

# Goods and Factor Market Integration: A Quantitative Assessment of the EU Enlargement

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
<sup>1</sup>The analysis, opinions, and findings represent the views of the authors, they are not necessarily those of Banco de Portugal.

# Introduction

- ▶ The aggregate and distributional consequences of economic integration are a central theme in economics
  - ▶ Considerable advances on the quantification and understanding of the gains from economic integration
  - ▶ Most of the focus has been on goods market
- ▶ Develop a dynamic GE model for trade and migration policy
- ▶ Use the EU 2004 enlargement to study the gains from trade and migration

## EU 2004 enlargement

- ▶ Agreement between member states of the European Union (EU) and New Member States (NMS)
- ▶ Trade policy and migration policy shocks




Note: EU-15 member states in blue, NMS countries in yellow

# Trade policy shock

- ▶ Integration in the goods market: zero tariffs starting in 2004
- ▶ NMS countries resigned to previous FTA and joined EU FTA's

**Figure:** Tariff rates between EU-15 and NMS, and within NMS, 2002-2007



# Migration policy shock

- ▶ Different from trade policy: the associated change in migration costs is not directly measurable
- ▶ Reduced form regression shows a positive impact of the EU enlargement on the stocks of migrants ▶ Figure
- ▶ Diff-in-diff approach, consistent with our model, identifies the change in migration costs due to the enlargement by exploiting the timing variation in the enlargement
  - ▶ UK granted access to NMS nationals in 2004, IT/ES/PT/GR in 2006
  - ▶ AT/BE/DK/DE/FR in 2008 or 2011

# Approach

- ▶ Structural dynamic model of trade and migration
  - ▶ Dynamic model: welfare includes the option value of migration
  - ▶ Large degree of heterogeneity: skills, nationalities, trade & migration costs, agglomeration & congestion forces, infrastructures
  - ▶ Key focus: interaction between trade and migration policy
- ▶ Measure the changes in trade and migration costs
- ▶ Counterfactuals: quantify the migration and welfare effects of the EU enlargement
- ▶ Main findings:
  - ▶ Gradual response in migration
  - ▶ Largest winners: New Member States (NMS) unskilled workers
  - ▶ Interaction between trade and migration quantitatively matters
  - ▶ Without trade policy changes the EU-15 would have been worse off

# Literature

- ▶ **Static models of trade and migration:** Davis and Weinstein (2002), di Giovanni et al. (2015), Burstein et al. (2017)
- ▶ **Quantitative trade policy analysis:** Caliendo and Parro (2015) and Ossa (2016)
- ▶ **Labor reallocation and spatial distribution of economic activity:** Redding (2016), Caliendo, Parro, Rossi-Hansberg, and Sarte (2017), Tombe and Zhu (2015)
  - ▶ **Trade and labor market dynamics:** Artuc et al. (2010); Dix-Carneiro (2014); Dix Carneiro and Kovak (2017), Caliendo, Dvorkin, Parro (2017)
- ▶ **Studies on the effect of immigration on wages and employment of natives:** Hanson and Slaughter (2002), Hanson and Slaughter (2016); Ottaviano and Peri (2012); Ottaviano et al. (2013) and many more
- ▶ **Studies on the EU enlargement** Baldwin (1995), Baldwin et al. (1997), Dustmann and Frattini (2011), and Kennan (2017)

# Quantitative Trade and Migration Model



# Household's problem - Dynamic migration decision

- ▶ Value of a  $n$  **national** of skill  $s$  in country  $i$  at time  $t$

$$v_{n,s,t}^i = \log(C_{s,t}^i) + \max_{\{j\}_{j=1}^N} \{ \beta E[v_{n,s,t+1}^j] - m_{n,s,t}^{ij} + \nu \epsilon_{n,s,t}^j \}$$

- ▶ migration costs  $m_{n,s,t}^{ij} = \tilde{m}_{n,s,t}^{ij} + mpol_{n,s,t}^{ij}$
- ▶ i.i.d Gumbel preference shocks  $\epsilon_{n,s,t}^j$ ;  $\nu > 0$  is the migration cost elasticity

- ▶ Migration share from  $i$  to  $j$

$$\mu_{n,s,t}^{ij} = \frac{\exp(\beta V_{n,s,t+1}^j - m_{n,s,t}^{ij})^{1/\nu}}{\sum_{k=1}^N \exp(\beta V_{n,s,t+1}^k - m_{n,s,t}^{ik})^{1/\nu}}$$

- ▶ Labor allocations

$$L_{n,s,t+1}^i = \sum_{j=1}^N \mu_{n,s,t}^{ij} L_{n,s,t}^j, \quad \text{for all } n, s$$

# Static production problem

- ▶ Perfect competition, CRS technology, idiosyncratic productivity  $z^i \sim \text{Fréchet}(1, \theta)$ , deterministic TFP  $A_t^i$  (Eaton and Kortum 2002)

$$q_t^i(z^i) = z^i A_t^i \left[ (\delta^i)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} (L_{h,t}^i)^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} + (1 - \delta^i)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} (L_{l,t}^i)^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} \right]^{\frac{\rho(1-\gamma^i)}{\rho-1}} (H^i)^{\gamma^i}$$

- ▶  $A_t^i = \phi_t^i L_t^i \Rightarrow$  scale effects,  $H^i$  fixed factor  $\Rightarrow$  congestion effect
- ▶ Costly trade  $\kappa_t^{ij} = (1 + \tau_t^{ij}) d_t^{ij}$ 
  - ▶ Ad-valorem tariffs  $\tau_t^{ij} \geq 0$ , with  $\tau_t^{ii} = 0$
  - ▶ Iceberg trade costs  $d_t^{ij} \geq 1$ , with  $d_t^{ii} = 1$

## Closure of the model



**Do not even think of clicking in case of 25 minutes presentations**

## Data and Estimation

## Data and Estimation

- ▶ From the European labour force survey (EU-LFS) confidential micro data...
- ▶ ...build a **new dataset** of bilateral gross flows by nationality & skill over 2002-2007 (soon till 2016)
  - ▶ EU15: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, UK, Greece, Italy, Portugal
  - ▶ NMS: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland
- ▶ Construct migration flows based on info. on past year residence
  - ▶ Distinguish between “EU15”, “NMS” and “Other” nationals
  - ▶ Define skilled workers as college educated, and unskilled labor as those with high school or less

## Example: change in migration costs from NMS to U.K.

- ▶ Treated flows: *NMS nationals* from NMS to UK
- ▶ Control flows: *NMS nationals* from NMS to EU5, EU5 to UK
  - ▶ EU5: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, and Germany, countries that did not open before 2008
- ▶ **Difference-in-difference** approach, guided by the model

$$\log \frac{\mu_{n,s,t}^{ij}}{\mu_{n,s,t}^{ii}} = -\frac{1}{\nu} \left( m_{n,s,t}^{ij} - m_{n,s,t}^{ii} \right) + \frac{\beta}{\nu} V_{n,s,t+1}^j - \frac{\beta}{\nu} V_{n,s,t+1}^i$$

# Estimation- Changes in migration policy/cost

- ▶ Migration costs structure ( $i \in NMS$ ):

$$m_{n,s,t}^{ij} = \tilde{m}_{n,s,t}^{ij} + mpol_{n,s,t}^{ij}$$

where

$$\tilde{m}_{n,s,t}^{ij} = \bar{m}_{n,s,t}^i + \bar{m}_{n,s,t}^j + \bar{m}_{n,s,t}^{ij}$$

- ▶ Estimating equation

$$\log \frac{\mu_{n,s,t}^{ij}}{\mu_{n,s,t}^{ii}} = \underbrace{-\frac{1}{\nu} \bar{m}_{n,s,t}^i - \frac{\beta}{\nu} V_{n,s,t+1}^i}_{\text{origin-time-nationality-skill FE}} \quad \underbrace{-\frac{1}{\nu} \bar{m}_{n,s,t}^j + \frac{\beta}{\nu} V_{n,s,t+1}^j}_{\text{dest-time-nationality-skill FE}} \\ - \underbrace{\frac{1}{\nu} mpol_{n,s,t}^{ij}}_{\text{dummy UK-NMS before-after}} \quad - \underbrace{\frac{1}{\nu} \bar{m}_{n,s,t}^{ij}}_{\text{dummy U.K.-NMS}} \quad + \underbrace{\epsilon_{n,s,t}^{ij}}_{\text{error term}}$$

- ▶ Levels of migration costs depends on nationality and skills
- ▶ Placebo: We expect the costs of migrating from NMS to the U.K not to have changed for EU-15 nationals

# Counterfactuals




# Counterfactuals

- ▶ What are the migration and welfare effects of the EU enlargement?
  - ▶ Baseline (EU enlargement) vs. counterfactual (no change in tariffs and migration costs) economies
- ▶ Two attractive properties:
  1. Given data  $\{L_t, \mu_t, \pi_t, X_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ , elasticities  $(\nu, \theta, \beta, \rho)$ , and a sequence of counterfactual changes in policy  $\{\hat{Y}_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ , **solving the model does not require to identify the evolution of the fundamentals**
  2. The baseline economy **matches exactly the observed sequence of gross migration flows, trade flows, and all the observed labor market allocations and wages**

▶ To: Equilibrium in "hats"

# Migration effects

Figure: Stocks of NMS nationals in EU-15 due to the enlargement



- ▶ Gradual increase in stocks
  - ▶ Stock of NMS nationals in EU-15 increases by 3 percentage points (pp) in 3 years, 21pp in 10 years, and 63pp in SS

## Migration effects

- ▶ EU enlargement primarily increases the migration of unskilled NMS workers to EU-15, and to a much lesser extent the migration of skilled workers
  - ▶ Stock of NMS unskilled increases 0.75pp (2.8 mill) in SS
  - ▶ Stock of NMS skilled increases 0.14pp (521 thous) in SS
- ▶ We find that trade policy helps mitigate congestion effects by reducing migration
  - ▶ About 300 thousand more migrants in SS in the absence of trade policy

▶ skills

# Welfare effects from trade and migration policy

- ▶ The largest winners are the NMS countries, in particular unskilled workers
- ▶ Migration without changes to trade policy would have resulted in welfare losses for EU15

		EU enlargement (%)	Only changes to trade policy (%)	Only changes to migration policy (%)
EU-15	<i>High skill</i>	0.503	0.439	0.060
	<i>Low skill</i>	0.386	0.442	-0.055
	<i>Aggregate</i>	0.409	0.441	-0.032
NMS	<i>High skill</i>	1.191	1.098	0.090
	<i>Low skill</i>	1.715	1.073	0.615
	<i>Aggregate</i>	1.653	1.076	0.554
	Europe	0.622	0.550	0.068

# Welfare effects from migration policy

- Welfare effect of migration policy depends on trade openness

		Changes to migration policy (%)	Changes to migration policy under trade autarky (%)	Changes to migration policy under free trade (%)
EU-15	<i>High skill</i>	0.060	0.071	0.058
	<i>Low skill</i>	-0.055	-0.049	-0.056
	<i>Aggregate</i>	-0.032	-0.025	-0.033
NMS	<i>High skill</i>	0.090	0.043	0.098
	<i>Low skill</i>	0.615	0.563	0.625
	<i>Aggregate</i>	0.554	0.502	0.563
	Europe	0.068	0.065	0.068

# Mechanisms & Extensions

- ▶ Role of scale effect, trade, and fixed factors
    - ▶ **Without scale effects:**
      - ▶ NMS welfare 0.3pp larger,
      - ▶ EU-15 welfare 0.06pp smaller
    - ▶ **Textbook model: without trade, scale, and congestion effects** → significantly different welfare evaluation of migration policy
      - ▶ Europe's welfare 0.06% instead of 0.62%
      - ▶ EU-15 countries has welfare losses
      - ▶ NMS welfare 0.4% instead of 1.65%
- ▶ results
- ▶ Role of congestion effects coming from the provision of public goods

# Conclusion

- ▶ Develop a dynamic model for trade and migration policy analysis
  - ▶ take into account role of tariff revenues, public goods, congestion effects, changes in migration costs, stock v/s flow of migrants
  - ▶ model guides the estimation of changes in migration costs as a consequence of changes in migration policy
- ▶ Compute the effects of actual changes in trade and migration policy as a consequence of the EU enlargement of 2004
  - ▶ results show welfare gains, heterogeneous across skill groups
  - ▶ unskilled NMS nationals are the largest winners
  - ▶ gradual employment adjustment
  - ▶ trade policy crucial for mitigating negative effects from congestion

Thank you!



# Household's problem

- ▶ Households supply a unit of labor inelastically
  - ▶ Receive a competitive market wage  $w_{s,t}^i$
- ▶ Consumption aggregator

$$C_{s,t}^i = \left( \frac{G^i}{L_t^i} \right)^{\alpha_i} \left( (1 - \tau_L^i) \frac{w_{s,t}^i}{P_t^i} \right)^{1-\alpha_i},$$

where  $P_t^i$  is the local price index, and  $\alpha_i$  is the fraction of public goods in total consumption

- ▶  $\frac{G^i}{L_t^i}$  is per capita provision of public goods => **congestion effect**
- ▶ Government finance spending with: tariff revenues, labor taxes ( $\tau_L^i$ ), lump sum transfer from structure owners

# All the rest

- ▶ Goods & labor market clearing (matching global imbalances)
- ▶ State of the economy  $L_t = \left\{ L_{n,h,t}^i, L_{n,l,t}^i \right\}_{n=1,i=1}^{N,N}$
- ▶ Fundamentals  $\Theta_t \equiv (\{d_t^{ij}\}, \{\tilde{m}_{n,h,t}^{ij}\}, \{\tilde{m}_{n,l,t}^{ij}\}, \{\phi_t^i\}, \{H^i\})_{i=1,j=1}^{N,N}$
- ▶ Policies  $\Upsilon_t \equiv (\{\tau_t^{ij}\}, \{mpol_{n,h,t}^{ij}\}, \{mpol_{n,l,t}^{ij}\})_{n=1,i=1,j=1}^{N,N,N}$
- ▶ Given  $(L_t, \Theta_t, \Upsilon_t)$ , the **temporary equilibrium** is a set of factor prices  $\{\omega_{s,t}^i(L_t, \Theta_t, \Upsilon_t)\}_{i=1}^N$  for  $s = \{h, l\}$  that solves the static sub-problem given by the equilibrium conditions
- ▶ Given an initial allocation of labor  $L_0$ , a sequence of fundamentals  $\{\Theta_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$ , and a sequence of policies  $\{\Upsilon_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$ , a **sequential competitive equilibrium** is a sequence  $\{L_{n,s,t}, \mu_{n,s,t}, V_{n,s,t}, \omega_{s,t}^i(L_t, \Theta_t, \Upsilon_t)\}_{n=1,t=0}^{N,\infty}$  for  $s = \{h, l\}$ , that solves the HH dynamic problem and the temporary equilibrium at each

## Solving for counterfactuals

**Proposition** Given data  $\{L_t, \mu_t, \pi_t, X_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ , elasticities  $(\nu, \theta, \beta, \rho)$ , and a sequence of counterfactual changes in policy  $\{\hat{Y}_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ , solving the model does not require  $\{\Theta_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ , and solves

$$\hat{u}_{n,s,t}^i = \hat{C}_{s,t}^i \left( \sum_{j=1}^N \mu'_{n,s,t-1}{}^{ij} \dot{\mu}_{n,s,t}{}^{ij} \left( \hat{m}_{n,s,t}^{ij} \right)^{-1/\nu} \left( \hat{u}_{n,s,t+1}^j \right)^{\beta/\nu} \right)^{\nu},$$

$$\mu'_{n,s,t}{}^{ij} = \frac{\mu'_{n,s,t-1}{}^{ij} \dot{\mu}_{n,s,t}{}^{ij} \left( \hat{m}_{n,s,t}^{ij} \right)^{-1/\nu} \left( \hat{u}_{n,s,t+1}^j \right)^{\beta/\nu}}{\sum_{k=1}^N \mu'_{n,s,t-1}{}^{ik} \dot{\mu}_{n,s,t}{}^{ik} \left( \hat{m}_{n,s,t}^{ik} \right)^{-1/\nu} \left( \hat{u}_{n,s,t+1}^k \right)^{\beta/\nu}},$$

$$L'_{n,s,t+1}{}^i = \sum_{j=1}^N \mu'_{n,s,t}{}^{ji} L'_{n,s,t}{}^j,$$

for all  $n$ , and  $s$ , where  $\dot{\mu}_{n,s,t}{}^{ij}$  is the observed (data) change in migration flows over time, and  $\hat{C}_{s,t}^i = \hat{\omega}_{s,t}^i(\hat{L}_t, \hat{Y}_t)$  is obtained from solving the temporary equilibrium conditions.

# Equilibrium in “hats”

- ▶ Transition matrix (migration flows)  $\{\mu_t^{ij}\}_{t=0}^T$ , **Data**

$$\mu_{n,s,t}^{ij} = \frac{\exp(\beta V_{n,s,t+1}^j - m_{n,s,t}^{ij})^{1/\nu}}{\sum_{k=1}^N \exp(\beta V_{n,s,t+1}^k - m_{n,s,t}^{ik})^{1/\nu}}$$

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- ▶ Transition matrix at  $t$ , from Model given counterfactual policy  $m'_t$

$$\mu'_{n,s,t}{}^{ij} = \frac{\exp(\beta V_{n,s,t+1}^j - m'_{n,s,t}{}^{ij})^{1/\nu}}{\sum_{k=1}^N \exp(\beta V_{n,s,t+1}^k - m'_{n,s,t}{}^{ik})^{1/\nu}}$$

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- ▶ Transition matrix at  $t$ , from Model given counterfactual policy  $m'_t$

$$\mu'_{n,s,t}{}^{ij} = \frac{\exp(\beta V'_{n,s,t+1}{}^j - m'_{n,s,t}{}^{ij})^{1/\nu}}{\sum_{k=1}^N \exp(\beta V'_{n,s,t+1}{}^k - m'_{n,s,t}{}^{ik})^{1/\nu}}$$

- ▶ Take the differences at each  $t$ . Model relative to data

$$\mu'_{n,s,t}{}^{ij} = \frac{\mu_{n,s,t}^{ij} \exp(V'_{n,s,t+1}{}^j - V_{n,s,t+1}^j)^{\beta/\nu} \exp(m'_{n,s,t+1}{}^j - m_{n,s,t+1}^j)^{-1/\nu}}{\sum_{k=1}^N \mu_{n,s,t}^{ik} \exp(V'_{n,s,t+1}{}^k - V_{n,s,t+1}^k)^{\beta/\nu} \exp(m'_{n,s,t+1}{}^k - m_{n,s,t+1}^k)^{-1/\nu}}$$

# Equilibrium in “hats”

- ▶ Denote by:

$$\hat{u}_{n,s,t}^i = \dot{u}_{n,s,t}^i / \dot{u}_{n,s,t}^i = \frac{\exp(V_{n,s,t+1}^{i'} - V_{n,s,t+1}^i)}{\exp(V_{n,s,t}^{i'} - V_{n,s,t}^i)}$$

$$\hat{m}_{n,s,t}^{ij} = \exp(m_{n,s,t}^{\prime ij} - m_{n,s,t}^{ij}) / \exp(m_{n,s,t-1}^{\prime ij} - m_{n,s,t-1}^{ij})$$

$$\dot{\mu}_{n,s,t}^{ij} = \mu_{n,s,t}^{ij} / \mu_{n,s,t-1}^{ij}$$

- ▶ and generically

$$\hat{\Theta}_t = \hat{\Theta}_t' / \dot{\Theta}_t$$

- ▶ Take the relative time difference to obtain

$$\mu_{n,s,t}^{\prime ij} = \frac{\mu_{n,s,t-1}^{\prime ij} \dot{\mu}_{n,s,t}^{ij} \left( \hat{m}_{n,s,t}^{ij} \right)^{-1/\nu} \left( \hat{u}_{n,s,t+1}^j \right)^{\beta/\nu}}{\sum_{k=1}^N \mu_{n,s,t-1}^{\prime ik} \dot{\mu}_{n,s,t}^{ik} \left( \hat{m}_{n,s,t}^{ik} \right)^{-1/\nu} \left( \hat{u}_{n,s,t+1}^k \right)^{\beta/\nu}}$$

# Equilibrium in “hats”

- ▶ Analogously, trade shares

$$\dot{\pi}_t^{ij} = \dot{A}_t^j \left( \frac{\dot{\kappa}_t^{ij} \dot{\omega}_t^j}{\dot{P}_t^i} \right)^{-\theta}$$

$$\dot{\pi}'_t{}^{ij} = \dot{A}_t^j \left( \frac{\dot{\kappa}_t^{ij} \dot{\omega}'_t{}^j}{\dot{P}'_t{}^i} \right)^{-\theta}$$

$$\hat{\pi}_t^{ij} = \left( \frac{\hat{\omega}_t^j}{\hat{P}_t^i} \right)^{-\theta}$$

- ▶ where

$$\hat{P}_t^i = \left( \sum_{j=1}^N \pi'_{t-1}{}^{ij} \dot{\pi}_t^{ij} (\hat{\omega}_t^j)^{-\theta} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\theta}}$$



# Employment effects

	<i>High skill (%)</i>		<i>High skill (thous.)</i>	
	$\Delta$ EU enlargement	w/o trade policy	$\Delta$ EU enlargement	w/o trade policy
2002	0	0	0	0
2007	0.014	0.019	53.2	69.4
2015	0.058	0.066	217.8	247.3
Steady state	0.140	0.174	521.1	650.3

	<i>Low skill (%)</i>		<i>Low skill (thous.)</i>	
	$\Delta$ EU enlargement	w/o trade policy	$\Delta$ EU enlargement	w/o trade policy
2002	0	0	0	0
2007	0.066	0.070	245.6	261.7
2015	0.299	0.309	1,115	1,152
Steady state	0.745	0.784	2,780	2,925


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# Solving the model

- ▶ Solving for the model requires information on the whole set of fundamentals and economic policies
  - ▶ Levels of migration costs, trade costs, productivities, stock of public goods, stock of infrastructure
- ▶ We solve this problem by the Dynamic Hat Algebra method developed in CDP
- ▶ Why is this progress?
  - ▶ We can solve the model without knowing levels of  $\Theta_t$  and  $\Upsilon_t$



# Stock of NMS nationals in EU-15



- ▶ Reduced form regression shows a positive impact of the EU enlargement on the stocks of migrants
  - ▶ Controlling by country and time effects

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# Estimation- Changes in migration policy/cost

- ▶ **Change in migration costs from NMS to NMS**
- ▶ We use a Head-Ries index due to the lack of control groups

$$\log \frac{\mu_{t,n}^{ij} \mu_{t,n}^{ji}}{\mu_{t,n}^{ii} \mu_{t,n}^{jj}} = -\frac{1}{\nu} \left( m_{t,n}^{ij} + m_{t,n}^{ji} \right)$$

- ▶ We assume symmetry for costs from NMS to NMS
- ▶ [▶ Back](#)

## Measuring changes in migration costs

- ▶ For migration costs from NMS to NMS, and EU nationals to NMS, we use a Head-Ries index due to the lack of control groups

$$\log \frac{\mu_{n,s,t}^{ij} \mu_{n,s,t}^{ji}}{\mu_{n,s,t}^{ii} \mu_{n,s,t}^{jj}} = -\frac{1}{\nu} \left( m_{n,s,t}^{ij} + m_{n,s,t}^{ji} \right)$$

- ▶ we assume symmetry for costs from NMS to NMS
- ▶ we assume no change in migration cost from NMS to EU for EU nationals

▶ Back

# Migration effects

	<i>High skill (%)</i>		<i>High skill (thous.)</i>	
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## Extension: Provision of public goods

- ▶ We extend our model to account for additional congestion effects coming from the provision of public goods

$$C_{s,t}^i = \left( \frac{G^i}{L_t^i} \right)^{\alpha_i} \left( (1 - \tau_L^i) \frac{w_{s,t}^i}{P_t^i} \right)^{1-\alpha_i}$$

- ▶ Government finance spending with: tariff revenues, labor taxes ( $\tau_{L,t}^i$ ), lump sum transfer from structure owners
  - ▶ We re-estimate  $\nu$  in a model with public goods ( $\nu = 1.89$ )
  - ▶ We calibrate  $\alpha_i$  using final government consumption over total final consumption by country from the WIOD



## Extension: Provision of public goods

- ▶ We find somewhat larger welfare effects for NMS, lower for EU-15, smaller migration effects
  - ▶ In the long run, the stock of NMS skilled workers in EU-15 countries increases by 375.5 thousands (instead of 521 thousands)
  - ▶ The stock of NMS unskilled workers increases by 2.2 million (instead of 2.8 mm)
  - ▶ Aggregate NMS welfare increases 1.59% (instead of 1.65%), while EU-15 welfare increases 0.26% (instead of 0.41%).

▶ back

## Additional results

		EU enlargement	No scale effects	Autarky, no congestion and scale effects
EU-15	<i>High skill</i>	0.503	0.416	0.090
	<i>Low skill</i>	0.386	0.331	-0.042
	<i>Aggregate</i>	0.409	0.348	-0.016
NMS	<i>High skill</i>	1.191	1.478	-0.003
	<i>Low skill</i>	1.715	2.020	0.465
	<i>Aggregate</i>	1.653	1.957	0.410
Europe		0.622	0.623	0.057

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# Estimation- Changes in migration policy/cost

Estimates of  $-\frac{1}{\nu} \left( m_{n,s,post}^{ij} - m_{n,s,pre}^{ij} \right)$  for NMS8 and EU nationals

		NMS nationals				
Destination $j \rightarrow$	<i>U.K. (2004)</i>	<i>GR (2006)</i>	<i>IT (2006)</i>	<i>ES (2006)</i>	<i>PT (2006)</i>	
$\beta_{n,post}^j$	3.52*** (1.11)	2.29** (0.83)	1.01* (0.55)	0.18 (0.54)	1.01*** (0.49)	
$R^2$	0.96	0.97	0.98	0.97	0.98	
Obs.	564	564	564	564	564	

Standard errors in parenthesis. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.10$ .

# Estimation- Changes in migration policy/cost

Estimates of  $-\frac{1}{\nu} \left( m_{n,s,post}^{ij} - m_{n,s,pre}^{ij} \right)$  for NMS8 and EU nationals

		NMS nationals				
Destination $j \rightarrow$	U.K. (2004)	GR (2006)	IT (2006)	ES (2006)	PT (2006)	
$\beta_{n,post}^j$	3.52*** (1.11)	2.29** (0.83)	1.01* (0.55)	0.18 (0.54)	1.01*** (0.49)	
$R^2$	0.96	0.97	0.98	0.97	0.98	
Obs.	564	564	564	564	564	
		Placebo: EU nationals				
Destination $j \rightarrow$	U.K. (2004)	GR (2006)	IT (2006)	ES (2006)	PT (2006)	
$\beta_{n,post}^j$	0.74 (1.40)	-0.08 (1.52)	-0.02 (1.35)	0.46 (1.34)	-1.22 (1.45)	
$R^2$	0.88	0.90	0.89	0.90	0.90	
Obs.	564	564	564	564	564	

Standard errors in parenthesis. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.10$ .

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## Migration costs

- ▶ Migration costs have policy and non-policy components

$$m_{n,s,t}^{ij} = \tilde{m}_{n,s,t}^{ij} + mpol_{n,s,t}^{ij}$$

- ▶ To fix ideas, let us describe the cost of migrating from NMS countries to the U.K. ( $i = NMS, j = UK$ )

$$\tilde{m}_{n,s,t}^{iUK} = \bar{m}_{n,s,t}^i + \bar{m}_{n,s,t}^{UK} + \bar{m}_{n,s,t}^{iUK}$$

$$mpol_{n,s,t}^{i,UK} = mpol_{NMS,t}^{NMS,UK}$$

- ▶ Migration policy is non-discriminatory across NMS countries and across skills
- ▶ Levels of migration costs depends on nationality and skills