

# Mirrlees meets Diamond-Mirrlees: Simplifying Nonlinear Income Taxation

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- They also make a serious effort to show how it is useful 'in practice'

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$$U(q; \theta) := \max_{c, \phi} u(c, \phi; \theta) = c - \sum_{i=1}^I \phi_i v(y_i; \theta)$$
$$\text{s.t.} \quad c \leq \sum_i q_i \phi_i + q_0, \quad \sum_i \phi_i = 1.$$

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Suppose we can focus on  $\phi_i \in \{0, 1\}$  (not needed).

$$A_i(q) := \{\theta \mid U(q, \theta) = q_i + q_0 - v(y_i, \theta)\}$$

$$\text{Aggregate Demand : } \mu_i(q) := \mu(A_i(q)) = \int_{A_i(q)} dF(\theta).$$

## General Optimal Tax Program

$$\max_q \sum_{i=1}^I \int_{A_i(q)} W(q_i + q_0 - v(y_i, \theta); \theta) dF(\theta)$$
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- Let the **average Pareto** associated to agents who have positive 'demand' in income  $i$  be:

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- The FOC w.r.t. to  $q_s, s > 0$  reads

$$\mu_s(q) \beta_s(q) = - \sum_{i=1}^I \frac{\partial \mu_i(q)}{\partial q_s} t_i,$$

where  $\beta_s(q) := P(A_s(q)) - 1$  and  $t_i := y_i - q_i$ .

## DM Formula: Lesson 1 (Slutsky symmetry)

Compare our 'naive' formula (FOC)

$$\mu_s(q)\beta_s(q) = - \sum_{i=1}^I \frac{\partial \mu_i(q)}{\partial q_s} t_i,$$

and DM with no wealth effects

$$\mu_s(q)\beta_s(q) = - \sum_{i=1}^I \frac{\partial \mu_s(q)}{\partial q_i} t_i.$$

DM is better since it refers to the same good. And as such it delivers nice interpretations ... With no wealth effects we indeed have:

$$\frac{\partial \mu_s(q)}{\partial q_i} = \frac{\partial \mu_i(q)}{\partial q_s}$$

## DM Formula: Lesson 2 (redefine Pareto weights)

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$$\mu_s(q) \hat{\beta}_s(q) = - \sum_{i=1}^I \frac{\partial \mu_s^c(q)}{\partial q_i} t_i.$$

where

$$\hat{\beta}_s(q) = \beta_s(q) + \sum_{i=1}^I \frac{\mu_i^c(q)}{\partial q_0} t_i$$

because

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And FOC w.r.t.  $q_0$  delivers (if no wealth effects always true)

$$\sum_s \mu_s(q) \hat{\beta}_s(q) = 0.$$

# What is special to Mirrlees framework?

1. As in our model, there is a fixed supply of workers

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  - This amounts to increase jointly  $q_i, q_{i+1}, \dots, q_I$  (well known)
  - Equivalently, the set  $\cup_{s=1}^I A_i$  has only one border: with  $A_{i-1}$

## Redefining goods instead of re-arranging FOCs

- The authors show that if we re-define goods as the bundles  $(y_i, y_{i+1}, \dots, y_I)$  then the associated tax is  $t_i - t_{i-1}$  (integrations by parts), and there are no cross-price effects, i.e. DM delivers directly Mirrlees formula:

$$\begin{aligned}(t_i - t_{i-1}) \frac{\partial \mu_i^c(q)}{\partial q_i} &= \sum_{s=i}^I \mu_s(q) \hat{\beta}_s(q), \\ \Leftrightarrow \frac{t_i - t_{i-1}}{q_i - q_{i-1}} &= \frac{1}{\varepsilon_i^c(q)} \frac{1}{\mu_i(q)} \sum_{s=i}^I \mu_s(q) \hat{\beta}_s(q), \\ \Leftrightarrow \frac{\tau_{i,i-1}}{1 - \tau_{i,i-1}} &= \frac{1}{\varepsilon_i^c(q)} \frac{1}{\mu_i(q)} \sum_{s=i}^I \mu_s(q) \hat{\beta}_s(q),\end{aligned}$$

where  $\tau_{i,i-1} := \frac{t_i - t_{i-1}}{y_i - y_{i-1}}$  and  $\varepsilon_i^c(q) := \frac{\partial \mu_i^c(q)}{\partial (q_i - q_{i-1})} \frac{q_i - q_{i-1}}{\mu_i(q)}$

# Lessons

- 1 What matters are aggregate demands.
- 2 Cross-price effects can be seen as 'active borders' (or relevant IC constraints)
- 3 Slutsky symmetry holds for 'compensated demands' (at the aggregate), this suggests a redefinition of Pareto weights (DM suggest a way to deal with income effects)
- 4 M has two main peculiarities: a. specific structure of cross-price effects; b. fixed supply of workers
- 5 The authors' reading of DM recall us that with a proper redefintion of the 'good' any perturbation can become another perturbation

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- Q2: Other cases where the usual formula fails while DM holds?
- Q3: Other theoretical insights?
- Q4: Advantages of the continuum of goods?
- Q5: Do we really have to focus on the no-bunching case?