

# Dynamic Credit Constraints: Theory and Evidence from Credit Lines

(Amberg, Jacobson, Quadrini, and Rogantini Picco)

**Discussion by Fred Malherbe (UCL)** 

## The paper



- Stylised facts
- Model of dynamic credit constraints
- Empirical tests

## An alternative (sketch of a) model



• Budget constraints

$$\begin{cases} x_0 = e + b_0 \\ x_1 = x_0 R_1 + b_1 - b_0 (1 + r_0) \\ d_2 = [x_1 R_2 - b_1 (1 + r_1)]^+ \end{cases}$$

- Technology
  - Riskfree rate is nil
  - $-R_1, R_2 \in \{R_L, R_H\}, E[R] > 1, R_H \text{ with probability } p_1 \text{ and } p_2$

#### **Financial distress costs**



• First focus on date 1 borrowing

Creditor break even condition (assume debt is risky)

$$b_1 = p_2 b_1 (1 + r_1) + (1 - p_2) x_1 [R_L] - \underbrace{(1 - p_2) \kappa \left( [b_1 - x_1 R_L]^+ \right)^2}_{\text{default costs}}$$

- Solve for  $r_1$
- Substitute constraints

#### **Static view**



• Look at date 1 decision (assuming no default at date 1)

$$\max_{x_1} \underbrace{x_1 \left(\overline{R}_2 - 1\right) + x_0 \left(\overline{R}_1 - 1\right)}_{\text{MM surplus}} + e - \underbrace{\left(1 - p_2\right) \kappa \left(\left[x_1(1 - R_L) + x_0 \left(1 - R_L\right) - e\right]^+\right)^2}_{\text{financial distress costs}}$$

or 
$$\max_{x_1} \underbrace{x_1 \left(\overline{R}_2 - 1\right) + x_0 \left(\overline{R}_1 - 1\right)}_{\text{MM surplus}} + e - \underbrace{\left(1 - p_2\right) \kappa \left(\left[x_1(1 - R_L) + x_0 \left(1 - R_H\right) - e\right]^+\right)^2}_{\text{financial distress costs}}$$

- Static trade off: surplus versus cost
  - Costs are convex => expected cost increase with volatility
  - No need for dynamics for this

## Bring on the dynamics



- Investing at date 0 is positive NPV
- Allows for more equity in expectation at date 1

$$\max_{x_0, x_1} \underbrace{x_1 \left(\overline{R}_2 - 1\right) + x_0 \left(\overline{R}_1 - 1\right)}_{\text{MM surplus}} + e - (1 - p_1)(1 - p_2)\kappa \left( \left[ x_1(1 - R_L) - \underbrace{\left(e + x_0 \left(R_L - 1\right)\right)}_{\text{date-1 equity after } R_L} \right]^+ \right)^2$$

$$- p_1(1 - p_2)\kappa \left( \left[ x_1(1 - R_L) - \underbrace{\left(e + x_0 \left(R_H - 1\right)\right)}_{\text{date-1 equity after } R_H} \right]^+ \right)^2$$


- But increasing  $b_0$  increases leverage, which increases volatility of date-1 equity
- Equity volatility is more costly in a volatile environment
- Less leverage ex-ante for firms facing volatility risk

#### Remarks




- Playing with  $\kappa$  and  $\overline{R}_2$  is similar to compa. statics in the paper
- But where are the credit lines?

Figure 6: Optimal debt policy



## What are borrowing constraints?





## **Empirical analysis**



- Utilisation rate decreases with volatility of cashflows
  - Borrowing related to volatility
  - Speaks to trade off theory
  - How shall we interpret the committed amount?
- Utilisation rate increases with maturity
  - A credit line is an option
  - If the credit line is currently in the money
    - \* Static: no brainer
    - \* Dynamic:
      - · Refinancing is an issue, short maturity makes it less valuable
      - · Role of irreversibility
  - Maturity likely to depend on irreversibility: endogeneity issue

## **Empirical analysis (2)**



- Propensity to draw on increase in borrowing limit is <u>positive</u> and <u>decreasing</u> in distance to limit
  - "Hard to rationalise based on static conceptions of credit constraints"
  - It's positive: in line with trade off theory
  - Decreasing in the distance: link between credit line and borrowing limits



# Thank you