

A Model of Equilibrium Institutions

Bernardo Guimaraes Kevin Sheedy

London School of Economics

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- Important in explaining disparities in income across the globe.
- Institutions may serve the interest of elites...but why does this give rise to large economic inefficiencies?
- Why is there no “political” Coase Theorem in general?
- Under what conditions will elite control of institutions lead to economic distortions?
- This paper builds a model to address these questions.

This paper

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▶ Related literature

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- In the absence of a rebellion, the rules laid down by the institutions are followed.
 - Institutions might be able to establish credible rules.
 - So a political Coase Theorem might emerge.
- However, once institutions have been destroyed, new ones are not constrained by any past rules or deals.
 - Rebellions cannot commit to establishing particular institutions.
 - Who would enforce such deals?

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 - Political Coase theorem breaks down.
- Not enough power sharing (elites are too small) \implies Too little investment.

- 1 Basic model
- 2 Benchmark case of public good provision
- 3 Private investment and capital taxation

Measure one of ex-ante identical and self-interested individuals.

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- As in Orwell's *Animal Farm*, the “men” and the “pigs” are the same.
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No uncertainty:

- No rebellions in equilibrium.

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
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
What individuals do:

- Producers receive q units of a homogeneous good.
- Members of the elite can defend their institutions.
- They can all take part in rebellions.

Sequence of events




Establishing institutions



Who is in power:

- Size of the elite a maximizes the average utility of its members:
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 - No incentive to draft or expel any members.
 - Distribution of power reflects the interest of the elite power, not the welfare of society.
- Given size a , the composition of the elite is determined by a predetermined ordering, set by the previous rebellion (or “nature” in the first round).


Allocation of resources:

- The elite chooses:
 - $\tau(\cdot)$: distribution of (lump-sum) taxes on producers;
 - $C_a(\cdot)$: distribution consumption among elite members;
- to maximize the average utility of its members.
- Once institutions are established, each individual gets to know his $C_a(i)$ or $\tau(i)$.

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The maximization problem for choosing institutions is forward looking.



- Maximum fighting effort individual i is willing to exert if he expects to have a place in the subsequent elite:

$$F(i) = U'_a - U(i)$$

- U'_a : belief about the average utility of members of the subsequent elite;
- $U(i)$: utility of individual i under the current institutions.
- Incentives for rebellion will also depend on:
 - a' : belief about the size of the subsequent elite.

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 - a = size of elite,
 - d = measure of elite members in the rebel army.
- The rebellion is profitable if

$$\int_{\mathcal{R}} F(v) dv > \delta(a - d)$$

where δ is an (exogenous) power parameter of the incumbent army.

- $\delta(a - d)$ is the cost the incumbent army imposes on the rebels.

Assumption: any fighting would only be between those in the current or subsequent elites.

- Those who are producers and who expect to remain producers will not fight.


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Rationale: it is much easier for armies to provide incentives to fight for those who will be in power if they win.


- Armies could deny a place in the elite to those who did not exert enough effort.
- Other forms of punishment would be costly.

Production, taxation, payoffs



- Producers make q units of goods (exogenous).
- The “rules of the game” laid down by the prevailing institutions are followed:
 - Taxes are collected and distributed among members of the elite.
- Payoffs are received:
 - Utility function: $u(C)$, with $U' > 0$ and $U'' \leq 0$.

Equilibrium



Equilibrium institutions are those that maximize

$$\frac{1}{a} \int_{\mathcal{A}} U_a(\iota) d\iota$$

subject to

$$\int_{\mathcal{R}} (U'_a - U(\iota)) d\iota \leq \delta(a - d)$$

for all sets \mathcal{R} such that $\mathbb{P}(\mathcal{R}) = a'$; with $d = \mathbb{P}(\mathcal{R} \cap \mathcal{A})$.

- Solution depends on beliefs U'_a and a' .

The post-rebellion institutions

How are U'_a and a' determined?

- Once a rebellion occurs, the new institutions are determined through an identical maximization problem.
 - After each potential rebellion, history is payoff irrelevant — the cost of conflict is sunk.
- No fundamental reason why elites would make different choices.
- Natural to focus on Markovian equilibria.

Definition of a Markovian equilibrium:

- a , $\tau(\cdot)$ and $U_a(\cdot)$ maximize the average payoff of those in the elite;
- $a = a'$;
- Same distribution of taxes over producers;
- Same distribution of payoffs in the elite.

Proposition

Any Markovian equilibrium must have the following properties:

- 1 *Equalization of producers' payoffs: $U_p(i) = U_p, \forall i$*
- 2 *Sharing power implies sharing rents: $U_a(i) = U_a, \forall i$*
- 3 *The no-rebellion constraint can be written as:*

$$U_p \geq U_a - \delta \frac{a}{a'}$$

- 4 *Power determines rents: $U_a - U_p = \delta$*

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In a simple endowment economy, equalization of producers' payoffs entails tax equalization ($\tau(i) = \tau$).

The provision of public goods

Benchmark case of provision of public goods:

- Technology that converts units of output into public goods.
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Does a political Coase theorem arise in this setting?

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The provision of public goods

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- Individuals take g into account when deciding whether to rebel.
- Consumption of a producer:

$$C_p = q - \tau + f(g)$$

- Consumption of a member of the elite:

$$C_a = \frac{(1-a)\tau - g}{a} + f(g)$$

The choice of institutions

The equilibrium institutions are the solution of:

$$\max_{a, \tau, g} U \left(\frac{(1-a)\tau - g}{a} + f(g) \right)$$

subject to

$$U'_a - \delta \frac{a}{a'} \leq u(q + f(g) - \tau) \quad \text{with } a = a', \tau = \tau' \text{ and } g = g'.$$

First-order condition with respect to g :

$$f'(g^*) = 1$$

- The public good is efficiently provided.
 - Even though the elite is purely self-interested, it acts as a meaningful government in its provision of public goods.
 - Similar result has been found in other models — a benchmark case.
- Individuals take the public good provision as well as taxes into account when deciding whether to rebel:
 - provision of public goods slackens the no-rebellion constraint;
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- Individuals take the public good provision as well as taxes into account when deciding whether to rebel:
 - provision of public goods slackens the no-rebellion constraint;
 - taxes raised to finance them tighten the constraint.
- Result is consistent with a political Coase Theorem:
 - setting down rules analogous to contracting;
 - threat of rebellion: there is a price attached to policy actions;
 - efficient outcome, transfers ensure constraints are respected.

Extension of the model:

- Producers can exert effort to raise output in the future,
- and rebellions can occur after effort is made but before output is received.


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
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Investment proceeds changes incentives for rebellion, and thus affects the choice of institutions.


- What are the equilibrium institutions?
- Are they consistent with a political Coase Theorem?

Investment






- Each producer gets to know his own (idiosyncratic) effort requirement, $\epsilon : \text{Uniform}[\epsilon_L, \epsilon_H]$.
 - Assumption: parameters are such that some producers will choose not to invest.
- Those who make the effort receive κ units of output (“capital”) at the production stage.
- Capital is observable, effort is not.



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- Capital is observable, effort is not.

For tractability, $U(C) = C$.

Equilibrium institutions survive rebellion at all points.



To characterize the equilibrium:

- 1 We start by analysing the possibility of a rebellion at the post-investment stage.
- 2 Then we determine the institutions chosen at the pre-investment stage.

A rebellion at the post-investment stage: Expropriation

Suppose a rebellion succeeds.

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Result: the elite chooses capital tax = 100%:

- Optimal for the elite to have all producers receive the same utility U_p .
- Having payoffs independent of individual capital stock requires full expropriation.
- Sunk investment cost does not influence decisions about rebelling.

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- Sunk investment cost does not influence decisions about rebelling.
- Total capital K is confiscated and equally distributed among all individuals (both inside and outside the elite).
- The new elite size is independent of the capital stock.

Equilibrium institutions (from pre-investment stage)

The institutions specify:

- The size of the elite a ;
- A lump-sum tax on all producers τ_q ;
- A tax on capital τ_K :

Chosen to maximize the payoff of those in the elite, subject to no rebellions.

No-rebellion constraints

Three no-rebellion constraints.

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By source and timing of rebellion:

- Producers at pre-investment stage
- Producers (with no capital) at post-investment stage
- Elite at post-investment stage

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By source and timing of rebellion:

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In a Markovian equilibrium with some investment:

- The post-investment stage constraints for both producers (with no capital) and the elite are binding
- The pre-investment stage constraint is slack.

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- If the return on investment is sufficiently high then equilibrium capital taxes will be less than 100%, and some producers will invest.
- When some producers will invest, the equilibrium elite size will be larger than when there is no investment.

Intuition for protection of property rights

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- Discouraging rebellion by producers (with no capital) requires either a larger elite or *lower* taxes.
- Discouraging rebellion by members of the elite requires either a larger elite or *higher* taxes.

Intuition for protection of property rights

If the pre-investment stage elite is larger than its equilibrium size after a rebellion at the post-investment stage then changing institutions is costly for the elite:

- There would not be enough places in the subsequent elite for all those in the current elite.
- Those who would lose power fight against rebellions changing the institutions.

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The extra members of the elite have no special function:

- They simply deter rebellions that would dislodge them from power.

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Two key assumptions:

- 1 Institutions cannot be modified without a rebellion.
 - In principle, elites can create institutions that tie their hands.
 - Institutions survive everything — except the collapse of the whole system.

Intuition for protection of property rights

Two key assumptions:

- ① Institutions cannot be modified without a rebellion.
 - In principle, elites can create institutions that tie their hands.
 - Institutions survive everything — except the collapse of the whole system.
- ② Were a rebellion to occur, there can be no enforcement of deals made prior to the rebellion.
 - Optimization along *all* institutional variables.
 - No “meta-institutions” to enforce deals concerning the choice of institutions themselves.

- Elites can choose institutions that allow for a credible commitment to a capital tax less than 100%.
- Will they set the capital tax rate efficiently?

The efficient choice of capital taxes

Efficiency benchmark:

- Suppose a benevolent agent can impose a particular level of capital taxes on all elites.
- The elite chooses all other institutional variables in its own interests (subject to no rebellions) taking capital taxes as given.
- The benevolent agent chooses capital taxes to maximize the average utility of all individuals, taking elite control of other institutional variables as given.

There are two distortions

First distortion: too little power sharing.

- Protection of property rights requires a larger elite.
- The extra elite members must be paid more than producers.
 - Sharing power requires sharing rents.
- The elite are reluctant to share rents by increasing their size.

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First distortion: too little power sharing.

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Second distortion: investor surplus cannot be fully extracted by the elite.

- Individual investment effort is unobservable.
- The extent to which individual investors' no-rebellion constraints are slack is unknown.

A political Coase Theorem breaks down

- Inseparability of power and rents puts an endogenous limit on the set of possible transfers.
 - It is not feasible to add individuals to the elite to ensure stable institutions, but only pay these individuals the same as a producer.
 - The low-paid members of the elite would rebel.
- Unobservability of investors' surplus.

Analogy: Parliaments

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- The extra individuals in the elite might be interpreted as a parliament.
- Parliaments represent those who elected them...
- ... but so do democratically elected presidents.
- Power sharing ensures institutions are more stable by making it costly for some members of the elite to try to change them.
- “The princes who have wanted to make themselves despotic have always begun by uniting in their person all the magistracies” — Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*.

Related historical examples: Glorious Revolution

- The Glorious Revolution, England, 1688: power sharing between King and Parliament.
- North and Weingast (1989): that led to secure property rights and the elimination of confiscatory government.
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 - Sharing power allows for institutions credibly protecting property rights.
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 - Sharing power requires sharing rents.

▶ Skip other examples

Related historical examples: Roman Empire

- Malmendier (2009): Rome's *societas publicanorum* were the earliest predecessors of modern corporations.
- Their demise coincided with transition from the Roman Republic to the Roman Empire.
- Possible reason: while power was decentralized (Roman Republic), it was possible to have rules that guarantee property rights.
- But once power is centralized (Roman Empire), protection against expropriation was not possible any longer.

Related historical examples: Podesteria

- Greif (1994, 2006): Podesteria in Genoa.
- Many medieval Italian cities employed a podestà.
- Podestà: a leader coming from another city with military power that would rule the city for one year.
- Generously paid.
- Having the podestà allowed for inter-clan cooperation and investment.
- The podestà had to be sufficiently strong relative to the powerful clans in the city.
- In the language of the model, the elite (the total group of people with power) had to be large enough.

- Empirical evidence: government expropriation of property is an important issue.
 - Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) suggest “property rights” institutions are more important than “contracting institutions”.
- Model: protection against government expropriation is not optimally provided (capital taxes are too high):
 - Institutions credibly committed to low capital taxes are feasible...
 - but require the elite to share power...
 - which requires sharing rents.

1 Samuel 8:10-20

And Samuel told all the words of the Lord unto the people that asked of him a king.

And he said, This will be the manner of the king that shall reign over you: He will take your sons, and appoint *them* for himself, for his chariots, and *to be* his horsemen; and *some* shall run before his chariots. . . .

And he will take your daughters *to be* confectionaries, and *to be* cooks, and *to be* bakers. . . .

He will take the tenth of your sheep: and ye shall be his servants.

And ye shall cry out in that day because of your king which ye shall have chosen you; and the Lord will not hear you in that day.

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And ye shall cry out in that day because of your king which ye shall have chosen you; and the Lord will not hear you in that day.

Nevertheless the people refused to obey the voice of Samuel; and they said, Nay; but we will have a king over us;

That we also may be like all the nations; and that our king may judge us, and go out before us, and fight our battles.

Concluding remarks

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- Possible extensions:
 - Which factors influence power sharing (and investment);
 - Other sources of inefficiency in this framework;
 - Heterogeneity, uncertainty...

- Downs (1957): governments composed of self-interested agents.
 - A vast literature on political economy has developed.
 - Much of that focuses on elections, assuming an environment with well-functioning institutions.
- Work with similar motivation has been done by:
 - Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, 2008),
 - Besley and Persson (2009, 2010),
 - Greif (1994, 2006).

- Coalition formation (Ray (2007)).
 - Non-cooperative process to establish rules, that are implemented by assumption.
 - Modelling of rebellions related to blocking in coalitions.
 - Distinguishing feature: the “rebellion technology”.
- Myerson (2009) application of Schelling (1960).
 - Institutions as the *focal point* that determines allocation of resources once production has taken place.
- Conflict (Grossman and Kim (1995), Hirshleifer (1995)).
 - Here, people fight to establish the rules, not over what has been produced.
 - They fight in groups, not as isolated individuals.

The model with linear utility

- $U(C) = C$.
- Problem:

$$\max_{a, \tau} \frac{1-a}{a} \tau \text{ s.t. } C'_a - \delta \frac{a}{a'} \leq q - \tau$$

How we solve it

$$\max_{a, \tau} \frac{1-a}{a} \tau \text{ s.t. } C'_a - \delta \frac{a}{a'} \leq q - \tau$$



- Constraint yields an expression for τ .
- We substitute it into the objective function.
- First order condition with respect to a .
- Impose equilibrium ($a = a'$, $C_a = C'_a$)

$$a^* = \frac{\delta}{q + 2\delta}$$

$$C_a = \frac{(q + \delta)^2}{q + 2\delta}, \quad C_p = \frac{(q + \delta)^2}{q + 2\delta} - \delta$$

- In equilibrium, $C_a - C_p = \delta$.
- Results for $\delta/q < (1 + \sqrt{5})/2$ (otherwise consumption of producers is 0).

The model with linear utility



The model with log utility

- $U(C) = \log(C)$.
- Problem:

$$\max_{a, \tau} \log \left(\frac{1-a}{a} \tau \right) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \log(C'_a) - \delta \frac{a}{a'} \leq \log(q - \tau)$$

$$a = \frac{2\delta e^{-\delta}}{1 + 2\delta e^{-\delta} + \sqrt{1 + 4\delta e^{-\delta}}}$$

$$C_a = \frac{(1-a)q}{a + (1-a)e^{-\delta}}, \quad C_p = \frac{e^{-\delta}(1-a)q}{a + (1-a)e^{-\delta}}$$

- a^* is independent of q .
- Log utility: cost of conflict is proportional to q .

The model with log utility

