Safe Assets Shortages and some Policy Implications

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Debt and Credit, Growth and Crises Conference

Banco de España and The World Bank

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
The Plan

- Part I: A View on the Global Economy
 - Potential systemic shock: Europe
 - Safe asset / systemic insurance shortage
- Part II: Some equations (joint wip with E. Farhi)
 - Safe asset shortages
 - Some policy implications

A View on the Global Economy PART I




Euro-area: GDP Weighted CDS






It is not just contagion... G. Debt





Budget





Rate-growth spreads


10y sovereign yields minus nominal trend growth (real potential growth + 5Y inflation expectations)



Source: Haver Analytics, consensus expectations (for long-term inflation expectations), Barclays Research




TFP Growth



Sources: Conference Board and Citi Investment Research and Analysis




Spain and Italy





Spain... surprises

Exhibit 7: Regional debt as % of Spanish GDP




Source: Credit Suisse



Liabilities (Summary)


(Percent of GDP)






Doubling down

Spanish and Italian banks have increased their holdings of govt. bonds






Lethal embrace?





Runs... when, not if...

Figure 2.21. Cumulative Euro Area Deposit Flows, 2011–12 (In billions of euros)




Source: Haver Analytics.

Note: Other includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Portugal.



EM Style Sudden Stop






EM Style Sudden Stop + Target2

				I		
	Variación neta	Variación neta	Saldos	Variación neta	Variación neta	Saldos
	pasivos (VNP)	activos (VNA)	(VNP-VNA)	pasivos (VNP)	activos (VNA)	(VNP-VNA)
CUENTA FINANCIERA	-		9.847,2	-	-	8.481,4
Excluido Banco de España			20.887,1	_		-97.090,9
Inversiones directas	-	-	-3.520,3	-	-	7.940,1
De España en el exterior	-	11.155,1	-11.155,1	-	-1.279,1	1.279,1
Del exterior en España	7.634,8	-	7.634,8	6.661,0	-	6.661,0
Inversiones de cartera	-	-	22.817,6	-	-	-34.385,2
De España en el exterior	-	-8.412,1	8.412,1	-	2.821,0	-2.821,0
Del exterior en España	14.405,4	-	14.405,4	-31.564,3	-	-31.564,3
Otras Inversiones (1)	-	-	-1.158,8	-	-	-75.762,1
De España en el exterior	-	10.083,3	-10.083,3	-	37.387,1	-37.387,1
Del exterior en España	8.924,5	-	8.924,5	-38.375,0	-	-38.375,0
Derivados financieros	-	-	2.748,7	-	-	5.116,3
Banco de España (2)			-11.039,8			105.572,3
Reservas	-	-	-491,9	-	-	-212,4
Activos netos BE frente al EUROSISTEMA	-	-	-10.894,5	-	-	101.054,7
Otros activos netos	-	-	346,5	-	-	4.730,0
ERRORES Y OMISIONES			5.444,9	_		5.738,1
Fuente: Banco de España	•		•	1		




Target2






It used to be like this...





And it is now like this





Bottom line

- There is a very significant risk of a large tail event from Europe
- Even if it doesn't materialize right away, fluctuations in the fear that it might, has become a core market factor
- Unfortunately, old fashioned global and sectoral diversification no longer offers good risk-control options...
- It may be the time to buy systemic insurance!... if we can find it...



THE SHORTAGE OF MACRO-INSURANCE IS ACUTE




The "Safe Asset" Shortage

	\$ bn		% of World GDP	
	2007	2011	2007	2011
US Federal Government Debt held by the public	5,136	10,692	9.20%	15.80%
Held by the Fed	736	1,700	1.30%	2.50%
Held by private investors	4,401	8,992	7.90%	13.30%
GSE obligations	2,910	2,023	5.20%	3.00%
Agency- and GSE-backed mortgage pools	4,464	6,283	8.00%	9.30%
Private-issue ABS	3,901	1,277	7.00%	1.90%
German and French government debt	2,492	3,270	4.50%	4.80%
Italian and Spanish government debt	2,380	3,143	4.30%	4.70%
Safe assets	20,548	12,262	36.90%	18.10%

Note: Numbers are struck through if they are believed to have lost their "safe haven" status after 2007. Source: Federal Reserve, Haver Analytics, Barclays Research




QE is reducing supply





Real Rates Have Collapsed





Bye-bye Rates Hedge (10y Tsy)






Bye-bye CHF Hedge





Bye-bye JPY Hedge



Source: Barclays Research



Taking stock

- Significant tail risk from Europe
- No easy place to hide
 - Correlations are very high
 - Fewer producers of AAA and defensive assets
 - Dangerous negative skewness in natural defensive trades
- In this world LTRO/SMP make sense in some instances, QE/TWIST less so...



A Model and Some Policy Implications PART II



Reference Model (no Knightians)

- Continuous time perpertual youth OLG model with only finite consumption (withdrawal)
- The only store of values is a tree that produces X fruit, of which a fraction δ can be paid as a dividend and embodied in an asset with equilibrium value V. The rest of the output, $(1 \delta)X$, is paid as a "wage" to the newly born
- At each instant (but will only look at steady state):

$$C = \theta W; W = V; C = X \Rightarrow V = \frac{X}{\theta}$$

$$rV = \delta X \Rightarrow r = \delta \theta$$



Knightians and Safe Assets

- There is a hazard λ (henceforth very small) that output drops (once) to $\mu X < X$ (or current status gets resolved, up or down)
- The financial sector can tranch the risky dividend and pledge a share ρ to a *safe* asset, with equilibrium value:

$$V^{\mu} = \rho \mu \frac{X}{\theta}$$

• A share α of agents is Knightian (convinced that $\lambda \to \infty$ if they invest in risky asset). We shall assume that they demand all the safe assets in equilibrium:

$$\alpha > \rho \mu$$



Equilibrium Interest Rates

$$W^{K} = V^{\mu}; W^{N} = V - V^{\mu}$$

$$\begin{array}{rcl} \theta \, V^\mu & = & \alpha (1-\delta) X + r^K \, V^\mu \\ \theta (\, V - V^\mu) & = & (1-\alpha) (1-\delta) X + r (\, V - V^\mu) \end{array}$$

$$r^{K} = \delta\theta - (1 - \delta)\theta \frac{\alpha - \rho\mu}{\rho\mu}$$
$$r = \delta\theta + (1 - \delta)\theta \frac{\alpha - \rho\mu}{1 - \rho\mu}$$



An Investment Margin

- Chopping trees: Untranched trees can be cut and their wood can be transformed into a low productivity but safe fruit production function
- Fertilization model: Maintaining trees consumes resources
- In both cases we can translate statements about $r r^K$, into statements about investment and output



Public Debt

• Assume $\rho=0$ and the govt backs debt by a stream of taxes on dividends τ^{μ}

$$W^{K} = D; W^{N} = V^{\tau}; D = \tau^{\mu} \mu X / \theta$$
$$V^{\tau} = V - D = (1 - \tau^{\mu} \mu) \frac{X}{\theta}$$

$$r^{K} = \delta\theta - (1 - \delta)\theta \frac{\alpha - \tau^{\mu}\mu}{\tau^{\mu}\mu}$$

$$r = \delta\theta + (1 - \delta)\theta \frac{\alpha - \tau^{\mu}\mu}{1 - \tau^{\mu}\mu}$$




Bullish and Bearish Assets

- Reinterpretation: No safe asset but there are Bullish and Bearish assets, such that putting together one of each yields a safe asset
- Suppose that ρ now represents the amount of Bearish assets, which is much smaller than the amount of Bullish assets
- Then we get the same results as above. In particular, if ρ drops, the spread widens and risky assets sell off




QE/Twist





QE/Twist



2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Source: Treasury, DB Global Markets Research




QE/Twist and Safe Assets

- Short term debt: safe asset
- Long term debt: Bearish asset
- Operation Twist / QE has drawbacks:
 - Twist increases the supply of safe assets
 - But it reduces the supply of Bearish assets



Redemption Fund





ERF and Safe Assets

- Redemption fund
 - Member states transfer debt exceeding 60% to ERF,
 which takes some new collateral and issues jointly
 guaranteed debt. It is a sinking fund
 - Model: Tranching increases supply of safe assets
 (2.5 trillion euros right away) and lowers r
 - Of course US rates and other safe heavens could see a rise...



Credit Policies

- QE1
- BOE / UK Treasury newly announced Sterling Liquidity Facility to foster "risky" investment
- Model: Increase demand for risky asset lowers r and increases investment
 - Caveat: As long as the govt doesn't generate risky debt as a result of the funding...



Final Remarks

- The European crisis is very far from over
- The risk of a global systemic shock is too high for comfort
- This situation has exacerbated a shortage of assets that already caused severe distortions before the subprime crisis
- In is central to take into consideration this shortage when thinking about macro/financial policy



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