages are found to be more sensitive to unemployment decreases during expansionary periods, while downward wage rigidities pose limits to wage adjustments in recessions. Furthermore, the level of unemployed stock in the economy seems not to affect the path at which real wages adjust during an economic downturn, but low levels of unemployed individuals lead to higher procyclicity of real wages in a booming economy.

This general picture remains unchanged when we look at differences between different types of workers, in particular, across tenure categories, contract type, and age groups. We show that wages procyclicity is lower for high tenured individuals, those with a permanent contract, and older workers, who also present a higher asymmetry in wage cyclicality between expansions and recessions. As a result, these workers are especially protected against wage adjustments in economic downturns, while during expansionary periods these differences tend to disappear.

All in all, these results point out to very low wage cyclicality in Spain with respect to the one usually estimated for the US and other European countries, where downward wage rigidities play a relevant role in limiting wage reductions in recessions. These results are fully in line with recent developments in the Spanish labour market where wage reaction to the strong increase in unemployment rate was mild, especially in the first phase of the crisis. Moreover, it should be noticed that composition effects exacerbate the weak procyclicity of wages in Spain in recessions, since those groups with lower wage sensitiveness to the cycle, permanent workers and those with longer tenure, increase their share in total employment in downturns¹⁹.

Although identifying the sources of these rigidities is beyond the scope of this paper, these results would be in line with previous analysis, which have documented the presence of rigidities in the adjustment of labor costs in Spain with a high degree of price indexation (see, for instance Druant et al 2008 for a comparative analysis with other European countries). The Spanish labor market (see for instance Estrada et al 2009) is characterized by a high degree of wage stickiness, mostly deriving by the main features of the collective bargaining system, where automatic extension of agreements extend their application to all firms and workers (Bentollilla et al 2010). In this respect, recent reforms approved as a reaction to the strong deterioration of the labor market, tried to increase wage bargaining decentralization, increasing firm's possibilities to adjust wages in the presence of adverse shocks. In principle, our results would indicate that these measures may have been able to correct the excessive wage rigidity observed in the first phase of the crisis but they would not have increased wage responsiveness above the one observed in previous recessions.

19. See Table A in the Appendix.

REFERENCES

- BENTOLILA, S. M. IZQUIERDO and J.F. JIMENO (2010). "Negociación colectiva: la gran reforma pendiente", *Papeles de Economía Española*, num 124, pp 176-192.
- CARNEIRO, A, P. GUIMARAES and P. PORTUGAL (2012). "Real Wages and the Business Cycle: Accounting for Worker and Firm Heterogeneity" *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 4(2): 133-52.
- CERVINI PLA, M. J. I. SILVA and A. LOPEZ (2013). "The heterogenous cyclicalidad of real wages. Evidence from wage groups in economic expansions and recessions", mimeo
- DE LA ROCA (2014). "Wage cyclicalidad: Evidence from Spain using social security data" *Series: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association* 5(2), August 2014: 173-195
- DEVEREUX, P. (2001). "The Cyclicalidad of Real Wages within Employer-Employee Matches", *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 54, pp. 835-850.
- DEVEREUX, P. J., and R. A. HART (2006). Real Wage Cyclicalidad of Job Stayers, Within-Company Job Movers, and Between-Company Job Movers, *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 60, 105-119.
- DICKENS, WILLIAM T., LORENZ GOETTE, ERICA L. GROSHEN, STEINAR HOLDEN, JULIAN MESSINA, MARK E. SCHWEITZER, JARKKO TURUNEN, and MELANIE E. WARD (2007). "How Wages Change: Micro Evidence from the International Wage Flexibility Project," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 21, 195-214.
- DRUANT M., S. FABIANI, A. LAMO, R. SABBATINI and G. KEZDI (2012). "Firms' price and wage adjustment in Europe: Survey evidence on nominal stickiness" *Labour Economics*, 10, 19(5), pp 772-782
- ESTRADA, A., M. IZQUIERDO and A. LACUESTA (2009). "El funcionamiento del mercado de trabajo y el aumento del paro en España", *Boletín Económico*, Banco de España, July-August, pp 95-115
- GALAN, S., PUENTE, S. (2014). "Un análisis de los efectos composición sobre la evolución de los salarios", *Boletín Económico*, Banco de España, February, pp 57-61
- IZQUIERDO, M., E. MORAL and A. URTASUN (2004). "Collective Bargaining in Spain: An Individual Data Analysis" *Occasional Paper* 0302, Banco de España
- IZQUIERDO, M., A. LACUESTA and S. PUENTE (2013). "The 2012 Labour Market Reform: An Initial Assessment of Some of its Effects on the Labour Market", *Boletín Económico*, Banco de España, Septiembre pp 17-25
- MARTINS, P. S. (2007). "Heterogeneity in Real Wage Cyclicalidad", *Scottish Journal of Political Economy*, 54(5), 684-698.
- MESSINA, J. C. F. DUARTE, M. IZQUIERDO, P. D. CAJU and N. L.HANSEN (2010). "The Incidence of Nominal and Real Wage Rigididad: An Individual-Based Sectoral Approach", *Journal of the European Economic Association*, vol 8, n 2-3, pp 487-496
- MITCHELL, M., M. WALLACE and J. WARNER (1985). "Real Wages over the Business Cycle: Some Further Evidence", *Southern Economic Journal*, Vol. 51, pp. 1162-1173.
- MOULTON B. R. (1986). "Random group effects and the precision of regression estimates", *Journal of Econometrics*, 32(3):385-397
- OECD (2014). "The 2012 Labour Market Reform in Spain: A Preliminary Assessment", OECD Publishing. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264213586-en>
- PENG F., and W. S. SIEBERT (2006). "Real Wage Cyclicalidad in Italy," *Discussion Paper* 2465, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- PISSARIDES, C. A. (2009). "The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: Is Wage Stickiness the Answer?" *Econometrica*, 77 (5):1339-69.
- SHIN, D. (1994). "Cyclicalidad of Real Wages among Young Men", *Economics Letters*, Vol. 46, pp. 137-142
- SHIN, D., and K. SHIN (2008). "Why Are The Wages Of Job Stayers Procyclical?," *Macroeconomic Dynamics*, 12(01), 1-21.
- SOLON, G., R. BARSKY and J. PARKER (1994). "Measuring the Cyclicalidad of Real Wages: How Important is Composition Bias?," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 109, pp.1-25.

Tables and Charts

Table 1: Real wage cyclicality: 4 scenarios

	Recession		Expansion		Expansion		Recession	
	Unemp. high (1)	Test 1=2	Unemp. high (2)	Test 2=3	Unemp. low (3)	Test 3=4	Unemp. low (4)	Test 4=1
Overall	-0.243*** (0.038)	***	-0.383*** (0.041)	***	-0.481*** (0.067)	***	-0.245*** (0.065)	no

*** Significant at the 1 percent level

** Significant at the 5 percent level

* Significant at the 10 percent level

Table 2: Real wage cyclicality by tenure groups: 4 scenarios

	Recession		Expansion		Expansion		Recession	
	Unemp. high (1)	Test 1=2	Unemp. high (2)	Test 2=3	Unemp. low (3)	Test 3=4	Unemp. low (4)	Test 4=1
New hires	-0.416*** (0.045)	***	-0.548*** (0.048)	**	-0.649*** (0.079)	***	-0.408*** (0.077)	no
Job movers	-0.333*** (0.044)	***	-0.484*** (0.047)	no	-0.533*** (0.076)	***	-0.315*** (0.075)	no
Tenure 1-2	-0.350*** (0.047)	***	-0.486*** (0.051)	**	-0.584*** (0.083)	***	-0.282*** (0.081)	no
Tenure 2-4	-0.274*** (0.047)	***	-0.456*** (0.051)	***	-0.599*** (0.083)	***	-0.267** (0.082)	no
Tenure 4-6	-0.237*** (0.040)	***	-0.381*** (0.043)	***	-0.533*** (0.070)	***	-0.298*** (0.068)	no
Tenure 6+	-0.130*** (0.033)	***	-0.253*** (0.036)	***	-0.333*** (0.058)	***	-0.134* (0.057)	no

*** Significant at the 1 percent level

** Significant at the 5 percent level

* Significant at the 10 percent level

Table 2.A: Significance of differences across tenure groups (a): 4 scenarios

	Recession Unemp. High	Expansion Unemp. High	Expansion Unemp. Low	Recession Unemp. Low
Job movers	no	no	no	no
Tenure 1-2	no	no	no	no
Tenure 2-4	**	no	no	no
Tenure 4-6	***	**	no	no
Tenure 6+	***	***	***	**

(a) Tests against New Hires

*** Significant at the 1 percent level

** Significant at the 5 percent level

* Significant at the 10 percent level

Table 3: Real wage cyclicality by contract types: 4 scenarios

	Recession		Expansion		Expansion		Recession	
	Unemp. high (1)	Test 1=2	Unemp. high (2)	Test 2=3	Unemp. low (3)	Test 3=4	Unemp. low (4)	Test 4=1
Permanent	-0.207*** (0.041)	***	-0.345*** (0.044)	***	-0.466*** (0.071)	***	-0.209** (0.070)	no
Fixed-term	-0.431*** (0.043)	***	-0.520*** (0.046)	*	-0.587*** (0.074)	***	-0.414*** (0.072)	no

*** Significant at the 1 percent level

** Significant at the 5 percent level

* Significant at the 10 percent level

Table 3.A: Significance of differences across contract types (a): 4 scenarios

	Recession Unemp. High	Expansion Unemp. High	Expansion Unemp. Low	Recession Unemp. Low
Fixed-term	***	***	no	**

(a) Test against Permanent contract

*** Significant at the 1 percent level

** Significant at the 5 percent level

* Significant at the 10 percent level

Table 4: Real wage cyclicality by age groups: 4 scenarios

	Recession		Expansion		Expansion		Recession	
	Unemp. high (1)	Test 1=2	Unemp. high (2)	Test 2=3	Unemp. low (3)	Test 3=4	Unemp. low (4)	Test 4=1
16-29	-0.306*** (0.046)	***	-0.497*** (0.049)	***	-0.611*** (0.080)	***	-0.318*** (0.079)	no
30-45	-0.227*** (0.037)	***	-0.364*** (0.040)	***	-0.469*** (0.065)	***	-0.224*** (0.063)	no
45+	-0.146*** (0.035)	***	-0.264*** (0.037)	***	-0.353*** (0.061)	***	-0.146* (0.060)	no

*** Significant at the 1 percent level

** Significant at the 5 percent level

* Significant at the 10 percent level

Table 4.A: Significance of differences across age groups (a): 4 scenarios

	Recession Unemp. High	Expansion Unemp. High	Expansion Unemp. Low	Recession Unemp. Low
30-45	no	**	no	no
45+	***	***	***	*

(a) Test against 16-29 group

*** Significant at the 1 percent level

** Significant at the 5 percent level

* Significant at the 10 percent level

Table 5: Real wage cyclicality: 3 scenarios

	Recession (1)	Test 1=2	Expansion Unemp. high (2)	Test 2=3	Expansion Unemp. low (3)	Test 3=1
Overall	-0.243*** (0.035)	***	-0.382*** (0.034)	***	-0.480*** (0.056)	***

*** Significant at the 1 percent level

** Significant at the 5 percent level

* Significant at the 10 percent level

Table 6: Real wage cyclicality: 5 scenarios

	90's Recession 1991q4-1994q3 (1)	Recent Recession 2008q3-2012q2 (2)	Recent Recession 2012q3-2013q4 (3)	Expansion Unemp. high	Expansion Unemp. low
Overall	-0.239*** (0.061)	-0.135** (0.042)	-0.260*** (0.043)	-0.367*** (0.050)	-0.435*** (0.069)

Test 1=2 no


Test 1=3 no

Test 2=3 ***

*** Significant at the 1 percent level

** Significant at the 5 percent level

* Significant at the 10 percent level



APPENDIX: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Table A: Distribution of Observations. Share in sample (%) (a)

	Total	Recession Unemp. High (1)	Expansion Unemp. High (2)	Expansion Unemp. Low (3)	Recesion Unemp. Low (4)
New hires	17.7	13.7	20.4	18.8	15.4
Job movers	13.1	8.2	11.4	16.3	11.0
Tenure 1-2	14.3	11.6	13.9	15.4	15.4
Tenure 2-4	17.6	18.2	15.5	17.7	19.8
Tenure 4-6	10.9	13.8	9.9	10.1	11.0
Tenure 6+	26.4	34.4	28.9	21.7	27.5
Permanent	68.9	78.6	70.6	62.9	74.2
Fixed-term	31.1	21.4	29.4	37.1	25.8
16-29	27.6	18.2	32.3	30.6	24.3
30-45	46.8	51.1	44.7	45.3	49.0
45+	25.6	30.7	23.0	24.1	26.8
Number of Observations (First Stage)	12,473,369	2,716,514	2,340,325	6,203,384	1,213,146
Number of Individuals (First Stage)	163,447	99,295	76,317	138,472	94,739

(a) Calculated from a 20% random sample of the MCVL

BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS

WORKING PAPERS

- 1301 JAMES COSTAIN and ANTON NAKOV: Logit price dynamics.
- 1302 MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA: Insolvency institutions and efficiency: the Spanish case.
- 1303 MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA and JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI: Firm size and judicial efficacy: evidence for the new civil procedures in Spain.
- 1304 MAXIMO CAMACHO and GABRIEL PEREZ-QUIROS: Commodity prices and the business cycle in Latin America: living and dying by commodities?
- 1305 CARLOS PÉREZ MONTES: Estimation of regulatory credit risk models.
- 1306 FERNANDO LÓPEZ VICENTE: The effect of foreclosure regulation: evidence for the US mortgage market at state level.
- 1307 ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO and LUIS SERVEN: Testing weak exogeneity in cointegrated panels.
- 1308 EMMA BERENQUER, RICARDO GIMENO and JUAN M. NAVE: Term structure estimation, liquidity-induced heteroskedasticity and the price of liquidity risk.
- 1309 PABLO HERNÁNDEZ DE COS and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: Fiscal multipliers in turbulent times: the case of Spain.
- 1310 SAMUEL HURTADO: DSGE models and the Lucas critique.
- 1311 HENRIQUE S. BASSO and JAMES COSTAIN: Fiscal delegation in a monetary union with decentralized public spending.
- 1312 MAITE BLÁZQUEZ CUESTA and SANTIAGO BUDRÍA: Does income deprivation affect people's mental well-being?
- 1313 ENRIQUE ALBEROLA, ÁNGEL ESTRADA and DANIEL SANTABÁRBARA: Growth beyond imbalances. Sustainable growth rates and output gap reassessment.
- 1314 CARMEN BROTO and GABRIEL PEREZ-QUIROS: Disentangling contagion among sovereign CDS spreads during the European debt crisis.
- 1315 MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA and JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI: Are there alternatives to bankruptcy? A study of small business distress in Spain.
- 1316 ROBERTO RAMOS and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: Agglomeration matters for trade.
- 1317 LAURA HOSPIDO and GEMA ZAMARRO: Retirement patterns of couples in Europe.
- 1318 MAXIMO CAMACHO, GABRIEL PEREZ-QUIROS and PILAR PONCELA: Short-term forecasting for empirical economists. A survey of the recently proposed algorithms.
- 1319 CARLOS PÉREZ MONTES: The impact of interbank and public debt markets on the competition for bank deposits.
- 1320 OLYMPIA BOVER, JOSE MARIA CASADO, SONIA COSTA, PHILIP DU CAJU, YVONNE MCCARTHY, EVA SIERMINSKA, PANAGIOTA TZAMOURANI, ERNESTO VILLANUEVA and TIBOR ZAVADIL: The distribution of debt across euro area countries: the role of Individual characteristics, institutions and credit conditions.
- 1321 BRINDUSA ANGHIEL, SARA DE LA RICA and AITOR LACUESTA: Employment polarisation in Spain over the course of the 1997-2012 cycle.
- 1322 RODOLFO G. CAMPOS and ILIANA REGGIO: Measurement error in imputation procedures.
- 1323 PABLO BURRIEL and MARÍA ISABEL GARCÍA-BELMONTE: Meeting our D€STINY. A Disaggregated €uro area Short Term Indicator model to forecast GDP (Y) growth.
- 1401 TERESA SASTRE and FRANCESCA VIANI: Countries' safety and competitiveness, and the estimation of current account misalignments.
- 1402 FERNANDO BRONER, ALBERTO MARTIN, AITOR ERCE and JAUME VENTURA: Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times: creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects.
- 1403 JAVIER J. PÉREZ and ROCÍO PRIETO: The structure of sub-national public debt: liquidity vs credit risks.
- 1404 BING XU, ADRIAN VAN RIXTEL and MICHIEL VAN LEUVENSTEIJN: Measuring bank competition in China: a comparison of new versus conventional approaches applied to loan markets.
- 1405 MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA and JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI: Entrepreneurship and enforcement institutions: disaggregated evidence for Spain.
- 1406 MARIYA HAKE, FERNANDO LÓPEZ-VICENTE and LUIS MOLINA: Do the drivers of loan dollarisation differ between CESEE and Latin America? A meta-analysis.
- 1407 JOSÉ MANUEL MONTERO and ALBERTO URTASUN: Price-cost mark-ups in the Spanish economy: a microeconomic perspective.
- 1408 FRANCISCO DE CASTRO, FRANCISCO MARTÍ, ANTONIO MONTESINOS, JAVIER J. PÉREZ and A. JESÚS SÁNCHEZ-FUENTES: Fiscal policies in Spain: main stylised facts revisited.

- 1409 MARÍA J. NIETO: Third-country relations in the Directive establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions.
- 1410 ÓSCAR ARCE and SERGIO MAYORDOMO: Short-sale constraints and financial stability: evidence from the Spanish market.
- 1411 RODOLFO G. CAMPOS and ILIANA REGGIO: Consumption in the shadow of unemployment.
- 1412 PAUL EHLING and DAVID HAUSHALTER: When does cash matter? Evidence for private firms.
- 1413 PAUL EHLING and CHRISTIAN HEYERDAHL-LARSEN: Correlations.
- 1414 IRINA BALTEANU and AITOR ERCE: Banking crises and sovereign defaults in emerging markets: exploring the links.
- 1415 ÁNGEL ESTRADA, DANIEL GARROTE, EVA VALDEOLIVAS and JAVIER VALLÉS: Household debt and uncertainty: private consumption after the Great Recession.
- 1416 DIEGO J. PEDREGAL, JAVIER J. PÉREZ and A. JESÚS SÁNCHEZ-FUENTES: A toolkit to strengthen government budget surveillance.
- 1417 J. IGNACIO CONDE-RUIZ, and CLARA I. GONZÁLEZ: From Bismarck to Beveridge: the other pension reform in Spain.
- 1418 PABLO HERNÁNDEZ DE COS, GERRIT B. KOESTER, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO and CHRISTIANE NICKEL: Signalling fiscal stress in the euro area: a country-specific early warning system.
- 1419 MIGUEL ALMUNIA and DAVID LÓPEZ-RODRÍGUEZ: Heterogeneous responses to effective tax enforcement: evidence from Spanish firms.
- 1420 ALFONSO R. SÁNCHEZ: The automatic adjustment of pension expenditures in Spain: an evaluation of the 2013 pension reform.
- 1421 JAVIER ANDRÉS, ÓSCAR ARCE and CARLOS THOMAS: Structural reforms in a debt overhang.
- 1422 LAURA HOSPIDO and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: The public sector wage premium in Spain: evidence from longitudinal administrative data.
- 1423 MARÍA DOLORES GADEA-RIVAS, ANA GÓMEZ-LOSCOS and GABRIEL PÉREZ-QUIRÓS: The Two Greatest. Great Recession vs. Great Moderation.
- 1424 ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO and OLIVER ROEHN: The impact of financial (de)regulation on current account balances.
- 1425 MÁXIMO CAMACHO and JAIME MARTÍNEZ-MARTÍN: Real-time forecasting US GDP from small-scale factor models.
- 1426 ALFREDO MARTÍN OLIVER, SONIA RUANO PARDO and VICENTE SALAS FUMÁS: Productivity and welfare: an application to the Spanish banking industry.
- 1427 JAVIER ANDRÉS and PABLO BURRIEL: Inflation dynamics in a model with firm entry and (some) heterogeneity.
- 1428 CARMEN BROTO and LUIS MOLINA: Sovereign ratings and their asymmetric response to fundamentals.
- 1429 JUAN ÁNGEL GARCÍA and RICARDO GIMENO: Flight-to-liquidity flows in the euro area sovereign debt crisis.
- 1430 ANDRÉ LEMELIN, FERNANDO RUBIERA-MOROLLÓN and ANA GÓMEZ-LOSCOS: Measuring urban agglomeration. A refoundation of the mean city-population size index.
- 1431 LUIS DíEZ-CATALÁN and ERNESTO VILLANUEVA: Contract staggering and unemployment during the Great Recession: evidence from Spain.
- 1501 LAURA HOSPIDO and EVA MORENO-GALBIS: The Spanish productivity puzzle in the Great Recession.
- 1502 LAURA HOSPIDO, ERNESTO VILLANUEVA and GEMA ZAMARRO: *Finance for all*: the impact of financial literacy training in compulsory secondary education in Spain.
- 1503 MARIO IZQUIERDO, JUAN F. JIMENO and AITOR LACUESTA: Spain: from immigration to emigration?
- 1504 PAULINO FONT, MARIO IZQUIERDO and SERGIO PUENTE: Real wage responsiveness to unemployment in Spain: asymmetries along the business cycle.