

# A Positive Analysis of Bank Behaviour under Capital Requirements

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
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# Contribution

- A bank faces an increase in capital requirement
  - Will it raise capital or cut lending?
- Theoretical framework
  - Risk-shifting and debt overhang
- Main takeaway: it depends
  - Lending response typically U-shaped
  - Economic conditions matters
- Test predictions using UK data
  - Find that main margin of adjustment is
  - Lending in bad times but capital in good times

# The environment

- Three dates: 0, 1, and 2, random variable  $A \in [A_L, A_H]$
- A bank and risk-neutral households



- Capital requirement:  $e \geq \gamma(x + z)$
- Three choice variable, but
  - Focus on binding capital requirement:  $e = \gamma(x + z)$
  - Balance sheet identity:  $d = z + x - e$

# The problem of the bank

- Economic surplus:  $E [X + Z(A) - (x + z)]$
- Private surplus:  $E [X + Z(A) - (1 - \gamma)(x + z)]^+ - \gamma(x + z)$

- FOC: 
$$\int_{A_0}^{A_H} (X_x - (1 - \gamma)) f(A) dA - \gamma = 0$$


where  $A_0$  is the default threshold

- Define  $\pi(x, \gamma) \equiv \int_{A_0(x, \gamma)}^{A_H} f(A) dA$

$$X_x - \left( 1 - \gamma + \frac{\gamma}{\pi(x, \gamma)} \right) = 0$$

# The overhang problem

$$\int_{A_0}^{A_H} (X_x - (1 - \gamma)) f(A) dA - \gamma = 0 \implies X_x - 1 + \int_{A_L}^{A_0} ((1 - \gamma) - X_x) f(A) dA = 0$$



- The **wedge is negative**
  - Positive NPV loans are not issued
  - Reflects an overhang problem

- How does  $\gamma$  affect wedge?
- Comparative statics with respect to  $\gamma$  based on the FOC

# Conditional reasoning

$$\underbrace{X_x}_{\text{mr}} - \underbrace{\left(1 - \gamma + \frac{\gamma}{\pi(x, \gamma)}\right)}_{\text{mc}} = 0$$


- The sign of  $\frac{dx^*}{d\gamma}$  hinges on conditional marginal cost

$$\frac{dmc}{d\gamma} = \underbrace{\frac{1}{\pi} - 1}_{\substack{\text{composition effect} \\ > 0}} + \underbrace{\gamma \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial \gamma} \left(\frac{-1}{\pi^2}\right)}_{\substack{\text{price effect} \\ < 0}}$$

As  $\pi \rightarrow 1$ , price effect dominates!

# The U-shape


- Equilibrium lending as a function of  $\gamma$



- Changes in economic conditions, for instance  $E[A]$ , shift the relationship

# Risk-shifting

- Assume  $X$  also depends on  $A$



- Either can dominate
- $\frac{dmr}{d\gamma} < 0 \rightarrow$  internalisation effect
- Reinforces the composition effect; but price effect can still dominate




- We use regulatory UK data (Basel I)
  - Changes to individual capital requirements
  - Test the interaction with economic conditions
  - We can control for what other banks do
- Find that the main margin of adjustment is
  - Lending in bad times
  - Capital in good times
- Consistent with prediction on
  - how economic conditions “shift” the U-shape

# Conclusion

- Capital requirement under Basel III
  - Overall increase
  - Time varying adjustments
- Intellectual debate
  - Costs and benefits
  - Normative and general equilibrium questions
- Tractable general equilibrium analysis
  - Requires stark assumptions on bank individual behavior
- Understanding the determinants of such behavior is essential

Thank you

# Overhang and risk-shifting



# Lending response

Figure 3: Lending and lending response in the general case

$\beta_x=1, \beta_z=2, z=2.5, \mu_z=-2, \mu_x=1, \sigma=0.3, b=0.20$

