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Are Fiscal Policy Rules Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem? On the False Dichotomy between Rules and Discretion

ADEMU Conference, Banco de España

A. Introduction





Outline



- A. Introduction
- B. Theory: From Discretion to Rules in Fiscal Policy
- C. Practice: Dilemmas of Fiscal Policy Rules in the EMU
- D. Discourse: Beyond the Rule vs Discretion Dichotomy
- E. Conclusion

B. Theory: From Discretion to Rules



- Time inconsistency:
 - rational actors prefer overspending today
 - politics as rent-seeking (Buchanan)
 - → Tension between present and future democratic decisions, intergenerational justice
- Moral hazard in monetary unions
 - Risk of macroeconomic imbalances
 - Overspend at the expense of the union/other members
 - > Tension between different constituencies in a union


C. Practice: Dilemmas of FPRs in the EMU



- Legal ambiguity:
 - Law is language, and language changes with context
 - Numerical rules? → measurement difficulties
 - But even they are part of a network of rules
 - E.g. Pringle (Art. 125 TFEU)
- Democratic dilemmas:
 - Crises of capitalism make governments step up debt to gain legitimacy
 - → undermines legitimacy in the long run












SPAIN GOVERNMENT DEBT TO GDP



SOURCE: WWW.TRADINGECONOMICS.COM | BANK OF SPAIN

C. Practice: Dilemmas of FPRs in the EMU




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- Democratic dilemmas:
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 - → undermines legitimacy in the long run
 - In EMU, raising debt due to macroeconomic imbalances
 - → undermines legitimacy of MS governments, or of EU
 - → Human rights!





Fiscal Policy Rules might guide behavior by triggering discourse



D. Discourse: Beyond Rules vs Discretion



- → Understand Fiscal Policy Rules as principles!
- Discurse in the Stability and Growth Pact:
 - 2005: country-specific assessment
 - 2015: Account for structural reforms, investments, adjustment path, effective measures taken ...
 - European Fiscal Board: consultative
- Discourse relating to Balanced Budget Rules:
 - No numerical limits, or deficit allowed (DE: 0.35%)
 - Vague concepts: exceptional circumstances / severe economic downturn
 - One-off and temporary measues
 - National fiscal councils: comply or explain

E. Conclusion



- → Practice understands Fiscal Policy Rules as principles: find situatively acceptable solutions, guided by the objective of fiscal consoldiation
- → Third way is possible
- → Flexibility is strength, not weakness. In fact, it seems to be the best way to get around the dilemmas of legal ambiguity and democratic legitimacy



Thank you!

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