

Dynamics of the price distribution in a general model of state-dependent pricing

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Sticky prices: crucial but controversial

- **Calvo (1983)**: constant probability of adjustment
 - easy aggregation: central to DSGE models
 - no microfoundations / many costly mistakes
 - Lucas critique: Calvo parameter should change with inflation
- **Golosov-Lucas (2007)**: menu costs as microfoundation for price stickiness
 - calibrated to match moments in microdata on price adjustments
 - money shocks have **much less persistent effects** than in Calvo
 - higher inflation: **more frequent adjustment**



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 - calibrated to match moments in microdata on price adjustments
 - money shocks have **much less persistent effects** than in Calvo
 - higher inflation: **more frequent adjustment**
- But **GL07 fits poorly** when nested in more general model

This paper



Study **dynamics** of simple **state-dependent** pricing model
that **nests** Calvo-Yun, Golosov-Lucas and others

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Study **dynamics** of simple **state-dependent** pricing model that **nests** Calvo-Yun, Golosov-Lucas and others

- Estimate to **match price adjustments** in US microdata
- **Simulate distributional dynamics** using method of Reiter (2008)
- Report **impulse response functions** for all three models

This paper: results



Study **dynamics** of simple **state-dependent** pricing model that **nests** Calvo-Yun, Golosov-Lucas and others

- Estimate to **match price adjustments** in US microdata
 - **GL07 model is rejected: no small price changes**
 - **Preferred model is closer to Calvo**, but mildly state-dependent
- **Simulate distributional dynamics** using method of Reiter (2008)
 - **Nonlinear** in idiosyncratic states / **linear** in aggregate state
- Report **impulse response functions** for all three models
 - **Much larger real effects** of money shocks than GL07 found
 - Almost like Calvo
 - Difference due to (counterfactually) **strong selection effect** in GL07
 - Effects of **autocorrelated shocks similar, but stronger**

Related literature: dynamics of state-dependent pricing



- **Partial equilibrium**
 - Caballero-Engel (1993, 2007), Klenow-Kryvstov (2008)
- **General equilibrium without idiosyncratic shocks**
 - Dotsey-King-Wolman (1999)
- **Strong restrictions on idiosyncratic processes**
 - Caplin-Spulber (1987), Gertler-Leahy (2006)

Related literature: dynamics of state-dependent pricing



- **Partial equilibrium**
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- **Strong restrictions on idiosyncratic processes**
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- **Distributional dynamics**
 - **Golosov-Lucas (2007):**
 - *assumed money shock i.i.d.*
 - *assumed c constant*
 - **Midrigan (2008):**
 - *different model: multiproduct firms*
 - *assume mean p is sufficient statistic (Krusell-Smith method)*
 - **Dotsey-King-Wolman (2008)**
 - *flexible and sticky-price firms; normal and extreme shocks*
 - *we fit finer histogram with fewer free parameters*

OUTLINE



(1) Introduction

(2) Monopolistic competitors in partial equilibrium

- Nesting various models of state dependence
- Finite grid approximation

(3) General equilibrium: steady state

(4) How to compute distributional dynamics

(5) Results: dynamics

- Impulse responses
- Inflation decomposition
- Transition dynamics



Model

Our model



- **Probability of adjustment** increases with the **value of adjustment**:

$$\lambda(L) \text{ where } \lambda' \geq 0$$

- **Firm-level** price adjustments due to **idiosyncratic shocks**
- Rest of model: standard “New Keynesian” DSGE

Our model



- **Probability of adjustment** increases with the **value of adjustment**:

$$\lambda(L) \text{ where } \lambda' \geq 0$$

- Interpretation: **stochastic menu costs**
- Interpretation: **axiom for boundedly rational choice**

- **Firm-level** price adjustments due to **idiosyncratic shocks**
- Rest of model: standard “New Keynesian” DSGE
 - Focus on **dynamics, including distributional effects**

Our model



- **Probability of adjustment** increases with the **value of adjustment**:

$$\lambda(L) \text{ where } \lambda' \geq 0$$

- **Stochastic menu costs** (DKW99 and Caballero-Engel)
 - **Axiom for boundedly rational choice** (Akerlof-Yellen 1985)
 - Nested: **Calvo (1983)**
 - Nested: **Dotsey-King-Wolman (1999)**
 - Nested: **Golosov-Lucas (2007)**
 - Nested: **Woodford (2008)**
- **Firm-level** price adjustments due to **idiosyncratic shocks**
 - Rest of model: standard “New Keynesian” DSGE
 - Focus on **dynamics, including distributional effects**



Partial equilibrium, steady state

Monopolistic competitor



Profits of firm i are: $P_{it}Y_{it} - WN_{it}$

Output is: $Y_{it} = A_{it}N_{it}$

Demand is: $Y_{it} = \xi P_{it}^{-\varepsilon}$

Monopolistic competitor



Profits of firm i are: $P_{it}Y_{it} - WN_{it}$

Output is: $Y_{it} = A_{it}N_{it}$

A_{it} is exogenous
shock

Demand is: $Y_{it} = \xi P_{it}^{-\varepsilon}$

P_{it} is “sticky”
decision

Monopolistic competitor



Profits of firm i are: $P_{it}Y_{it} - WN_{it}$

Output is: $Y_{it} = A_{it}N_{it}$

Demand is: $Y_{it} = \xi P_{it}^{-\varepsilon}$

With **sticky prices**, the value function is:

$$V(P_{it}, A_{it})$$

If the firm can **adjust its price**, value increases to:

$$V^*(A_{it}) \equiv \max_P V(P, A_{it})$$

Probability of adjustment



- **Nominal loss from failing to adjust:**

$$D \equiv D(P_{it}, A_{it}) \equiv V^*(A_{it}) - V(P_{it}, A_{it})$$

- **Probability of adjustment:**

$$\lambda(L) = \frac{\bar{\lambda}}{\bar{\lambda} + (1 - \bar{\lambda})(\alpha/L)^\xi}, \quad \text{where } L \equiv D/W.$$

–We divide by the wage to express the loss **in units of labor time.**

Probability of adjustment



- **Nominal loss from failing to adjust:**

$$D \equiv D(P_{it}, A_{it}) \equiv V^*(A_{it}) - V(P_{it}, A_{it})$$

- **Probability of adjustment:**

$$\lambda(L) = \frac{\bar{\lambda}}{\bar{\lambda} + (1 - \bar{\lambda})(\alpha/L)^\xi}, \quad \text{where } L \equiv D/W.$$

- **Special cases:**

- $\xi \rightarrow 0$: equivalent to Calvo model
- $\xi \rightarrow \infty$: equivalent to fixed menu cost model

Nesting alternative models




- **Calvo-Yun**

$$\lambda(L) = \xrightarrow{\xi \rightarrow 0} \bar{\lambda}$$




- **Golosov-Lucas**

$$\lambda(L) \xrightarrow{\xi \rightarrow \infty} \begin{cases} 0, & L < \alpha \\ 1, & L \geq \alpha \end{cases}$$



- **Costain-Nakov**

$$\lambda(L) = \frac{\bar{\lambda}}{\bar{\lambda} + (1 - \bar{\lambda})(\alpha/L)^\xi}$$



Bellman equation at time of production



Firm that **produces at price P_i and productivity A_i**
will adjust price with probability λ next period:

$$V(P_i, A_i) = \left(P_i - \frac{W}{A_i} \right) \xi P_i^{-\varepsilon} + \frac{1}{1+r} E \left\{ \left(1 - \lambda \left(\frac{D}{W} \right) \right) V(P_i, A_i') + \lambda \left(\frac{D}{W} \right) V^*(A_i') \mid A_i \right\}$$

This can be **simplified** using $D = V^*(A) - V(P, A)$.

Simplifying Bellman



Steady state Bellman equation:

$$V(P_i, A_i) = \left(\overset{\text{current profits}}{P_i - \frac{W}{A_i}} \right) \xi P_i^{-\varepsilon} + \frac{1}{1+r} E\{ \underset{\text{value of not adjusting}}{V(P_i, A_i')} + \underset{\text{expected gains from adjusting}}{G(P_i, A_i')} \mid A_i \}$$

where

$$G(P_i, A_i') \equiv \lambda \left(\frac{D(P_i, A_i')}{W} \right) D(P_i, A_i')$$

$$D(P_i, A_i') \equiv V^*(A_i') - V(P_i, A_i').$$

Alternative models



1. Calvo model:

$$G(P_i, A_i) = \lambda D(P_i, A_i)$$

2. Bounded rationality:

$$G(P_i, A_i) = \lambda (D(P_i, A_i) / W) D(P_i, A_i)$$

3. Fixed menu costs:

$$G(P_i, A_i) = 1(D(P_i, A_i) \geq W\kappa)(D(P_i, A_i) - W\kappa)$$

4. Stochastic menu costs:

$$G(P_i, A_i) = \lambda (D(P_i, A_i) / W) (D(P_i, A_i) - WE(\kappa | D(P_i, A_i) \geq W\kappa))$$

5. Woodford's model:

$$\lambda(D(P_i, A_i) / W) = \frac{\bar{\lambda} \exp((D / W - \kappa) / \theta)}{(1 - \bar{\lambda}) + \bar{\lambda} \exp((D / W - \kappa) / \theta)}$$



Distributional dynamics and finite grid approximation

Finite grid of real states



- Define **grids**: $\Gamma^A \equiv \{a^1, a^2, \dots, a^{\#A}\}$, $\Gamma^P \equiv \{p^1, p^2, \dots, p^{\#P}\}$

- Grid represents **real prices, deflated by money supply**: $M_{t+1} = \mu M_t$

Beginning-of-period prices: $\tilde{p}_{it} \equiv \tilde{P}_{it} / M_t \in \Gamma^P$

Prices at time of production: $p_{it} \equiv P_{it} / M_t \in \Gamma^P$

- **Real value function**: $V(P_{it}, A_{it}) = M_t v(p_{it}, A_{it})$

Finite grid of real states



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
- Real value function**: $V(P_{it}, A_{it}) = M_t v(p_{it}, A_{it})$

Next period: $V(P_{it}, A_{i,t+1}) = M_{t+1} v(\mu^{-1} p_{it}, A_{i,t+1})$

Distributional dynamics



Time line:



Beginning of period: $\tilde{\Psi}_t : \tilde{\psi}_t^{jk} = \text{prob}(\tilde{p}_{it} = p^j, A_{it} = a^k)$
 $N^P \times N^A$

Time of production: $\Psi_t : \psi_t^{jk} = \text{prob}(p_{it} = p^j, A_{it} = a^k)$
 $N^P \times N^A$

Matrix notation



- Define **grids**: $\Gamma^A \equiv \{a^1, a^2, \dots, a^{\#A}\}$ $\Gamma^P \equiv \{p^1, p^2, \dots, p^{\#P}\}$

- Productivity shocks S**: $s^{jk} = \text{prob}(a^j | a^k)$

- Adjust real prices:**

Define **R** with ones in column j , row j -# μ , zeros elsewhere

- Current profits U**: $u^{jk} = (p^j - w/a^k) \xi (p^j)^{-\varepsilon}$

Now rewrite Bellman...

Matrix notation



- Define **grids**: $\Gamma^A \equiv \{a^1, a^2, \dots, a^{\#A}\}$ $\Gamma^P \equiv \{p^1, p^2, \dots, p^{\#P}\}$
- **Productivity shocks S**: $s^{jk} = \text{prob}(a^j | a^k)$
 $N^A \times N^A$
- **Adjust real prices**:
Define **R** with ones in column j , row $j - \#P$, zeros elsewhere
 $N^P \times N^P$ \rightarrow Deflates real price from p^j to $p^j / \mu = p^{j - \#P}$
- **Current profits U**: $u^{jk} = (p^j - w/a^k) \xi (p^j)^{-\varepsilon}$
 $N^P \times N^A$

Now rewrite Bellman...

Backwards induction in matrix notation



Guess \mathbf{V} with elements $v^{jk} \equiv v(p^j, a^k)$: $p^j \in \Gamma^P, a^k \in \Gamma^A$

1. Optimal value:

$$\mathbf{v}^* = \max \mathbf{V}$$

2. Loss from not adjusting:

$$\mathbf{D} = \mathbf{1} * \mathbf{v}^* - \mathbf{V}$$

3. Expected gains:

$$\mathbf{G} = \lambda(\mathbf{D} / w) * \mathbf{D}$$

4. Work backwards:

$$\mathbf{V} = \mathbf{U} + \beta \mathbf{R}' * (\mathbf{V} + \mathbf{G}) * \mathbf{S}$$

and return to **1.**

Backwards induction in matrix notation



Guess \mathbf{V} with elements $v^{jk} \equiv v(p^j, a^k)$: $p^j \in \Gamma^P, a^k \in \Gamma^A$
 $N^P \times N^A$

1. Optimal value:

$$\mathbf{v}^* = \max_{1 \times N^A} \mathbf{V}$$

2. Loss from not adjusting:

$$\mathbf{D} = \mathbf{1} * \mathbf{v}^* - \mathbf{V}$$

$$N^P \times N^A$$

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$$\mathbf{V} = \mathbf{U} + \beta \mathbf{R}' * (\mathbf{V} + \mathbf{G}) * \mathbf{S}$$

and return to **1.**

$$u^{jk} = (p^j - w/a^k) \xi(p^j)^{-\epsilon}$$

Relates p^j
to $p^{j-\mu}$

Markov process
for A shocks

Distributional dynamics in matrix notation



Shocks and detrending:

Productivity A follows Markov process \mathbf{S} ,

price p^j deflated to p^j/μ :

$$\tilde{\Psi}_t = \mathbf{R} * \Psi_{t-1} * \mathbf{S}'$$

Price adjustments:

Change to optimal price with probability $\Lambda \equiv \lambda(\mathbf{D} / w)$:

$$\Psi_t = (\mathbf{1} - \Lambda) * \tilde{\Psi}_t + \mathbf{P} * (\mathbf{1} * (\Lambda * \tilde{\Psi}_t))$$

Distributional dynamics in matrix notation



Shocks and detrending:

Productivity A follows Markov process \mathbf{S} ,

price p^j deflated to p^j/μ :

$$\tilde{\Psi}_t = \mathbf{R} * \Psi_{t-1} * \mathbf{S}'$$

\mathbf{R} deflates and rounds
up or down to grid

Price adjustments:

Change to optimal price with probability $\Lambda \equiv \lambda(\mathbf{D} / w)$:

$$\Psi_t = (\mathbf{1} - \Lambda) * \tilde{\Psi}_t + \mathbf{P} * (\mathbf{1} * (\Lambda * \tilde{\Psi}_t))$$

\mathbf{P} selects optimal price
and rounds to grid



General equilibrium: steady state results

Households, firms, central bank



Utility of households:

$$\frac{C_t^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} - \chi N_t + \nu \log(M_t / P_t), \text{ discount factor } \beta$$

Period budget constraint:

$$P_t C_t + M_t + \frac{1}{1+r_t} B_t = W_t N_t + M_{t-1} + T_t + B_{t-1} + \Pi_t$$

Consumption aggregation:

$$C_t = \left\{ \int_0^1 C_{it}^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} di \right\}^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}} \rightarrow C_{it} = (P_{it} / P_t)^{-\varepsilon} C_t$$

Money supply:

$$M_{t+1} \mu_{t+1} = M_t, \quad (\mu_{t+1} - \mu) = \phi(\mu_t - \mu) + \varepsilon_{t+1}, \quad \varepsilon_{t+1} \sim i.i.d.$$

General equilibrium: Steady state fixed point



- **Guess:** p

- **Euler, FOC:**

$$C^r = (1 - \beta\mu) / p, \quad w = \chi C^r \quad \rightarrow \quad u^{jk} = \left(p^j - \frac{w}{a^k} \right) C \left(\frac{p^j}{p} \right)^{-\varepsilon}$$

- **Solve Bellman:**

$$\mathbf{V} = \mathbf{U} + \beta \mathbf{R}' * (\mathbf{V} + \mathbf{G}) * \mathbf{S}$$

- **Calculate distributions:** $\tilde{\Psi} = \mathbf{R} * \Psi * \mathbf{S}'$

$$\Psi = (\mathbf{1} - \Lambda) * \tilde{\Psi} + \mathbf{P} * (\mathbf{1} * (\Lambda * \tilde{\Psi}))$$

- **Calculate** $p = \left\{ \sum_j \sum_k \psi^{jk} (p^j)^{1-\varepsilon} \right\}^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}}$ and return.

Parameters



As in Golosov and Lucas (2007):

- Discounting: $\beta=0.99$ quarterly
- CRRA: $\gamma=2$
- Labor supply coefficient: $\chi=6$
- Money demand coefficient: $\nu=1$
- Elasticity of substitution: $\varepsilon=7$
- Money growth: 0% (as in AC Nielsen data)

- Productivity process: $\log A_{t+1} = \rho \log A_t + \varepsilon_{t+1}^A$,
with $\text{std}(\varepsilon^A)=\sigma^A$

Adjustment probability:

$$\lambda(L) = \frac{\bar{\lambda}}{\bar{\lambda} + (1 - \bar{\lambda})(\alpha / L)^\xi}$$

Simulate at **monthly** frequency.

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Simulate at **monthly** frequency.

Adjustment probability:

$$\lambda(L) = \frac{\bar{\lambda}}{\bar{\lambda} + (1 - \bar{\lambda})(\alpha / L)^\xi}$$

Estimate free parameters

Estimation



- **Estimated parameters:**

$$\log A_{t+1} = \rho \log A_t + \varepsilon_{t+1}^A, \quad \text{std}(\varepsilon_{t+1}^A) = \sigma^A$$

$$\lambda(L) = \frac{\bar{\lambda}}{\bar{\lambda} + (1 - \bar{\lambda})(\alpha / L)^\xi}$$

- **Microdata on price adjustments:**




- AC Nielsen supermarket data (Midrigan 2008)

- **Minimize objective function** with two terms:




- Mean adjustment **frequency** in model vs. data

- **Histogram** of price adjustments in model vs. data

Price changes: models vs. evidence



Price changes: models vs. evidence



Price changes: models vs. evidence





	GL07	Calvo	CN	Data
Monthly frequency of changes	10%	10%	10%	10% (NS07)
Mean absolute price change	18.3	6.4	10.1	10.5 (VM08)
Standard deviation	18.8	8.2	12.1	13.2 (VM08)
Changes less than 5%	0%	49.7%	25.2%	25% (VM08)
Variance of λ relative to GL07	1	0	0.025	

Benchmark calibration: probability of adjustment



$$\lambda(L) = \frac{\bar{\lambda}}{(1 - \bar{\lambda})(\alpha/L)^\xi + \bar{\lambda}}$$


$$(\sigma_\varepsilon^2, \rho, \bar{\lambda}, \alpha, \xi) = (0.005, 0.881, 0.109, 0.031, 0.290)$$




Benchmark calibration: distributions and price policy




Density of firms after mc shock and inflation




Stationary density of firms



Optimal price policy



Density of adjusting firms





Computing general equilibrium: dynamics

Is Krusell-Smith method suitable for menu cost model?



Consider Golosov-Lucas (2007) menu cost model...

–Suppose firm adjusts if it deviates from optimum by 5%.

Two possible initial conditions:

- All firms deviate by 1% from optimal price
 - Result: 0% of firms adjust
- 10% of firms deviate by 10% from optimal price
 - Result: 10% of firms adjust
- Krusell-Smith method assumes **tomorrow's mean varies smoothly with today's mean**
- Fails to predict tomorrow's mean in menu cost model because individual choices are **highly nonlinear**

Method of Reiter (2008)



Reiter (2008, forthcoming *JEDC*):

- Often, individual shocks bigger than aggregate shocks.
- Therefore: **individual choice** needs **nonlinear solution**, but **linear solution** suffices for **aggregate dynamics**.
- Step 1: detailed **nonlinear** solution of **steady state** on **grid**
 - Solve individual choices by **backwards induction** on grid
- Step 2: **Linearize dynamics at every grid point**
 - Viewed **point by point**, the Bellman equation is just a system of first-order expectational difference equations
 - Many equations, but standard toolkits applicable (Sims, Klein, etc)
- Surprise: **It's easy!!!**

Is Reiter's method suitable for menu cost model?



Consider Golosov-Lucas (2007) menu cost model...

–Suppose firm adjusts if it deviates from optimum by 5%.

Two possible initial conditions:

- All firms deviate by 1% from optimal price
 - Result: 0% of firms adjust
- 10% of firms deviate by 10% from optimal price
 - Result: 10% of firms adjust
- Reiter's method can capture this difference: 1% and 10% from optimal price are **different grid points**
- Each grid point treated by a **different equation**... coefficients of these equations **not** linearly related

Step 1: steady state (already done)



- **Guess:** p

- **Euler, FOC:**

$$C^r = (1 - \beta\mu) / p, \quad w = \chi C^r \quad \rightarrow \quad u^{jk} = \left(p^j - \frac{w}{a^k} \right) C \left(\frac{p^j}{p} \right)^{-\varepsilon}$$

- **Solve Bellman:**

$$\mathbf{V} = \mathbf{U} + \beta \mathbf{R}' * (\mathbf{V} + \mathbf{G}) * \mathbf{S}$$

- **Calculate distributions:** $\tilde{\Psi} = \mathbf{R} * \Psi * \mathbf{S}'$

$$\Psi = (\mathbf{1} - \Lambda) * \tilde{\Psi} + \mathbf{P} * (\mathbf{1} * (\Lambda * \tilde{\Psi}))$$

- **Calculate** $p = \left\{ \sum_j \sum_k \psi^{jk} (p^j)^{1-\varepsilon} \right\}^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}}$ **and return.**

Dynamics



1. F.O.C. labor: $C_t^{-\gamma} = \chi / w_t$

2. Euler equation: $1 - p_t C_t^\gamma = \beta E_t \left(\mu_{t+1} \frac{p_t C_t^\gamma}{p_{t+1} C_{t+1}^\gamma} \right)$

3. Labor demand: $N_t = \sum_j \sum_k \Psi_t^{jk} (p^j / p_t)^{-\varepsilon} C_t / a^k \equiv \Delta_t C_t$

4. Price index: $p_t = \left\{ \sum_j \sum_k \Psi_t^{jk} (p^j)^{1-\varepsilon} \right\}^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}}$

Dynamics



Matrices \mathbf{U}_t , \mathbf{V}_t , \mathbf{D}_t , \mathbf{G}_t , Ψ_t , $\tilde{\Psi}_t$, $\mathbf{1}$, \mathbf{P}_t have size $N^p \times N^A$.

5. Bellman is:

$$\mathbf{V}_t = \mathbf{U}_t + \beta E_t \left\{ \frac{p_t C_{t+1}^\gamma}{p_{t+1} C_t^\gamma} \mathbf{R}_{t+1}' * (\mathbf{V}_{t+1} + \mathbf{G}_{t+1}) * \mathbf{S} \right\}$$

6. Distributions satisfy:

– Beginning of period:
$$\tilde{\Psi}_{t+1} = \mathbf{R}_{t+1} * \Psi_t * \mathbf{S}'$$

– Time of production:

$$\Psi_t = (\mathbf{1} - \Lambda_t) * \tilde{\Psi}_t + \mathbf{P}_t * (\mathbf{1} * (\Lambda_t * \tilde{\Psi}_t))$$

– JUST A HUGE SYSTEM OF 1ST-ORDER DIFFERENCE EQS... **CAN BE LINEARIZED!** (Reiter 2008)

Step 2: Linearized dynamics



Suppose $\hat{\mu}_{t+1} = \phi \hat{\mu}_t + \varepsilon_{t+1}$ with ε_{t+1} *iid*, mean zero.

Define row vector: $\mathbf{X}_t \equiv (\text{vec}(\mathbf{V}_t)', C_t, p_t, \text{vec}(\mathbf{\Psi}_{t-1})')$

length: $2N^{\text{PN}} + 2$

Equilibrium dynamics can be summarized by:

$$E_t F(\mathbf{X}_{t+1}, \mathbf{X}_t, \hat{\mu}_{t+1}, \hat{\mu}_t) = 0$$

$2N^{\text{PN}} + 3$ first-order expectational difference equations in $2N^{\text{PN}} + 3$ series.

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(We've eliminated w_t , N_t , and Ψ_t .)

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length: $2N^p N^\pi + 2$

Steady state satisfies:

$$F(\mathbf{X}^*, \mathbf{X}^*, 0, 0) = 0$$

We've already solved for the steady state ("step 1").

Step 2: Linearized dynamics



Suppose $\hat{\mu}_{t+1} = \phi \hat{\mu}_t + \varepsilon_{t+1}$ with ε_{t+1} *iid*, mean zero.

Define row vector: $\mathbf{X}_t \equiv (\text{vec}(\mathbf{V}_t)', C_t, p_t, \text{vec}(\mathbf{\Psi}_{t-1}'))'$

length: $2N^P N^\pi + 2$

Linearization around steady state:

$$A E_t \Delta \mathbf{X}_{t+1} + B \Delta \mathbf{X}_t + C E_t \hat{\mu}_{t+1} + D \hat{\mu}_t = 0$$


Can be solved by Paul Klein's "QZ" algorithm.

Alternatives: Chris Sims' algorithm, etc.



General equilibrium: dynamic results

Impulse responses: *iid* money growth shock



Inflation decompositions



- **Inflation identity**

$$\pi_t = \sum_{j,k} x_t^{jk} \lambda_t^{jk} \tilde{\Psi}_t^{jk}$$

where $x_t^{jk} = \log\left(\frac{p_t^*(a^k)}{p^j}\right)$ is the **desired price adjustment**, in logs

Inflation decompositions



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Desired price change

Distribution after shock

Probability of adjustment

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Desired price change
 ↓
 Distribution after shock ←
 ↑
 Probability of adjustment

- **Klenow and Kryvtsov**

- Intensive and extensive margin

$$\pi_t = \frac{\sum_{j,k} x_t^{jk} \lambda_t^{jk} \tilde{\Psi}_t^{jk}}{\sum_{j,k} \lambda_t^{jk} \tilde{\Psi}_t^{jk}} \sum_{j,k} \lambda_t^{jk} \tilde{\Psi}_t^{jk} = av_t fr_t$$

$$\Delta \pi_t \approx \overline{fr} \Delta av_t + \overline{av} \Delta fr_t$$

Inflation decompositions



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Intensive margin Extensive margin

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Desired price change
 ↓
 Distribution after shock ←
 ↑
 Probability of adjustment

- **Costain and Nakov**

- Intensive margin, extensive margin, and selection effect

$$\pi_t = \sum_{j,k} x_t^{jk} \tilde{\Psi}_t^{jk} \sum_{j,k} \lambda_t^{jk} \tilde{\Psi}_t^{jk} + \sum_{j,k} x_t^{jk} (\lambda_t^{jk} - \sum_{j,k} \lambda_t^{jk} \tilde{\Psi}_t^{jk}) \tilde{\Psi}_t^{jk} = av_t^* fr_t + sel_t$$

$$\Delta \pi_t \approx \overline{fr} \Delta av_t^* + \overline{av}^* \Delta fr_t + \Delta sel_t$$

Inflation decompositions



- **Inflation identity**

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

$$\pi_t = \sum_{j,k} x_t^{jk} \tilde{\Psi}_t^{jk} \sum_{j,k} \lambda_t^{jk} \tilde{\Psi}_t^{jk} + \sum_{j,k} x_t^{jk} (\lambda_t^{jk} - \sum_{j,k} \lambda_t^{jk} \tilde{\Psi}_t^{jk}) \tilde{\Psi}_t^{jk} = av_t^* fr_t + sel_t$$

$$\Delta \pi_t \approx \underbrace{\overline{fr} \Delta av_t^*}_{\text{Intensive margin}} + \underbrace{\overline{av}^* \Delta fr_t}_{\text{Extensive margin}} + \underbrace{\Delta sel_t}_{\text{Selection effect}}$$

Why the difference with GL07?



Golosov-
Lucas
(2007)





- Fixed menu costs imply strong **selection effect**:
 - Firms that adjust are far from optimal price.
- Shock redistributes mass from price decreases to price increases
 - Large change in average adjustment, $\Delta av_t \dots$
 - ...even if small change in average desired adjustment, Δav_t^*
- Depends on firms jumping from $\lambda^{jk}=0$ to $\lambda^{jk}=1$
 - Such **strong state dependence** rejected by estimate of $\lambda(L)$

Why the difference with GL07?




Costain-Nakov (2008)



- In estimated model, many adjusters are near optimal price
- Selection effect smaller (1/3 of change in inflation)
 - Average adjustment similar to average desired adjustment: $\Delta av_t \approx \Delta av_t^*$
- Shock falls less on inflation, **more on output**

Impulse responses: autocorrelated money growth



Real impact of money growth shocks



“Phillips curve”: $\log(C_t) = \alpha + \beta \log(\mu_t)$

Uncorrelated shocks ($\phi_\mu = 0$)	GL07	Calvo	CN
Std dev money growth shock (x100)	0.52	1.05	0.81
Std dev quarterly inflation (x100)	0.25	0.25	0.25
% explained by nominal shock	100%	100%	100%
Std dev quarterly output growth (x100)	0.13	0.72	0.49
% explained by nominal shock	26%	142%	96%
Slope of the Phillips curve (β)	0.23	0.52	0.46
Standard error	0.00	0.03	0.02
R ²	0.71	0.20	0.33


Real impact of money growth shocks




“Phillips curve”: $\log(C_t) = \alpha + \beta \log(\mu_t)$

Correlated shocks ($\phi_\mu = 0.8$)	GL07	Calvo	CN
Std dev money growth shock (x100)	0.11	0.21	0.16
Std dev quarterly inflation (x100)	0.25	0.25	0.25
% explained by nominal shock	100%	100%	100%
Std dev quarterly output growth (x100)	0.15	0.67	0.47
% explained by nominal shock	29%	131%	91%
Slope of the Phillips curve (β)	0.82	2.88	2.20
Standard error	0.01	0.03	0.00
R ²	0.89	0.88	0.99


Transitional dynamics: shift in p




Transitional dynamics: shift in A



Transitional dynamics: “post-euro”



Effect of starting conditions: IRFs after productivity shock



Conclusions



- Now feasible to **compute DSGE distributional dynamics with state-dependent prices**
 - Reiter (2008)
- **Benchmark calibration: money growth shocks not neutral**
- **Autocorrelated shocks: effects similar, but stronger**
- **Near-neutrality in GL07 calibration due to strong selection effect**
 - strong selection effect and lack of small price changes both due to counterfactual degree of state dependence
- **Additional findings:**
 - Price dispersion** quantitatively important (unlike standard NK DSGE)
 - Increased **aggregate productivity** causes labor to fall (like NK DSGE)

Conclusions




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- **Additional findings:**
 - Price dispersion** quantitatively important (unlike standard NK DSGE)
 - Increased **aggregate productivity** causes labor to fall (like NK DSGE)
- **Phillips curve is alive and well!**




Some extensions: Taylor rules

Shock in Taylor rule



Taylor rule: “Permanent” disinflation





James Costain

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION

BANCO DE ESPAÑA



150 AÑOS DE HISTORIA
1856 - 2006

SERVICIO DE ESTUDIOS