

# The Vanishing Procyclicality of Labor Productivity


Jordi Galí and Thijs van Rens

CREI, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, and Barcelona GSE


European Summer Symposium in International  
Macroeconomics (ESSIM) 2010

May 25, 2010

# The Vanishing Procyclicality of Labor Productivity



# The Vanishing Procyclicality of Labor Productivity



# The Vanishing Procyclicality of Labor Productivity

	Pre-84	Post-84	Change
Corr prod with output	0.78 [0.04]	0.60 [0.05]	-0.18 [0.06]
Corr prod with labor input	0.31 [0.08]	-0.15 [0.10]	-0.47 [0.13]

- BP, 1949-2007
  - prod = output / worker
  - labor input = employment
- Robustness

# Changes in Labor Market Dynamics

	Pre-84	Post-84	Ratio
Std.dev. employment	1.57 [0.08]	0.91 [0.05]	0.58 [0.04]
Relative std.dev. empl	0.66 [0.03]	0.81 [0.05]	1.23 [0.09]

# Changes in Labor Market Dynamics

	Pre-84	Post-84	Ratio
Std.dev. employment	1.57 [0.08]	0.91 [0.05]	0.58 [0.04]
Relative std.dev. empl	0.66 [0.03]	0.81 [0.05]	1.23 [0.09]
Std.dev. wages	0.71 [0.05]	0.99 [0.06]	1.38 [0.12]
Relative std.dev. wages	0.30 [0.02]	0.88 [0.07]	2.93 [0.31]

- Robustness

# Changes in Labor Market Dynamics

- 1 Procyclicality labor productivity 'vanished'
  - Correlation with output: less procyclical
  - Correlation with labor input: countercyclical
- 2 Relative volatility labor input increased
- 3 Relative volatility wages increased
- 4 Volatility output decreased (Great Moderation)

# Did the labor market become more flexible?

- A reduction in labor market frictions can explain all of these facts



# Did the labor market become more flexible?

- A reduction in labor market frictions can explain all of these facts
- Production requires employment  $n_t$  and effort  $e_t$

$$y_t = a_t + (1 - \alpha) (n_t + \psi e_t)$$

# Did the labor market become more flexible?

- A reduction in labor market frictions can explain all of these facts
- Production requires employment  $n_t$  and effort  $e_t$

$$y_t = a_t + (1 - \alpha) (n_t + \psi e_t)$$

- Adjusting employment subject to search frictions

# Did the labor market become more flexible?

- A reduction in labor market frictions can explain all of these facts
- Production requires employment  $n_t$  and effort  $e_t$

$$y_t = a_t + (1 - \alpha) (n_t + \psi e_t)$$

- Adjusting employment subject to search frictions
- Effort provides intensive margin to adjust labor input

# Did the labor market become more flexible?

- A reduction in labor market frictions can explain all of these facts
- Production requires employment  $n_t$  and effort  $e_t$

$$y_t = a_t + (1 - \alpha) (n_t + \psi e_t)$$

- Adjusting employment subject to search frictions
- Effort provides intensive margin to adjust labor input
- Search frictions  $\downarrow \Rightarrow$  volatility employment  $\uparrow \Rightarrow$  volatility effort  $\downarrow$

# Did the labor market become more flexible?

- A reduction in labor market frictions can explain all of these facts
- Production requires employment  $n_t$  and effort  $e_t$

$$y_t = a_t + (1 - \alpha) (n_t + \psi e_t)$$

- Adjusting employment subject to search frictions
- Effort provides intensive margin to adjust labor input
- Search frictions  $\downarrow \Rightarrow$  volatility employment  $\uparrow \Rightarrow$  volatility effort  $\downarrow$ 
  - Relative volatility employment (with respect to output) increases

# Did the labor market become more flexible?

- A reduction in labor market frictions can explain all of these facts
- Production requires employment  $n_t$  and effort  $e_t$

$$y_t = a_t + (1 - \alpha) (n_t + \psi e_t)$$

- Adjusting employment subject to search frictions
- Effort provides intensive margin to adjust labor input
- Search frictions  $\downarrow \Rightarrow$  volatility employment  $\uparrow \Rightarrow$  volatility effort  $\downarrow$ 
  - Relative volatility employment (with respect to output) increases
  - Labor productivity becomes less procyclical (countercyclical)

$$y_t - n_t = a_t - \alpha n_t + (1 - \alpha) \psi e_t$$

# Did the labor market become more flexible?

- A reduction in labor market frictions can explain all of these facts
- Production requires employment  $n_t$  and effort  $e_t$

$$y_t = a_t + (1 - \alpha) (n_t + \psi e_t)$$

- Adjusting employment subject to search frictions
- Effort provides intensive margin to adjust labor input
- Search frictions  $\downarrow \Rightarrow$  volatility employment  $\uparrow \Rightarrow$  volatility effort  $\downarrow$ 
  - Relative volatility employment (with respect to output) increases
  - Labor productivity becomes less procyclical (countercyclical)

$$y_t - n_t = a_t - \alpha n_t + (1 - \alpha) \psi e_t$$

- Wages *endogenously* become more flexible

# Outline

- Facts
- Model
- Results I
- Endogenous wage rigidity
- Results II
- Discussion



- RBC model with labor market frictions (adjustment costs)
  - No capital
  - No other frictions or market imperfections
- Intensive margin for labor input (effort)
- Two types of shocks
  - Technology shocks (TFP)
  - Non-technology shocks (preference shocks)

- Choose vacancies and labor demand to maximize

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} Q_{0,t} [Y_t - W_t N_t - g(V_t)]$$

subject to

$$N_t = (1 - \delta) N_{t-1} + qV_t$$

- Output

$$Y_t = A_t \left( \int_0^{N_t} \mathcal{E}_{it}^{\psi} di \right)^{1-\alpha} = A_t \left( \mathcal{E}_t^{\psi} N_t \right)^{1-\alpha}$$

- Choose consumption and labor supply to maximize

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [Z_t u(C_t) - \gamma L_t]$$

subject to (given new hires  $qV_t$ )

$$C_t = W_t N_t$$

$$N_t = (1 - \delta) N_{t-1} + qV_t$$

- Total effective labor supply

$$L_t = \int_0^{N_t} \frac{1 + \zeta \mathcal{E}_{it}^{1+\phi}}{1 + \zeta} di = \frac{1 + \zeta \mathcal{E}_t^{1+\phi}}{1 + \zeta} N_t$$

- Effort is set to maximize match surplus (MDU = MP)

$$\mathcal{E}_{it}^{1+\phi} = \mathcal{E}_t^{1+\phi} = \frac{\psi}{1+\phi} \frac{1+\zeta}{\zeta} \frac{Z_t u'(C_t)}{\gamma} \frac{(1-\alpha) Y_t}{N_t}$$

- Effort increases with preference shocks and technology shocks
  - Effort decreases with employment  $N_t$  (substitutes)
- Wages are set to share surplus equally (Nash bargaining)

$$W_t = \frac{1}{2} \left( W_t^{UB} + W_t^{LB} \right)$$

where  $S_t^H = W_t - W_t^{LB}$  and  $S_t^F = W_t^{UB} - W_t$

# Equilibrium

- Efficiency condition for effort
- Job creation equation

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{g'(V_t)}{q} &= W_t^{UB} - W_t \\ &= E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} (1 - \delta)^s Q_{t,t+s} \left[ (1 - \Psi_F) \frac{(1 - \alpha) Y_{t+s}}{N_{t+s}} - W_{t+s} \right]\end{aligned}$$

- Nash bargaining over wages
- Good market clearing

$$Y_t = C_t + g(V_t)$$

# Preview of the Results

- Infinite matching frictions  $\Rightarrow$  Employment is constant

$$e_t = (1 - \eta) a_t + z_t$$

$$y_t = (1 + \phi) a_t + (1 - \alpha) \psi z_t$$

$$y_t - n_t = y_t$$

- Frictionless labor market  $\Rightarrow$  Effort is constant

$$n_t = (1 - \eta) a_t + z_t$$

$$y_t = a_t + (1 - \alpha) z_t$$

$$y_t - n_t = \eta a_t - \alpha z_t$$

- Standard parameters

$\alpha$	$\beta$	$u(C_t)$	$\gamma$	$\delta$
1/3	0.99	$\log C_t$	$\bar{N} = 0.7$	6%/qrt

- Non-standard parameters

- Relative variance preference shocks  
⇒ match relative volatility employment
- Labor market frictions: 0 – 3% of output  
(Silva-Toledo 2007: 1 – 1.4%)

- Free parameter

- Importance of effort,  $\phi + \psi$

# Results I

	$\bar{N}$	$\rho(p, y)$	$\rho(p, n)$	$\frac{sd(n)}{sd(y)}$	$\frac{sd(w)}{sd(y)}$
<i>Data</i>					
Pre-84		0.78	0.31	0.66	0.30
Post-84		0.60	-0.15	0.81	0.88
<i>Model</i>					
frictions 3%	0.57			0.66	
frictions 2%	0.61				
frictions 1%	0.66				
frictionless	0.70				



# Results I

	$\bar{N}$	$\rho(p, y)$	$\rho(p, n)$	$\frac{sd(n)}{sd(y)}$	$\frac{sd(w)}{sd(y)}$
<i>Data</i>					
Pre-84		0.78	0.31	0.66	0.30
Post-84		0.60	-0.15	0.81	0.88
<i>Model</i>					
frictions 3%	0.57	0.75	-0.04	0.66	0.87
frictions 2%	0.61	0.69	-0.14	0.73	0.86
frictions 1%	0.66	0.63	-0.24	0.79	0.86
frictionless	0.70	0.56	-0.35	0.88	0.87


# Results I

	$\bar{N}$	$\rho(p, y)$	$\rho(p, n)$	$\frac{sd(n)}{sd(y)}$	$\frac{sd(w)}{sd(y)}$	$sd(y)$
<i>Data</i>						
Pre-84		0.78	0.31	0.66	0.30	
Post-84		0.60	-0.15	0.81	0.88	
<i>Model</i>						
frictions 3%	0.57	0.75	-0.04	0.66	0.87	1.00
frictions 2%	0.61	0.69	-0.14	0.73	0.86	1.00
frictions 1%	0.66	0.63	-0.24	0.79	0.86	1.00
frictionless	0.70	0.56	-0.35	0.88	0.87	1.01


# Endogenous wage rigidity

- With flexible wages, wage proportional to MP of labor
- Search frictions allow for equilibrium wage rigidity (Hall 2005)
- Endogenizing wage rigidity
  - Wages are rigid within the bargaining set
  - The width of the bargaining set is determined by search frictions
- Reduction in labor market frictions makes wages more flexible


# Endogenous wage rigidity




# Endogenous wage rigidity




# Endogenous wage rigidity



# Endogenous wage rigidity




# Endogenous wage rigidity





# Endogenous wage rigidity



- Wages are rigid within the bargaining set

$$W_t = R_t W_{t-1} + (1 - R_t) \frac{1}{2} \left( W_t^{UB} + W_t^{LB} \right)$$

- The width of the bargaining set is determined by search frictions
- Degree of rigidity  $R_t \in [0, 1]$  is endogenous

$$R_t = \bar{R} \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{W_t - \frac{1}{2} (W_t^{UB} + W_t^{LB})}{\frac{1}{2} (W_t^{UB} - W_t^{LB})} \right)^{2\rho} \right]$$

- Guarantees that  $W_t \in (W_t^{LB}, W_t^{UB})$
- Need non-linear solution method: 2nd order approximation

- Standard parameters

$\alpha$	$\beta$	$u(C_t)$	$\gamma$	$\delta$
1/3	0.99	$\log C_t$	$\bar{N} = 0.7$	6%/qrt

- Non-standard parameters

- Relative variance preference shocks  
⇒ match relative volatility employment
- Labor market frictions: 0 – 3% of output  
(Silva-Toledo 2007: 1 – 1.4%)

- Free parameters

- Importance of effort,  $\phi + \psi$
- Maximum wage rigidity,  $\bar{R}$

# Results II

	$\bar{N}$	$\rho(p, y)$	$\rho(p, n)$	$\frac{sd(n)}{sd(y)}$	$\frac{sd(w)}{sd(y)}$	$sd(y)$
<i>Data</i>						
Pre-84		0.78	0.31	0.66	0.30	
Post-84		0.60	-0.15	0.81	0.88	
<i>Model</i>						
frictions 3%	0.57	0.75	-0.04	0.66	0.87	1.00
frictions 2%	0.61	0.69	-0.14	0.73	0.86	1.00
frictions 1%	0.66	0.63	-0.24	0.79	0.86	1.00
frictionless	0.70	0.56	-0.35	0.88	0.87	1.01
<i>Endog wage rigidity</i>						
frictions 3%	0.57			0.66		
frictions 2%	0.61					
frictions 1%	0.66					
frictionless	0.70					

# Results II

	$\bar{N}$	$\rho(p, y)$	$\rho(p, n)$	$\frac{sd(n)}{sd(y)}$	$\frac{sd(w)}{sd(y)}$	$sd(y)$
<i>Data</i>						
Pre-84		0.78	0.31	0.66	0.30	
Post-84		0.60	-0.15	0.81	0.88	
<i>Model</i>						
frictions 3%	0.57	0.75	-0.04	0.66	0.87	1.00
frictions 2%	0.61	0.69	-0.14	0.73	0.86	1.00
frictions 1%	0.66	0.63	-0.24	0.79	0.86	1.00
frictionless	0.70	0.56	-0.35	0.88	0.87	1.01
<i>Endog wage rigidity</i>						
frictions 3%	0.57	0.75	0.17	0.66	0.69	1.00
frictions 2%	0.61	0.68	0.05	0.72	0.69	1.00
frictions 1%	0.66	0.64	-0.05	0.76	0.70	1.02
frictionless	0.70	0.62	-0.14	0.78	0.74	0.99

# More Flexible Labor Markets and the Great Moderation

- Can a reduction in labor market frictions explain the increase wage volatility?

# More Flexible Labor Markets and the Great Moderation

- Can a reduction in labor market frictions explain the increase wage volatility?
  - In principle yes, quantitatively not sure

# More Flexible Labor Markets and the Great Moderation

- Can a reduction in labor market frictions explain the increase wage volatility?
  - In principle yes, quantitatively not sure
  - Endogenous wage rigidity needs to be sufficiently strong (non-linear)



# More Flexible Labor Markets and the Great Moderation

- Can a reduction in labor market frictions explain the increase wage volatility?
  - In principle yes, quantitatively not sure
  - Endogenous wage rigidity needs to be sufficiently strong (non-linear)
- Can a reduction in labor market frictions explain the Great Moderation?

# More Flexible Labor Markets and the Great Moderation

- Can a reduction in labor market frictions explain the increase wage volatility?
  - In principle yes, quantitatively not sure
  - Endogenous wage rigidity needs to be sufficiently strong (non-linear)
- Can a reduction in labor market frictions explain the Great Moderation?
  - Only if increase wage volatility large enough (direct effect makes output *more* volatile)

# More Flexible Labor Markets and the Great Moderation

- Can a reduction in labor market frictions explain the increase wage volatility?
  - In principle yes, quantitatively not sure
  - Endogenous wage rigidity needs to be sufficiently strong (non-linear)
- Can a reduction in labor market frictions explain the Great Moderation?
  - Only if increase wage volatility large enough (direct effect makes output *more* volatile)
  - If wage rigidity is extended to newly hired workers (Haefke-Sonntag-van Rens 2008)

# More Flexible Labor Markets and the Great Moderation

- Can a reduction in labor market frictions explain the increase wage volatility?
  - In principle yes, quantitatively not sure
  - Endogenous wage rigidity needs to be sufficiently strong (non-linear)
- Can a reduction in labor market frictions explain the Great Moderation?
  - Only if increase wage volatility large enough (direct effect makes output *more* volatile)
  - If wage rigidity is extended to newly hired workers (Haefke-Sonntag-van Rens 2008)
  - If fluctuations driven largely by labor demand (technology) shocks

# Conclusions

- More flexible labor markets (lower hiring costs) can explain

# Conclusions

- More flexible labor markets (lower hiring costs) can explain
  - ① The vanishing procyclicality of labor productivity

# Conclusions

- More flexible labor markets (lower hiring costs) can explain
  - 1 The vanishing procyclicality of labor productivity
  - 2 The rising relative volatility of employment and hours

# Conclusions

- More flexible labor markets (lower hiring costs) can explain
  - ① The vanishing procyclicality of labor productivity
  - ② The rising relative volatility of employment and hours
  - ③ *Potentially:* The rising relative volatility of wages



- More flexible labor markets (lower hiring costs) can explain
  - ① The vanishing procyclicality of labor productivity
  - ② The rising relative volatility of employment and hours
  - ③ *Potentially*: The rising relative volatility of wages
  - ④ *Potentially*: The Great Moderation

# Conclusions

- More flexible labor markets (lower hiring costs) can explain
  - ① The vanishing procyclicality of labor productivity
  - ② The rising relative volatility of employment and hours
  - ③ *Potentially*: The rising relative volatility of wages
  - ④ *Potentially*: The Great Moderation
- What caused the reduction in search frictions?

- More flexible labor markets (lower hiring costs) can explain
  - ① The vanishing procyclicality of labor productivity
  - ② The rising relative volatility of employment and hours
  - ③ *Potentially*: The rising relative volatility of wages
  - ④ *Potentially*: The Great Moderation
- What caused the reduction in search frictions?
  - Internet-based job search (monster.com)

- More flexible labor markets (lower hiring costs) can explain
  - ① The vanishing procyclicality of labor productivity
  - ② The rising relative volatility of employment and hours
  - ③ *Potentially*: The rising relative volatility of wages
  - ④ *Potentially*: The Great Moderation
- What caused the reduction in search frictions?
  - Internet-based job search (monster.com)
  - Wrongful discharge protection laws (Autor, Kerr and Kugler 2007)


- More flexible labor markets (lower hiring costs) can explain
  - ① The vanishing procyclicality of labor productivity
  - ② The rising relative volatility of employment and hours
  - ③ *Potentially*: The rising relative volatility of wages
  - ④ *Potentially*: The Great Moderation
- What caused the reduction in search frictions?
  - Internet-based job search (monster.com)
  - Wrongful discharge protection laws (Autor, Kerr and Kugler 2007)
  - Temporary help services (Estevao and Lach 1999)

# Temporary help services (Estevao and Lach 1999)



- More flexible labor markets (lower hiring costs) can explain
  - ① The vanishing procyclicality of labor productivity
  - ② The rising relative volatility of employment and hours
  - ③ *Potentially*: The rising relative volatility of wages
  - ④ *Potentially*: The Great Moderation
- What caused the reduction in search frictions?
  - Internet-based job search (monster.com)
  - Wrongful discharge protection laws (Autor, Kerr and Kugler 2007)
  - Temporary help services (Estevao and Lach 1999)
  - Ronald Reagan and the decline of unions (Farber and Western 2002)

# Declining unionization (Farber and Western 2002)





- More flexible labor markets (lower hiring costs) can explain
  - ① The vanishing procyclicality of labor productivity
  - ② The rising relative volatility of employment and hours
  - ③ *Potentially*: The rising relative volatility of wages
  - ④ *Potentially*: The Great Moderation
- What caused the reduction in search frictions?
  - Internet-based job search (monster.com)
  - Wrongful discharge protection laws (Autor, Kerr and Kugler 2007)
  - Temporary help services (Estevao and Lach 1999)
  - Ronald Reagan and the decline of unions (Farber and Western 2002)