GLOBAL IMBALANCES FROM A STOCK PERSPECTIVE


Enrique Alberola (BIS), Ángel Estrada and Francesca Viani (BdE) (*)

(*) The views expressed here do not necessarily coincide with those of Banco de España, the BIS or the Eurosystem

ADG INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS


GLOBAL DISEQUILIBRIA: FLOW VS STOCK IMBALANCES


- **Expansion** of **global imbalances** in first half of 2000s was linked to outburst of Global Financial Crisis. Eight years later, has **increasing trend** in **imbalances** been corrected?
- Global imbalances are traditionally characterized as divergences in the current account flows of surplus & deficit countries ("current account" or "flow" imbalances)
 - When the GFC exploded, an important correction in flow imbalances was observed, adjustment that was generally interpreted as a sign of sustainability of the recovery



GLOBAL DISEQUILIBRIA: FLOW VS STOCK IMBALANCES

- **Expansion** of **global imbalances** in first half of 2000s was linked to outburst of Global Financial Crisis. Eight years later, has **increasing trend** in **imbalances** been corrected?
- Still, global imbalances can also characterized from a stock perspective, as divergences in net foreign asset position of creditor & debtor countries ("stock" imbalances)
 - ➤ Under this metric, the correction in global disequilibria observed after the crisis was only a **transitory** phenomenon, as afterwards **stock imbalances** continued to **widen**





STOCK IMBALANCES AND EXTERNAL STABILITY

- o In light of this evidence, the **focus** of the **economic debate** has recently shifted from the analysis of current account imbalances to reconsider the **implications that stock imbalances may have for external stability**
 - ➤ The IMF, in its World Economic Outlook, alerts against the projected widening of stock imbalances in the next years, which may leave several debtor economies exposed to market sentiments
 - The IMF 2016 External Sector Report suggests the opportunity to monitor and ultimately limit the growth of stock positions of both debtor and creditor countries
 - Several contributions, focused on countries' NFA positions, have recently studied
 - The role of foreing debt in determining external crises (Catao & MFerretti, 2014);
 - The implications of **large NFA positions** for the ability of an economy to respond to **external shocks** (Forbes et al. 2016);
 - How countries' NFA lead them to accumulate or lose wealth through valuation effects (Benetrix et al., 2016)



THIS PAPER

ARE STOCK IMBALANCES STABILIZING OR DESTABILIZING FOR COUNTRIES' WEALTH ACCUMULATION?

- The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on the implications of stock imbalances for external stability
- Main question: Do stock imbalances have a destabilizing impact on countries' accumulation of external wealth?
 - > Do creditor economies, due to their positive stock of net foreign assets, keep accumulating net external wealth?
 - Do debtor countries, due precisely to their stock of external debt, keep increasing their net foreign debt over time?
 - ➤ If this was the case, stock imbalances would lead creditors (debtors) to accumulate (lose) even more wealth in the future, and could therefore trigger destabilizing dynamics in the evolution of external wealth



THIS PAPER

ARE STOCK IMBALANCES STABILIZING OR DESTABILIZING FOR COUNTRIES' WEALTH ACCUMULATION?

- The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on the implications of stock imbalances for external stability
- Main question: Do stock imbalances have a destabilizing impact on countries' accumulation of external wealth?
- Our answer (for short):
 - ➤ **Debtor** economies, due to the existing **stock of net debt**, have a tendency to limit current account deficits & to **contain future debt accumulation**
 - Creditor countries, instead, due to positive stock of net foreign assets, have tendency to run current account surpluses & to keep accumulating external wealth
 - > Do stock imbalances have a destabilizing impact on countries' wealth / debt accumulation? Yes, but only for creditors
 - This important asymmetry between creditor and debtor economies might have relevant implications for global trade and growth



THIS PAPER A ROADMAP

Focus on a wide set of advanced and emerging market economies

- 1. We **inspect** the **evolution of wealth accumulation** over the last three decades, by decomposing it into its **main channels** (CA, trade balance, investment income...)
- 2. We illustrate how –according to economic theory– stock imbalances may affect wealth accumulation through each channel
 - Economic theory provides reasons to believe stock imbalances may boost wealth accumulation in creditors and wealth losses in debtors...
 - ...But it also offers theoretical reasons to believe the opposite –that stock imbalances
 help limit wealth accumulation in creditors and wealth losses in debtors...
 - ...So whether stock imbalances have a stabilizing or destabilizing impact on wealth accumulation is essentially an empirical question
- 3. We address this empirical issue by **testing** the **relevance of theoretical mechanisms** through **panel regressions** of CA, its sub-balances and real exchange rate on a set of fundamental determinants, including countries' stock of **net foreign assets**



INSPECTING THE EVOLUTION OF EXTERNAL WEALTH


- Use Balance of Payment data from 1980 to 2015 for a set of 39 advanced and emerging markets economies
- We inspect the evolution of wealth accumulation over the last three decades by decomposing it into its main channels:

$$nfa_{it} - nfa_{it-1} = -\frac{g_{it}}{1 + g_{it}} nfa_{it-1} + ca_{it} + val_{it} + eo$$

We also decompose **current and capital account flows** into the main sub-balances:

$$ca_{it} = tb_{it} + iib_{it} + res_{it}.$$

 Advanced creditors (debtors) have accumulated (lost) wealth at an increasing pace in the last two decades





- Advanced creditors (debtors) have accumulated (lost) wealth at an increasing pace in the last two decades
- 2. Emerging debtor countries increased external debt over full horizon but reversed this trend in the last 5 years
- The majority of wealth accumulation (loss) occurs through the current and capital account
- 4. Valuation changes are sizable but very volatile

$$nfa_{it} - nfa_{it-1} = -\frac{g_{it}}{1 + g_{it}} nfa_{it-1} + ca_{it} + val_{it} + eo$$


5. The trade balance is relatively volatile and especially relevant for creditor countries

$$ca_{it} = tb_{it} + iib_{it} + res_{it}.$$





- 5. The trade balance is relatively volatile and especially relevant for creditor countries
- The investment income balance is more persistent; it is quantitatively relevant especially for debtor economies



$$\Delta n f a_{it} = i i b_{it} + t b_{it} + v a l_{it} + (others)$$

$$\Delta nfa_{it} = (iib_{it} + tb_{it} + val_{it} + (others))$$

Economic theory suggests stock imbalances (NFA) should have:

A destabilizing impact on wealth accumulation through the investment income balance (iib), as creditor (debtor) countries should tend to receive more (less) revenues from their foreign assets than they pay on their liabilities

$$iib_{it} = \left[\frac{\widehat{i_{it}^A}}{1 + g_{it}} \left(\Delta FEER_{it}^A\right)^{-1}\right] \cdot nfa_{it-1} + \left[\frac{\widehat{i_{it}^A}/\Delta FEER_{it}^A - \widehat{i_{it}^L}/\Delta FEER_{it}^L}{1 + g_{it}}\right] \cdot l_{it-1},$$

$$iib_{it} = f(\underbrace{nfa_{it-1}}_{+})$$

$$\Delta nfa_{it} = iib_{it} + tb_{it} + val_{it} + (others)$$

- A destabilizing impact on wealth accumulation through the investment income balance (iib), as creditor (debtor) countries should tend to receive more (less) revenues from their foreign assets than they pay on their liabilities
- A stabilizing impact through the trade balance (tb), as wealth effects should imply that wealthier, creditor countries will end up consuming and therefore importing more than poorer, debtor economies, thus reducing their trade surpluses

$$tb_{it} = [f.absorption] - f(tot_{it}) \left[\left(\frac{i_{it}}{1 + g_{it}} \right) \cdot nfa_{it-1} + \left(\frac{i_{it}}{1 + g_{it}} \right) \cdot v_{it-1} + h_{it} \right]$$

$$tb_{it} = f(\underbrace{nfa_{it-1}})$$

$$\Delta nfa_{it} = iib_{it} + tb_{it} + val_{it} + (others)$$

- A destabilizing impact on wealth accumulation through the investment income balance (iib), as creditor (debtor) countries should tend to receive more (less) revenues from their foreign assets than they pay on their liabilities
- A stabilizing impact through the trade balance (tb), as wealth effects should imply that wealthier, creditor countries will end up consuming and therefore importing more than poorer, debtor economies, thus reducing their trade surpluses
- ➤ A destabilizing impact through the trade balance in response to cyclical increases in income (positive ygap), to which debtors react by running higher deficits than creditors (Bussiere, Chortareas & Driver, 2003)
 - > This may be due either to **frictions in portfolio reallocations** (Kraay & Ventura, 2000)
 - Or to stricter credit constraints in debtor economies (Bussiere et al., 2003)

$$\Delta nfa_{it} = iib_{it} + tb_{it} + val_{it} + (others)$$

- A destabilizing impact on wealth accumulation through the investment income balance (iib), as creditor (debtor) countries should tend to receive more (less) revenues from their foreign assets than they pay on their liabilities
- A stabilizing impact through the trade balance (tb), as wealth effects should imply that wealthier, creditor countries will end up consuming and therefore importing more than poorer, debtor economies, thus reducing their trade surpluses
- ➤ A destabilizing impact through the trade balance in response to cyclical increases in income (positive ygap), to which debtors react by running higher deficits than creditors
- A stabilizing impact through the trade balance in response to cyclical decreases in income (negative ygap), which generate higher surpluses in debtor than in creditor countries

$$tb_{it} = f\left(\underbrace{nfa_{it-1} * pos_cyclical_{shocks}}_{+}; \underbrace{nfa_{it-1} * neg_cyclical_{shocks}}_{-}\right)$$

$$\Delta nf a_{it} = iib_{it} + tb_{it} + val_{it} + (others)$$

Additional indirect impacts of NFA through exchange rate fluctuations:

- ➤ Economic theory suggests higher (lower) NFA position should correspond –at least in long run– to a more appreciated (depreciated) real exchange rate (e.g., Lane & MFerretti)
- ➤ Creditors' (debtors') more appreciated (depreciated) exchange rate, in turn, should affect wealth accumulation by:
 - Reducing trade surpluses (deficits) (stabilizing impact)
 - Changing returns on foreign assets and liabilities in local currency (impact on IIB may be stabilizing or destabilizing depending on currency composition of NFA)
 - Generating valuation changes on gross assets and liabilities (stabilizing / destabilizing impact on wealth accumulation depending on currency composition)


Overall impact of stock imbalances on wealth accumulation:

$$\Delta nfa_{t} = tb_{t} \left(\underbrace{nfa_{t-1}}_{-} ; \underbrace{nfa_{t-1} * pos_cyclical_{shock}}_{+} ; \underbrace{nfa_{t-1} * neg_cyclical_{shock}}_{-} ; \underbrace{reer_{t} \left(\underbrace{nfa_{t-1}}_{+} \right)}_{-} \right)$$

$$+iib_{t}\left(\underbrace{nfa_{t-1}}_{+};\Delta feer_{t}\left(\underbrace{\Delta nfa_{t-1}}_{+}\right)\right)$$

$$+ val_t \left(\underbrace{\Delta f eer_t \left(\underbrace{\Delta n f a_{t-1}}_{?}\right)}_{?}\right)$$

Overall impact of stock imbalances on wealth accumulation:



• We employ **panel regressions** of **CA** (over GDP) on its determinants, including the **stock of NFA**, which allow to estimate the impact of stock imbalances on CA **controlling** for a set of other possible determinants of external flows (e.g., **IMF External Balance Assessment**)

$$\begin{aligned} ca_{it} &= \alpha + \beta_{1} \cdot nfa_{it-1} + \beta_{2} \cdot nfa_{it-1} \cdot (creditor_{dum}) + \beta_{3} \cdot nfa_{it-1} \cdot (ygap_{t}) \\ &+ \beta_{4} \cdot nfa_{it-1} \cdot (ygapneg_{it}) + \beta_{5} \cdot nfa_{it-1} \cdot (ygap_{t}) \cdot (creditor_{dum}) \\ &+ \beta_{6} \cdot nfa_{it-1} \cdot (ygapneg_{it}) \cdot (creditor_{dum}) \\ &+ \gamma_{1} \cdot reer_{it-1} + \gamma_{2} \cdot \Delta feer_{it-1} + (others)_{it} + \varepsilon_{t}. \end{aligned}$$

- Distinguish between creditor and debtor countries
- Study how NFA influence CA in response to cyclical income shocks (ygap), distinguishing btw expansions & recessions and btw creditors & debtors
- Exchange rates only appear lagged. Therefore, NFA coefficient estimates both the direct impact of NFA on CA (through wealth effects and investment income) and the indirect one through effect they have on contemporaneous exchange rates

Table 1. Current account regressions

	Basic specif.	Diff. btw. creditors & debtors	Valuation effects	Cyclical shocks
Net foreign assets (L)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.019** (0.008)	-	-0.031*** (0.008)
Net foreign assets creditor countries (L)	-/	0.062***	-	0.078*** (0.015)
Net foreign assets highly	-	0.012** (0.005)	0.012** (0.005)	0.010** (0.005)
In debtors, stock of		N The second sec	-0.017* (0.010)	-
CA deficits and debt accumulation	ontains 1	future	-0.023** (0.009)	-
	-	-	0.065*** (0.014)	-
In creditors, positiv CA surpluses and			リエノ	-
accumulation			-	0.596*** (0.157)
	-	-	-	-0.791*** (0.210)
Net foreign assets * output gap creditors (L)	-	-	-	-1.39** (0.593)
Net foreign assets * negative output gap creditors (L)	-	-	-	1.60* (0.886)
Constant	-0.046*** (0.008)	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.048*** (0.008)	-0.052** (0.008)
Obs.	1164	1164	1164	1164
\mathbb{R}^2	0.6591	0.6758	0.6796	0.6852

Table 1. Current account regressions

		Basic specif.	Diff. btw. creditors & debtors	Valuation effects	Cyclical shocks
	Net foreign assets (L)	0.003	-0.019** (0.008)	-	-0.031*** (0.008)
	Net foreign assets creditor countries (L)	-	0.062*** (0.014)	-	0.078*** (0.015)
	Net foreign assets highly		0.012** (0.005)	0.012** (0.005)	0.010** (0.005)
	npact of debt relative		-	-0.017* (0.010)	-
countries (NF	nced in highly-indebto FA<-80%)	- -	-	-0.023** (0.009)	-
		-	-	0.065*** (0.014)	-
	Net foreign assets creditor countries. Valuation effects (L)	-	-	0.049*** (0.017)	-
	Net foreign assets * output gap (L)	-	-	- /	0.596***
tł	following positive cyc ne higher net debt the l ebtors tend to run				-0.791*** (0.210) -1.39** (0.593) 1.60* (0.886)
	Constant	-0.046*** (0.008)	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.048*** (0.008)	-0.052** (0.008)
	Obs.	1164	1164	1164	1164
	R ²	0.6591	0.6758	0.6796	0.6852

Table 1. Current account regressions

	Basic specif.	Diff. btw. creditors & debtors	Valuation effects	Cyclical shocks
Net foreign assets (L)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.019** (0.008)	-	-0.031*** (0.008)
Net foreign assets creditor countries (L)	-	0.062*** (0.014)	-	0.078***
Net foreign assets highly	-	0.012** (0.005)	0.012** (0.005)	0.010** (0.005)

Due to their stock of NFA:

- ➤ Debtors reduce their CA deficit by 0.6-0.9% GDP each year
- > Creditors increase their CA surplus by 1.3% GDP each year

Net foreign assets * output gap (L)	-	-	-	0.596***
Net foreign assets * negative output gap (L)	-	-	-	-0.791*** (0.210)
Net foreign assets * output gap creditors (L)	-	-	-	-1.39** (0.593)
Net foreign assets * negative output gap creditors (L)	-	-	-	1.60* (0.886)
Constant	-0.046*** (0.008)	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.048*** (0.008)	-0.052** (0.008)
Obs.	1164	1164	1164	1164
R ²	0.6591	0.6758	0.6796	0.6852

WHERE DO ASYMMETRIES COME FROM? IIB OR TB?

Table 2. Investment income balance and trade balance regressions

	Investment income balance	Trade balance
Net foreign assets (L)	(0.024*** (0.004)	-0.043*** (0.008)
Net foreign assets creditor countries (L)	0.001 (0.009)	0.072*** (0.015)
	0.002	0.005 (0.005)
Creditors receive posincome flows, debtors may ments to foreigners	sitive investment nake net investment	0.754*** (0.197) -1.07***
stock imbalances ha		(0.288) -0.640 (0.464)
		0.847 (0.665)
Constant	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.046*** (0.007)
Obs. R ²	1164 0.8268	1261 0.7621

WHERE DO ASYMMETRIES COME FROM? IIB OR TB?

Table 2. Investment income balance and trade balance regressions

	Investment income balance	Trade balance
Net foreign assets (L)	0.024*** (0.004)	-0.043*** (0.008)
Net foreign assets creditor countries (L)	0.001 (0.009)	0.072*** (0.015)
Due to stock of net debt, consume and import less stocks limit debt acc	0.005 (0.005) 0.754*** (0.197) -1.07***	
In spite of positive stock on not consume and import	· ·	(0.288) -0.640 (0.464)
stocks do NOT limit	0.847 (0.665)	
Constant	(0.003)	-0.046*** (0.007)
Obs.	1164	1261
R ²	0.8268	0.7621

Valuation

High-debt

- Why is it that a higher stock of NFA does not make creditors import more?
 - NFA coefficient captures both the direct impact of NFA on the TB (wealth effects)
 and the indirect impact due to the effect that NFA may have on the level of the REER
 - So why do creditor countries not import more for a higher stock of NFA?
 - 1. Because of **low marginal propensity** to consume out of external wealth? Or a higher expenditure does not translate into more imports (**high home bias**)? (**weak wealth effect on imports**)
 - 2. Or because a **higher NFA stock** does **not appreciate creditors' REER** and does **not** make their **imports** relatively **cheaper**?
- We test for this second possibility by running panel regressions of the REER on its determinants, including NFA positions (in spirit of IMF External Balance Assessment)
 - We also use these regressions to study whether impact of NFA on REER might have been reduced for countries that joined the Euro Zone, as, in presence of frictions, EZ members' REER might move with the NFA position of the currency area as a whole

$$reer_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 nf a_{it-1} + \beta_2 nf a_{it-1} (creditor_{dum}) + \beta_3 nf a_{it-1} (EZmember_{dum}) + \beta_4 nf a_{it-1} (EZmember_{dum}) (creditor_{dum}) + (others)_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}.$$

Table 3. Real effective exchange rate regressions

	Basic spec.	Diff. btw creditors & debtors	Euro Zone member dummy
Net foreign assets (L)	0.108***	-0.065** (0.032)	0.028 (0.045)
Net foreign assets creditor countries (L)	-	0.414***	0.323*** (0.069)
NFA *EuroMember (L)	-	-	-0.161*** (0.047)
NFA creditors* EuroMember (L)	-	-	-0.123 (0.099)
Obs.	977	977	977
Country fixed effects	No	No	No
R ²	0.8277	0.8434	0.8488

 Higher stock of NFA appreciates REER of creditor countries, which should make their import cheaper, tend to increase their imports flows and to contain their trade surpluses, with a stabilizing impact on their trade balance

Table 3. Real effective exchange rate regressions

	Basic spec.	Diff. btw creditors & debtors	Euro Zone member dummy
Net foreign assets (L)	0.108*** (0.029)	-0.065** (0.032)	0.028 (0.045)
Net foreign assets creditor countries (L)	-	0.414***	0.323***
NFA *EuroMember (L)	-	-	-0.161*** (0.047)
NFA creditors* EuroMember (L)	-	-	-0.123 (0.099)
Obs.	977	977	977
Country fixed effects	No	No	No
R ²	0.8277	0.8434	0.8488

- Higher stock of NFA appreciates REER of creditor countries, which should make their import cheaper, tend to increase their imports flows and to contain their trade surpluses, with a stabilizing impact on their trade balance
- This stabilizing mechanisms is hampered for EZ members, but this does not explain the asymmetry between creditors and debtors

Table 3. Real effective exchange rate regressions

	Basic spec.	Diff. btw creditors & debtors	Euro Zone member dummy
Net foreign assets (L)	0.108***	-0.065** (0.032)	0.028 (0.045)
Net foreign assets creditor countries (L)	-	0.414***	0.323***
NFA *EuroMember (L)	-	-	-0.161*** (0.047)
NFA creditors* EuroMember (L)	-	-	-0.123 (0.099)
Obs.	977	977	977
Country fixed effects	No	No	No
R ²	0.8277	0.8434	0.8488

Fixed effects

- Higher stock of NFA appreciates REER of creditor countries, which should make their import cheaper, tend to increase their imports flows and to contain their trade surpluses, with a stabilizing impact on their trade balance
- This stabilizing mechanisms is hampered for EZ members, but this does not explain the asymmetry between creditors and debtors
- Stabilizing impact of REER not robust to FE estimation: only a long run phenomenon?
 Still, REER relatively more stabilizing for creditors

- So why do creditor countries not import more for a higher stock of NFA?
 - Because of low marginal propensity to consume out of external wealth? Or a higher expenditure does not translate into more imports (high home bias)? (weak wealth effect on imports)
 - Or because a higher NFA stock does not appreciate creditors' REER and does not make their imports relatively cheaper?
 - > A: No, their REER actually appreciates (at least in the long-run) for a higher stock of NFA, making creditors' imports relatively cheaper
- So our preliminary results suggest that the reason why creditors' stock of net foreign assets do not boost their imports might be either a low marginal propensity to consume out of their external wealth or other characteristics that do not make their imports react much to an increased expenditure (e.g., a high propensity to consume home-produced goods)



CONCLUDING

- After the recent crisis, a reduction was observed in global current account (flow) imbalances. Still, global disequilibria as measured in terms of countries' net foreign assets (stock imbalances) kept increasing
- This paper studies whether stock imbalances have a stabilizing or destabilizing impact on countries' accumulation of external wealth
- We find that there exists a notable asymmetry between creditor and debtor economies in the impact that stock imbalances have on current account flows
- Creditor countries, due to NFA, have a tendency to keep accumulating external wealth
 - ➤ Their **low marginal propensity to consume** does not make their imports increase with external wealth, and cannot compensate for the increased investment income they receive on NFA
- Debtors' negative NFA, instead, tends to limit future wealth losses
 - Debtors tend to pay more revenues on their stock of debt, but also to consume and import less due to a negative wealth effect, which halts to some extent the accumulation of external debt over time



CONCLUDING

- Asymmetry btw creditors & debtors has implications for global trade & growth:
 - As **debtors** remain most **vulnerable** to market sentiment, corrections in their disequilibria are called for, usually by generating **surpluses** in their current account
 - > Still, if **creditors** do not react by increasing their demand & imports (which constitute debtor economies' exports), the adjustment can only go through a **reduction in debtors'** imports and, ultimately, in **aggregate demand**
 - This kind of **adjustment**, while effective in limiting risks stemming from excessively negative current account and debtor positions, would likely imply a **slowdown** in both global **trade** and **GDP** growth, and may eventually end up **hampering global recovery**

Work in progress:

- > Highly preliminary version of our paper does not fully exploit richness of our dataset
 - Heterogeneity between Advanced Economies and Emerging Markets?
 - Is currency composition of assets and liabilities a relevant driver of asymmetries in wealth accumulation for EMEs?
- > Delve deeper into **drivers of asymmetries**?




THANKS FOR YOUR ATTENTION




DGA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Creditor and debtor positions are highly persistent



SOME (NAÏVE) SIGNS OF ASYMMETRIES

- Unconditional relationship between NFA and next year's CA:
 - In creditors higher stock imbalances (a higher positive stock of NFA) are often associated with a higher CA surplus in the following year
 - The unconditional association between stock of net debt and CA deficits is less strong for debtors –and the difference in the slopes is statistically significant



SOME (NAÏVE) SIGNS OF ASYMMETRIES

- Unconditional relationship between NFA and next year's CA:
 - In creditors higher stock imbalances (a higher positive stock of NFA) are often associated with a higher CA surplus in the following year
 - The unconditional association between stock of net debt and CA deficits is less strong for debtors –and the difference in the slopes is statistically significant
- Might stock imbalances be less destabilizing for debtor than for creditor countries?
- When testing empirically whether the overall impact of NFA on CA is stabilizing or destabilizing, we will also test whether this effect is different across creditor & debtor economies



THE IMPACT OF STOCK IMBALANCES ON THE CA: THE EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK (I)

Reduced specification (Diff. btw creditors & debtors)

$$ca_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \cdot nfa_{it-1} + \beta_2 \cdot nfa_{it-1} \cdot (creditor_{dum}) +$$

$$+ \gamma_1 \cdot reer_{it-1} + \gamma_2 \cdot \Delta feer_{it-1} + (others)_{it} + \varepsilon_t.$$

- Assumes NFA do not change the impact of cyclical shocks on the CA
- > NFA coefficients capture the overall impact of stock imbalances on the CA of different groups of countries (assuming cyclical shocks don't make a difference)
- What does overall impact include? Exchange rates only appear lagged. Then NFA coefficients estimate both the direct impact of NFA ont he CA (through wealth effects and investment income) and the indirect one through the effect they have on contemporaneous exchange rates

THE IMPACT OF STOCK IMBALANCES ON THE CA: THE EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK (II)

Extended specification (Cyclical shocks)

$$\begin{split} ca_{it} &= \alpha + \beta_{1} \cdot nfa_{it-1} + \beta_{2} \cdot nfa_{it-1} \cdot (creditor_{dum}) + \beta_{3} \cdot nfa_{it-1} \cdot (ygap_{t}) \\ &+ \beta_{4} \cdot nfa_{it-1} \cdot (ygapneg_{it}) + \beta_{5} \cdot nfa_{it-1} \cdot (ygap_{t}) \cdot (creditor_{dum}) \\ &+ \beta_{6} \cdot nfa_{it-1} \cdot (ygapneg_{it}) \cdot (creditor_{dum}) \\ &+ \gamma_{1} \cdot reer_{it-1} + \gamma_{2} \cdot \Delta feer_{it-1} + (others)_{it} + \varepsilon_{t}. \end{split}$$

- ➤ To study whether NFA change the impact of cyclical shocks on the CA, NFA also appear interacted with the output gap (ygap), distinguishing btw recessions (ygapneg) and expansions and btw creditors and debtors
- Ygap also included as a separate regressor. Then interacted coefficients represent differential impact of ygap on the CA depending on a country's NFA (wrt country with zero net external wealth)
- Coefficient of NFA alone represents impact of NFA on the CA at closed ygap (wealth effects, investment income and exchange rates at closed ygap)



PROPENSITY TO CONSUME OUT OF VALUATION EFFECTS

Trade balance regressions

	Basic specif.	Diff. btw. creditors & debtors	Valuation effects	Cyclical shocks	Cyclical shocks (exp. vs rec.)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Net foreign assets (L)	-0.015*** (0.006)	-0.035*** (0.008)	-	-0.035*** (0.008)	-0.043*** (0.008)
Net foreign assets creditor countries (L)	-	0.065*** (0.015)	-	0.066*** (0.014)	0.072*** (0.015)
Net foreign assets highly indebted countries (NFA/GDP < -80%) (L)	-	0.006 (0.005)	0.006 (0.004)	0.008 (0.004)	0.005 (0.005)
Net foreign assets. CA accumulation (L)	-	-	-0.033*** (0.009)	-	-
Net foreign assets. Valuation effects (L)	-	-	-0.034*** (0.010)	-	-
Net foreign assets creditor countries. CA accumulation (L)	-	-	0.071*** (0.014)	-	-
Net foreign assets creditor countries. Valuation effects (L)	-	-	0.050***	-	-
Net foreign assets * output gap (L)	-	-	-	0.083 (0.105)	0.754*** (0.197)
Net foreign assets * negative output gap (L)	-	-	-	-	-1.07*** (0.288)
Net foreign assets * output gap creditors (L)					-0.640 (0.464)
Net foreign assets * negative output gap creditors (L)					0.847 (0.665)
Real effective trade weighted exchange rate (L)	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)
Constant	-0.047*** (0.007)	-0.047*** (0.007)	-0.047*** (0.007)	-0.046*** (0.007)	-0.046*** (0.007)
Obs.	1261	1261	1261	1261	1261
R²urosistema	0.7204	0.7341	0.7355	0.7593	0.7621



HIGHLY-INDEBTED COUNTRIES

Trade balance and investment income balance regressions

	Tr. 1	m 1 1 1 . /	T
	Trade	Trade balance w/	Investment
	balance	cyclical shocks	income balance
		-	
Net foreign assets (L)	-0.035***	-0.043***	0.024***
net foreign assets (L)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.004)
Net foreign assets creditor	0.065***	0.072***	0.001
countries (L)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.009)
Net foreign assets highly	0.006	0.005	0.002
indebted countries	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)
(NFA/GDP < -80%) (L)	(0.000)		(0.000)
Net foreign assets * output	_	0.754***	_
gap (L)		(0.197)	
Net foreign assets * negative	_	-1.07***	_
output gap (L)		(0.288)	
Net foreign assets * output	_	-0.640	_
gap creditors (L)		(0.464)	
Net foreign assets * negative	_	0.847	_
output gap creditors (L)		(0.665)	
Real effective trade	-0.007	0.001	_
weighted exchange rate (L)	(0.006)	(0.006)	
Constant	-0.047***	-0.046***	-0.007**
Constant	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.003)
Obs.	1261	1261	1164
R2	0.7341	0.7621	0.8268

REAL EXCHANGE RATE REGRESSIONS WITH FIXED EFFECTS

Real Exchange Rate regressions, fixed effects

	Basic spec.	Diff. btw cred.	Euro Zone member
		& deb.	dummy
Cons.	-1.551***	-1.527***	-1.591***
	(0.153)	(0.156)	(0.155)
Net foreign assets (L)	-0.161***	-0.176***	-0.312***
rect foreign assets (L)	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.0436)
Net foreign assets creditor	_	0.055	0.172**
countries (L)		(0.071)	(0.084)
NFA *EuroMember (L)	_	_	0.231***
Title Eurovichiber (E)			(0.048)
NFA creditors* EuroMember	_	_	-0.123
(L)	_	_	(0.114)
Obs.	977	977	977
R ²	0.9396	0.9397	0.9427

