

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CURRENT INFLATIONARY SETTING AND THE ECONOMIC POLICY RESPONSE


Pablo Hernández de Cos

Governor

BOARD OF THE CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE OF CASTILE-LA MANCHA

Toledo

26 September 2022






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- 1. The main determinants of the current economic outlook
- 2. Recent developments and outlook
- 3. The economic policy response




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


SOURCE: INE. Latest observation: August.

a) Consumer price index (CPI) up to December 1996. Harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) from January 1997.




RESPONSE OF UNDERLYING INFLATION TO INNOVATION IN ENERGY (a)




SOURCES: Refinitiv and Banco de España.

a. Effect of an unexpected increase of 1% in energy prices on underlying inflation. Results of estimating a VAR model with parameters that change over time following random walks. The model includes monthly inflation of the energy component and of the underlying component and the growth rate of a measure of monthly GDP. This model is estimated using a sample encompassing April 2004-March 2022. The structural innovations are obtained by means of the Cholesky decomposition. See J. M. González Mínguez, S. Hurtado, D. Leiva-León and A. Urtasun (2022). "De la energía al resto de componentes: la generalización del fenómeno inflacionista", Artículos Analíticos, *Boletín Económico*, Banco de España, forthcoming.





FOOD COMPONENTS WITH THE LARGEST CONTRIBUTION TO HEADLINE INFLATION (b)




SOURCES: Eurostat, INE and Banco de España.

a) Increase in the year-on-year rate between December 2021 and August 2022.

b) Components ranked by their contribution to the headline inflation rate in 2022 Q3 (data up to August). The figure above each component denotes its respective inflation rate in 2022 Q3.







SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.

a) Quarterly HICP data. 2022 Q3 data refer to July and August. The NEIG category denotes non-energy industrial goods.

UNDERLYING INFLATION: SUB-INDICES BY PURPOSE (a)




CONTRIBUTION TO HEADLINE INFLATION AUGUST 2022




SOURCES: INE, Eurostat and Banco de España.

a) The "Other underlying items" sub-index includes "Clothing and footwear", "Housing" (excluding energy and home maintenance expenditure), "Health", "Communications", "Education" and "Miscellaneous goods and services". The sub-index includes rental of main residence, but not holiday rentals.

Eurosistema









Mark-up indicators = ratio of GDP deflator at factor cost to unit labour costs.

SOURCES: Eurostat, European Commission and ECB. Latest observation: June 2022 (euro area and France), July 2022 (Germany and Italy) and August 2022 (Spain).


- a. Observed data refer to wage settlements in the total economy, except in France and Spain, where they refer to the market economy.
- b. The forecasts refer to the total economy for all countries (except for Italy, where they refer to the private sector). Preliminary forecasts from the September 2022 MPE (except for the euro area, which are from the June 2022 BMPE). For France, they refer to compensation per employee adjusted for job retention schemes.



NATURAL GAS INVENTORIES IN EUROPE



ELECTRICITY PRICE ON THE GENERATION MARKET




SOURCES: Refinitiv, IEA, Bloomberg and ENTSOG.

THERE IS MUCH UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE MAGNITUDE OF THE POTENTIAL SLOWDOWN IN THE EVENT THAT RUSSIA CUTS OFF SUPPLIES


The Spanish economy would be hit by a total cut-off of gas supplies from Russia, but not as hard as other euro area countries would foreseeably be


IMPACT OF GAS IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON GDP



SOURCE: Izquierdo, Moral-Benito, Prades and Quintana (2022). "The propagation of worldwide sector-specific shocks", Working Paper No 2213, Banco de España.


ASIDE FROM HOW THE WAR UNFOLDS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY, THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK HAS ALSO WORSENED SIGNIFICANTLY





SOURCES: IHS Markit and Kiel Institute for the World Economy. Latest data: August (first two charts).

Percentage of countries with increases in inflation and policy interest rates hikes (a)



SOURCES: National statistics, BIS, IMF and Refinitiv.

(a) The inflationary impulse depicts the percentage of countries that, in each quarter, simultaneously experience an inflation rate higher than that of the previous quarter and a level of inflation above its historical average (1984 Q1 to 2022 Q2). Monetary policy stance tight ening shows the percentage of countries that are raising their interest rates each quarter. Global recession refers to periods in which global per capita GDP growth is close to 0 or negative. The number of countries included in these measures progressively increases to 28: Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Denmark, United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, United States and the euro area (advanced economies) and Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Malaysia, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, South Africa, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, Indonesia and Peru (emerging market economies). The euro area data begin in 1999.



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
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QUARTER-ON-QUARTER REAL GDP GROWTH



QUARTER-ON-QUARTER GROWTH IN DEMAND COMPONENTS




QNA Q2 (29 JUL)


SOURCE: INE.




OVERNIGHT HOTEL STAYS




FOREIGN TOURIST ARRIVALS




SOURCE: INE.






SOURCE: Ministerio de Inclusión, Seguridad Social y Migraciones.

RETURN TO PRE-PANDEMIC GDP LEVELS



GROSS VALUE ADDED, BY SECTOR



SOURCES: INE and Eurostat.

- a) Trade, transportation and hospitality, professional, scientific and administrative activities and arts and recreation services.
- b) Information and communication, financial and insurance activities and real estate activities.

Jan-20 Oct-21 Apr-22 Apr-22 Apr-22 Jul-22 Ju


MANUFACTURING PMI. OUTPUT

SERVICES PMI. ACTIVITY


COMPOSITE PMI

PURCHASING MANAGERS' INDEX





SOURCES: IHS Markit and European Commission. Latest observation: August.




SOURCES: ANFAC, INE and Banco de España.


Seasonally adjusted time series. Quarterly rates calculated using the data available for Q3 compared with the Q2 average.



ADJUSTMENT TO SPENDING ON NON-ENERGY GOODS AND SERVICES IN THE EVENT OF A 1 PP INCREASE IN THE RATIO OF ENERGY SPENDING TO HOUSEHOLD INCOME (a)




SHARE OF HOUSEHOLDS EXPECTING TO SPEND ON MAJOR CONSUMER ITEMS OVER THE NEXT 12 MONTHS



SOURCE: C. Martínez-Carrascal (2022). "The impact of the surge in inflation and the war on Spanish households' economic outlook", Analytical Articles, *Economic Bulletin* 3/2022, Banco de España.

a) Households with a small liquidity buffer are defined as those that do not have sufficient liquidity (or the means to obtain it) to cover an unexpected payment equal to one month of household income. Spending on energy is proxied by drawing on total spending on electricity, gas, water, sewerage, telephony and cable television, as the Consumer Expectations Survey on which the estimation is based groups spending on these items together.

MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE EURO AREA (BMPE)





ADVERSE SCENARIO

SOURCE: ECB.

MONTHLY CONSENSUS FORECASTS FOR EURO AREA COUNTRIES

GDP INFLATION





SOURCE: Consensus Economics.


3M-1Y SWAP VOLATILITY (a)



SOURCE: Bloomberg Data License. Latest observation: 13/09/22.

(a) The chart shows the normalised volatility of three-month at-the-money options, whose underlying assets are one-year interest rate swaps that have a variable component of three-month EURIBOR (EUR) and LIBOR (USD).

IMPLIED VOLATILITIES



SOURCE: Refinitiv Datastream. Latest observation: 13/09/2022.

(a) Average implied volatility of three-month exchange rate options on USD/EUR, USD/GBP and JPY/USD.



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IN DECEMBER 2021 THE ECB EMBARKED ON A PROCESS OF MONETARY POLICY NORMALISATION IN RESPONSE TO THE CURRENT INFLATIONARY EPISODE

 July saw the first key interest rate hike in 11 years (50 bp), followed by the biggest hike at a single meeting in the history of the euro (75 bp) in September

MARCH 2022 JUNE 2022 JULY 2022 SEPTEMBER 2022

End of purchases under the PEPP

 End of the net purchases under the PEPP (as announced in

December 2021).

End of purchases under the APP and announcement of the intention to raise interest rates


- Once the three conditions set out in the forward guidance had been met, net purchases under the APP were ended on 1 July, announcing the intention to raise interest rates at the July and September meetings.
- Flexible reinvestment of the payments from the PEPP portfolio to counter transmission risks (ad hoc meeting).

- Interest rate hike and announcement of the TPI
- 50 bp increase in the three key interest rates.
- Approval of the *Transmission Protection Instrument* (TPI), to support effective monetary policy transmission.

- Increase in the ECB's key interest rates
- 75 bp increase in the three key interest rates, a step that frontloads the transition from the prevailing highly accommodative level of policy rates towards levels that will ensure the timely return of inflation to our 2% mediumterm target.


Looking ahead, we will continue normalising monetary policy at a pace and to a level in a manner that is data-dependent and considers the impact on the return of inflation to our medium-term target.

INSTANTANEOUS FORWARD OIS €STR. EURO AREA




SOURCES: Refinitiv Datastream and Banco de España calculations. Latest data: 22/09/2022.

10-YEAR OIS €STR



SOURCE: Refinitiv Datastream. Latest observation:22/09/2022.


EURO AREA: INSTANTANEOUS FORWARD ILS % 10,0 9,0 8,0 7,0 6,0 5,0 4,0 3,0 2,0 1.0 Jul-22 Jul-23 Jul-24 Jul-25 Jul-26



SOURCES: Bloomberg Data License and Banco de España calculations.

Latest data: 22/09/2022.

EURO AREA INSTANTANEOUS FORWARD ILS ADJUSTED FOR RISK PREMIA (a)



SOURCES: Bloomberg Data License and Banco de España calculations. Latest data: 22/09/2022.

(a) Banco de España calculations based on the model in Gimeno and Ortega (2022).


EURO AREA: INFLATION IN THE SMA (a)




SOURCE: SMA.

(a) Median of the HICP data in the SMA.

10-YEAR SOVEREIGN YIELDS




10-YEAR SPREADS AGAINST GERMANY



SOURCE: Refinitiv Datastream. Latest observation: 22/09/2022.

MARKET INTEREST RATES




SOURCE: Refinitiv Datastream. Latest observation: 22/09/2022.

STOCK MARKET INDICES






LOANS FOR HOUSE PURCHASE




LOANS TO NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS




SOURCE: Banco de España. Latest observation: July (bank interest rates) and August (reference interest rates).

BLS: CHANGE IN CREDIT STANDARDS (a)




BLS: CHANGE IN DEMAND FOR CREDIT (b)




SOURCE: Banco de España. Latest observation: 2022 Q2.

- a. Indicator = percentage of banks that have tightened their credit standards or terms and conditions considerably × 1 + percentage of banks that have tightened their credit standards or terms and conditions somewhat × 1/2 percentage of banks that have eased their credit standards or terms and conditions considerably × 1.
- b. Indicator = percentage of banks reporting a considerable increase × 1 + percentage of banks reporting some increase × 1/2 percentage of banks reporting a considerable decrease × 1/2 percentage of banks reporting a considerable decrease × 1.


ESTIMATED INCREASE IN FIRMS' MEDIAN DEBT BURDEN AS A RESULT OF HIGHER INTEREST RATES (a)



IMPACT OF HIGHER INTEREST RATES ON THE PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH A HIGH NET DEBT BURDEN. BREAKDOWN BY INCOME PERCENTILE (b)



SPANISH GENERAL GOVERNMENT DEBT BURDEN (c)



SOURCES: Banco de España and Encuesta Financiera de las Familias (2017).

- a. The debt burden is defined as financial costs / (gross operating profit + financial revenue). Firms with no financial costs are excluded.
- b. The net debt burden is considered to be high when the ratio of (debt service expenses interest income from deposits) / household income is higher than 40%. Households without debt are excluded from this calculation.
- c. The projections are based on the June macroeconomic scenario and the interest rate curve at 8 September 2022.

THE NEED FOR AN INCOMES AGREEMENT TO PREVENT AN INFLATIONARY SPIRAL



 Under such an agreement, firms and workers would share the inevitable loss of income in the national economy that higher commodity import prices entail

What form should this agreement take?

MINDFUL OF THE UNEVEN IMPACT

The uneven impact of the current shocks among workers, firms and sectors must be taken into account, by avoiding overly sweeping measures that may prove excessively rigid for some groups of agents

WAGES

Arrangements that automatically link wages to past inflation or indexation clauses are also to be avoided

MULTI-YEAR

The agreement should envisage multi-year commitments concerning wage settlements – where the nominal benchmarks for wage bargaining should be based on the projected trend in underlying inflation – and job protection

PROFIT MARGINS

Explicit commitments to moderate profit margins

THE ROLE OF OTHER NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES



The fiscal policy measures should be targeted and temporary, given the limited fiscal leeway and high inflation. They should focus on lower-income households (who bear the brunt of inflation) and the firms most vulnerable to this shock, and significant distortions to price signals and the widespread use of automatic indexation clauses in government expenditure items should be avoided

A credible and gradual medium-term fiscal consolidation programme that provides a framework of stability for economic agents urgently needs to be designed

Supply-side policies are the most appropriate for responding to the current shocks; the NGEU funds could play a particularly important role in accompanying and funding such policies

THE NEED TO MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN OUR JOINT EUROPEAN RESPONSE



Structural policies that foster the integration and interconnection of European markets (in particular energy markets) and strengthen the single market will not only generate greater resilience to shocks, but also drive competitiveness

Joint funding arrangements should be established to safeguard this common effort and avoid any excessive or highly unequal impact on national public finances. Common funding arrangements would enable financing for large-scale programmes based on shared quality standards and provide for a uniform approach for assessing programme execution

Headway must also be made in the expansion of the public and private risk-sharing arrangements in the EU. The euro area needs a permanent macroeconomic stabilisation mechanism – with revenue-raising and borrowing capacity – to complement the single monetary policy. It is also imperative that the banking union be completed with the establishment of a European deposit guarantee scheme. Lastly, we must press forward with constructing a capital markets union

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS



After the recovery witnessed up to the summer, the information available points to a slowdown in the Spanish economy in the coming months, against a background of very high uncertainty and rising inflation

The inflationary pressures are mainly explained by global factors and affect the euro area as a whole. This prompted the ECB to embark on a process of monetary normalisation in December 2021. The ECB Governing Council will continue taking measures for as long as the information available suggests that inflation remains above the medium-term target

The incomes agreement is essential to avoid an inflationary spiral, which could have highly adverse effects on activity and employment. Under such an agreement, firms and employees would agree to share the loss of income in the national economy. The agreement should be of a multi-year nature and appropriately designed to take into account the uneven impact of the current shock on workers, firms and sectors

Other economic policies should focus on support for the most vulnerable, resolute supply-side reforms, a firm commitment to fiscal sustainability and the reinforcement of the European project