

# The Distributional Impacts of Real-time Pricing

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Banco de España Annual Conference

June 8, 2022

# The Energy transition is underway

- ▶ Need to reduce Green House Gas emissions (GHGs).
- ▶ Electricity sector ( $\approx 35\text{-}40\%$  of  $\text{CO}_2$  emissions) has been **most active** and has the greatest potential in making the transition.
- ▶ **Carbon-free (or net zero) electricity** by 2035-2050.
  - ▶ Massive deployment of renewable energies.

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  - ▶ Massive deployment of renewable energies.

## A challenge to decarbonizing power:

- ▶ **Renewables' intermittency** might lead to a potential mismatch between supply and demand.
- ▶ Changing the **supply-demand paradigm** in electricity:
  - ▶ Before: Supply follows demand
  - ▶ Now: Can demand follow supply?

## A necessary condition for demand response

### **Dynamic pricing:**

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- ▶ Reduce production costs.
- ▶ Mitigate market power.

## Potential concerns:

- ▶ Little awareness/scope of households for changing their consumption. [▶ Fabra, Rapson, Reguant, Wang](#)
- ▶ Distributional implications
  - ▶ Under time-invariant prices, households who consume at low-priced hours **cross-subsidize** those who consume at high-priced hours: how does this correlate with income?

## **British households face fuel poverty as energy prices skyrocket**


**(Reuters, 16 Feb 2022) Many people in Britain are struggling to weather a cost-of-living crisis, with rising fuel bills putting further strain on household budgets.**

Whenever Sam's hand hovers over the heating control at his home in southern England, he faces a grim dilemma: turn it up and erode his meagre food budget, or turn it down and risk another spell in hospital.

# Equity concerns in countries with high energy poverty

**Spain has seen an increase in energy poverty rates in recent years, with almost 11% of Spaniards unable to keep their home warm in 2020**

Population unable to keep home adequately warm by poverty status, 2010–20



Source: Eurostat

ENERGYMONITOR



# Our paper

- ▶ **Goal:** study the distributional impacts of RTP using hourly electricity consumption data of 2M Spanish households.
  1. Quantify the impacts assuming price-inelastic consumers.
    - Justified by our previous project. [▶ Fabra, Rapson, Reguant, Wang](#)
  2. Assess the relationship of RTP impacts with income.
    - Decompose main **effects** and **channels**.
  3. Consider **counterfactual experiments**.
    - Extreme events; price-elastic households.

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    - Decompose main **effects** and **channels**.
  3. Consider **counterfactual experiments**.
    - Extreme events; price-elastic households.
- ▶ **Challenge:** we do not have detailed income information.
  - ▶ We complement aggregate patterns of distributional effects with a **method to infer individual income** using zip-code income distributions.

## Preview of results

### **Main Finding:**

- ▶ The move towards RTP was slightly regressive, with heating mode and locations as the main drivers.

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## Main Effects:

- ▶ Switch from **annual to monthly prices** is regressive → low-income households tend to consume relatively more during winter when RTP prices are higher.
- ▶ Switch from **monthly to hourly prices** is progressive → low-income households consume relatively less at off-peak hours when RTP prices are lower.

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## Main Effects:

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- ▶ Switch from **monthly to hourly prices** is progressive → low-income households consume relatively less at off-peak hours when RTP prices are lower. **Main Channels:**
- ▶ **Building/heating stock** appears to be the major driver of consumption patterns, which is correlated with income but also differs across locations.

# Overview of today's talk

1. ▶ Related literature
2. Background and data
3. Inferring households' income
4. Quantifying the distributional impacts
5. Channels
  - ▶ Consumption patterns
  - ▶ Appliance ownership
  - ▶ Locations
6. Counterfactuals
  - ▶ Extreme events
  - ▶ Price-elasticity
7. Conclusions

## Dynamic electricity pricing in Spain

- ▶ April 2015: Spain becomes the only country in which RTP is the **default option for all households**.
  - ▶ *The case of Spain with a regulated default dynamic price contract is unique (EC, 2019).*
- ▶ Households can opt out to time-invariant prices.




Figure: Example: electricity prices for Spanish households on 11/01/2017

# Data

- ▶ We obtained smart-meter data for over 2M households, from one large Spanish utility (Naturgy).
- ▶ For each household (January 2016-July 2017), we have:
  - hourly electricity consumption
  - plan characteristics (pricing, contracted power)
  - postal code
- ▶ We link the postal code with detailed Census data:
  - education, income and age distribution, avg number of rooms...



## Data: electricity consumption area




Figure: Locations of households in our data

## A first look at the data: month vs annual variation




Figure: Summary of price variation

## Computing bills under RTP and time-invariant prices

- ▶ We compute the bill change from being at RTP:

$$\Delta \text{Bill} = \text{Bill}_i^{\text{RTP}} - \overline{\text{Bill}}_i$$

where:

- ▶  $\text{Bill}_i^{\text{RTP}}$ : Bill under hourly prices (RTP)
- ▶  $\overline{\text{Bill}}_i$ : Bill under the annual average price (time-invariant)

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  - ▶  $\overline{\text{Bill}}_i$ : Bill under the annual average price (time-invariant)
- ▶ We also separate hourly and monthly cross-subsidization:

“within month” and “across months” effects

$$\Delta \text{Bill} = [\text{Bill}_i^{\text{RTP}} - \overline{\text{Bill}}_i^m] + [\overline{\text{Bill}}_i^m - \overline{\text{Bill}}_i].$$

where:

- ▶  $\overline{\text{Bill}}_i^m$ : Bill under the monthly average prices

## The challenge: inferring households' income

- ▶ We observe the distribution of income at the zip code level.
  - ▶ Assigning the income distribution at the zip code level to all households in that zip code (naïve approach) can miss important within-zip-code heterogeneity.
- ▶ We assign households' income by exploiting richness of hourly consumption data and zip-code level income distributions.

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
## Overview of our two-step approach: [▶ Details](#)

1. Classify consumers into types (*k-cluster*): [▶ Step 1](#)
    - ▶ Households with “representative” consumption patterns.
  2. Infer income distribution of those types based on the distribution of income and types in each zip code. [▶ Step 2](#)
- ▶ **Identifying assumption:** types are shared across zip codes (what changes is the *proportion* of types in each zip-code).

## Our two-step method extracts relevant signal

- ▶ Contracted power tends to be positively correlated with income.
- ▶ Our two-step approach predicts a higher income distribution for households with high contracted power.
- ▶ In contrast, the aggregate zip-code level distribution of income would miss such correlation.

Figure: Estimated income distribution and contracted power



(a) Two-step method

(b) Naïve approach

## Bringing it back to measuring the policy impacts


We use the inferred distribution of income at the household level to assess the distributional impacts of RTP.

- ▶ *What is the impact of RTP across income bins?*
- ▶ *How can it be decomposed?*
- ▶ *What are the main drivers for the effects?*
- ▶ *Does the within-zip-code heterogeneity matter?*



# Heterogeneous impacts by income bins


Figure: Bill changes due to the switch to RTP



- ▶ RTP is slightly regressive - still, the average impact is small.
- ▶ RTP impacts are highly heterogeneous within zip-code because of income heterogeneity.
- ▶ Distributional implications are reversed relative to using zip-code level income.

# Decomposing the impacts


Figure: Decomposition of the bill changes (two-step approach)




- ▶ **Within month** price changes have progressive impacts.
- ▶ However, **across month** price changes have regressive effects.

# The mechanisms behind these patterns


- ▶ We explore different channels in which consumption of electricity can relate to income and other factors.
- ▶ We consider:
  - ▶ Consumption patterns by income.
  - ▶ Appliance ownership, across and by income.
  - ▶ Geographical variation related to weather/appliances.



(a) Share of electric heating owners and AC owners



(b) AC ownership by state




(c) EH ownership by state

Figure: Appliance ownership by income and location

# Mechanisms: consumption patterns during the day


Figure: Hourly consumption during the day




- ▶ Higher income quintiles consume more electricity.
- ▶ They also consume proportionally more at peak hours.
- The within month effect is progressive.

# Mechanisms: appliance ownership

Figure: Bill changes by appliance ownership



(a) Within month effects




(b) Across months effects


- ▶ We infer appliance ownership based on consumption structural breaks to local temperatures.
- ▶ Appliance ownership, key for the within-income heterogeneity.
- ▶ The bigger bill increases are suffered by households with electric heating due to the across months effect.

# Mechanisms: appliance ownership and income impacts

Figure: Consumption curves for households with and w/o electric heating



(a) Hourly consumption




(b) Monthly consumption

- ▶ Households with electric heating consume more during peak hours and winter when prices are higher.
- ▶ Appliance ownership creates bigger differences than income.
- ▶ Conditional on appliance ownership, income still induces substantial differences.

# Mechanisms: geographical heterogeneity

Figure: Geographical heterogeneity and decomposition of the impact



(a) Within month effects

(b) Across months effects


- ▶ Within month effects are similar across income and geography.
- ▶ Seasonal price variation across locations drives the heterogeneous impacts.

## Counterfactual experiments


- ▶ The distributional impacts in our sample are limited and bounded (small price variation).
- ▶ However, patterns could change going forward, with increasing extreme pricing and volatility (as experienced lately).
- ▶ We explore several counterfactuals:
  - Demand elasticity (under different correlations with income).
  - Extreme events (under alternative assumptions on price levels and volatility).



# Commodity risks and energy poverty



(a) Simulated prices




(b) Simulated price volatility


- ▶ We consider simulated prices (with low, medium, high levels and low, medium, high volatility).
- ▶ We re-analyze the distributional implications of RTP.

# Commodity Risks and Energy Poverty

Figure: Distributional implications of RTP under a large price shock



(a) Redistribution




(b) Decomposition


- ▶ Low-income households are relatively worse off under high prices and low volatility.
- ▶ High price levels have more adverse distributional impacts than high price volatility.
- ▶ The across month effects strongly dominate the within month effects.

# Demand elasticity

Figure: Distributional implications of RTP under demand elasticity



(a) Aggregate impact



(b) Within month effect

- ▶ Suppose that elasticity is positively correlated with income.
- ▶ RTP becomes more regressive.
- ▶ The within month effect is no longer progressive as high-income households can now benefit from the within day price variation.

# Conclusions

- ▶ Distributional implications of RTP in Spain (2016-2017).
  - ▶ In this context, RTP was **slightly regressive**.
- ▶ Bill impacts decomposed in:
  - ▶ within month effects (daily price variation).
  - ▶ across months effects (seasonal price variation).
- ▶ Key drivers: **appliance ownership** and **location**.
  - ▶ In Spain, low-income households rely more on electric heating, which exposes them to the high winter prices.

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  - ▶ across months effects (seasonal price variation).
- ▶ Key drivers: **appliance ownership** and **location**.
  - ▶ In Spain, low-income households rely more on electric heating, which exposes them to the high winter prices.
- ▶ **Not a criticism to RTP** - results might be country specific.
- ▶ Rather, we provide a framework to assess its distributional effects so as to design an **equitable RTP system**.
  - ▶ The potential regressive of across months effects can be addressed while **preserving the hourly price signal**.

# Thank you!

*Questions? Comments?*


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# Appendix

## Measuring elasticity to RTP

- ▶ We estimate the short-run price elasticity of households.
- ▶ Main regression (individual by individual):

$$\ln q_{ith} = \beta_i \ln p_{ith} + \phi X_{ith} + \gamma_{ith} + \epsilon_{ith}$$





## Average elasticities by group are close to zero

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	p_iv11	p_iv21	p_iv31	p_lasso
rtp	-0.00513 (0.00238)	-0.00430 (0.00237)	-0.00374 (0.00220)	-0.00468 (0.00217)
Constant	-0.00473 (0.00244)	-0.00883 (0.00252)	-0.0117 (0.00182)	-0.0237 (0.00274)
Observations	14598	14598	14598	14598

Standard errors in parentheses

- ▶ No effect from RTP. [▶ Back](#)

## Related literature

- ▶ Papers on the role of RTP and efficiency:
  - Borenstein (2005) among related papers.
- ▶ Papers on the role of electricity pricing and equity:
  - Borenstein (2007) (industrial), Borenstein (2012) (nonlinear pricing), Borenstein (2013) (critical peak pricing), Faruqui et al. (2010), Horowitz and Lave (2017), Zethmayr and Kolata (2018), Burger et al. (2019).
- ▶ Papers on inferring income:
  - Pissarides and Weber (1989), Feldman and Slemrod (2007), Artavanis, Morse, and Tsoutsoura (2016), Dunbar and Fu (2015), etc.
- ▶ Papers unveiling household heterogeneity:
  - BLP (1995, 2004), Petrin (2002), Fox et al. (2011), Almagro and Dominguez-Lino (2021), Bonhomme, Lamadon, and Manresa (2021).

# Inferring households' income

## Notation and definitions

- ▶ Zip code as  $z \in \{1, \dots, Z\}$ .
- ▶ Income bins as  $inc_k \in \{inc_1, \dots, inc_K\}$ .
- ▶ Households in zip code  $z$  as  $i \in \{1, \dots, H_z\}$ .
  
- ▶ Observed zip-code income distribution:  $Pr_z(inc_k)$ .
- ▶ Unknown household income distribution:  $Pr_i(inc_k)$ .


# Assigning a prob. income distribution to households

We introduce new additional objects:

- ▶ Zip code as  $z \in \{1, \dots, Z\}$ .
- ▶ Income bins as  $inc_k \in \{inc_1, \dots, inc_K\}$ .
- ▶ Households in zip code  $z$  as  $i \in \{1, \dots, H_z\}$ .
- ▶ Discrete types as  $\theta_n \in \{\theta_1, \dots, \theta_N\}$ .
  
- ▶ Observed zip-code income distribution:  $Pr_z(inc_k)$ .
- ▶ Unknown household income distribution:  $Pr_i(inc_k)$ .
- ▶ Unknown household type distribution:  $Pr_i(\theta_n)$
- ▶ Unknown type-income distribution:  $\eta_n^k$  (probability that type  $n$  has income bin  $k$ ).


## Step 1: classify consumers into types

- ▶ We reduce the dimensionality of our data into **market shares** for daily consumption in weekdays and weekends for each individual household.
- ▶ We **group nearby zip codes** and cluster the population of consumers based on these market shares as well as the levels of consumption. Observable types based on contracted power.
- ▶ Our baseline has 5 types per observable types.




## Step 2: Infer income distribution of the types

Zipcode 1



Zipcode 2




$$\eta_A^H Pr_1(\theta_A) + \eta_B^H Pr_1(\theta_B) = Pr_1(\text{inc} = H)$$

$$\eta_A^H Pr_2(\theta_A) + \eta_B^H Pr_2(\theta_B) = Pr_2(\text{inc} = H)$$

- ▶ Assume we have already inferred the distribution of types  $\theta_i$  in each zip code  $z$ ,  $Pr_z(\theta_i)$ , in Step 1.
- ▶  $\eta_A^H$  is the (unknown) probability of income  $H$  for type  $\theta_A$  (similarly for  $\theta_B$ ).
- ▶ Match zip code moments on the distribution of income, assuming same underlying types across (a set of) zip codes.

# Mechanisms: appliance ownership and income impacts

Figure: Consumption curves for households with and w/o electric AC



(a) Hourly consumption

(b) Monthly consumption

- ▶ Households with air conditioning are affected by prices during peak hours and summer.
- ▶ AC ownership creates smaller differences than heating.

▶ back