

Comments on
Women's Rights and Development

by
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May 27, 2010

Summary



- Women's Rights 
- Model 
- Transition and rights 
- Empirics 
- Comments 



“Our women are now seen as serving no useful purpose to mankind other than having children; they are considered simply as serving for pleasure, like musical instruments or jewels. But they constitute half and perhaps more than half of our species. Preventing them from contributing to the sustenance and improvement of others by means of their efforts infringes on the basic rules of public cooperation to such a degree that our national society is stricken like a human body that is paralyzed on one side. Yet women are not inferior to men in their intellectual and physical capacities. [...] The reason why women among us are thus deprived is the perception that they are totally ignorant and know nothing of right and duty, benefit and harm. Many evil consequences result from this position of women, the first being that it leads to a bad upbringing of their children.”

Nanık Kemal. In *Tarvish-i Efkâr*, 1867

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- Why took so long for women to have (property) rights?
- Why did they get them eventually?

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- Why did they get them eventually?

Answers:

- Because husbands do not care about their wives.
- Because husbands do care about their daughters.

Women's Rights



Paper NOT about:



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- Female labor supply
 - Property right on her own time
 - Fertility decisions

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I do not know how much the paper is about

- Female human capital accumulation.
 - In NR, after inheritance, the husband disposes of it.

- Patriarchal model: Males got all the power, all the time.
 - At least in sense that society gives rights to women only if men are better off if the women have rights.
 - The mechanism that determines what do families maximize cares only about men.
 - It cares about women only in the measure that men care about their daughters.
 - **Politically, women do not exist.**
 - ...even with Equal Rights
- **Exogenous fertility**
 - Albeit endogenous discussed as extension.
 - Very important in empirical part.

- No Rights Regime. **(NR)**
 - Inheritance and consumption decision taken by husband only.
 - Subject to minimum wife consumption
 - care about children. Both male and female ones.
 - Dowry
 - Determine how much to eat, how much to give to children.
- Equal Rights Regime. **(ER)**
 - Wife gets to choose.
 - Model as: Inheritance and consumption decisions taken by family unit.
 - Maximizing the joint utility of male and female.
 - Caring about sons and daughters equally.

- Males can be better in ER because their daughters are better.
 - Consumption by females is larger.
 - Happier daughters, happier father.
- Father: would like his daughter to live in a ER regime.
 - Hate-your-Son-in-law
- But he himself would (obviously) like to live in a NR regime.
- ... and probably would like his sons to live in NR.
 - Hate-your-Daughter-in-law,

- Growth depends on savings (AK model)
- Growth is larger in ER regime.
 - In spite of caring more for current consumption.
- REASON:
 - ER: you want to give k to daughter.
 - NR: smaller point in giving to daughter.
 - Your son-in-law gets the cookies
- In the NR regime growth is zero for women.
 - It would be reasonable to assume that \underline{c} grows with time.

- Assumption: The Regime we are in is the one that makes males the happiest.
- They take the regime as given.
 - Males as passive political actors.
 - Females are not even political actresses.
- They act as believing that the regime will never change.
- ... even if it will eventually change.
- In a full political model things probably would not be much different.
- Albeit: Incentive to procrastinate in implementing regime change.

- There is a value of k such that from there on the males would rather be in ER.
 - $+k \Rightarrow$ relatively more concern about daughter's welfare
 - Her consumption in NR is constant.
 - More k , smaller Mg Ut of consumption Husband.
 - I imagine that harder if \underline{c} grows.
- Given k there exists fertility $n^* : \forall n < n^*$ males prefer ER to NR.
 - Timing of Reform depends (negatively) on fertility.
 - Reason: Concavity & gender inequality in NR
 - $-n \Rightarrow$ more inheritance
 - Under NR, more dispersion between sons and daughters.
 - Because k of your daughters only affects via grandsons.
- More \underline{c} delays reform.
 - Daughters are better off in NR.

- Use of variance in timing of granting of property rights to women in the US
- Timing of the implementation of BOTH:
 - right of managing her own state
 - ownership and control of her own earnings.
- What about using ANY?
- Probit/linear prob model
 - LHS: 1 if BOTH

RHS variables:

- Contemporaneous wealth
 - The higher, the more likely ER.
 - Albeit in model has non-linear effects.
- Fertility
 - The lower, the more likely ER
- Community
 - Some states: Spanish or French legal origin (civil law)
 - Better treatment of females in NR: joint property in marriage
 - Higher \underline{c} . Delaying of reform

- In general the model does well.
- Albeit is a bit hard to follow the non-linearity of capital stuff.
 - The sort of hard stuff that does not get along with regressions
 - calibration?
- Issue of endogeneity of fertility:
 - IV: child mortality
 - A bit harsh to follow.
 - calibration?

- Endogenous dowry in NR
- Role of culture.
 - Different rights with similar development.
 - Endogenous?
- Endogenous fertility
- Any reversals in granting rights?
- Political rights and property rights

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