The past three years have seen a radical change in the structure of the oil market, as a result of the deep-seated transformation the US oil industry has undergone and of OPEC’S strategic reaction. This has translated into a substantial reduction in the price of oil. Specifically, this article analyses three key factors behind oil market developments in the past two years: the resilience of US shale oil production, the new turn in OPEC’S strategy to cut output and the slowdown in demand. Further, the medium and long-term outlook for this market is discussed, with the conclusion drawn that a marked rise in prices owing to the foreseeable course of supply and demand is not expected. While some fall-off in supply is contemplated owing to the decline in investment, demand, too, will be contained by greater efficiency in the use of oil-derived fuels and social awareness about their negative externalities.
Introduction

The past three years have seen a radical change in the structure of the oil market, which has culminated in a highly marked decline in crude oil prices. Specifically, from mid-2014 to January 2016 the price of a barrel of Brent fell from $112 to a low of $28 (see Chart 1.1). This decline was the outcome of the increase in output derived from the deep-seated transformation the US oil industry has undergone and of the strategic reaction by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), against a background of high uncertainty over the cyclical position of the global economy and its potential growth (see Chart 1.2). From February 2016 there was a gradual pick-up in the price of crude, which increased further to the agreements reached by OPEC and other producer countries to cut production, whereby a barrel of Brent stood at $57 dollars at end-2016. However, the resilience of US shale oil production, doubts over OPEC’s capacity to influence the market and high levels of stocks have once again exerted downward pressure on prices and, at the cut-off date for this article, a barrel of Brent once again stood at around $50.

At the root of this market transformation is the so-called “shale oil revolution”, which began in the United States around 2010. This revolution arose further to the confluence of a decade of high oil prices and advances in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracking techniques, which initially allowed access to large volumes of gas and, subsequently, of oil, trapped in existing fields but whose extraction was not economically viable using traditional methods. Moreover, the United States has a legal framework that grants sub-soil ownership rights to the owners of the overlying land, it is very easy to access external financing for small and innovative projects and it also has a particular productive infrastructure, consisting of a large number of extraction wells and a dense network of pipelines. The upshot of these developments has been a strong increase in US crude production, which has risen to levels comparable with those of the biggest global producers, Saudi Arabia and Russia (see Chart 1.3). Thus, in the first half of 2017, the United States produced around 5 million barrels per day (mb/d) of shale oil, more than four times the output of this type of oil in 2010 and around half the country's total crude output which, in 2014, returned to levels not reached since 1985. As a result, the United States has shed its net importer status, with the subsequent relief this entails for its foreign trade balance.

Faced with the expansion of output in the United States and the weakness of demand, in summer 2014, OPEC – and more specifically Saudi Arabia – and more specifically Saudi Arabia decided to abandon its

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1 Shale oil refers to oil located in rocks that are not sufficiently porous or permeable as to allow oil to flow using traditional drilling techniques. This crude oil is extracted using hydraulic drilling techniques which, stated simply, involve the pressurised injection of material into the terrain (usually water, along with sand and chemical products) with the aim of expanding the existing fractures in the rocky substrate enclosing the gas or oil, thereby prompting its exit to the surface. The name “shale oil” thus responds to the extraction technique, and not to a specific type of oil, as is for instance the case with bituminous shale.

2 The network of pipelines was designed for the import of crude. With the increase in production came some distribution bottlenecks, favouring refining and the emergence of a significant price differential between WTI crude, a US benchmark, which is non-exportable (although its derivatives are), and Brent. The export prohibition was lifted in December 2015.

3 Saudi Arabia’s role in the crude oil market is pivotal, since it is the biggest exporter country and one of the main global producers, along with Russia and the United States. Moreover, together with Venezuela, it has the biggest oil reserves, which can be extracted at very low marginal costs. The behaviour of Saudi Arabia is key to the functioning of OPEC, to the extent that it is said that Saudi Arabia is OPEC, since other major producers, such as Iraq, Iran and Venezuela, have traditionally not met their quota targets, attempting to produce at their maximum capacity. With production above 10 mb/d, accounting for one-third of the cartel’s oil, Saudi Arabia has the highest surplus capacity, at around 2mb/d. Iran, which is the third-ranked OPEC producer after Iraq, has raised its production by almost 1 mb/d following the lifting of sanctions, drawing its production closer to its all-time high of 3.9 mb/d in 2008.
There was no OPEC agreement during 2016.

Prices per barrel of WTI in 2014 dollars in the four main shale oil production areas. The shock exerts an influence as from July 2016.

Benchmark production cut agreed by OPEC and other producers.
traditional role, which ensured the adjustment of global output to the swings in demand, enabling prices to be held stable at a level deemed appropriate. Thereafter, OPEC began to increase its production, irrespective of the trend in demand and in the rest of the world’s production (see Chart 1.4). This change in strategy sought to generate temporary surplus supply in the market and to lower the oil price level (and to increase its volatility), with the aim of making US shale oil production non-viable, as the latter had a higher extraction cost. Moreover, it would enable Saudi Arabia to maintain – and even increase – its market share and to hamper Iran’s repositioning following the lifting of international sanctions [Nuño (2015)]. The new strategy became explicit at the half-yearly OPEC meeting in December 2015, at which official production quotas were abandoned, this being interpreted as the end of the price-support strategy.

As a result of OPEC’s new strategy to increase production, the decline in prices was perceived as persistent; but the unexpected resilience of US shale oil production, which, far from being substantially cut, benefited from major technological advances that considerably reduced its profitability thresholds, frustrated one of OPEC’s main objectives, namely the expulsion of North American producers from the market. Although the OPEC countries have low extraction costs, the notable worsening of their fiscal position, given that their main source of revenue is oil exports, against the backdrop of social dissatisfaction and geopolitical tensions in the area, meant that they were unable to maintain the new strategy, and Saudi Arabia led the return to a production-accommodation strategy at the end of 2016.4 In parallel, the demand for oil progressively weakened owing to the slowdown and worse outlook for the emerging economies, and to the gains in efficiency in the use of oil derivatives. Moreover, the implications surrounding hydrocarbons in terms of environmental pollution and climate change impacted the prospects of recovery. The supply/demand mismatch has led to the excess supply on the market being persistent, prompting significant growth in stocks (see Chart 1.2).

Against this background, this article analyses, in its second section, oil market developments in the past two years: the resilience of US shale oil production, the new turn in OPEC’s strategy, the slowdown in demand and the impact of stocks at maximum levels. The third section discusses the market outlook for the short, medium and long term, analysing the demand-side factors arising from an increase in efficiency in the use of oil-derived fuels and from social awareness about the negative externalities, and the trend of supply in an environment of declining investment and of discoveries of new fields.

Far from expelling US shale oil producers from the market, the reduction in oil prices from mid-2014 acted as a catalyst for technological innovation and led to a significant increase in productivity. Drilling and production costs fell, additionally assisted by the swift reallocation of resources towards more profitable fields. Hence, shale oil production held at high levels, notwithstanding the abrupt decline in prices. The main productivity gains were in drilling and hydraulic fracking activities, associated with the adoption of pad drilling technology (which enables one platform to drill numerous wells from the same place, without it being necessary to shift machinery), with the increase in the average length of each well, and with the more efficient use of water, sand and chemicals. A study by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors [Decker et al. (2016)] corroborates this notable increase in productivity: specifically, extraction in the first month of operation of a well has

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4 Although some members at the OPEC meetings in the first half of 2016 attempted to reach an agreement to stabilise or cut production, Saudi Arabia refused to accept unless the agreement were binding on Iran, its regional rival.
doubled since 2007 and the rise in production persists throughout its life-cycle. Furthermore, the composition effect derived from the high production of the new wells, which are longer and concentrate the increase in productivity, offsets the declining contribution of existing wells. Accordingly, increasingly less drilling equipment is needed to maintain production (see Chart 1.5).

Market mechanisms have contributed to further reducing production costs by more than 10%, thanks to the fall in wages, in the cost of services associated with extraction and in energy itself, which is the main input in production. Moreover, royalties and taxes, linked to the value of output, are also estimated to have fallen. Nonetheless, some of these elements have a temporary component which the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates at 50% of the total reduction in costs [IEA (2017c)]. Overall, Decker et al. (2016) draw on the quarterly and annual accounts of listed oil companies to estimate that the average weighted variable cost has fallen from $28 to $24 per barrel between 2013 and 2015, although it is rising commensurately with crude oil prices. Another more recent study by the Dallas Federal Reserve (2017), based on producer surveys, estimates that the average variable cost remains in this range despite the pick-up in oil prices since.

With regard to investment, extraction projects will be undertaken if the path of oil prices makes new fields profitable. Estimates of this profitability threshold are highly variable, standing in the range of $25 to $70, and they have also fallen in a sustained fashion. Producers from the Permian basin, the main extraction area, would face a profitability threshold of below $45, which is even below that of conventional fields. In this respect, the partial pick-up in prices, from their 2016 lows, is expected to have contributed to alleviating the financial position of these companies and to accelerating their investment. Indeed, the rise in investment in prospection and production activities, which has grown by 53% in the opening months of 2017 with oil prices around $50-55 per barrel, would confirm the reduction in profitability thresholds.

In any event, shale oil production forecasts are very sensitive to the level of prices, reflecting fairly elastic supply in the medium term. A model developed by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to estimate US shale oil production shows that, while supply is inelastic in the short term, it is fairly elastic after two years [Lasky (2016)]. The implicit sensitivity of the model to an increase in prices of $10 per barrel is for an increase in production of more than 1 mb/d in three years. Indeed, the increase in shale production in 2017 has been greater than forecast by the CBO’s model at current prices, despite the fact that it had already projected a notable increase, reflecting greater elasticity than that estimated (see Chart 1.6).

Bearing in mind all these factors, the US Energy Information Administration (2017) forecasts that total US oil production will increase gradually, after the 2016 slump, and will rise to 9.3 mb/d at end-2017 (a level close to the 2015 peak) and 10 mb/d in 2018, continuing to grow slightly in the following years. Furthermore, these forecasts might fall

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5 A period of six months usually elapses from a well first being drilled until it begins to produce, which explains the lag between the increase in extraction platforms and the related increase in oil production.

6 Estimates of the reduction in costs vary. The International Energy Agency’s report, “World Energy Investment 2017,” indicates that, with the reduction in investment, costs in prospection and production activities fell by 15% in 2015 and by 17% in 2016 globally. The deflation of costs observed in the US shale oil industry was even greater: by around 50% from 2014 to 2016, and with an estimated 16% increase in 2017.

7 The increase in investment is centred on these projects, since they show a limited degree of complexity and short maturity periods, and where financing conditions have improved appreciably, although the legacy of the decline in prices in 2014 may still be a burden for some companies.
short if the policies announced by the Trump administration were to be pursued. Such policies would entail a boost to the energy sector through the construction of pipelines, the lessening of requirements for shale oil operations and the possibility of prospecting in federal jurisdiction zones, which would result in additional cost cuts.

As earlier noted, the low oil prices environment substantially cut the fiscal revenues of the OPEC members, leading them to incur swollen budget deficits. Initially, sales of sovereign wealth fund assets, the reduction in international reserves and the issuance of debt were used to help cushion the adjustment. Nonetheless, currency depreciation, growing financial pressures and, generally, the perception of the unsustainability of the economic situation made fiscal consolidation and the introduction of expenditure-cutting programmes unavoidable (see Chart 1.7). As a result, and given the impossibility of expelling shale oil producers from the market, OPEC decided to resume a strategy of matching output to demand in November 2016 (see Chart 1.8).

Against this background, Saudi Arabia has resumed its supply-stabilising role, but at price levels that are approximately half those prevailing in summer 2014. The economic downturn has obliged its authorities to introduce an aggressive fiscal consolidation programme, involving privatisations, investment cuts and reductions in subsidies and public-sector employees’ wages. However, the success of the plans to modernise the economy and to partially privatise the State-owned oil company Aramco depends, to some extent, on the return to higher oil prices.

The new November 2016 OPEC agreement, which was extended in December to other producer countries, includes the commitment of the group, which represents approximately 50% of global supply, to cut its production by 1.8 mb/d (1.9% of world supply) in the first half of 2017, with the aim of steering the market towards a situation of greater equilibrium between supply and demand. At its meeting on 30 November 2016, 13 OPEC members agreed to set a production target of 32.5 mb/d, signifying a cut of 1.2 mb/d compared with October’s production. Subsequently, on 10 December, other producers led by Russia signed up, with an additional cut of 0.56 mb/d. Six months later, on 25 May 2017, faced with the continuous difficulties in re-balancing the market, the signatories to the agreement decided to extend it for another nine months, up to the end of 2018 Q1, and they signalled their intention of taking additional measures, if necessary. The degree of fulfilment of the agreement has been very high, unlike previous episodes. The IEA (2017b) estimates that the OPEC cuts in the first half of the year enjoyed a compliance rate of 92%, one of the biggest in the cartel’s history (see Chart 1.8). As regards compliance by non-OPEC producers, Russia, which had stated at the time of the agreement that its production cuts would be staggered, had by June already cut 93% of its committed target.

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8 In 2015, the Middle Eastern oil exporting countries saw their budget deficits increase by 8.7 pp of GDP, and around 80% of these deficits were financed with the sale of financial assets, limiting the recourse to debt. With a view to the future, the scale and sustained nature of these deficits will require financing strategies that combine a reduction in assets and the issuance of debt on domestic and foreign markets [IMF (2016) and IMF (2017)].

9 According to the distribution of quotas within OPEC, Saudi Arabia and its Persian Gulf partners assume most of the cuts, while Iran increases its production. Saudi Arabia would contribute with 0.49 mb/d, and the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar with an additional 0.3 mb/d. Iraq ultimately accepts to use the production figures of independent sources and to make a cut of 0.21 mb/d. For Iran, OPEC agreed to use as the benchmark production figure the highest pre-sanctions level, to which a 4.5% reduction was applied, which in practice allows Iran to increase its current production by 90,000 barrels per day. Outside the OPEC cartel, Russia is the main backer of the agreement, with a reduction of 0.3 mb/d that it undertook to deploy fully during the first half of 2017. At 0.1 mb/d, Mexico’s contribution is notable, although it is attributable in large measure to the natural decline in its oilfields.
Despite the high fulfillment of the production-cutting plans, the influence of these cuts on the market has been less than in previous episodes in which similar decisions were taken. Indeed, the production cuts made during the 1998-1999 Asian crisis and the 2008-2009 global financial crisis played a central role in the increase in oil prices. In the latter case, prices rose considerably, anticipating the pick-up in activity. After the OPEC agreement in November, its prices remained practically unchanged in relation to those as of end-November. This shows the difficulties OPEC, and Saudi Arabia in particular, face in boosting prices upwards significantly. The role of the cartel in determining prices appears to have been much weakened, in a setting in which, as indicated, prices are being determined by the economic viability threshold of US shale oil production.

In recent years a loss of momentum in the global demand for oil has been observed, owing essentially to the slowdown in activity in the emerging economies, especially China, and to efficiency gains in the advanced economies (see Chart 2.1). In the emerging economies the demand for crude slowed considerably from 2014 and its growth in 2016 was the lowest for the last seven years. Contributing to this have been China's economic re-balancing policies, which have not only affected its growth (and that of its trading partners) but also the composition thereof, with a shift towards a greater weight of consumption (and services), which are less commodities-intensive, and a lower weight of investment and exports (and manufactures). Moreover, China has embarked on the implementation of policies promoting energy efficiency in the transport sector, given the unhealthy pollution levels in its major cities. The advanced economies, for their part, have witnessed a sustained downtrend in the demand for oil owing to policies geared to improving efficiency in transport and in the industrial sectors. However, the heavy fall in oil prices in 2015 generated an increase in demand, which exceeded the 2010 peak, although demand slowed once more in 2016, with the slight pick-up in prices.

The main factor that has traditionally explained the growth in demand for oil is the dynamism of activity. Fournier et al. (2013) show that non-OECD countries have a greater income elasticity of demand for oil than the OECD members. On average, a 1% increase in real GDP boosts the demand for oil in the medium and long term by 0.5% in the latter countries, while the figure draws close to unity for most non-OECD members. Energy efficiency is the fact that tends most to ease the growth in oil demand. The level of energy efficiency, measured as the amount of production generated per unit of oil, increased by 20% from 2004 to 2015 for the world economy as a whole. The high oil prices prevailing from 2004 to 2014 encourage the adoption of policies to increase efficiency in oil consumption, essentially in transport, which accounts for two-thirds of total demand. Specifically, compulsory standards of efficiency cover approximately 75% of global sales of passenger vehicles. The introduction of these standards had already given rise in 2014 to a global saving of 2.3 mb/d [IEA (2016)]. Currently, Japan has the most demanding standards, which have improved its efficiency by 27% since 2000. Indeed, had other major markets harmonised their standards with those of Japan, the demand for oil would have fallen by an additional 2.5 mb/d in 2015, and if the most demanding efficiency standards for passenger vehicles had been adopted globally, the reduction in oil consumption in 2015 would have amounted to 4.5%. Nonetheless, the recent environment of low oil prices has tended to temper efficiency gains, owing to the greater accessibility of high-fuel-consumption vehicles. With a view to the future, it

10 Other studies, such as Hamilton (2014), Baumeister and Killian (2015) and Badel and McGillicuddy (2015), are less conclusive and point to various impacts of world growth on oil prices.
appears that the drive to attain greater efficiency and transport might focus on trucks, which account for half of the oil consumption in road vehicles and where only 13% of consumption is subject to efficiency standards.

Overall, the continuous downward revisions of global economic growth, along with the improving trend in energy efficiency, have progressively reduced the forecast growth of world demand for oil, contributing to the current price environment.
The situation of excess supply has been reflected in a sustained increase in stocks since mid-2014 (see Charts 1.2 and 2.2). Indeed, OECD and US oil stocks at the beginning of 2017 remained at five-year highs. The new OPEC strategy pursues a reduction in stocks that will enable them to recoup part of their price-controlling capacity, but so far it is not having the desired effect, not even on global production (see Chart 2.3). Moreover, the slope of the futures curve further hampers OPEC’s price-control strategy. In the past two years, futures prices have been higher than spot prices (the upward sloping shape of the futures “contango” curve), which encourages the build-up of stocks [Alquist et al. (2014)], since it causes the return derived from the maintenance of physical stocks to be greater than the associated storage and financial costs.11

The narrative of events draws essentially on supply-side phenomena to explain the decline in prices. However, several analytical papers based on different methodologies12 provide widely differing results. According to the results obtained by the New York Federal Reserve (2017)13, which evaluates price developments weekly (see Chart 2.4), it is estimated that the main determinants of price changes since July 2014 are supply-side factors associated with the rapid US production reaction, which hampers OPEC’s price-boosting strategy. The demand-side factors assumed importance in the downtrend in prices from July 2015 to January 2016, given the doubts over the outlook for the emerging economies, but since then they have tended to boost prices, in line with the enhanced outlook for activity, as tail risks in the global economy – such as the sharp slowdown in the Chinese economy and Brexit – abated.

In the short term, the consensus envisages that the high level of stocks and the economic viability of a large volume of US shale oil will tend to curb any future rise in prices. Forecasts by the IEA (2017b) and OPEC itself suggest that the world oil market is moving to a situation where supply equals demand, as a result of a high degree of compliance with the agreement within OPEC.14 However, the role of the cartel, and in particular that of Saudi Arabia, in boosting prices is very uncertain given the rapid US supply reaction and the structural easing in demand. Moreover, the scant fiscal room in most OPEC members may encourage some producers to deviate from the agreement.

As regards the outlook for prices, compiled by Bloomberg, the main analysts consider that a barrel of Brent will stand below €60 at end-2018. The Brent futures curve includes even smaller price increases, marginally outpacing spot prices, which stand at €55 in contracts.

11 There is also anecdotal evidence that shale oil producers are engaging in forward sales of oil, while OPEC is selling on the spot market. In an environment such as the present, this tactic has benefited agents that have resorted to hedging. Indeed, part of OPEC’s strategy would involve placing the market in a backwardation position (with futures prices lower than spot prices, reflecting the existence of stock maintenance costs), which would be conducive to a reduction in stocks.

12 Indeed, the various methodologies for determining the influence of supply- and demand-side factors obtain different results on numerous occasions — Hamilton (2014), Baumeister and Killian (2015), and Badel and McGillicuddy (2015) — although they generally suggest that most of the decline in prices in the second half of 2014 was due to supply-side factors. Hamilton (2014) sustains that only two-fifths of the fall in oil prices in the second half of 2014 was due to the weakness of global demand. The results obtained by Baffes et al. (2015), using vector autoregressive (VAR) techniques, indicate that supply-side shocks account for double the fall in prices as demand-side shocks. This is in contrast to the findings of Baumeister and Killian (2015) and Badel and McGillicuddy (2015), who suggest a greater weight of demand, likewise using a VAR methodology with other specifications.

13 This model breaks down the changes in oil prices into oil supply and demand shocks, harnessing as an identification strategy the impact that such shocks may be expected to exert on the prices of different financial assets.

14 However, the recent rise in production in Libya and Nigeria and the high US production might delay the attainment of a market in equilibrium until 2018, even if the signatories to the agreement maintain the production targets to which they have committed.
maturing in 2020. The information provided by financial derivatives on oil corroborates the increasingly lesser prospect of an increase in prices, since long net positions, compatible with a rise in price, have been falling off for several months.

In the medium and long run, changes in the demand for oil are key to understanding where the market is heading. The IEA (2017a) forecasts a slowdown in world demand to 2022, with an increase of 1.2 mb/d, approximately 0.3 mb/d less than the increase observed between 2010 and 2016. Gains in efficiency in the OECD economies are expected to reduce the demand for oil, essentially in the transport sector. Indeed, the IEA projects demand to fall in the advanced economies by 1.2 mb/d between 2017 and 2022 (approximately 0.2 mb/d per annum). In the emerging economies, still in the process of converging, demand will increase by 1.5 mb/d until 2021, slowing mildly thereafter. In 2022, the IEA forecasts demand in the emerging economies to exceed that of the OECD by 28%. The influence of the structural changes under way in the Chinese economy, towards the lesser weight of industry and greater weight of services, is central to this scenario.

In the long term, the outlook for the demand for oil is one of decelerated growth, according to most analysts. The IEA (2016) considers that the demand for oil will increase by more than 10% to 2040. The growth of demand is underpinned by the road transport, petrochemicals and aviation sectors. By geographical area, China and India will account for most of the growth, along with the OPEC countries. The increase in the number of vehicles in the emerging economies is expected to more than offset the efficiency gains arising from the renewal of the vehicle stock. However, advances in transport efficiency, the mass adoption of electric vehicles, stricter emission standards and changes towards other sources of fuel might lead to the demand for oil being far lower. Beyond the Paris Agreement, the commitment to check climate change or the concern over pollution in large cities may also lead to a push towards stricter efficiency standards and to the establishment of low-emission areas.

In any event, probably the most notable change in respect of the demand for oil in the long term is the revolution in technology and transport, not only in relation to electric vehicles, but also to the tendency to conceive transport as a service on demand, in driverless vehicles, which is far removed from the traditional norm of individual ownership of petrol-driven vehicles. There is expected to be a shift towards an electric or hybrid car exchange system. A recent IMF paper [Cherif et al. (2017)] analyses the technological revolution in transport, which is replacing combustion-engine vehicles with electric ones and which, consequently, reduces the importance of oil as a main source of energy for

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15 These discrepancies would be due to the reaction by futures to the spot price, which has been highly volatile, and to the lag with which analysts’ forecasts are compiled.

16 The Paris agreement, which will enter fully into force in 2020, targets a reduction in the greenhouse gas emissions that are the cause of global warming. Specifically, one of the main aims is to restrict the increase in the average global temperature to below 2°C compared with pre-industrial levels and to attempt to limit this increase to 1.5°C, which would considerably reduce the risks and the effects of climate change. Each country determines, plans and regularly communicates a contribution. The agreement does not include a mechanism to force through individual measures. To attain the objectives of the agreement, some countries, such as France, are already studying considerable limits on the use of coal for electricity generation and, in the longer term, on combustion engine vehicles.

17 Technological improvements and public policies have led the stock of electric vehicles worldwide to increase significantly in 2015 to 1.3 million units, 78% more than in 2014. The United States, China, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and Scandinavia are currently the main markets. Subsidised purchases, tax exemptions and investment in recharging infrastructures have hitherto encouraged the adoption of the electric vehicle. China also exempts these vehicles from the draws for obtaining licence plates for new cars in its major cities.
transport. If this trend firms, the price-elasticity of the demand for oil would increase, which would tend to exert downward pressure on oil prices, as it would have to compete in the electricity market with other sources of energy, such as coal, natural gas, nuclear energy and renewables. In any event, the scenarios considered in this article do not match those on which there is a consensus, since both the IEA (2016) and BP (2017) consider a much more limited pace of adoption of electric vehicles, such that this type of vehicle would account for less than 10% of the total stock of vehicles in 2040, with development highly dependent on the support of public policies. Nonetheless, the IEA is revising its oil demand forecasts to incorporate the electric vehicle-adoptions policies recently announced by China and India.\(^\text{18}\)

SUPPLY WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE INFLUENCE OF THE LOW-PRICE ENVIRONMENT ON INVESTMENT, TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS AND PROFITABILITY

With regard to medium- and long-term developments in supply, the low-price environment is an expansion-curbing factor as it erodes the profitability of investment projects, which bears on reserves turning economically viable and on the resources discovered. In fact, there has already been an actual reduction in investment by 44% from 2014 to 2016, meaning that there will only be excess production capacity in the United States, Saudi Arabia and Iran [IEA (2017c)]. In 2017 there have been signs of a moderate recovery in investment but, as mentioned, essentially in the US shale oil sector\(^\text{19}\). The decline in investment has already been reflected in in the fact that discoveries of oil resources have fallen to their lowest level in over 70 years, and the volume of resources for which operating authorisation has been granted fell by 30% in 2015 (see Chart 2.5) [IEA (2017c)].

The low-price environment not only affects investments and technological advances in extraction, but also reduces the economic viability of the oil resources recoverable with current technology worldwide. These resources are estimated at 2.2 billion barrels or 73 times current annual production [Rystad Energy (2017)]. Shale oil accounts for 30% of the total, while offshore oil is at 33%. In the United States, shale oil accounts for more than 50% of its recoverable resources, which currently stand at 263 billion barrels. The measures planned by the Trump administration to boost the energy sector, which include lowering environmental standards, would be a spur to exploit these resources in the medium term. However, the outlook for shale oil potential worldwide is uncertain since, despite the fact that the volume of technically recoverable resources is estimated at 660 billion barrels, its economic viability depends on the geological differences in the substrates in which the oil is confined. Further, there is uncertainty over the extent to which the application of shale oil extraction techniques is feasible outside Canada or the United States, not only due to geological differences but also to legal systems less disposed towards sub-soil exploitation and to the environmental risks entailed.

In this respect, to make a significant proportion of global oil resources economically viable, higher oil prices will be needed: it is estimated that 40% of recoverable oil would be profitable with oil prices above $80 per barrel. Chart 2.6 illustrates the profitability thresholds of different extraction techniques. Resources requiring techniques such as deep water or offshore extraction, or even shale oil extraction in certain areas of the United States and abroad, would not be viable at current prices and costs, which would have a bearing on supply in the medium term.

\(^{18}\) China aims for alternative-fuel vehicles to account for at least one-fifth of the 35,000,000 vehicle sales per annum projected to 2025. India is considering even more radical action, which would lead to the electrification of most of the vehicles sold in the country in 2032.

\(^{19}\) The Middle East and Russia have maintained their investment expenditure, and in Mexico it is increasing after the success of the auctions for the operation of its offshore oilfields. It should be noted that for extraction techniques such as those used offshore, there is moreover room for cost cuts, since the renegotiation of long-term contracts remains under way.
The future outlook for oil prices depends on various factors that are difficult to foresee: technological factors, such as changes in the productivity of shale oil producers; geological factors, which determine the commercial viability of oilfields; economic factors, such as the strategic reaction of OPEC producers; developments in investment and demand; and geopolitical factors, associated with the instability and armed conflicts in some producer countries. In the short term, there appear to be no factors conducive to a substantial rise in prices, unless there should be a further cut in production by OPEC and other producers or an increase in geopolitical tensions. The role of the cartel, in general, and that of Saudi Arabia, in particular, in the price-setting mechanism appears to have weakened and, at present, prices are expected to depend to a greater extent on US producer costs. In the medium term, nor is the return to an environment of high oil prices expected, although there are significant factors of uncertainty. On one hand, the decline in investment or an increase in the costs associated with shale oil may reduce economically viable reserves, thereby restricting supply. On the other, and further ahead, demand will be conditioned, among other factors, by the boost to energy efficiency prompted by environmental considerations, which might alter the prominent role of oil as a transport energy source.

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